R. Ashoka vs. The State Of Karnataka

2025 INSC 1441
NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______ OF 2025
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 9070 of 2018)

R. ASHOKA ... APPELLANT (S)

Versus

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 9614 of 2018)

J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
“The service of India means the service of the
millions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty
and ignorance and disease and inequality of
opportunity. ”
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.12.16
17:08:41 IST
Reason:
-Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru in ‘Tryst with Destiny’
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 1 of 35

Leave Granted.
2 . In these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India, the appellants namely R. Ashoka in SLP (Crl.)9070 of
2018 and C. Sandeep Sahu in SLP (Crl.) 9614 of 2018, pray that
this Court quash and set aside judgment dated 25th September
2018 which are analogously titled, passed in W.P. No. 1775 of
2018 and Crl.P.No.912 of 2018 arising out of FIR in Crime No.
5/2018 dated 8th January 2018 registered by the Anti-Corruption
1
Bureau , State of Karnataka.
CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) 9070 of 2018
BRIEF FACTS
3. The appellant was an elected member of the legislative
assembly in the State of Karnataka. Between 1998 and 2007, he
was Chairman of the Committee for regularisation of
unauthorised occupation. The members thereof were the
Tahsildar as the Secretary and three other persons. It was alleged
2
in terms of the complaint dated 05th September 2012 submitted
to the Lokayukta that under the Chairmanship of the appellant,
the land that was originally meant to be allotted to economically
downtrodden persons and those below the poverty line as also the
Scheduled Caste, was allotted to the members of his

1
ACB for short
2
First Complaint
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 2 of 35

family/followers/members of the City Corporation etc. In terms
of communication dated November 2012, the Additional Director
General of Police, Karanataka Lokayukta, concluded that the
appellant, who was at the relevant time a high-ranking Minister
in the Cabinet, was in no way connected to the allegations. The
conclusion is as under:
“In so far as the allegations relating to alienation of
the lands granted in favour of Scheduled
Castes/Tribes etc., are concerned, they do not
concerned with the Committee for Regularization of
Unauthorized Occupation. It would be between the
grantee and the purchase of the land. Those issues
cannot be answered by the Committee for
Regularization of Unauthorized Occupation and
they are all of separate entity under the separate set
of Acts and Rules.
It is submitted that, the entire issues raised and
allegations made by the Complainant against Shri R.
Ashok in the instant cases are from truth and
arbitrary and has no base.
Under the above facts and circumstances, the
allegations made by the Complainant against Shri
R.Ashok do not stand to reason, they are
misconceived and it is without proper verification of
the matter.
”
The Deputy Inspector General of Police, by way of memo no.:
LOK/ADGP/MEMO/2013 dated 27th May 2013, directed
conduction of a revised inquiry on the allegations made in the
first complaint. In compliance thereof, the Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, submitted a Report dated 04th
August 2014, by which again it was concluded that no charges
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 3 of 35

against the appellant would be substantiated and, as such, the
complaint had to be closed. Relevant extract thereof is
reproduced below:
“In his petition, the petitioner had alleged that during
the tenure of Sri R Ashok as Chairman of the
committee, 570 acres of government land in Sy No
46, Kaggalipura Village was sanctioned to Schedule
Caste and Tribe in 1993 and irrespective of the rule
that land should not be encumbered for 15 years,
MLA, Sri M Srinivas had registered 25 aces in the
name of his son. In his petition, the petitioner had
mentioned that in 1993 these lands were sanctioned
to sanctioned to Schedule Caste and Tribe; Sri R
Ashok was chairman of said committee from
18.08.1998 to 17.09.2006 and in 1993 Sri M Srinivas
had purchased and registered lands in the name of
his son from those who were sanctioned those lands.
As this did not come under the period of Sri R Ashok
as chairman of said committee, charge of the
petitioner against R Ashok is not substantiated.
In his petition, the petitioner had mentioned that
while sanctioning cultivable lands under Bagar
Hukum limits, out of the available land 50% to be
allotted to Scheduled Caste; 10% to Ex-Servicemen;
10% to freedom fighters and the remaining land to
the eligible. Report of Tahasildar had confirmed that
this rule did not apply in the context of unauthorized
cultivable land regularization.
In his letter No. 32/DYSP/BMTF/14, dated
3/7/2014 Deputy Superintendent of Police, BMTF,
Bengaluru had mentioned about the petition of Sri G
Honnanjappa, r/o Hesarughatta, Bengaluru about
illegal sanction of land in Sy No. 112,91 and 35
respectively of Uttari, Agara and B.M. Kaval of
Bengaluru South Taluk by Sri R Ashok as Chairman
of unauthorized cultivable lands regularization
committee and registration of Cr No 189/2012; Cr
No 191/2012; Cr No 192/2012 under Section 120 B,
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 4 of 35

