Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PANDHARINATH SHRIDHAR RANGNEKAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DY. COMMR. OF POLICE, THE STATE OF MAHRASHTRA
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1972
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1973 AIR 630 1973 SCC (1) 372
CITATOR INFO :
F 1989 SC1304 (4)
ACT:
Bombay Police Act (22 of 1951)-Ss. 56, 59-Externment Order-
Duty to inform "the general nature of the material
allegations"-Full disclosure of particulars if necessary-If
the externing authority and the State government should give
reasoned order-order of externment if should be restricted
to area chosen for unlawful activities.
HEADNOTE:
Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act provides that whenever
it shall appear, in Greater Bombay, to the Commissioner (a)
that the movements or acts of any person are causing or are
calculated to cause alarm, danger or-harm to person or
property or (b) that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that such person is engaged or is about to be
engaged in the commission of offence involving force or
violence or an offence punishable under Chapter 22, 16 and
17 of the Indian Penal Code, and when in the opinion of such
officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give
evidence in public against such person by reason of
apprehension on their part as regards safety of their person
or property, the said officer may by order in writing direct
such person to remove himself outside the-area districts, or
any part thereof contiguous thereto, within such time as the
said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the
said area, from which he was directed to remove himself.
Section 59(1) requires that before an order under s. 56 is
passed against any person the officer shall inform that
person in writing "of the general nature of the material
allegations against him" and give him a reasonable
opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding those
allegations.
The appellant was served with a notice under s. 56 of the
Act. The allegations were that the appellant’s acts and
movements were causing alarm and danger to the residents of
certain localities within the jurisdiction of Vile Parle
Police Station, that he was given to assaulting the resi-
dents of the localities either because they were suspected
to be police informants or because they failed to accede to
the demands of money, that he had committed robberies in the
particular localities, and that witnesses were not willing
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to come forward to depose against him in public. The
appellant offered his explanation and examined his witnesses
to refute the allegations. On a consideration of the
explanation and the evidence tendered by the appellant an
order was passed externing him from the limits of Greater
Bombay and the District of Thana for a period of two years.
The order was confirmed in appeal by the State government.
A writ petition to the High Court was dismissed. in the
appeal to this Court it was contended (i) the allegations
that witnesses were not willing to come forward to depose
against the appellant in public was falsified by the very
record of the present proceedings; (ii) the particulars
contained in the notice issued under s. 59 of the Act were
so vague that the appellant could not possibly meet the
allegations made against him and thus he was denied
reasonable opportunity to defend himself; (iii) the extern-
ing authority had the duty to pass a reasoned order or else
the right of appeal would become illusory; and the State
Government also ought to have given reasons in support of
the order dismissing the appeal and its failure to do so
showed non-application of mind; and (iv) the order of
64
externment imposed unreasonable restrictions on the personal
liberty of the appellant in that, whereas his activities
were alleged to be restricted to an area within the
jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police station, the order of
externment not only extended to the whole district of
Greater Bombay but to the district of Thana also.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD (1) In order to attract the operation of section 56 of
the Act the officer concerned has to satisfy himself that
witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence
in public., But it is not necessary that all the witnesses
must be found unwilling to give evidence. The circumstance,
therefore, that in two criminal cases certain witnesses came
forward to depose against the appellant cannot falsify the
assertion that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence
against the appellant to public. [68C]
Dhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate,
Thana & Ors. [1956] S.C.R. 533, referred to.,
(2)The relevant provisions of the Act show that the
reasons which necessitate or justify the passing of an
externment order arise out of extraordinary circumstances.
An order of externment can be passed under Clause (a) or (b)
or selection 56 if, and only if, the authority concerned is
satisfied that witnesses are unwilling to come forward to
give evidence in public against the proposed extend by
reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety
of their person or property. A full and complete disclosure
of particulars such as-is requisite in an open prosecution
will frustrate the very purpose of externment proceedings.
There is a brand of lawless element in society which it is
impossible to bring to book by established methods of
judicial trial, because, in such trials, there can be no
conviction without legal evidence. And, legal evidence is
impossible to obtain because out of fear of reprisals
witnesses are unwilling to depose in public. That explains
why section 59 of the Act imposes but a limited obligation
on the authorities to inform the proposed externee "of the
general nature of the material allegations against him".
