Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SIRSILK LTD. AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
TEXTILES COMMITTEE & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1988
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 317 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 880
1989 SCC Supl. (1) 168 JT 1988 (4) 592
1988 SCALE (2)975
ACT:
Textile Committee Act, 1963/Textile Committee Rules
1965: Sections 2(g), 12(1) and 22/Rule 21--Fee-Imposition
of-On production of rayon yarn and staple fibre yarn--
Constitutional validity of--Words used in statute to be
interpreted in popular sense.
%
Statutory Construction: Provision of earlier statute can
be made use of for purpose of construing a subsequent
statute in case of ambiquity.
HEADNOTE:
A number of textile mills which were engaged in the
business of manufacture and sale of rayon yarn and staple
fibre, i.e. man-made fibre, moved the High Courts under
article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
constitutional validity of the fee imposed upon them by the
Textile Committee under rule 21 of the Textile Committee
Rules. 1965 made by the Central Government under s. 22 of
the Textiles Committee Act, 1963. The levy of fee was
challenged on the ground that the Textile Committee was not
rendering any service to them by way of inspection or
examination of rayon yarn and that the element of quid pro
quo was totally absent.
The High Courts of Allahabad. Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat
and Madras upheld the validity of the levy, while the Kerala
High Court took the contrary view. The parties came up in
appeal to this Court. Four similar petitions pending in the
High Court of Bombay were also transferred to this Court.
Before the Court, it was contended on behalf of the
textile mills (1) the rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured
by them was made wholly Of filaments and not of fibres and
therefore the same are not textiles within the meaning of
the definition of textiles’ as contained of S.2(g) of the
Textile Committee Act. and hence not liable to payment of
any fee in accordance with rule 21 of the Textile Committee
Rules; and (2) the Textiles Committee rendered no service to
the writ petitioners because neither they needed the
services of the Committee nor the Committee was in a
position to render any service to them.
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PG NO 881
On behalf of the Revenue, the Additional Solicitor
General contended (I) the levy under r. 21 of the Rules was
not correlated to the power of inspection which the Textiles
Committee had under s. 11 of the Act, but was relatable to
its power to levy fees under s. 12 for the performance of
its functions, powers and duties under s. 4 (2) the avowed
object and purpose of the Act, as was clear from s. 3, was
‘quality control’ of all textile and it would be idle to
contend that rayon yarn and nylon yarn which were but
species of what was known as man-made fibres, otherwise
called artificial silk, and had a world market, should be
outside the purview of the Act, (3) the Act and the words
used therein had to be interpreted not on a technological or
specialised scientific plane, but in a popular sense as
understood by experts in the sphere of the textile industry
and the commercial world dealing with it; and (4) the
definition of ’textiles’ must be given a broad and liberal
construction in furtherance of the object and purpose of the
Act.
Dismissing the appeals filed by the textile mills and
allowing the appeal filed by the Textile Committee, it was
HELD: (1) In view of the fact that in the writ petitions
filled in the High Courts the textile mills had stated that
they were actually engaged in the manufacture of rayon yarn
and nylon yarn both of which. they averred, were ‘species of
what was known as man-made fibres’. their contention that
rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by them were not
‘yarn’ and therefore did not fall within the definition of
textiles under s. 2(g) of the Act could be countenanced.
[899E,-F]
(2) There was no explicable reason for the Legislature
to have excluded rayon yarn and nylon yarn from the purview
of the definition of textiles in s.(2)(g) of the Act. In the
premise, the expression ‘textiles’ as defined in s.2(g) of
the Act has to be given a broad and liberal construction, in
furtherance of the purpose and object of the Act. [901A-B]
(3) The Act and the words used therein have to be
interpreted not on a technological or specialised scientific
plane but in the popular sense as understood by experts in
the sphere of the textile industry and the commercial world
dealing with it. [901D-E]
(4) The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951 treats rayon as well as nylon as textiles made of
artificial (man-made) fibres. The Industries (Development
and Regulation) Act, 1951 and the Textiles Committee Act may
properly be considered to be statutes in pari materia.
[905b]
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(5) The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act is
an Act earlier in point of time, and there is no reason why
if a subsequent statute by the same Legislature can be
pressed In aid for the purpose of interpreting, in the event
of any doubt, the provisions of an earlier statute, the
earlier statute cannot be made use of for the purpose of
construing, in the event of ambiguity, the provisions of a
later statute. [905E]
(6) Rayon and nylon yarn are not only made of ’other
fibre’ but are also yarn of ’artificial silk’ within the
meaning of s. t(g) of the Act. [904D]
(7) The contention that rayon yarn and nylon yarn
manufactured by the mills are made wholly of filaments and
not of fibres and therefore did not come within the purview
of textiles as defined in s. 2(g) of the Act prior to its
amendment and therefore were not liable for payment of the
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fee levied under r. 21 of the Rules, cannot prevail.[905F]
(8) The grievance of the textile mills that there is no
inspection of the rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by
them at the stage of production is belied by the fact that
there is pre-shipment inspection of the fabrics manufactured
from such fibres for export. [91OB-C]
(9) When the entire proceeds of the fee are utilised in
financing the various projects undertaken by the Textiles
Committee, as also the inspection of all textiles including
man-made fibres and textile machinery, the appellants cannot
be heard to say that there is no reasonable and sufficient
correlation between the levy of the fee and the services
rendered. [907C]
(10) When the levy of the fee is for the benefit of the
entire textile industry, there is sufficient quid pro quo
between the levy recovered and the services rendered to the
industry as a whole. [91OD]
(11) The conclusion is inevitable that the levy of the
fee under r. 21 of the Textiles Committee Rules, 1965 by the
Textiles Committee under sub-s. (1) of s. 12 of the Textiles
Committee Act, 1963 is valid and constitutionally
permissible. [912B-C]
M/s Juggilal Kamalapat Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills
Co. Ltd. v. The Textiles Committee, Bombay, [1972] Tax L.R.
2104; The Travancore Rayons Ltd. r The Textiles Committee,
ILR (1972) Ker. 437: Sreeniwasa General Traders & Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, [1983]-3 SC R 843 referred to. The
PG NO 883
Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd ., Birlagram
Ujjain v. The Textiles Committee, Bombay, AIR 1980 MP
69,overruled.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 869/73,
863-64/77, 1460/80, 1281/73, and 1133-34/79.