468, 471, 420 Indian Penal Code r/w 13(1), 13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Sri R
Ashok and other others on the same day. Hon’ble
High Court had quashed the above-cited three cases
Vide order dated: 13/11/2013 in W.P No.
49022/2012; 45502-03/2012; 45794/2012;
45500/2012; 46842/2012; 45845-47/2012 & 49264-
65/2012.
Under the grounds that the charges made by the
petitioner, Sri T.R. Srinivas, Chairman, Bengaluru
City Corporation, District Congress Committee
against Sri R Ashok in his petition to Lokayukta
office having not proved due to lack of evidences I
request to close the petition. Herewith this, I have
enclosed the reports secured from Tahasildar,
Bengaluru South Taluk and records enclosed with it;
documents provided by Superintendent of Police,
BMTF, Bengaluru and report of former
Superintendent of Police-2, Bengaluru City relating
to said petition and with enclosures of records for
your perusal…. ”
th
On 9 November 2017, one M.A. Saleem filed a written
complaint before the Superintendent of Police, ACB alleging
illegalities having been committed in the grant of government
lands since 1994, wherein certain persons who did not fall into
the specified criteria who were, on the contrary, financially well
placed, were granted the said lands. It was submitted that earlier
representations on this same cause of action had not yielded any
results, as no action was taken. The record does not reveal any
action having been taken on this complaint. Still further, another
complaint was filed before the same authority on 03rd January
2018.
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 5 of 35

Pursuant to such a complaint, the ACB conducted a preliminary
th
inquiry, the Report whereof, dated 06 January 2018 is placed on
record, opining investigation with the registration of the
complaint.
3
Based thereupon is the First Information Report , subject matter
th
before us, registered on 08 January 2018.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE WRIT PETITION
4. Just three days after the registration of the FIR, the
appellant invoked the High Court’s power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the FIR and
proceedings initiated against him thereunder. A perusal of the
writ petition reveals the following grounds to have been
agitated:-
(a) The complaint, because of which the FIR came to be
registered, was nearly identical to the earlier complaints
registered before the Lokayukta;
(b) The complaint arises out of political vendetta having
been registered on the complaint made by a member of the
other major political party in the State;
(c) The appellant had no personal knowledge about the
lands being granted and only functioned on the information

3
‘FIR’
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 6 of 35

furnished by the officials as such, if there is any incorrect
information, he cannot be held responsible, nor can there be
any criminal liability therefor;
(d) The appellant had been singled out, and action was
initiated only against him and none of the other members of
the Committee.
5. The ACB objected to the said writ petition and while also
strenuously opposing the interim relief granted, made the
following points inter-alia on the substance of the petition
preferred by the appellant:
(a) The FIR has been registered after the conducting of a
preliminary inquiry, which has disclosed a cognizable
offence;
(b) The grant of benefit to certain recipients was arbitrary
and with an intent to cause wrongful gains to people, as
many were granted lands in contravention of the rules, such
as distance from the city, age requirements, separate
allotments to members of the same family etc.;
(c) It is not that the appellant and the members of the
Committee were not aware of the rules, since they have on
such and similar grounds rejected a number of applications.
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 7 of 35

6. The High Court, having considered the submissions made
at length, arrived at a conclusion that it was not a fit case for
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
A perusal of the impugned judgment reveals the following
reasons for such conclusion:
(a) The appellant's argument of delay was rejected, stating
that in view of the allegations that the allotment had been
made entirely dehors the procedure laid down, leading to
great loss to the government exchequer. In such situations,
delay cannot vitiate the necessary legal action required to be
taken;
(b) It is apparent from the record that, despite knowing
otherwise, the Committee accepted income affidavits from
applicants showing the income to be Rs.8000/-. This prima
facie establishes co-operation of the Committee members as
also officials in commission of these offences.
(c) The contention that the appellant, as the Chairman of the
Committee, had no personal knowledge about the
applications were rejected, holding that it was the
responsibility of the Committee to verify the applications
inasmuch as actual entitlement was concerned. The
officials, having furnished wrong information, had to be
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 8 of 35