That obligation fixes the limits of the correlative right of
the proposed externee. He is entitled before an order of
externment is passed under s. 56 to know the material
allegations against him and the general nature of those
allegations. He is not entitled to be informed of specific
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particulars relating to the material allegations. Though
the provisions of s. 56 make a serious inroad on personal
liberty, such restraints have to be suffered in the larger
interests of society. However, care must be taken to ensure
that the terms of sections 56 and 59 are strictly complied
with and that the slender safeguards which those provisions
offer are made available to the proposed externee. [70E]
Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay and another, [1952]
S.C.R. 737; Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhdndari v. The District
Magistrate Thana & others [1956] S.C.R. 533; Hari Khemu
Gawali v. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay and
Another [1956] S.C.R. 506 and State of Gujarat and Anr. v.
Mehboob Khan Usman Khan etc. [1968] 3 S.C.R.
View of the Bombay High Court in Criminal application No.
332 of 1971 in judgment dated April 29, 1971 disapproved.
65
(3)Precisely for the reason for which the proposed
externee is only entitled to be informed of the general
nature of the material allegations, neither the externing
authority nor the State government in appeal can be asked to
write a reasoned order in the nature of a judgment. If
those authorities were to discuss the evidence in the case
it would be easy to fix the identity of the witnesses who
were unwilling to depose in public against the proposed
externee. [72H]
(4)It is primarily for the externing authority to decide
how best the externment order can be made effective so as to
subserve its real purpose An excessive order can
undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restraint on
personal liberty can be premitted than is reasonable in the
circumstances of the case. An order of externment
restricted to the particular area chosen by the externee for
his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof may
in certain circumstances fail of its true purpose. A larger
area may conceivably have to be comprised within the
externment order so as to isolate the externee from his
moorings. [73 B, D]
Balu Shivling Dombe v. The Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur
s. 71 Bombay Law Reporter, 79, held inapplicable.
The High Court of Bombay has, on similar facts, consistently
repelled challenges made to externment orders on the ground
that they extended not only to the district of Greater
Bombay but also to the District of Thana. In matters of
such local colour and conditions, the view so consistently
expressed by the learned judges of the High Court must be
accepted as correct. [75C]
Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1968, judgment dated March
17, 1968; Criminal Application 30 to 93 of 1970 judgment
dated February 23, 1970, 73 Bombay L.R. 442; Criminal
Application No. 149 of 1972 decided on March 3, 1972,
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 14 of
1972.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 11, 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Crl.
Application No. 618 of 1971.
S. B. Wad, for the appellant.
M. C. Bhandare and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD J. This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment dated August 11, 1971 of the High Court
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at Bombay, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge
an order of externment passed by the 1st respondent.
On October 9, 1969 a notice of even date was served on the
appellant under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 22 of
1951, asking him to appear before the Assistant Commissioner
of Police, ’M’ Division, Bombay, in answer to allegations
contained in the notice. Briefly, the allegations were that
the appellant’s_acts and movements were causing harm, 6-
L63lSup.CI/73
66
alarm and danger to the residents of certain localities
within the, jurisdiction of Vile Parle Police Station, that
he was given to assaulting the residents of those localities
either because, they were suspected to be, police informants
or because they failed to accede to the demands of money,
that he had committed robberies in the particular
localities, that since March 1969 he had committed several
acts of the above description and that witnesses were not
willing to come forward to depose against him in public.
The appellant appeared before the Assistant Commissioner of
Police, offered his explanation and examined 16. witnesses
to refute the, allegations. He contended that the
allegations were vague and general, that they were made at
the instance of one Damayanti Deshpande who was inimical to
him, that he was a social worker of some standing, that he
was, a member of the Congress Party and that in two
criminal cases which were filed against him he was acquitted
in spite of the evidence led by the prosecution.
Later, the appellant was heard by Shri G. K. Nadkarni,
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-IV, Greater Bombay. On
a consideration of the explanation and the evidence tendered
by the appellant, the Dy. Commissioner passed an order
dated July 23, 1970 under section 59 of the Act, externing
him from the limits of Greater Bombay and the District of
Thana, for a period of two years. The order of externment
was directed to take effect within two days of the decision
of two criminal cases which were then pending against the
appellant and in case he was sentenced in the aforesaid
cases to a term of imprisonment, the order was to take
effect within two days from the date of his release from
jail. Against that order, the appellant filed an appeal
under section 60 of the Act, to the 2nd respondent, the
Government of Maharashtra, but that appeal was dismissed on
May 20, 1971, have with the modification that the externment
was to be effective from May 31, 1971.