From the Judgments and Orders dated 22.1.1973,
18.11.1976 10.4.1980, 30.10.72 and 24.10.1978 of the
Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Allahabad, Kerala, Allahabad High
Courts in Writ Appeal No. 154/72, Special Civil Application
No. 597/69, 598/69 F.A.F.O. No. 235/1972, S.C.A. No.
13707/1972 & Special Appeal No. 3 and 4/1972.
WITH
TRANSFERRED CASE NOS. 351-52, 354-55 of 1983.
Transfer Petition Nos. 21, 22, 24 to 26 of 1981 from
Bombay High Court.
V.C.Mahajan, G.L. Sanghi, N.R. Khaitan, Alok Sharma,
Krishan Kumar, Mrs. P. Shroff, Mrs. A.K. Verma, Joel Peres
and S.K. Jain for the Appellants in all the appeals.
V.A. Bobde, B.R. Agarwala, Ms. S. Manchanda, Dr. D.
Chandrachud and P . H . Parekh for the Petitioners in
Transferred Cases.
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, V.C.
Mahajan, Harish Salve, D.N. Misra, Mrs. A.K. Verma, T.C.
Sharma and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents in all the
appeals.
G.Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, V.C. Mahajan,
S.S. Shroff, P. Shroff, R. Sasiprabhu, T.C. Sharma, C.V.
Subba Rao. V.B. Desai, Bharat Sangal and Ms. Madhuri Gupta
for the Respondents in all the Transfer Cases.
P.H. Parekh and P. Narasimhan for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. In all these appeals except the one by special
leave, and the connected transferred cases brought by the
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appellants, each of which is a company incorporated under
the Companies Act, 1956 engageded in the business of
manufacture and sale on a very large scale of textiles
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generally and also of rayon yarn and staple fibre, both of
which form species of what is known as man-made fibre i.e.
artificial silk, there is a common question as to the
constitutional validity of a fee imposed under r. 21 of the
Textiles Committee Rules, 1965 made by the Central
Government under s. 22 of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963,
by the Textiles Committee constituted under s. 3 of the Act,
on the production of rayon yarn and staple fibre i.e. man-
made fibres manufactured by them. These appeals are against
the various judgments and orders of the High Courts of
Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Madras upholding the
validity of the levy. The remaining appeal i.e. Civil Appeal
No. 1281 of 1973 is preferred by the Textiles Committee
against the judgment and order of the Kerala High Court
taking the view to the contrary.
The facts in all these cases are more or less similar.
It would suffice for our purposes to notice the salient
features thereof. To illustrate, the appellant company in
Civil Appeal No. 869 of 1973, Messrs Sirsilk Ltd., Hyderabad
is a manufacturer of rayon yarn and staple fibre and has
established its factory at Sirpur Kagaznagar in the State of
Andhra Pradesh for the manufacture of the aforesaid man-made
fibres. The Chief Inspecting Officer, Textiles Committee by
his letter dated May 19, 1965 directed all the textile mills
in India including the appellant to send immediately, the
monthwise statements of production for March and April l965
and a cheque in payment of the fees due thereon. However,
the Association of Man-made Fibre Industry, Bombay of which
the appellant is a member by its letter dated May 25, 1985
advised the textile mills to keep the payment of fees in
abeyance, as it had made a representation dated May 26, 1965
on behalf of its members to the Ministry of Commerce,
Government of India and to the Textiles Commissioner. Along
with its letter, the Association forwarded to all its
members a copy of the said representation. By a further
letter dated May 29, 1965, the Association advised all the
textile mills including the appellant to send a reply to the
letter addressed by the Textiles Committee demanding payment
of fees to the effect that the Association had already made
a represention to the Ministry of Commerce and to the
Textiles Commissioner and as soon as a reply was received by
them, they would revert to the subject and take such action
as might be necessary in the circumstances. In the mean-
while, the Textiles Committee by its letter dated August 10,
1965 made a demand for payment of the fees for the months of
March to July 1965. The appellant in its reply expressed its
inability to pay the fees in view of the pending
representation made by the Association on their behalf and
more so because the Association had advised the members that
PG NO 885
the fee would become payable by the textile mills only in
connection with the inspection and examination and must be
commensurate with the exact quantum of services rendered by
the Committee. The appellant were however informed that one
of its members had already remitted the fees. Consequently,
the appellant paid a sum of Rs.40,186.37 p. towards the fee
for the period from March 1, 1965 to February 28, 1966. It
however adopted to the stand that the payment of the fee was
under a mistake and under misconception as to its legal
rights. It accordingly called upon the Association to take
up the matter with the Ministry of Commerce and the Textiles
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Commissioner and to lodge a strong protest against the
illegal exaction of the fee by the Textiles Committee from
its members when, in fact, no services of any kind were
being rendered.
Thereafter, the Accounts Officer, Textiles Committee by
letter dated February 26, 1969 called upon the appellant to
remit a sum of RS.33,343.62 p. towards the fee in respect of
production of rayon or staple fibre for the period from
March 1, 1966 to March 31, 1967. It was also advised to pay
the fee upto April 1968. In response thereto, the appellant
by its letter dated February 27, 1969 stated that the
Association had on behalf of its members addressed a letter
to the Secretary, Textiles Committee for certain
clarifications and on receipt of the reply, the Association
would advise its members as to the course of action.
Eventually,.the Secretary, Textiles Committee by a letter
dated March 11, 1970, called upon the appellant that it
should remit an amount of Rs.35,138.63 p. being the amount
of fee outstanding within ten days failing which the said
amount would be recovered as arrears of land revenue under
s. 12(2) of the Act. Aggrieved, the appellant moved the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art. 226 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the fee and the threatened
action for recovery. A learned Single Judge (Parthasarthi,
J.) by his judgment dated January 28, 1972 dismissed the
writ petition upholding the validity of the levy of the fee.
On appeal being preferred by the appellant the judgment of
the learned Single Judge was upheld by a Division Bench
(Gopuirao Ekbote, CJ and Chennakesava Reddy, J.) by its
judgment dated January 22 1973. The High Court of Andhra
Pradesh preferred to follow the view expressed by B.N.