investigated, and the appellant cannot be let off the hook on
that count;
(d) For the argument of political vendetta and that none of
the other members of the Committee had been made
accused, it was observed by the Court that the investigating
officer at any time before filing the chargesheet has the
power to arraign persons in the matter so also does the Court
after the filing of the chargesheet, in terms of Section 319
CrPC. Therefore, at this stage, this is not a ground that can
aid the case of the appellant;
(e) The question of sanction under Section 197 CrPC was
addressed to say that the same is required for subsequent
initiation of prosecution after completion of investigation,
and therefore, at the investigation stage, the question of
having not obtained sanction does not arise.

SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS MADE AT THE BAR
7. We have heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Sajan Poovayya,
Mr Gaurav Agraval, learned senior counsel for the appellant, and

Mr. P.B. Suresh, Mr. Harin P. Rawal, learned senior counsel and
Mr. Aman Pawar for the respondents, and perused the documents
on record.
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 9 of 35

8. The case of the appellant is, in effect, quite similar to what
was urged before the High Court. It is submitted that the
complaints are politically motivated and all of the complaints
have been filed by members of a rival party, and the latest one
had been strategically filed in an election year as such, the
exercise of Section 482 CrPC powers would be justified, as it is
settled law that criminal machinery cannot be allowed to use as a
weapon of harassment. The next aspect is that two different
officers of the Lokayukta have, on earlier occasions, investigated
the complaints and found no substance therein. The complaint,
which led to the subject FIR, has also been filed without any new
material or facts being brought on record and is also filed with
inordinate, unexplained delay. Such a delay is hit by Section 8 of
4
Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 which provides that no
investigation shall be conducted into a complaint after expiry of
five years from the alleged occurrence of the offence. It is further
submitted that the Committee of which the appellant was the
Chairman is the recommendatory body, and the determination of
eligibility is in fact is to be undertaken by the Deputy
Commissioner. The function of the Committee is, upon the
determination of the Deputy Commissioner, to determine the
extent of land which is to be granted to the applicant. A further
ground of attack by the appellant is the absence of sanction. This

4
‘KLA’
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 10 of 35

is in contravention of Government Order dated 14th March 2016,
which under Clause 5 thereof mandates that no investigation by
ACB can be carried out without sanction. Lastly, regarding the
allotment of land to beneficiaries, it is submitted that in as many
as four instances the allotment in question has been upheld. As
such, on a holistic consideration of the above submissions, the
FIR and subsequent action deserved to be quashed and set aside.
9. The Lokayukta , State of Karnataka, has essentially,
adopted a position supporting the case of the Appellant, except in
as much as limitation is concerned. It is submitted that
consequent to the stay granted by this Court as per order dated
26th October 2018, not new material has been placed before the
authority. Its stand is the same as averred in the affidavit before
this Court dated 4th April 2024.
10. The respondent, State of Karnataka, has submitted that
delay as urged by the appellant cannot be a ground to quash
proceedings on account of nullum tempus aut locus occurit regi
which translates to lapse of time is no bar to the Crown in
proceedings against the offenders. Secondly, it is submitted that
in appreciation of the scheme of the Karnataka Land Revenue
Act 1964 the recommendations of the Committee may be
recommendatory, but they are final in nature as evidenced by the
use of the word ‘ shall ’ in Rule 108D. Regarding the bar of
Section 8 of KLA, it is submitted that the offence in question is
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 11 of 35

5
under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and the bar
enumerated in that Section only applies to what stands specified
in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof. On the submission that an FIR
should not have been registered on the same cause of action,
given that the earlier two complaints stood closed, it is submitted
that, being cognizant of the said situation, at first instance, a
preliminary inquiry was conducted and only then was an FIR
registered, which is also an obligation upon the Police. In no way,
it is submitted that these situations as alleged by the appellant
6
meet the stipulations of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal .
According to the State, the Lokayukta does not have the
power to investigate offences under the PC Act, and the
abolishing of the ACB (which is a legislative act, subsequent to
the dismissal of quashing petition of the Appellant) would not
help the case of the appellant.
CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS
11. When the State undertakes the allotment of land in favour
of persons who are economically disadvantaged, such action is
not an exercise in charity, but a discharge of the constitutional
obligation cast upon a Welfare State. The scheme of the
Constitution, particularly the Directive Principles of State Policy,