The appellant then filed a petition in the Bombay High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge
the order of externment. Two contentions were made in the
High Court on behalf of the appellant : one, that the
allegations contained in- the show-cause notice where, too
vague to afford him a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself and two,that his activities were at best
confined to specific localities withinthe jurisdiction of
the Vile Parle police station and thereforethe order
asking him to remove himself from the limits of the
Districts of Greater Bombay and Thana was excessive and
unreasonable. On the first contention, reliance was placed
by the appellant on the judgment dated April 29, 1971 of a
Division bench of the Bombay High Court in Criminal
Application No.
67
332 of .1971, in which a similar notice was stuck down on
the ground of vagueness. The learned Judges declined to
follow that judgment as, in their opinion, it was
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inconsistent with the view taken by this Court in State of
Gujarat and Anr. v. Meliboob Khan Usman Khan etc.(1). On the
second contention, distinguishing the judgment of a Division
Bench of the High Court in Balu Shivling Dombe v. The
Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur (71 Bombay Law Reported
79) and following a judgment dated March 17, 1968 of another
Division Bench in Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1966, the
Iearned Judges held that in the circumstances of the case it
was reasonable to extern the appellant from the Emits of
Greater Bombay as also of the Thana District. The
correctness of this view is under challenge before US.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has
raised the following points :-
(i) The allegation that witnesses were not willing to come
forward to depose against the appellant in public is
falsified by the very record of the present proceedings.
(ii)The particulars contained in the notice issued under
section 59 of the Act are so vague that the appellant could
not possibly meet the allegations made against him and thus
he was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
(iii)The externing authority must pass a reasoned order
or else the right of appeal would become illusory.
(iv)The State Government also ought to have given reasons
in support of the order dismissing the appeal. Its failure
to state reasons show non-application of mind, and
(v) The order of externment imposes unreasonable
restrictions on the personal liberty of the appellant in
that, whereas his activities are alleged to be restricted to
an area within the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police
station, the order of externment not only extends to the
Whole District of Greater Bombay but to the District of
Thana also.
Regarding the first point, it is urged that in Criminal
Cases No. 2106/P of 1969 and 2337/P of 1969 which were filed
(1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 746.
68
against the appellant in the court of the learned Presidency
Magistrate, 22nd Court, Andheri, Bombay, five witnesses were
examined by the persecution in each case thereby falsifying
the. assertion that witnesses were not willing to come
forward to depose against the appellant in public. We
cannot accept this contention. No connection is shown to
exist between the two particular criminal cases and the
incidents referred to in the externment order. Counsel
attempted to establish that connection by saying that
Damayanti Deshpande who was inmical to the appellant was the
motive force behind the prosecution as well as the
externment proceedings. But the, affidavit of the Deputy
Commissioner has specifically denied that allegation.
Besides, as held by this Court in Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai
Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana & Ors. (1),
though, in order to attract the operation of section 56 of
the Act, the officer concerned has to satisfy himself that
witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence
in public, it is not necessary that all the witnesses must
be found thus unwilling to give evidence. The circumstance
therefore that in the two criminal cases certain witnesses
came forward to depose against the appellant in public
cannot falsify the assertion that witnesses were unwilling
to give evidence against the appellant in public.
On the second point, it is necessary to call attention to
the notice issued to the appellant, which was in these terms
:
"NOTICE UNDER SECTION 59 OF THE BOMBAY
POLICE ACT, 1961
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Name, address and age : Shri Pandharinath Shridhar
Rangnekar, Hindu, 28 years, Res. Rama Niwas, Nariman Road,
Vile Parle (East), Bombay-57.
Under Section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bom. XXIII
of 1951) you are hereby informed that the following
allegations are made against you in proceedings against you
under section 56 of the said Act.
In order to give you opportunity of tendering your
explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed
9 A.M. on 16-10-1969 to receive your explanation and to hear
you and your witness, if any, in regard to the said
allegations I Shri N. S. Joshi, Assistant Commissioner of
Police ’M’ Division, Bombay therefore require
you to appear before me at Vile Parl
e Police
Station on the said date viz. 16-10-1969 at 9
A.M. for the said purpose and to pass a bond
in the
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 533.
the
69
sum of Rs. 5001- for your attendance ’during the enquiry of
the said proceedings. Should you fail to appear before me
and to pass the bond as directed above, I shall proceed with
the enquiry in your absence.
