M/S.SHIVALI ENTERPRISES ETC. vs. SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED) THR. LRS.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8904­8907 OF 2010 M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES           ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED)  THR. LRS. AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. rd 1. These   appeals   challenge   the   judgment   dated   3 March 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at   Chandigarh   in   Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207 of 2005, thereby allowing the appeals filed by the respondents­defendants challenging rd the   concurrent   judgments   and   decrees   dated   3   January 2001 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridabad (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”) in RBT th 329/90/2000, and 8  February 2005 passed by the learned 1 District   Judge,   Faridabad   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the “Appellate Court”) in Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2001.  Vide the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed that, if the plaintiff desires to get the sale deed executed pursuant to the agreement(s) to sell, he would do so by   paying   the   present   prevalent   market   value   as   sale consideration.   The appellant­plaintiff has also assailed the th order dated  10   April 2008  passed by the  learned  Single Judge   of   the   High   Court,   thereby   dismissing   the   review applications being R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1206 of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1207 of 2005, filed by the appellant­plaintiff. 2. Facts in brief giving rise to the present appeals are as under: The   appellant­plaintiff   through   its   partner   Raj th Kumar, entered into an agreement to sell dated 29  October 1983 with the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 with regard to the suit property, which was situated in the revenue estate of   Chak Salarpur, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad (U.P.), at the rate of Rs. 2900/­ per Bigha.  Though the suit property initially   was   in   the   State   of   U.P.,   vide   notification   of   the 2 th Central Government dated 15  September 1983, it became a part of the State of Haryana.  At the time of agreement to sell th dated 29  October 1983, earnest amount of Rs.50,000/­ was paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants. Due   to   a   dispute   between   the   State   of   U.P.   and 3. Haryana, the aforesaid sale deed could not be executed in favour   of   the   appellant­plaintiff.     Therefore,   another rd agreement to sell was executed between the parties on 23 August 1985.  At the time of execution of the said agreement, an   additional   amount   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   was   paid   by   the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.  It is not in dispute that the total amount payable as per the terms of the th agreement   to   sell   dated   29   October   1983   was   Rs. 1,65,000/­ out of which, an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was duly   received   by  the   respondents­defendants   on  or  before rd 23   August 1985.   As per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, the remaining sale price was to be paid before the Sub­ Registrar at the time of execution and registration of sale deed.  It is not in dispute that the physical possession of the suit property was also delivered to the appellant­plaintiff by the respondents­defendants at the time of execution of the 3 agreement(s)   to   sell.     It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the appellant­plaintiff is thereafter in continuous possession of the suit property. As   per   the   terms   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell,   the 4. respondents­defendants were required to obtain Income­Tax Clearance   (for   short  “ITC”)  Certificate   and   to  also   get  the revenue   records   mutated   to   show   them   as   the   owners inasmuch   as   the   Central   Government   was   shown   as   the owner mistakenly.  The agreement to sell further stipulated that, in case of default by the respondents­defendants, the appellant­plaintiff was at liberty to get the sale deed executed and registered. 5. After   coming   to   know   that   the   respondents­ rd defendants   were   trying   to   create   3   party   rights,   the appellant­plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance with further   prayer   for   permanent   injunction   as   against   the respondents­defendants.   The said suit was resisted by the respondents­defendants   by   filing   their   written   statement. rd The learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 3 January 2001 decreed the suit.   In an appeal filed by the respondents­defendants, the learned Appellate Court upheld 4 the findings of the trial court vide judgment and decree dated th 8  February 2005. 6. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents­defendants filed   second   appeals   before   the   High   Court.     Vide   the impugned judgment, the High Court reversed the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the Appellate Court and   passed   the   judgment   as   aforesaid.     