5
PC Act
6
1992 Suppl.(1) SCC 335
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 12 of 35

envisages that the State shall strive to promote social and
economic justice and secure a social order in which the material
resources of the community are so distributed as to best subserve
the common good. Articles 38 and 39(b) are of particular
relevance in this regard. These provisions, serve as guiding
beacons for all State action and inform the content of
reasonableness under Part III.
In a nation characterised by a large population and a
continuing reliance on agrarian livelihoods, land assumes an
elevated significance. It constitutes a vital and scarce resource,
often the sole means of subsistence for vulnerable sections of
society. The State, therefore, holds land not as a private proprietor
but in its capacity as a trustee of the people, a conception that
finds support in the jurisprudence surrounding the public trust
doctrine. This doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty upon the State
to manage and distribute resources in a manner consistent with
the public interest and with due regard to intergenerational equity.
Accordingly, any decision relating to the allotment of land
must withstand the scrutiny of Article 14. The prohibition against
arbitrariness, as articulated by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State
7 8
of T.N and reaffirmed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ,
operates as a constitutional check on the exercise of discretionary

7
(1974) 4 SCC 3
8
(1978) 1 SCC 248
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 13 of 35

power. The State cannot indulge in unfettered or capricious
allocation of public land; its decisions must be informed by
rational criteria, transparent procedures, and an identifiable
nexus with the constitutional mandate of advancing the welfare
of weaker sections.
Moreover, this Court has consistently held that when the
State deals with public property, whether by allotment, lease, or
otherwise, it must act fairly, reasonably, and in a manner that does
not give rise to any semblance of favouritism or extraneous
considerations. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
9
Airport Authority of India , and subsequent decisions, the Court
has emphasised that State largesse must be distributed through
processes that ensure equality of opportunity and avoid arbitrary
preferences.
Thus, when the Government allots land to those who are
economically unfortunate, it acts within the domain of its welfare
responsibilities. However, such power is circumscribed by
constitutional limitations. The State must function as the
guardian of the lands vested in it, ensuring that allotments serve
the common good, comply with equality norms, and reflect a
judicious exercise of public power. Any deviation from these
principles would not only undermine the constitutional vision of

9
(1979) 3 SCC 489
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 14 of 35

distributive justice but also expose the impugned action to
invalidation on the ground of arbitrariness.
12. Before proceeding to the merits, there are two aspects that
this Court must remind itself of. One , that even though the
parameters of the powers of quashing cases and proceedings
under Section 482 CrPC are well-settled, the same must 2be re-
appreciated, with reference to certain cases. Two , that the concept
and Origins of the Lokayukta, its powers and scope of operation.
Principles of Quashing
I. Bhajanlal (supra)
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we have
given the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 15 of 35

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

10
II. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa , a bench
of three judges held:
“ 6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in
a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule.

10
(2002) 3 SCC 89
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 16 of 35

The section does not confer any new powers on the
High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the
Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It
envisages three circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, ( i ) to give effect
to an order under the Code, ( ii ) to prevent abuse of the
process of court, and ( iii ) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all
cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have
inherent powers apart from express provisions of law
which are necessary for proper discharge of functions
and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section which
merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal
possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course
of administration of justice on the principle quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo
res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot
exist). While exercising powers under the section, the
court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone courts
exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has power to
prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 17 of 35

these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint,
the court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to
look into the materials to assess what the complainant
has alleged and whether any offence is made out even
if the allegations are accepted in toto.”

III. Recently, this Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani
11
v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. , reiterated the
steps laid down by this Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan
12
Lal Kapoor to be taken by the High Court in exercising
its quashing powers:
“ 20. The following steps should ordinarily determine
the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an
accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- (i)Step one, whether
the material relied upon by the accused is sound,
reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of
sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether
the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out
the assertions contained in the charges levelled against
the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained in the
complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade
a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual
basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three,
whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not
been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the
material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by
the 13 prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether

11
Criminal Appeal No.3831 Of 2025
12
(2013) 3 SCC 330
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proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of
process of the court, and would not serve the ends of
justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal –
proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power,
besides doing justice to the accused, would save
precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted
in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising
therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same
would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.
[(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor
(Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]”
(emphasis supplied)