Take note.
Allegations:-
1.Since March 1969 in the localities of Nehru Road, Azad
Road, Monghibai Road, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Ram Mandir Road
and the areas adjoining thereto in the jurisdiction of Vile
Parle Police Station, Great of Bombay your acts and
movements are causing harm, alarm and danger
to the residents of the aforesaid localities
’and areas.
2.That you assault the residents of the aforesaid
localities and areas either suspecting them of giving
information to the police about your illegal activities or
because they fail accede to your demand of money which
offences are punishable under chapter XVI of. the Indian
Penal Code.
3.That you commit robberies by extorting money and articles
from the residents of the aforesaid localities and areas by
means of assault and/or under threats of assault which are
offences punishable under chapter XVII of the Indian Penal
Code.
4.That since March,, 1969, you have committed several-acts
of the matter described in paras 1, 2 and 3 above.
5.That the witnesses to your above described acts and
movements are not willing to come forward and depose against
you in public by reason of apprehension on their part as
regards the safety of their persons in that they apprehend
danger to the safety of their person or property, if they do
so.
Sd/- 9-10-1969
N. S. Joshi,
Assistant Commissioner of Police ’N’ Division, Bandra,
Bombay."
Section 56 of the Act provides, to the extent material, that
whenever it shall appear in Greater Bombay to the
Commissioner (a) that the movements or acts of any person
are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm
to person or property, or (b) that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is
about to be engaged in the commission
70
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of an offence involving force or violence or an offence
punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian
Penal Code, and when in the opinion of such officer
witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence
in public against such person by reason of apprehension on
their part as regards the safety of their person or
property, the said officer may by order in writing direct
such person to remove himself outside the area within the
local limits of his jurisdiction or such area and any
district or districts, or any part thereof contiguous
thereto, within such time as the said officer may prescribe
and not to enter or return to the said area from which he
was directed to remove himself. .Under section 58, an order
of externment passed under section 56 can in no case exceed
a period of two years from the date on which it was made.
The relevant part of section 59(1) provides that before an
order under section 56 is passed against any person, the
officer shall inform that person in writing "of the general
nature of the material allegations against him and give him
a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation
regarding those allegations. The proposed externee is
entitled to lead evidence unless the authority takes the
view that the application for examination of witnesses is
made for the purpose of vexation or delay. Section 59 also
confers on the person concerned a right to file a written
statement and to appear through an advocate or attorney.
These provisions show that the reasons which necessitate or
justify the passing of an externment order arise out of
extraordinary circumstances. An order of externment can be
passed under clause (a) or (b) of section 56 if, and only
if, the authority concerned is satisfied that witnesses are
unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against
the proposed externee by reason of apprehension on their
part as regards the safety of their person or property. A
full and complete disclosure of particulars such as is
requisite in an open prosecution will frustrate the very
purpose of an externment proceeding. If the show cause
notice were to furnish to the proposed externee concrete
data like specific dates of incidents or the names of
persons involved in-these incidents, it would be easy enough
to fix the identity of those who out of fear of injury to
their person or property are unwilling to depose in public.
There is a brand of lawless element in society which it is
impossible to bring to book by established methods of
judicial trial because in such trials there can be no
conviction without legal evidence. And Illegal evidence is
impossible to obtain, because out of fear of reprisals
witnesses are unwilling to depose in public, That explains
why section 59 of the Act imposes but a limited obligation
on the authorities to inform the proposed externee "of the
general nature of the material allegations against him".
That obligation fixes
71
the limits of the co-relative right of the proposed
externee. He is entitled, before an order of externment is
passed under section 56, to know the material allegations
against him and the general nature of those allegations. He
is not entitled to be informed of specific particulars
relating to the material allegations.
It is true that the provisions of section 56 make a serious
inroad on personal liberty but such restraints have to be
suffered in the larger interests of society. This Court in
Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay and Another(1) had
upheld the validity of section 27(1) of the City of Bombay
Policy Act, 1902, which corresponds to section 38 of the
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Act. Following that decision, the challenge to the
constitutionality of section 56 was repelled in Bhagubhai
Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate,
Thana & Others (2 ). We will only add that care must be
taken to ensure that the terms of sections 56 and 59 are
strictly complied with and that the slender safeguards Which
those provisions offer are made available to the proposed
externee.