Being   aggrieved thereby,   the   present   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the appellant­plaintiff. We have heard Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel 7. appearing on behalf of the appellant­plaintiff and Shri S.R. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­defendants. Shri Malhotra submitted that the High Court has 8. grossly   erred   in   interfering   with   the   concurrent   findings passed   by   the   trial   court   and   the   Appellate   Court.     He submitted that, since no substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court, the appeals deserve to be allowed on this short ground alone.   He relies on the judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Kondiba   Dagadu 5 1 Kadam   v.   Savitribai   Sopan   Gujar   and   Others   in   this regard. Shri   Malhotra   further   submitted   that,   even 9. assuming that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab   Courts   Act,   1918   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the “Punjab   Act”)   it   is   not   necessary   to   frame   a   substantial question of law, the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge of   the   High   Court   would   still   be   circumscribed   by   the provisions   of   Section   41   of   the   Punjab   Act   and   any interference in second appeal would only be warranted if the case falls within the limited area as earmarked in Section 41 of the Punjab Act. 10. He   further   submitted   that  the   respondents­ defendants have not entered into the witness box  and as such, the case of the appellant­plaintiff on the basis of the agreement(s) to sell has gone unchallenged.   He therefore submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed and the impugned judgments are liable to be quashed and set aside. Shri Singh, on the contrary, submitted that the High 11. Court has rightly allowed the second appeals.  He submitted 1 (1999) 3 SCC 722 6 that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, the sale deed was to be registered only after the ITC Certificate was obtained and the property was mutated in the name of the respondents­defendants. He submitted that the respondents­ defendants   had   filed   a   suit   for   getting   the   suit   property th mutated in their names on 4  June 1986 and the said suit nd came   to   be   decreed   only   on   22   December   2006.     It   is therefore   submitted   that   the   suit   filed   by   the   appellant­ th plaintiff on 17  October 1989 was premature.   12. Shri Singh submitted that in view of the Punjab Act, no substantial question of law was required to be framed.  He relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By LRs. 2 and Others .  The learned Senior Counsel further relies on the judgments of this Court in the cases of   Kirodi (since deceased)   Through   His   Legal   Representatives   v.   Ram 3 Parkash and Others  and  Satyender and Others v. Saroj 4 in   support   of   this   proposition.     Shri   Singh, and   Others   further relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of 2 (2001) 4 SCC 262 3 (2019) 11 SCC 317 4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026 7 Nirmala   Anand   v.   Advent   Corporation   (P)   Ltd.   and 5 , submitted that there is no reason to interfere with Others the   direction   of   the   trial   court   which   directs   that   if   the plaintiff desires to get the specific performance, the same shall   be   done   at   the   prevalent   market   rate.     He   further submitted   that   the   suit   itself   was   not   tenable   in   view   of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.   Section 41 of the Punjab Act reads thus: 13. “ 41. Second appeals  — (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court on any of the following grounds, namely: (a)   the   decision   being   contrary   to law   or   to   some   custom   or   usage having the force of law:  (b)   the   decision   having   failed   to determine   some   material   issue   of law or custom or usage having the force of law:  (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 [V of 1908], or   by   any   other   law   for   the   time being  in  force  which  may  possibly have produced error or defect in the decision   of   the   case   upon   the merits;  [Explanation — A question relating to   the   existence   or   validity   of   a custom or usage shall be deemed to 5 (2002) 5 SCC 481 8 be   a   question   of   law   within   the meaning of his section:]  (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed  ex parte .” 14. This Court, in the case of  Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi 6 , after   considering   the   scope   of Pal   Singh   and   Others   interference under the old Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) and Section 41 of the Punjab Act, has observed thus:

15. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that, even when a court exercises jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Act, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact in second   appeal   on   the   ground   that   the   said   findings   are erroneous,   howsoever   gross   or   inexcusable   the   error   may 6 (2019) 17 SCC 71 9 seem to be.  It has been held that t he findings of fact would also   include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of   documentary evidence. The jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Act would be available only when there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the CPC or by any other law for the time being in force. 16. A bench of three learned Judges of this Court, in a