Origins, Powers and Scope of Operation of Lokayukta
The concept of Lokayukta has been adapted from the
Scandinavian concept of Ombudsman, the origins of which can
be traced back to the early 1800s. In India, it was recommended
by the First Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966. The
State of Maharashtra became the first State to establish the body
in 1971. The State of Karnataka, with which, we are concerned,
enacted this law in 1984. The scope is given in Sections 7 & 8 of
KLA. Section 7 provides for the jurisdictional framework of the
Lokayukta and Upalokayukta. It details who the Lokayukta or
Upalokayukta can investigate, transfer complaints, bars legal
challenges and provides for continuity in cases of vacancies.
Section 8 is the counterpart to Section 7 and, as such details the
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restriction on the jurisdiction of the Lokayukta and
Upalokayuktas.
This Court in Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C.
13
Krishna, had occasion to consider the act in extensive detail.
We may quote some of the relevant paras:
“ Functions of the Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta —
Investigative in nature
32. The provisions discussed above clearly indicate
that the functions to be discharged by the Lokayukta
or Upa-Lokayukta are investigative in nature and the
report of Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta under sub-
sections (1) and (3) of Section 12 and the special
report submitted under sub-section (5) of Section 12
are only recommendatory. No civil consequence as
such follows from the action of the Lokayukta and
Upa-Lokayukta, though they can initiate prosecution
before a competent court. I have extensively referred
to the object and purpose of the Act and explained
the various provisions of the Act only to indicate the
nature and functions to be discharged by Lokayukta
or Upa-Lokayukta under the Act.
33. The Act has, therefore, clearly delineated which
are the matters to be investigated by the Lokayukta
and Upa-Lokayukta. They have no authority to
investigate on a complaint involving a grievance in
respect of any action specified in the Second
Schedule of the Act, which are as follows:
“( a ) Action taken for the purpose of investigating
crimes relating to the security of the State.
( b ) Action taken in the exercise of powers in relation
to determining whether a matter shall go to a court
or not.
( c ) Action taken in matters which arise out of the
terms of a contract governing purely commercial

13
(2013) 3 SCC 117
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relations of the administration with customers or
suppliers, except where the complaint alleges
harassment or gross delay in meeting contractual
obligations.
( d ) Action taken in respect of appointments,
removals, pay, discipline, superannuation or other
matters relating to conditions of service of public
servants but not including action relating to claims
for pension, gratuity, provident fund or to any claims
which arise on retirement, removal or termination of
service.
( e ) Grant of honours and awards.”
…
37. The Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta while
exercising powers under the Act, of course, is acting
as a quasi-judicial authority but his functions are
investigative in nature. The Constitution Bench of
this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of
Hills Division and Appeals [AIR 1958 SC 398] held:
(AIR p. 408, para 14)
“ 14. … Whether or not an administrative body or
authority functions as a purely administrative one or
in a quasi-judicial capacity, must be determined in
each case, on an examination of the relevant statute
and the rules framed thereunder.”
…
40. The provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 11 clearly
indicate that the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are
discharging quasi-judicial functions while
conducting the investigation under the Act. Sub-
section (2) of Section 11 of the Act also states that
for the purpose of any such investigation, including
the preliminary inquiry the Lokayukta and Upa-
Lokayukta shall have all the powers of a civil court
while trying a suit under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, in the matter of summoning and
enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath. Further they have also the
power for requiring the discovery and production of
any document, receiving evidence on affidavits,
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requisitioning any public record or copy thereof
from any court or office, issuing commissions for
examination of witnesses or documents, etc. Further,
sub-section (3) of Section 11 stipulates that any
proceedings before the Lokayukta and Upa-
Lokayukta shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 of the
Penal Code. Therefore, the Lokayukta and Upa-
Lokayukta, while investigating the matters are
discharging quasi-judicial functions, though the
nature of functions is investigative. ”

13. Keeping in mind the above, we now consider the
submissions made across the Bar. The first aspect to be dealt with
is, the multiple complaints on the same cause of action i.e. the
allotment of land by the Regularisation Committee during the
Chairmanship of the appellant. The three complaints subject
matter of discussion are dated 5th September 2012, 9th
November 2017 and 3rd January 2018. Below is a tabular
summarisation of the three complaints-

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Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 23 of 35