In Hari Khemu Gawali V. The Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Bombay and Another(3), in which an order of externment was
passed under section 57 of the Act, it was held by this
Court on an examination of the general scheme of the Act
that the provisions of sections 55, 56, 57 and 59 cannot be
held to be invalid on the grounds that only the general
nature of the material allegations is required to be
disclosed to the externee, and ,that it would be difficult
for him to get the matter judicially examined. Sinha J.,
speaking for the majority, observed:
"The grounds available to an externee had necessarily to be
very limited in their scope because if evidence were
available which could be adduced in public, such a person
could be dealt with under the preventive sections of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, under section 107
or section 110. But the special provisions now under
examination proceed on the basis that the person dealt with
under any of the sections 55, 56 or 57 is of such a
character as not to permit the ordinary laws of the land
being put in motion in the ordinary way mainly of examining
witnesses in open court who should be cross-
examined by the party against whom they were
deposing.’ The provisions we are now examining
are plainly intended to be used in special
cases requiring special treatment, that is,
cases which cannot be dealt with under the
preventive sections of the Code of Criminal
Procedure."
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 737. (2) [1956] S.C.R. 533.
(3) [1956] S.C.R. 506.
72
In State of Gujarat and Anr. etc. v. Mehboob Khan Usman Khan
etc. (1) this Court, reversing the judgment of the High
Court of Gujarat, rejected the argument that a notice
substantially similar to the one in the instant case was bad
for vagueness. It was held that the person proposed to be
extend was entitled to be informed of the general nature of
the material allegations and not to the particulars of those
allegations. As to the meaning of the phrase "general
nature of the material allegations", it was observed :
"Without attempting to be exhaustive we may state that when
a person is stated to be a ’thief, that allegation is vague.
Again, when it is said that ’A’ stole a watch from X on a
particular day and at a particular place’, tie allegation
can be said to be particular. Again, when it is stated
that’ X is seen at crowded bus stands and he picks pockets’
it is of a general nature of a material allegation. Under
the last illustration, given above, will come the
allegations, which, according to the Gujarat High Court,
suffer from being too general, or vague. Considering it
from the point of view of the party against whom an order of
externment is proposed to be passed, it must be
emphasised that when he has to tender an
explanation to a notice, under S. 59, he can
only give an explanation, which can be of a
general nature. It may be open to him to take
a defence, of the action being taken, due to
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mala fides, malice or mistaken identity, or he
may be able to tender proof of his general
good conduct, or alibi, during the period
covered by the notice and the like."
We must therefore reject the argument that the particulars
contained in the notice are vague. We endorse the view of
the High Court that Criminal Application No. 332 of 1971 in
which judgment was delivered on April 29, 1971 by another
Division Bench of that court was not correctly decided, to
the extent to which the notice therein was held to be vague.
The view taken in that case is inconsistent with the view
expressed by this Court in Mehboob Khan’s case.
The third and fourth point have the same answer as the
second point just dealt with by us. Precisely for the
reasons for which the proposed externee is only entitled to
be informed of the general nature of the material
allegations, neither the externing authority nor the State
Government in appeal can be asked to write a reasoned order
in the nature of a judgment. If those authorities were to
discuss the evidence in the case, it would be easy to fix
the identity of witnesses who were unwilling to depose in
(1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 746.
73
public against the proposed externee. A reasoned order con-
taining a discussion of the evidence led against the
externee would probably spark off another round of tyranny
and harassment.
As regards the last point, it is primarily for the
externing, authority to decide how best the externment order
can be made effective, so as to subserve its real purpose.
Now long, within the statutory limit of 2 years fixed by
section 58, the order shall operate and to what territories,
within the statutory limitations of section 56 it should
extend, are matters which must depend for their decision on
the nature of the data which the authority is able ,to
collect in the externment proceedings. There are cases and
cases and therefore no general formulation can be made that
the order of externment must always be restricted to the
area to which the illegal activities of the externee extend.
A larger area may conceivably have to be comprised within
the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his
moorings.
An excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no
greater restraint on personal liberty can be permitted that
is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The
decision of the Bombay High Court in Balu Shivling Dombe v.
The Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur (71 Bombay Law
Reporter 79) is an instance in point where an externment
order was set aside on the ground that it was far wider than
was justified by the exigencies of the case. The activities
of the externee therein were confined to the city of
Pandharpur and yet the externment order covered an area as
extensive as the districts of Sholapur, Satara and Poona.
These areas are far widely removed from the locality in
which the externee had committed but two supposedly illegal
acts. The exercise of the power was therefore arbitrary and
excessive, the order having been passed without reference to
the purpose of the externment.
But Balu Shivling’s case furnishes no analogy in the instant
matter. A vast city like Bombay presents its own peculiar
problems of law and order. It has an ever-growing
industrial complex and the city has spread its areas far and
wide. A fair proportion of its teeming population is,
mobile, with large multitudes streaming in and out of the
city in the pursuit of their daily avocations. An order of
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externment restricted to the particular area chosen by the
externee for his unlawful activities and to a small
periphery thereof would in such circumstances fail of its
true purpose. It would be impossible to secure obedience to
such an order and its enforcement would raise practical
problems which would impair the efficacy of the order. An
order in the instant case if restricted, say, to the areas
within the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police station and
its periphery would not serve its purpose. Rather than
solving a problem of law and order, it would create yet one
more.
74
That is why, on similar facts, the Bombay High Court has
consistently repelled challenges made to externment orders
on the ground that they extended not only to the district of
Greater Bombay but to the district of Thana as well. In
Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1968 a Division Bench
(Kotval C. J. and Kamat J.) observed in their judgment of
March 17, 1968 :-
"In the present case the area of activity of the externee
was undoubtedly stated to be Santacruz, but Santacruz is a
fairly wide area. Moreover, it is very intimately connected
with the surrounding area of Thana district. It is common
knowledge that Thana town in the surrounding area is also an
area where large industries have grown contiguous with the
industrial area of Greater Bombay and that the entire
industrial area is connected together by several means of
communication Including suburban trains of which there are
several during each day,, by taxis plying to and from
Greater Bombay and by bus services operating between Greater
Bombay and several parts of Thana District. Therefore, the
Police could reasonably have thought that it would not be
sufficient to ask the petitioner to keep off only from the
area of Greater Bombay which has an equally busy and highly
industrialised area contiguous to it. Therefore, the order
was extended to Thana District."
A similar view taken by Palekar and Gatne JJ. in Criminal
Applications 30 and 93 of 1970 decided on February 23, 1970
by Tulzapurkar J. in 73 Bombay Law Reporter 442 at pp. 453-
454 and by Bhasme and Kania JJ. in Criminal Application No.
149 of 1972 decided on March 3, 1972. As against the
judgment last mentioned the externee had filed special leave
petition No. 487 of 1972 in this Court, one of the grounds
stated therein being that the externment order was void
because the externee was asked to remove himself not only
out of the district of Greater Bombay but from the limits of
Thana district as will. The petition was dismissed by this
Court (Palekar and Dwivedi JJ.) on September 20, 1972.
These judgments of the Bombay High Court have taken the view
that the districts of Greater Bombay and Thana form, so to
say, a single unit. Palekar J. observes in his judgment in
Criminal Applications Nos. 30 and 93 of 1970 : "It may be
that the area of operation may be in a particular locality,
but if the externment is limited only to that area, then it
might be impossible to prevent the externee from visiting-
that area every day. Any part in Bombay is easily connected
by transport with any other part of Greater Bombay and also
the Thana District, and if, for example, ’an externee is
externed outside the limits of Greater Bombay, then he
should not take more than 15 minutes ’to reach Kurla
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from a Place like Thana if the latter is excluded from
externment. The very object of externment is to make it as
difficult as possible to the externee to return to the field
of his activities." Tulzapurkar J. expressed the same view
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by saying that "the contiguous area of Thana district is
intimately connected with the industrial area of Greater
Bombay with cheaper and quicker means of transport and
communication." According to Bhasme J. who delivered the
judgment of the Bench in Criminal Application No. 149 of
1972, "By reason of the means of communication and
proximity, the districts of Greater Bombay and Thana are for
all practical purposes one local area or one district."
Deshmukh J. in the _judgment under appeal, says that
"Greater Bombay and Thana districts are ... intimately
connected by Several communications". In matters of local
colour and conditions the view so consistently expressed by
the learned Judges of the High Court must, in our opinion,
be accepted as correct.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
K.B.N. Appeal
dismissed.
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