(supra), has observed thus:

10

11

[emphasis supplied] 17. It would thus be clear that this Court has held that, though   it   is   not   necessary   to   formulate   a   substantial question   of   law,   the   jurisdiction   under   Section   41   of   the Punjab   Act   would   permit   only   such   decisions   to   be considered in second appeal which are contrary to law or to some custom or usage having the force of law, or when the courts below have failed to determine some material issue of law or custom or usage having the force of law.  The Court held that second appeal is not a forum where the court is to re­examine or re­appreciate the question of fact settled by the trial court or the Appellate Court.   It could thus clearly be seen that though in view of Section 41 of the Punjab Act, it is not necessary to frame a substantial question of law, the jurisdiction of the High Court under second appeal cannot be exercised for re­appreciation of evidence.   18. A perusal of the plaint filed by the appellant­plaintiff would   reveal   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   has   specifically referred to the terms of the agreement(s) to sell.   He has specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have 12 received   an   amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­.   He   has   further specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have delivered the actual possession of the suit property to him.  It is averred that after the respondents­defendants obtained the requisite   ITC   Certificate   and   got   the   revenue   records corrected,   they   were   required   to   serve   a   notice   upon   the appellant­plaintiff informing him about the same having been done.  After the receipt of such notice, the appellant­plaintiff was required to make the balance payment and get the sale deed executed.  The appellant­plaintiff was also given liberty to use the suit property in any manner so as to plant trees, raise construction, install tubewells etc.  It has been averred in the plaint as under:  “10.   That   all   the   defendants   have   been admitting and acknowledging the plaintiff firm to be in possession of the suit land and seeing them   spending   huge   amount   over   it.   The plaintiff   has   been   affecting   costly improvements   over   the   suit   land   and   the defendants have been seeing plaintiff spending huge amount objected to it. They are estopped from denying the fact by their acts, conduct, omissions, laches and admissions.  11. That the rates of the land in the dispute have started rising and the defendants out of sheer greed have threatened to take forcible possession,   dispossess   the   plaintiff   and   to interfere in the peaceful enjoyment of the suit 13 land by the plaintiff about a month ago. They have also threatened to alienate the suit land in favour of the third parties. They have also refused   to   obtain   the   requisite   Income   Tax Clearance certificate and to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff firm as agreed upon   in   accordance   with   the   terms   of   the agreement of sale dated 23.8.1985.  12. That defendants No.1 to 4 were repeatedly approached to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the   agreement   of   sale   dated   23.8.1985.   The defendants   were   also   further   requested   to desist from dispossessing the plaintiff, taking forcible possession or otherwise interfering in the peaceful enjoyment of the suit land by the plaintiff.   However,   defendants   after prevarication   for   some   time   have   finally refused to accede to the reasonable, just and legal request of the plaintiff about a week ago. Hence this suit.  13. That the plaintiff firm has all along been ready  and   willing  to  perform  its   part  of  the contract and is still ready and willing to do so. It has  all along got  the requisite amount of balance   sale   consideration   and   expense   etc. with it. The defendants have thus committed breaches of agreement of sale as per details above with malafide intention.  14. That cause of action arose about a month ago and again about a week ago on the final refusal of the defendants.” 19. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   the   appellant­ plaintiff has specifically averred that due to the rising rate of the suit property, the respondents­defendants, out of sheer 14 greed, had threatened to take forcible possession and also rd threatened to alienate the suit property in favour of a 3 party. In   the   written   statement,   the   respondents­ 20. defendants   have   stated   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   had obtained Power of Attorney from the respondents­defendants and had undertaken to obtain the ITC Certificate.   It was further stated by the respondents­defendants that they had executed the Power of Attorney and one Mukhtar, an agent of the appellant­plaintiff, was required to take all the requisite steps to get the revenue records corrected.  