Lokur, J. of the Allahabad High Court in M/s. Juggilal
Kamalapat Cotton Spinning Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. The
Textiles Committee, Bombay, [1972] Tax. LR 2104, and
dissented from the view taken by Issac, J. in The Travancore
Rayons Ltd. v. The Textile Committee, ILR 1972 Ker. 437
holding that the Textiles Committee was not entitled to levy
any fee under r.4 of the Rules so long as it was not
rendering any service by way of inspection or examination of
rayon yarn.
PG NO 886
Briefly stated, the facts in transferred cases nos. 351-
352 of 1983 are these. The petitioner in the first case the
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co, Ltd., Bombay carry on the business
of manufacture of rayon yarn and tyre-cord yarn, both of
which form species of what is popularly known as ‘men-made
rayon’, while the petitioners in the second Messrs Century
Enka Limited, Bombay carry on the business of manufacture of
nylon filament yarn. By letter dated May 25, 1968 the
Accounts Officer, Textiles Committee, Bombay called upon the
petitioner the Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. to remit a sum
of Rs.5,89,187.46 p. as fees in respect of production of
29,459,373.21 kgs. of rayon yarn for the period from March
1, 1966 to April, 30, 1968. The petitioners were also called
upon to pay the fees for April 1968. In reply, the
petitioners by their letter dated June 18, 1968 stated that
the Association of Man- made Fibre Industry, Bombay had
addressed a letter to the Secretary, Textiles Committee for
certain clarifications in the matter and on receipt of the
reply the Association would be advising its members further.
Thereupon, further correspondence ensued between the
Textiles Committee on the one hand and the Association on
the other. Thereafter, by letter dated February 20, 1969 the
Secretary, Textiles Committee intimated the petitioner that
it was proposed to initiate immediate action to recover the
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outstanding fees from the petitioner as arrears of land
revenue as contemplated under s. 12(2) of the Act. It was
further stated that in order to avoid coercive proceedings
the petitioner should pay up the arrears at least upto March
31, 1967 amounting to Rs.3,19,977.11 p.; in any case before
March 1, 1969 failing which the Textiles Committee would be
constrained to advise the concerned Collector to enforce
recovery of the outstanding fees as arrears of land revenue.
The petitioner accordingly moved a petition under Art. 226
of the Constitution before the High Court of Bombay for
quashing the impugned notice of demand dated February
20,1969 complaining that they had at no time made any
application for inspection and/or examination of the yarn
they manufacture nor did they ever approach the said
Committee to inspect and/or examine yarn manufactured by
them. They averred that neither the said Committee nor any
one on its behalf had rendered any service whatsoever to
them either at their instance or otherwise. Similarly, the
petitioner Century Enka Limited moved a petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution the High Court of Bombay contending
that the Textiles Committee was not entitled to demand or
recover a sum of Rs.78,553.15 p. or any other sum by way of
fees on the nylon yarn manufactured by them, on the ground
that the element of quid pro quo was totally absent inasmuch
PG NO 887
as no services at all were rendered by the Committee to
them. These two writ petitions were ordered to be
transferred to this Court under Art. 139 of the Constitution
and numbered as transferred cases nos. 351-352 of 1983.
Similar are the facts in other cases. In transferred
case no.354/83 Messrs Nirlon Synthetic Fibres & Chemicals
Limited, Bombay carry on the business of manufacture of
nylon yarn and apparently paid Rs.8,820.40 p. by way of fees
on the nylon yam manufactured by them in compliance with the
notice of demand issued by the Accounts Officer, Textiles
Committee dated February 20, 1969. The petitioner in the
other case transferred case no. 355/83 Messrs Garwara Nylons
Limited, Bombay also carry on the business of manufacture or
nylon yarn and paid Rs.51,738.89 p. by way of fee in
compliance with the circular issued by the Chief Inspecting
Officer, Textiles Committee, Bombay dated May 19, 1965 and
assert that the payment of the said amount was under a
mistake. Both these petitioners moved the High Court under
Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the
levy of the fee and prayed for the issue of a writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the Textiles Committee to
refund the amounts recovered from them. Both these writ
petitions were also transferred to this Court under Art. l39
and are numbered as transferred cases nos. 354-355/83.
In Civil Appeals Nos. 863-864/77, the appellant Baroda
Rayon Corporation Limited, Gujarat are engaged in the
business of manufacture of rayon yarn and paid Rs.55,100
towards the fee in compliance with the notice of demand
issued by the Accounts Officer, Textiles Committee dated
March 9, 1966 for the period from March 1. 1965 to February
28, 1966. They were further called upon by the Secretary,
Textiles Committee to remit a sum of Rs.39,211.26 p. towards
the arrears upto March 31, 1967. The appellant challenged
the recovery of the said amount of Rs.55,100 as well as the
threatened demand of a further sum of Rs.39,211.26 p. by the
Textiles Committee as being ultra vires by petitions under
Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of
Gujarat. A Division Bench (S. Obul Reddy, CJ & N.H. Bhatt,
J.) by its judgment dated November 18, 1976 upheld the
validity of the fee and accordingly dismissed the writ
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petitions.
The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1460/80 Messrs Modipon
Limited, Meerut are manufacturers of nylon yarn. The
Accounts Officer, Textiles Committee by his letter dated
June 11, 1960 required the company to pay the arrears of
fees for the period from March 1965 to May 1968. The company
PG NO 888
brought a suit being Original Suit No. 86/70 in the Court of
the II Civil Judge, Meerut for a declaration and perpetual
injunction. In the suit it applied for grant of a temporary
injunction under Order XXXIX, r. 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 restraining the Textiles Committee from
recovering the fees on the ground that the nylon yarn
manufactured by them did not fall within the definition of
’textiles’ under s. 2(g) of the Act. The learned Civil Judge
by his order dated May 12, 1972 granted ad-interim temporary
injunction but later vacated the same. The appellant
accordingly went up in appeal to the High Court. A Division
Bench (M.N. Shukla & N.N. Mithal, JJ) by its order dated
April 10, 1980 substantially disallowed the application for
temporary injunction while making a direction requiring the
learned Civil Judge to examine whether the appellant had
commenced production since March 1968 and therefore the
demand for fee for the period anterior to the commencement
of the production could not possibly be sustained.
Appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 1133-34/79 Messrs. J
business of manufacture of rayon yarn under the name and
style of J.K. Rayon, and of nylon yarn under the name and
style of J.K. Synthetics Limited. For the period from March
1965 to February 1966 they paid Rs.49,372.65 p. Thereafter,
they fell into arrears. The two companies filed petitions
under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of
Allahabad contending inter alia that the said payments were
made under mistake without realising the implications of the
Textiles Committee Act or the Rules, and prayed for the
issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
Textiles Committee to refund the amount in question. As
already stated, B.N. Lokur, J. in Juggilal’s case by his
judgment dated November 6, 1971 upheld the validity of the
levy of the fee and dismissed the writ petitions. On appeal,
a Division Bench (Satish Chandra, CJ and Yashoda Nandan, J.)
by its judgment dated October 24, 1978 dismissed the
appeal.
In Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 1973 the Textiles Committee
has come up in appeal against the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala (Isaac, J.) who by
his judgment dated March 3, 1972 in Travancore Rayons Ltd.
held that the levy of the fee by the Committee was without
the authority of law and so long as the Committee was not
rendering any service by way of inspection and examination
of rayon yarn manufactured by Messrs Travancore Rayon
Limited, it was not entitled to recover the same.
PG NO 889
In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is
necessary to set out the background in which the Textiles
Committee was constituted, the object and purpose of the
Textiles Committee Act as also the relevant provisions of
the said Act and the Rules made thereunder. The history of
the legislation has been set out in the counter-affidavit
filed on behalf of the Textiles Committee and is as
follows.
The Second world war gave a completely sheltered market
for Indian Textiles and created an unprecedented boom for
their products. They were, however, for a variety of
reasons, unable to with- stand the severe international
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competition they had to face in foreign markets with the
return of normal conditions after the war. Alive to the
various problems faced by the Textile Industry in general
and the Cotton Textile Industry in particular, the
Government of India took timely steps to arrest the crisis
by adopting various measures to safeguard production and
export of cotton textiles and to assure the efficiency of
the Cotton Textile Industry. It was in this context that the
Cotton Textiles Fund Ordinance, 1944’ was promulgated,
establishing a ‘Fund’ for supervising the exports of cloth
and yarn and for develop- ment of technical education,
research and other matters in relation to the Cotton Textile
Industry. The Cotton Textiles Fund Committee which was
appointed as the body to perform the various functions
imposed under the Ordinance did very useful work during the
period from 1945 to 1964 for the improvement of the said
industry and so as to enable it to meet the competition of
foreign textiles in international market. The Ordinance,
promulgated in 1944 establishing the Cotton Textiles Fund
Committee, had provisions to safeguard exports of Cotton
Textiles only. As more and more items of textiles such as
wool. silk, art silk and other man-made fibre fabrics and
yarn started finding their way into the international market
in increasing quantities. it became necessary for the
Government of India to create a homo- genous entity to look
after and promote the improvement and safeguard for all such
textile items. It was also necessary to take such step in
the case of these schemes of the Textile Industry both for
improving standards in such industry and because the same
were in many ways connected and inter-related with the
Textile Industry. Such action and inter-relation arose
because of the nature of the commodities and because in many
cases composite fibres and textiles were produced and many
units engaged in production of such synthetics and other
materials were also engaged in the Cotton Textile Industry.
Parliament accordingly enacted the Textiles Committee
Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) which received
the assent of the President on December 3, 1963. It was
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meant to re-enact the provisions of the aforesaid Ordinance
and to make the same applicable to all textiles including
all synthetic fibres i.e. rayon yarn, staple fibre, nylon
yarn, man-made fibre commonly known as artificial silk.
The avowed object and purpose of the Act, as reflected
in the long title, is to provide for the establishment of a
Committee for ensuring the. quality of textiles and textile
machinery and for matters connected therewith. S. 2(f) of
the Act defines ‘textile machinery’ to mean the equipment
employed directly or indirectly for the processing of
textile fibre into yarn and for the manufacture of fabric
therefrom by weaving or knitting and to include equipment
used either wholly or partly for the finishing, folding or
packing of textiles. S. 2(g) defines ‘textiles’. This
definition as originally enacted read as follows:
"2(g). ‘Textiles’ means any fabric or cloth or yarn made
wholly or in part of cotton, or wool or silk or artificial
silk or other fibre. "
By Act No. 51 of 1973, a new definition of ‘textiles’
was substituted w.e .f. January 1, 1975 and it reads:
"2(.g). ’textiles’ means any fabric or cloth or yarn or
garment or and other article made wholly or in part of--
(i) cotton; or
(ii) wool;or
(iii) silk;or
(iv) artificial silk or other fibre, and includes fibre.
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S. 3 of the Act provides for establishment of the
Textiles Committee by the Central Government. S. 4 deals
with the functions of the Committee. The functions of the
Committee as stated in s. 4 generally are to ensure by such
measures as it thinks fit, standard qualities of textiles
both for internal marketing and export purposes and the
manufacture and use of standard type of textile machinery.
It reads follows:
"4. Functions of the Committee--(1). Subject to the
provisions of this Act, the functions of the Committee shall
PG NO 891
generally be to ensure by such measures, as it thinks fit,
standard qualities of textiles both for internal marketing
and export purposes and the manufacture and use of standard
type of textile machinery.
(2) without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section (1), the Committee may--
(a) undertake, assist and encourage, scientific,
technological and economic research in textile industry and
textile machinery,
(b) promote export of textiles and textile machinery and
carry on propaganda for that purpose;
(c) establish or adopt or recognise standard
specifications for--
(i) textiles, and
(ii) packing materials used in the packing of textiles
or textile machinery, for the purposes of export and for
internal consumption and affix suitable marks on such
standardised varieties of textiles and packing materials;
(d) specify the type of quality control or inspection
which will be applied to textiles or textile machinery;
(da) provide for training in the techniques of quality
control to be applied to textiles or textile machinery;
(e) provide for the inspection and examination of--
(i) textiles;
(ii) textile machinery at any stage of manufacture and
also while it is in use at mill-heads;
(iii) packing materials used in the packing of textiles
or textile machinery;
(f) establish laboratories and test houses for the
testing of textiles;
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(g) provide for testing textiles and textile machinery
in laboratories and test houses other than those established
under clause (f);
(h) collect statistic for any of the above mentioned
purposes from--
(i) manufacturers of, and dealers in, textiles;
(ii) manufacturers of textile machinery; and
(iii) such other persons as may be prescribed;
(i) advice on all matters relating to the development of
textile industry and the production of textile machinery;
(j) provide for such other matters as may be prescribed.
