Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DILIPBHAI NATHJIBHAI PATEL & ANR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/03/1998
BENCH:
M.K. MUKHERJEE, K.T. THOMAS
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
Present:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.K. Mukherjee
Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas
Yashank P. Ahdyaru, Mr. Ann Sawhney and Ms. H. Wahi, Advs.
for the appellants.
J U D G M E N T
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.
Leave Granted.
The appellant no.2 a District Co-operative Officer of
Vadodara has lodged a prosecution against the two
respondents under Section 147(1) (d) of the Gujarat
Coperative Societies Act, 1961 (‘Act’ for short) for
committing breach of Section 71 of the Act after obtaining
sanction of the district Registrar as required under Section
149 (3) thereof. The prosecution is also for certain
offences under the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved thereby the
respondents moved the High Court by filling a petition under
Section 482 Cr. P.C. In disposing of the petition the High
Court observed that a sanction under Section 149(3) for
prosecution under Section 147(1)(d) cannot be given without
giving the party concerned a prior hearing. Since,
admittedly, the respondents were not given such hearing, the
High Court directed that the complaint relating to the above
offence shall not proceed till notice to the respondents
were given and sanction was accorded after hearing them.
However, it clarified, the complaint for the remaining
offences shall, in no way be affected by its order and shall
be proceeded with in accordance with law. The direction of
the High Court so far as it relates to the prosecution under
the Act is under challenge in this appeal.
To appreciate the reasoning of the High Court for
issuing the impugned direction it will be necessary to
reproduce Section 149(3) of the Act. It reads as under:
"149 Cognizance of offlences -
(1)xxx xxx xxx xxx
(2)xxx xxxx xxx xxx
(3) No prosecution under this Act
shall be lodged, except with the
previous sanction of the State
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Government in the case of an
offence under clause (c) of sub-
section (1) of section 147, and of
the Registrar in the case of any
other offence under this Act. Such
sanction shall not be given except
after hearing the party concerned,
by an officer authorised in this
behalf by the State Government by a
general or special order."
From a plain reading of the first part of the above
sub-section it is manifest that for lodging prosecution for
an offence under the Act previous sanction is essential.
While for the offence under Section 147(1)(c) the
sanctioning authority is the State Government for all other
offences it is the Registrar. When the words "such sanction
shall not be given" appearing at the beginning of the second
part is read in juxtaposition with the words "by an officer
authorised in this behalf by the State Government by a
general or special order" at the end, it is also manifest
that hearing is to be given only if a sanction for
prosecution under Section 147(1) (c) is contemplated and not
otherwise.
From the impugned order of the High Court we find that
when the above contention was raised before it on behalf of
the respondents therein (the appellants before us), the High
Court observed that the words "such sanction shall not be
given" are to be interpreted in the context of the
provisions made for the sanction in connection with two
different categories of offences and when so interpreted it
would necessarily mean that sanction required to be given
either by the Registrar or by the State must be preceded by
a notice to and hearing of the parties concerned. The High
Court, however, did not spell out, either in interpreting
the section or issuing the impugned direction who was to
give the notice and hear the parties in respect of the
offences for which the Registrar is the sanctioning
authority. If the legislature intended that in respect of
the offences for which the sanctioning authority is the
Registrar a prior hearing is also required to be given by
him then, after the words "by an officer authorised in this
behalf by the State Government by a general or special
order", the words "or by the Registrar, as the case may be"
(or similar such words) would have been added. When there is
no reference to the Registrar at all in the latter part of
the section such sanction appearing therein must refer to a
sanction which is required to be given by the State
Government. In interpreting a Statute the Court cannot aid
the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act nor can add
or amend and, by construction make up deficiencies which
are left there. In Union of India Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal
[1991) 3 S.C.R. 873], this Court observed:-
"It is not the duty of the Court
either to enlarge the scope of the
legislation or the intention of the
legislature when the language of
the provision is plain and
unambiguous. The Court cannot
rewrite, recast or reframe the
legislation for the very good
reason that it has no power to
legislate. The power to legislate
has not been conferred on the
Court. The Court cannot add words
to a statute or read words into it
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which are not there. Assuming there
is a defect or an omission in the
words used by the legislature the
Court could not go to its aid to
correct or make up the deficiency.
Court shall decide what the law is
and not what it should be. The
Court of course adopts a
construction which will carry out
the obvious intention of the
legislature but could not legislate
itself. But to invoke judicial
activism to set at naught
legislative judgment is subversive
of the constitutional harmony and
comity of instrumentalities."
(emphasis supplied)
In view of the law so laid down the above section
cannot be interpreted to mean that in respect of the
offences for which the Registrar is the sanctioning
authority a prior hearing is required to be given.
The matter can be viewed from the other angle also. If
the words "such sanction" is to refer also to offences for
which the Registrar is the sanctioning authority it will
lead to an absurd situation, in that a duly authorised
officer of the State Government will hear the parties on the
question of grant of sanction on its behalf, but the
decision to grant sanction will rest on the former. In any
view of the matter, therefore, the interpretation given by
the High Court and for that matter, the direction issued
cannot be sustained.
We accordingly allow this appeal and quash the impugned
direction.