It will be relevant to refer to paragraph (11) of the written statement of the respondents­defendants as under: “11. In reply to Para No.11 it is denied that the plaintiffs are in possession of the land in suit; it is also denied that defendants Nos. l to 4 had to obtain the ITCC; it is also denied that the   Plaintiff   had   the   financial   capability   to purchase   the   land;   it   is   submitted   that defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are in possession of the   suit   land   as   owners   thereof   and   an entitled to alienate the same if so desired. It is also denied that the agreement to sell dated 23.8.1985 is in force. ” [emphasis supplied] 15 A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would reveal 21. that   the   respondents­defendants   had   denied   that   the appellant­plaintiff   was   in   possession   of   the   suit   property. The respondents­defendants further asserted their right to alienate the suit property, if they so desired. The trial court, after perusal of the evidence, came to 22. a finding that the execution of the agreement(s) to sell was admitted   by   the   respondents­defendants.     The   trial   court further came to a specific finding of fact that the appellant­ plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract.   It found that, upon the respondents­defendants complying   with   the   conditions   as   provided   in   the agreement(s) to sell, they were required to issue a notice to the appellant­plaintiff and after receipt of the said notice, the sale consideration was required to be paid within 30 days from receipt of the said notice. In appeal, the learned Appellate Court affirmed the 23. findings of fact recorded by the trial court.  It held that the execution   of   the   agreement   to   sell   (Ex.   PW1/3)   and   the 16 receipt of earnest money of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was not disputed. It found that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, it was for the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 to get the revenue records corrected and they had also agreed to obtain the ITC Certificate and to send a copy of the same to the vendee.    The  learned  Appellate  Court  held  that even oral evidence to controvert these conditions incorporated in the written statement cannot be led in view of Section 92 of the Evidence   Act,   1872.     It   held   that   the   self­serving   oral statement of Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7 was not sufficient to controvert   the   terms   and   conditions   incorporated   in   the agreement(s) to sell.   Insofar as the argument that the suit for specific performance was filed without the correction of revenue   records,   the   learned   Appellate   Court   found   that since the respondents­defendants were intending to alienate the suit property, the appellant­plaintiff was justified in filing the suit. The   learned   Appellate   Court   came   to   a   specific 24. finding that none of the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4, who were signatories to the agreement, had entered into the witness box.  Though Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7, who is the 17 husband of defendant No. 3, had appeared as a witness, the Appellate Court found that he was not a good substitute for defendants No. 1 to 4, who, being vendors, were the material witnesses.     The   learned   Appellate   Court,   relying   on   the judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Vidhyadhar   v. 7 Manikrao   and   Another ,   held   that   on   account   of   non­ examination   of   any   of   the   vendors,   an   adverse   inference could be drawn against them. 25. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the impugned   judgment,   has   held   that   the   appellant­plaintiff could seek specific performance of the contract only after the revenue   record   was   corrected.     It   held   that   the   suit   for correction   of   the   revenue   record   was   filed   by   the th respondents­defendants on 4  June 1986 and the same was nd decreed on 22   December 2006.   It therefore held that the th suit of the appellant­plaintiff which was filed on 17  October 1989 was not tenable.   The learned Single Judge therefore allowed the appeals and held that, in view of the judgment of this  Court  in  the   case   of   (supra),   if   the Nirmala  Anand   7 (1999) 3 SCC 573 18 plaintiff desires to get the sale deed executed, he is required to pay the present prevalent market rate of the suit property. 26. We find that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court as well as by the Appellate Court.   The trial court as well as the Appellate Court had specifically found on the basis of the evidence that, though as per the terms and conditions of the agreement(s) to sell, the sale deed was to be executed only after the respondents­ defendants obtained the ITC Certificate and got the revenue records corrected, the appellant­plaintiff was compelled to file the   suit   since   the   respondents­defendants   were   trying   to alienate the suit property. 27. It is pertinent to note that the appellant­plaintiff has specifically averred that, though the respondents­defendants had neither obtained the ITC Certificate nor had the revenue records corrected, they were threatening to dispossess him rd and create 3   party rights over the suit property. In these circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff was constrained to file the   suit.   