(3) In the discharge of its functions, the Committee
shall be bound by such directions as the Central Government
may, for reasons to be stated in writing, give to it from
time to time.
S. 7 of the Act provides for constitution of a Fund
called the Textiles Fund. Fees recovered under the Act form
part of this Fund. The moneys in the Fund are applied for
meeting the pay and allowances of the officers and other
employees of the Committee and other administrative expenses
of the Committee and for carrying out the purposes of the
Act. S. 11 confers on the Committee the power of inspection
and provides:
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"(11) Inspection--(1) The Committee may, on application
made to it or otherwise, direct an officer specially
authorised in that behalf to examine the quality of textiles
or the suitability of textile machinery for use at the time
of manufacture or while in use in a textile mill and submit
a report to the Committee.
(2) Subject to any rules made under this Act, such an
officer shall have power to--
(a) inspect any operation carried on in connection with
the manufacture of textiles or textile machinery in relation
PG NO 893
to which construction particulars, marks or inspection
standards have been specified,
(b) the samples of any article or of any material or
substance used in any article or process in relation to
which construction particulars, marks or inspection
standards have been specified;
(c) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of the report referred to in sub-section
(1), the Committee may tender such advice, as it may deem
fit to the manufacturer of textiles the manufacturer of
textile machinery and the applicant."
S. 12 provides for levy of fees for inspection and
examination and reads as follows:
"12. (1). The Committee may levy such fees as may be
prescribed--
(a) for inspection and examination of textiles,
(b) for inspection and examination of textile machinery.
(c) for any other services which the Committee may
render to the manufacturers of textile and textile
machinery:
Provided that the Central Government may by notification
in the Official Gazette, exempt from the payment of fees,
generally or in any particular case.
(2). Any sum payable to the Committee under sub-s. (1)
may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue."
(The section quoted here is as it stood before its
amendment by Act 51 of 1973).
S. 22(1) confers on the Central Government power to make
rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In
particular, s. 22(2)(e) empower he Central Government to
make rules providing "the scale of fees that may be levied
for inspection and examination under s. 12".
PG NO 894
In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 22, the
Central Government made the Textiles Committee Rules, 1965.
A levy of fee was introduced for the first time w.e.f. March
1, 1965 by virtue of r. 21 of the Rules. The Table forming
part of r. 21 under which the fee was levied was in these
terms:
"21. Fee for inspection, examination and other services
rendered by the Committee--
(1) The Committee may with effect from 1st March, 1965
levy and collect for inspection and examination of textiles
and textile machinery specified in col. 2 of the Table
below, the fee specified in the corresponding entry in col.
3 of that Table:
-----------------------------------------------------------
TABLE:
Sl. Description of textiles Fee
No. and textile machinery
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3
-----------------------------------------------------------
1. Cotton cloth where the average 6 paise for every 100
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count of yarn used in the cloth square metres manufactu-
is less than 355 red.
2. Cotton cloth where the average 10 paise for every 100
count of yarn used in the cloth square metres manufa-
is less than 355. or finer ctured.
3. Woollen yarn 2 paise per kg. manufa-
ctured.
4. Man-made Cellulosic or 2 paise per kg. manuf-
non-cellulosic filament yarn actured.
5. Man-made cellulosic fibre cut 2 paise per kg. manuf-
to staple length actured.
6. Textile machinery 8 paise per Rs. 100ad
valorem on the ex-
factory price of the
machinery manufact-
ured.
----------------------------------------------------------
"(2) The Committee may levy and collect, for any other
service rendered by it to the manufacturers of textiles and
PG NO 895
textile machinery such fee as it may fix with the approval
of the Central Government."
With effect from the 11th June, 1966, the Table of Fee
was revised to reads as under:
TABLE
------------------------------------------------------------
Sl. Description of textiles Fee
No. and textile machinery
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3
------------------------------------------------------------
1. Cotton cloth where 6 paise for every
the average count of metres manufactured.
yarn used in the cloth
is less than 35 s.
2. Cotton cloth where 10 paise for every
the average count of square metres manu-
yarn used in the cloth factured.
is 35 or finer.
3. (a) Woollen yarn 2 paise per kg. manu-
(excluding shoddy factured
and carpet yarn)
(b) Shoody and carpet 1 paise per kg. manu-
yarn factured
4. (a) Man-made 2 paise per kg. manu-
cellulosic or non- factured
cellulosic filament
yarn (other than
nylon filament yarn)
(b)Nylon filament yarn 6 paise per kg. manu-
factured
5. (a) Man-made 1 paise per kg. manu-
cellulosic fibre cut factured
to staple length
(b) Man-made non- 2 paise per kg. manu-
Cellulosic fibre factured
cut to staple length.
6. Textile machinery 8 paise per Rs. 100
(assembled) ad valorem on the
ex-factory price of
the machinery manu-
factured
PG NO 896
7. Cotton yarn for 2 paise per kg. inspected.
export
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8. Natural silk yarn 50 paise per Rs.100 f.o.b.
for fabric for export price of the goods instec-
ted.
It must be stated here that Act No. 51/73 introduced a
new provision S. 5A as a result of which a cess has been
imposed in place of a fee. Sub-s. (1) provides that there
shall be levied and collected as a cess for the purposes of
this Act a duty of excise on all textiles and on all textile
machinery manufactured in India at such rate, not exceeding
1% ad valorem as the Central Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, fix. Proviso thereto interdicts
that no such cess shall be levied on textiles manufactured
from out of handloom or power- loom industry. Sub-s. (2) of
s. 5A directs that the duty of excise levied under sub-s.
(1) shall be in addition to any cess or duty leviable on
textiles or textile machinery under any other law for the
time being in force. Another change brought about was to
delete cl. (b) of s. 12, and cl. (c) relettered as cl. (b)
and a proviso were inserted, with the word’ special’
inserted in place of the word ’other’. The new cl. (b) so
inserted is in these terms:
(b) for any special service which the Committee may
render to the manufacturers or exporters of textiles and
textile machinery;
Provided that no fees shall be levied in respect of
inspection and examination of textiles on which a duty of
excise is leviable under this Act:’
All these cases pertain to the period prior to January
1, 1975 i.e. prior to the enactment of Act 51/73. We are
here concerned with the validity of the fee as levied under
r. 21 of the Rules and the question is whether the
imposition can be justified as a fee.