14. It is but obvious that the allegations made in the complaint
arise out of the same set of facts with only minor variations as to
the timeline in which these alleged illegal acts took place, but
broadly covering the time in which the appellant was the
Chairperson of the Committee. Connected herewith is the other
issue of the Lokayukta, having already investigated and arrived
at a conclusion regarding the first two complaints. The appellant's
grievance is that, despite this, the third complaint based on the
same facts has been entertained by the ACB. It may be noted that
the ACB was conceived as an investigative body, independent of
the Lokayukta, to investigate offences under the PC Act. This was
done under the powers conferred by Article 162 of the
Constitution of India. This action was challenged in Chidananda
14
Urs B.G v. State of Karnataka , before the High Court and was
quashed and set aside by judgment dated 11th August 2022. This
Court refused to entertain an SLP thereagainst in terms of order.
The effect of the ACB being set aside was that all the
investigations opened by it were re-transferred to the Lokayukta.

14
2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1488
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The effect of re-transfer is that the Lokayukta is once again the
relevant authority. The relevant extract of the judgment is as
follows:
“ 239 …
(6) Since this Court quashed the impugned Government
Order dated 14.3.2016 and the impugned Government
Notifications dated 19.3.2016, the Anti Corruption Bureau
is abolished. But all inquiries, investigations and other
disciplinary proceedings pending before the ACB will get
transferred to the Lokayukta. However, all inquiries,
investigations, disciplinary proceedings, orders of
convictions/acquittals and all other proceedings held by
ACB till today, are hereby saved and the Police Wing of
Karnataka Lokayukta shall proceed from the stage at which
they are pending as on today, in accordance with law.”

15. The stand of the Lokayukta is and has remained right from
the time of the first complaint that the complaint made against
the appellant has no legs to stand on. In other words, they lack
merit. Ordinarily, with the case having been retransferred to the
Lokayukta, the stand as enumerated above would have been the
end of the matter but in the present case, while the matter still
was in the jurisdiction of the ACB, an FIR stood registered and
hence the application for quashing before the High Court.
16. The submission of the appellant that the absence of a
sanction vitiates proceedings against him, in our view, is liable to
be accepted. In criminal law, the requirement of obtaining
sanction prior to the prosecution of a public official has been
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 25 of 35

envisaged as a procedural safeguard that operates in the interest
of discharging functions in furtherance of responsibility entrusted
to them. It is a requirement of law, therefore, that when the
allegedly improper act has been done with a reasonable nexus to
such official duties, action can be initiated against such person
only after a sanction has been obtained. It does not however,
cover within its ambit acts which are manifestly illegal or wholly
outside the public duty that is to be carried out by such person.
The most prominent illustrations of such requirement are under
Section 19 of PC Act and Section 197 of CrPC.
17. The Government Order by which the ACB before whom
the complaint subject matter of the instant proceedings came to
be filed, stipulates that “ No investigation shall be carried out by
the Anti Corruption Bureau in respect of any actions or
recommendations made by a public servant in discharge of his
official functions without prior approval from the recruitment
authority.” Quite apparently, the State, in bringing this
notification, has taken a stand different from the other statutory
examples of the requirement of sanction where the requirement
of sanction is a precursor to cognizance but here, sanction is to
be taken even prior to the commencement of an investigation.
Not to overextend the issue, it is seen that the record is
conspicuously silent on any sanction having been obtained
against the appellant. Since no investigation could have begun
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 26 of 35

without such sanction, the preliminary Report of the ACB,
subsequent FIR and any and all proceedings thereafter have
operated in the face of an express bar. Bhajan lal (supra) Para
102.6 clearly states that when such a case arises, a Court would
be justified in exercising its power of quashing.
18. In supporting his claim for quashing, the appellant has
made a case that he has been singled out for the reason that he
belonged to a rival political establishment, and the first complaint
came six years after the end of the period in controversy. In effect,
the appellant is alleging malafides . In opposition to such a claim,
the State has put forth a position that if there are enough materials
to sustain prosecution, the factum that the genesis is from a
complaint filed by a political rival ought not to be of any
consequence. We now examine the question of malice.
15
17.1 In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh , Krishna
Iyer J., in his inimitable style, wrote:-
“9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the
jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish
unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the
popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad
faith which invalidates the exercise of power —
sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on
power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions
and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends beyond
the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or
pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of
the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object