In   the   written   statement,   the   respondents­ defendants have specifically stated that they were entitled to 19 rd create   3   party   rights.     In   this   factual   situation,   the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Appellate Court that   the   appellant­plaintiff   was   justified   in   filing   the   suit could not have been faulted with. The respondents­defendants cannot be permitted to 28. blow hot and cold at the same time.   On one hand, they contended that the suit could not have been filed without getting the ITC Certificate and correction of revenue records, whereas on the other hand, they assert their right to alienate the suit property. 29. Shri Singh has heavily relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of  (supra).  No Kulwant Kaur and Others  doubt that where it is found that the findings of the trial court and the Appellate Court are vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly, there   is   an   element   of   perversity,   the   High   Court  will  be within its jurisdiction to deal with the same.  However, this can  be   permitted   only   in   the   event  where   such   a  fact   is brought   to   light   by   the   High   Court   explicitly   and   the judgment   should   also   be   categorical   as   to   the   issue   of perversity vis­à­vis the concept of justice. 20 30. In   the   present   case,   apart   from   there   being   no perversity in the concurrent findings of fact, there is not even an observation in the judgment of the High Court to that effect. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court also does not discuss the issue of perversity vis­à­vis the concept of justice.   As such, the said judgment, in our view, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 31. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents­ defendants   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of Nirmala Anand   (supra) is concerned, the said judgment, rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the   respondents­ defendants, would support the case of the appellant­plaintiff. In the said case, the suit filed by the appellant was partly decreed,   thereby   only   awarding   damages.     The   same   was upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court.  The defence of the defendant therein was with regard to impossibility of performance of the agreement entered into by the appellant with the respondents No. 1 and 2.   In the said case, this Court found that the respondents­defendants could not be solely blamed for delay inasmuch as the completion of the building was dependent upon certain acts that were to be 21 done   by   the   Corporation   and   the   Government.     In   this background, this Court directed an additional amount to be paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants to get the sale deed executed in her favour. In the present case, it would be seen that out of an 32. agreed amount of Rs.1,65,000/­, the appellant­plaintiff has rd already paid an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ on or before 23 August 1985.  He was already put in possession at the time of execution of the agreement(s) to sell.   The balance sale consideration that was to be paid was only about 10% of the total   agreed   amount.     Though   the   sale   deed   was   to   be executed upon the respondents­defendants getting the ITC Certificate and getting the revenue records corrected in the year   1986,   in   view   of   their   greed   since   the   prices   were rd escalating, the respondents­defendants had tried to create 3 party rights.  In these circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff was required to file the suit.   The respondents­defendants have also asserted in their written statement that they were entitled to alienate the suit property.   Having accepted the agreement(s)   to   sell  and   the   receipt  of   an   amount   of   Rs. 1,50,000/­   out   of   the   total   amount   of   Rs.1,65,000/­,   the 22 respondents­defendants   could   not   have   been   permitted   to take a contrary stand that on one hand, the suit could not be filed before the ITC Certificate was obtained and the revenue records were corrected, and on the other hand that they were entitled to alienate the suit property. 33. We are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the trial court and the   Appellate   Court   upon   correct   appreciation   of documentary as well as oral evidence. 34. In the result, we pass the following order: (i) The appeals are allowed; rd (ii) The judgment  3   March 2008  passed by the High Court in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207 th of 2005 and order dated 10   April 2008  passed by the High Court in R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1206 of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1207 of 2005 are quashed and set aside; and rd (iii) The judgments and decrees dated  3   January 2001 passed by the trial court in  RBT 329/90/2000 and 23 th dated  8   February   2005  passed   by   the   Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2001 are upheld.  35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs. …..….......................J. [B.R. GAVAI] …….......................J.        [C.T. RAVIKUMAR] NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 13, 2022. 24