We have had the benefit of hearing Shri V. M. Tarkunde,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant J.K. Cotton Spg.
& Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd., Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant Baroda Rayon Corporation
Limited, Shri Vinod Bobde, learned counsel appearing, on
behalf of Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. and Century Enka
Limited, Shri N.K. Khaitan, learned counsel appearing for
Sirsilk Limited, Dr. Dhananjaya Chandrachud, learned counsel
appearing for Nirlon Synthetics Fibres and Chemicals Ltd.
and Garware Nylons Ltd. and Shri Krishna Kumar, learned
PG NO 897
counsel for Modipon Limited. The learned counsel presented
their respective points of view with much resource and
learning.
On behalf of the appellants and the petitioners, the
learned counsel put forth in substance two main contentions,
namely: (1) That rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by
the writ petitioners before the High Court i.e. appellants
and the petitioners before us, are made wholly of filaments
and not at all of fibres and therefore are not textiles
within the meaning of the definition of ‘textiles’ as
contained in s. 2(g) of the Act accordingly are outside the
purview of the Act and not liable to payment of any fee in
accordance with r. 21 of the Rules as originally framed or
as it existed after its amendment w.e.f. June 11, 1966. And
(2) That the Textiles Committee rendered no service to the
writ petitioners in respect of their production of rayon
yarn and nylon yarn and hence it was not within its
competence to levy any fee on them under r. 21 of the Rules.
According to the writ petitioners, in fact they do not need
the services of the Committee and the Committee is also not
in a position to render any service to them, not having even
laid down standard specifications for the manufacture of
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rayon yarn or nylon yarn. It was submitted that there was no
correlation between the fee charged and the service
rendered by the Committee and there is complete absence of
the element of quid pro quo, legally essential for levying a
fee.
Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Additional Solicitor General,
on the other hand, during his lucid and forceful submissions
repelled the arguments. He submitted that the levy under r.
21 of the Rules was not correlated to the power of
inspection which the Textiles Committee had under s. 11 of
the Act, but was relatable to its power to levy fees under
s. 12 for the performance of its functions, powers and
duties under s. 4. He contended that the avowed object and
purpose of the Act as is clear from s. 3 was ‘quality
control’ of all textiles, and it would be idle to contend
that rayon yarn and nylon yarn which are but species of what
is known as man-made fibres, otherwise called artificial
silk and has a world market, should be outside the purview
of the Act. He cautioned that we have to bear in mind that
the Act is not a scientific treatise on organic and
inorganic chemistry but is an Act by Parliament for the
benefit of the indigenous textile industry so that it may be
able to hold its own in a fiercely competitive international
market. He therefore contends that the Act and the words
used therein have to be interpreted not on a technological
or specialised scientific plane, but in a popular sense as
understood by experts in the sphere of the textile industry
the commercial world dealing with it. The learned Additional
PG NO 898
Solicitor General questioned the correctness of the decision
rendered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in The Gwalior
Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd., Birlagram, Ujjain
v. The Textiles Committee, Bombay & Anr., AIR (1980) MP 69
as also its interpretation of the definition of ‘textiles’
in s. 2(g) of the Act prior to its amendment by Act No.
51/73 as not including viscose staple fibre. According to
him, the whole approach of the High Court in Gwalior Rayon’s
case in adopting a literal construction of the definition of
textiles’ in s. 2(g) of the Act prior to its amendment was
totally unsupportable. A literal construction of the
definition of ‘textiles’ in s. 2(g) of the Act prior to its
amendment, it is said, would lead to a manifest absurdity.
If that view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court were to
prevail, it is urged that the whole purpose and object of
the Act would be frustrated. The definition of textiles in
s. 2(g) prior to its amendment must be given a broad and
liberal construction in furtherance of the object and
purpose of the Act. The learned Additional Solicitor General
also placed before us a wealth of material showing that a
huge infra-structure has been built by the Central
Government over the years and it has invested crores of
rupees to make the establishment of the Textiles Committee
under s. 3 of the Act meaningful with a view to maintain
quality control on all textiles including man-made fibres or
artificial silk which have a world market. Finally, the
learned Additional Solicitor General strongly relied upon
the decision of this Court in Sreeniwasa General Traders &
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 843 for
the submission that the validity of the levy has to be
sustained as there is broad co-relationship between the
imposition of the fee and the nature of the services
rendered to the entire textile industry. We shall deal with
the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the
appellants and the petitioners in seriatim.
As to the first contention that the rayon yarn and nylon
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yarn manufactured by the appellants and the petitioners were
filaments and not fibres and therefore did not fall within
the ambit of the definition of textiles in s. 2(g) of the
Act prior to its amendment, Shri khaitan who,first argued
the case of Sirsilk Limited and more particularly Shri
Tarkunde appearing on behalf of J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg.
Mills Co. Ltd., followed by Shri Krishna Kumar appearing for
Modipon Limited placed strong reliance on scientific and
technological material explaining the manufacturing process
of rayon yarn and nylon yarn to contradistinguish the same
from fibres. The learned Additional Solicitor General
rightly drew our attention to the averments made in
paragraph 1 of the writ petitions before the High Court in
which each of the appellants and the petitioners has
specifically averred that they are manufacturers of rayon,
PG NO 899
and submitted that they cannot be heard to say that the
product manufactured by them was not rayon made of
artificial silk or fibre. The contention of the learned
Additional Solicitor General must prevail. The averments in
paragraph 1 of the writ petitions are more or less the same.
We need only reproduce paragraph 1 of the writ petition
filed by Messrs Sirsilk -Limited, and it reads:
"The petitioners are a Limited Company incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act and are having their
Registered office at Himayatnagar, Hyderabad-29. The
Petitioners, inter alia, carry on the business of
manufacture of rayon yarn and staple fibre both of which
form species of what is popularly known as "man made yarn".
For the purpose of manufacturing the aforesaid yarns, the
petitioners have established their factory at Sirpur
Kagaznagar."
To the same effect are the averments made in the writ
petitions filed by the appellants M/s. J.K. Cotton Spinning
& Weaving Co. Ltd., M/s. Baroda Rayon Corporation Ltd. and
M/s. Modipon Ltd. as well as by the petitioners M/s. Century
Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd.. Century Enka Ltd., M/s.