15
(1980) 2 SCC 471
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 27 of 35

the actuation or catalysation by malice is not
legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is
to reach an end different from the one for which the
power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous
considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the
entrustment. When the custodian of power is
influenced in its exercise by considerations outside
those for promotion of which the power is vested the
court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived
by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin
Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he
stated: “I repeat . . . that all power is a trust — that
we are accountable for its exercise — that, from the
people, and for the people, all springs, and all must
exist”. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not
exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in
this context is not equal to moral turpitude and
embraces all cases in which the action impugned is
to effect some object which is beyond the purpose
and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden
or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant
act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of
the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the
verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on
power vitiates the acquisition or other official act.”
(emphasis supplied)
16
17.2 In W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray , this Court
studied in detail, the meaning of malice. Relevant extracts
are as follows:
“ 15. …Malice in fact is malue animus indicating that
action against a party was actuated by spite or ill will
against him or by indirect or improper motives.
Malice in fact .—‘Malice in fact’ means express
malice.

16
(2007) 14 SCC 568
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Malice in fact or actual malice, relates to the actual
state or condition of the mind of the person who did
the act.
Malice in fact is where the malice is not established
by legal presumption or proof of certain facts, but is
to be found from the evidence in the case.
Malice in fact implies a desire or intention to injure,
while malice in law is not necessarily inconsistent
with an honest purpose….”

17
17.3 In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna , a co-
ordinate bench held :
“5. Whereas fairness is synonymous with
reasonableness — bias stands included within the
attributes and broader purview of the word “malice”
which in common acceptation means and implies
“spite” or “ill will”. One redeeming feature in the
matter of attributing bias or malice and is now well
settled that mere general statements will not be
sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will.
There must be cogent evidence available on record
to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there
was existing a bias or a mala fide move which results
in the miscarriage of justice (see in this
context Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja
Shankar Pant [(2001) 1 SCC 182 : JT 2000 Supp (2)
SC 206] ). In almost all legal inquiries, “intention as
distinguished from motive is the all-important
factor” and in common parlance a malicious act
stands equated with an intentional act without just
cause or excuse. In the case of Jones Bros.
(Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB 275 :
(1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA)] the Court of Appeal has
stated upon reliance on the decision
of Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB
463] as below:

17
(2001) 2 SCC 330
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“For this purpose maliciously means no more than
knowingly. This was distinctly laid down
in Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB
463] where Crompton, J. said that it was clear law
that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or,
which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the
relation of master and servant by harbouring and
keeping the servant after he has quitted his master
during his period of service, commits a wrongful act
for which he is responsible in law. Malice in law
means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally
without just cause or
excuse: Bromage v. Prosser [(1825) 1 C&P 673 : 4
B&C 247] . ‘Intentionally’ refers to the doing of the
act; it does not mean that the defendant meant to be
spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut
a plea of privilege in defamation, malice in fact has
to be proved.”
(emphasis supplied)
18
17.4 In Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab SEB , it was held :
13. … Incidentally, be it noted that the expression
“mala fide” is not meaningless jargon and it has its
proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be
appreciated from the records of the case in the facts
of each case. There cannot possibly be any set
guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala
fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts
and circumstances…. Mere user of the word “mala
fide” by the petitioner would not by itself make the
petition entertainable. The Court must scan the
factual aspect and come to its own conclusion i.e.
exactly what the High Court has done and that is the
reason why the narration has been noted in this
judgment in extenso. …”

(emphasis supplied)


18
(2000) 5 SCC 630
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17.5 In Ratnagiri Gas & Power (P) Ltd. v. RDS Projects
19
Ltd. ,
“25. Even otherwise the findings recorded by the
High Court on the question of mala fides do not
appear to us to be factually or legally sustainable.
While we do not consider it necessary to delve deep
into this aspect of the controversy, we may point out
that allegations of mala fides are more easily made
than proved. The law casts a heavy burden on the
person alleging mala fides to prove the same on the
basis of facts that are either admitted or satisfactorily
established and/or logical inferences deducible from
the same. This is particularly so when the petitioner
alleges malice in fact in which event it is obligatory
for the person making any such allegation to furnish
particulars that would prove mala fides on the part
of the decision-maker. Vague and general allegations
unsupported by the requisite particulars do not
provide a sound basis for the court to conduct an
inquiry into their veracity.
…
27. There is yet another aspect which cannot be
ignored. As and when allegations of mala fides are
made, the persons against whom the same are
levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the
proceedings to enable them to answer the charge. In
the absence of the person concerned as a party in
his/her individual capacity it will neither be fair nor
proper to record a finding that malice in fact had
vitiated the action taken by the authority concerned.
It is important to remember that a judicial
pronouncement declaring an action to be mala fide
is a serious indictment of the person concerned that
can lead to adverse civil consequences against him.
Courts have, therefore, to be slow in drawing
conclusions when it comes to holding allegations of
mala fides to be proved and only in cases where