Nirlon Synthetic Fibres & Chemicals Ltd. and M/s. Garware
Nylons Ltd. On their own showing, the appellants as well as
the petitioners are actually engaged in the manufacture of
rayon yarn and nylon yarn both of which they aver are
species of what is known as man-made fibres . In view of
this undisputed factual position, the contention that rayon
yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by them are ‘filaments’ and
not fibre’ or that they are not yarn’ and therefore do not
fall within the definition of textiles under s. 2(g) of the
Act prior to its amendment, cannot be countenanced.
The main thrust of the argument of learned counsel for
the appellants and the petitioners that rayon yarn and nylon
yarn manufactured by the appellants and the petitioners are
not fibres but filaments, stems from the decision of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in The Gwalior Rayon Silk
Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd., Birlagram, Ujjain v. The
Textile Committee, Bombay (supra). In the decision, the
Madhya Pradesh High Court assumes that a fibre in order to
answer the description of yarn, in the ordinary commercial
sense must be a spun strand meant for use in weaving,
knitting or rope-making. It proceeds upon the basis that
although viscose staple fibre was manufactured out of fibre
but it had to be subjected to various other operations such
PG NO 900
as blending, carding, combing or hackling and spinning
before fibre could be converted into yarn. Upon that basis,
the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that viscose staple fibre
manufactured by the Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.)
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Co. Ltd. was made wholly of filaments and therefore was not
fibre and hence was not yarn and accordingly did not fall
within the meaning of the expression textiles as defined in
s. 2(g) of the Act. We are afraid, we cannot accept this
line of reasoning.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court was clearly wrong in
giving to the expression ’textiles’ in s. 2(g) of the Act a
narrow and restricted meaning. The reasoning of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court is best stated in the words of G.P.
Singh, CJ. speaking for himself and C.P. Sen, J:
"According to this definition, textiles meant "any
fabric or cloth or yarn made wholly or in part of cotton, or
wool or silk, or artificial silk or other fibre". The use of
the word ‘means’ in the definition gives rise to the
inference of its being restrictive and exhaustive. Further,
it is clear that what was embraced by the definition before
1st January 1975 was any fabric or cloth or yarn and not any
fibre. The definition made a distinction between yarn and
fibre. The same distinction appears in Section 2(f) in the
definition of ‘textile machinery’ which expression is
defined to mean the equipment employed "for the processing
of textile fibre into yarn .. ". The Act does not contain
any definition of ’yarn’ and hence it has to be understood
in its ordinary sense to mean ’any fibre, or wool, silk,
flax, cotton, nylon etc. spun into strands for weaving,
knitting or making thread". [Webster’s New World
Dictionary]."
The learned Chief Justice then added:
"A fibre in order to answer the description of ‘yarn’ in the
ordinary commercial sense must be a spun strand meant for
use in weaving, knitting or rope-making Commr. of Sales Tax
U.P. v. Sarin Textile Mills, AIR 1975 SC 1262 at p. 1263. It
is true that yarn is manufactured out of fibre but various
operations such as blending, carding, combing or hackling
and spinning have to be performed for converting fibre into’
yarn (See the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th Edition,
Vol. 18, p. 173.)"
PG NO 901
There was no explicable reason for the legislature to
have excluded rayon yarn and nylon yarn from the purview of
the definition of textiles in s. 2(g) of the Act prior to
its amendment. The expression ‘textiles’ has been defined in
s. 2(g) of the Act in a way as to include not only yarn but
also man-made fibres or artificial silk. In the premises,
the expression ‘textiles’ as defined in s. 2(g) of the Act
has to be given a broad and liberal construction, in
furtherance of the purpose and object of the Act.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court was clearly in error in
construing the expression ‘textiles’ as defined in s. 2(g)
of the Act, prior to its amendment in a narrow and
restricted sense. The particular words used by the
legislature i.e. the terms ‘yarn, man-made fibres, otherwise
known as artificial silk’ had to be understood according to
the common commercial understanding of the terms used, and
not in their scientific or technical sense. The High Court
failed to bear in mind that the Act is not a scientific
treatise on organic or inorganic chemistry but is an
enactment by the Parliament for the benefit of the
indigenous textile industry, so that it may be able to hold
its own in a fiercely competitive international market. In
these circumstances, the Act and the words used therein have
to be interpreted not on a technological or specialised
scientific plane but in the popular sense as understood by
experts in the sphere of the textile industry and the
commercial world dealing with it. We find no discernible
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reason for Parliament to have left out man-made fibres like
viscose staple fit re. rayon yarn and nylon yarn from the
purview of the definition of textiles in s. 2(g) of the Act
prior to its amendment particularly when synthetic fibres
have a world market and India has entered into competitive
international trade in all textiles in a large way.
We were referred to several Encyclopaedias,
authoritative treatises, text-books and hand books viz.,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, both Micropaedia and the 15th
Edn., ‘Textile Terms and Definitions’, 5th Edn. published by
the Textile Institute, Manchester in 1963, 1968 Book of
American Society for Testing and Materials, Part 24, Mercury
Dictionary of Textile Terms, Standard Handbook of Textiles
by A.J. Hall, Handbook of Textile Fibres, 4th Edn. by J.
Gordon Cook, Manmade Fibres by Mark-Atlas and Cernia, Vol.
2, Textile Fibres by Mathews, 6th Edn. and Survey of Man-
made Fibre Industry by Dr. A.S. Kapur. These Encyclopaedias
and technological books contain a wealth of information
collected by knowledgeable, and distinguished men who have
acquired distinction in their own spheres of academic and
are made use of not only by our own Courts but by Courts of
PG NO 902
other countries where English language is in vogue.
The words ‘fibre’ and ‘filament’ are not defined either
in the Act or the Rules thereunder. The meaning assigned to
‘fibre’ in Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of
English Language, 2nd Edn. is a "filament and thread like
part of a substance as a filament of spun glass, wool, or
hornblende". Even a ‘filament’, according to this
Dictionary, consequently constitutes ‘fibre’. ‘Artificial
silk’, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, 6th Edn.,
1976 means rayon.
In Encyclopaedia Britannica 14th Edn. Vol. 7, p. 257
under the heading ‘Fibres, Man-made’, the following passage
occurs:
"Man-made fibre consists of two broad grounds, based
upon the origin of the fibre-forming substance. The first
group, of which rayon and acedate are examples, are produced
by modifying natural fibre-forming materials such as
cellulose. The second group, frequently called synthetics
and including such fibres as nylon and polyester, are
produced from synthetic chemicals ....... "
Again there occurs a passage at p. 260 of the same
volume in the following terms:
"In man-made fibres, the importance of rayon is similar
to that of cotton among the natural fibres."