19
(2013) 1 SCC 524

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based on the material placed before the Court or
facts that are admitted leading to inevitable
inferences supporting the charge of mala fides that
the Court should record a finding in the process
ensuring that while it does so, it also hears the person
who was likely to be affected by such a finding.”

19. Law considers the impact of a set of facts, demonstrable
conduct in terms of noticeable variance from procedure, timing
and other surrounding circumstances, taken together to lead to
credible inferences in a given factual context. In the present facts,
it has to be noted that three complaints making the same and
similar allegations primarily against the appellant but also against
certain other persons have been made and on two occasions the
Lokayukta has, in its recommendatory capacity observed the lack
of any material to proceed against the appellant. The third
complaint made before a different body now found certain
material, and an FIR was registered, but with the action of law,
the investigation now stands once again with the Lokayukta. At
the cost of repetition, it be observed that the first complaint was
made five years after the end of the period in 2007 on 5th
September which was closed in November of that year.
Reopening was ordered, investigated and the complaint was
again closed in the year 2014. At the end of 2017, a fresh
complaint was filed on which no action has been taken. And in
2018, the subject complaint came to be filed i.e. , almost 11 years
after the end of the period in question. It is also not lost on us
Crl.A. @ SLP (Crl.) 9070 of 2018 Page 32 of 35

that, as demonstrated by the record, all three complainants were
by the members of the rival political party even though the
complainant in the third complaint has averred otherwise in his
written submissions. Mr Anand, who is the complainant in the
third complaint, is also a signatory in the second complaint that
had been set out on the letterhead of the Youth faction of a rival
political party. This shows concerted effort on the part of the
complainants to cast aspersions on the credibility of the appellant
as a public leader, as also impute ill-intention upon him despite
having, on earlier occasions failed to do so. These facts can be
said to be pointing towards malice when taken together with the
fact of time gap. Why was the first complaint filed after five
years, and why did the complainant maintain silence from 2014
to 2017 when the second complaint was filed, is unexplained. In
an attempt to explain the time gap, the State has submitted that
lapse of time does not eclipse the factum of the crime having
taken place as such delay would not affect the same. We are
conscious of this position. However, in view of the above, the
actions against the appellant ex facie appear to be politically
motivated and thereby afflicted by malice, even if delay was kept
aside, the prosecution of the appellant could not proceed in the
eyes of the law.
20. A further point to be noted is that some of the alleged
illegal grants of land have been confirmed by judicial or
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administrative action, clarifying that, correctness thereof is not
subject matter of adjudication here. So, in total, three aspects
point to the subject complaint and FIR being bad in law - absence
of sanction, malice and administrative/judicial recognition,
approval of the allotment of land.
21. Consequent to the above discussion, the FIR subject
matter of the present case deserves to be quashed and set aside in
view of Bhajanlal (supra). The appeal is allowed.

CRIMINAL APPEAL @SLP (CRL.) 9614 OF 2018
22. This appeal has been filed by one of the beneficiaries of
the land allotment subject matter of controversy, who has, along
with the appellant in the above appeal, namely R. Ashoka, been
made an accused in FIR in Crime No. 5/2018 dated 08th January
2018 registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, State of
Karnataka.
23. It is submitted that his allotment was earlier cancelled on
28th July 2016, by the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru, but
in subsequent proceedings before the very same Authority, the
proceedings were found fit to be dropped vide order dated 14th
June 2017. The record does not disclose the said determination
to have been challenged. FIR has been filed post that. Now that
we have given reasons for quashing the FIR against the main
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accused, along with the fact that allotment has been upheld by
the Authority in favour of the appellant, we are of the view that
the FIR and consequent proceedings arising from it deserve to be
quashed.
Appeal is allowed.
Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.


………….……..……………..J.
(SANJAY KAROL)


………………..………..……..J.
(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

New Delhi
th
16 December 2025
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