Under the heading Synthetic fibres" sub-heading
"Polyamide fibres’’ at p. 263 it is stated:
"Polyamides are polymers, or chain-like structure of
linked molecular units, containing recurring amide groups as
integral parts of the main polymer chains. Synthetic
polyamide fibres form nylon, a major textile fibre."
In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 18 under the heading
"Development of the textile industry" sub-heading production
of yarn’, at p. 172, we notice the following passage:
"Yarn is a strand composed of fibres, filaments
(individual fibres of extreme length), or other materials,
either natural or man-made, suitable for use in the
construction of interlaced fabrics. such as woven or knitted
types."
PG NO 903
This passage again indicates that in the textile
industry ‘filaments’ are treated as individual fibres of
extreme length.
Similarly, in Chamber’s Encyclopaedia, Vol. 5 at p. 613,
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the term ‘fibre’ is explained thus:
"Fibre, a term used for a thread-like element of animal
or vegetable tissue .......and any thread or filament used
in the manufacture of textile materials. The range of fibres
used for making fabrics was restricted to naturally
occurring substances until the introduction of man-made
fibres. These include regenerated fibres, such as those made
from cellulose, and truly synthetic fibres, such as nylon,
Terylene, and Courtelle."
At p. 616 of the same volume under the heading
"Artificial Fibres", it is stated:
"Artificial fibres can be divided into two main groups;
regenerated and synthetic. In the first class a further sub-
division can be made between fibres made from regenerated
cellulose, i.e. viscose, acetate and cuprammonium protein
such as Fibrolane. Fibres in the second class are strictly
synthetic in the sense that they are built up from simple
chemical compounds into the complex molecular structure
required. They are classified according to their chemical
composition: polyamides (nylon and perlorn) ..........
In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, Vol. VIII at
P. 442 under the heading ‘rayon’ the following passage
occurs:
"Rayon, generic term for man-made textile fibre produced
from the plant substance cellulose. Developed in an attempt
to produce silk chemically, the fibre was originally known
by such terms as artificial silk and wood silk, but in 1924
it was given the coined name rayon. Anitrocellulose type,
first produced commercially in France in 1891 in the form of
a nitrocellulose fibre, it was later discontinued because of
its high flammability. Rayon is described as a re-generated
fibre because the cellulose is converted to a liquid
compound and then back to cellulose in the form of fibre.
The cellulose, obtained from soft woods or from the short
fibres adhering to cotton seeds (linters), is chemically
PG NO 904
treated to form a solution that is forced through tiny
holes in a nozzle (spinnerets). This process of forcing a
solution through spinneret holes is called spinning; the
same term is applied to the production of yarn by twisting
together fibres that may be of natural man-made origin.
Emerging in the form of filament, a fibre of great length,
the rayon is hardened by drying in air or by chemical means.
The filament is sometimes out into shorter pieces having
uniform length, called staple, and twisted together to make
yarn.
(Emphasis supplied)
The passages quoted above clearly show that even in the
sphere of textile technology distinction between ‘fibre’ and
‘filament’ has reached a vanishing point. They further show
that both nylon and rayon are ‘artificial silk’ yarn in
contra-distinction to genuine silk. We accordingly uphold
the view expressed by the High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat and Madras and hold that rayon and nylon
yarn are not only made of ’other fibre’ but are also yarn of
‘artificial silk’ within the meaning of s. 2(g) of the Act.
The view to the contrary by the Madhya Pradesh High Court
does not lay down correct law.
Other considerations lead us to the same conclusion. The
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 enacted by
Parliament received the assent of the President on October
31, 1951. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended
to the Bill which became the Act. it is stated:
"The Bill brings under Central control the development
and regulation of a number of important industries, the
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activities of which affect the country as a whole and the
development of which must be governed by economic factors of
all India import .. The Bill confers on Government power
to make rules for the registration of existing undertakings,
for regulating the production and development of the
industries in the Schedule and for consultation with
Provincial Governments on these matters."
The First Schedule of this Act sets out the various
industries which it declared that it was expedient in the
public interest that the Union should take under its
control. Cl. (7) of Item No. 19 which bears the heading
"Chemicals (other than Fertilisers)" is "man-made fibres
including regenerated cellulose-rayon, nylon and the like."
Cl. (5) of Item No. 23 which bears the heading "Textiles
(including those dyed, printed or otherwise processed)" is
"made wholly or in part of synthetic, artificial (man-made)
PG NO 905
fibres, including yarn and hosiery of such fibres." This
Parliamentary Act thus treats rayon as well as nylon as
textiles made of artificial (man-made) fibres.
The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951,
and the Textiles Committee Act, with which we are concerned,
may properly be considered to be statutes in pari materia.
According to Sutherland:
"Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to
pertain to the same subject-matter when they relate to the
same person or things, or to the same class of persons or
thing, or have the same purpose or object (Statutes and
Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 535, 3rd Edn. )"
The object of either of these two Acts is to protect and
to assist in the development of Textile Industry inter alia.
"Assistance in ascertaining the meaning of an enactment may
be obtained by comparing is language with that used in
earlier statutes relating to the same subject" (Craies on
Statute Law, P. 140, 1971 Edn.) Maxwell-also in "The
Interpretation of Statutes" ( 1976 Edn. p. 66) states that:
"light may be thrown on the meaning of a phrase in a
statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier
statute dealing with the same subject-matter."
The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 is
an Act earlier in point of time and we see no reason why if
a subsequent statute by the same Legislature can be pressed
in aid for the purpose of interpretating in the event of any
doubt, the provisions of an earlier statute, the earlier
statute cannot be made use of for the purpose of construing,
in the event of ambiguity, the provisions of a later
statute.
For all these reasons the contention that rayon yarn and
nylon yarn manufactured by the appellants and the
petitioners are made wholly of filaments and not of fibres
and therefore did not come within the purview of textiles
as defined in s. 2(g) of the Act prior to its amendment and
therefore they were not liable for payment of the fee levied
under r. 21 of the Rules, cannot prevail.
The various activities undertaken by the Textiles
Committee for the development of the textile industry and
the promotion of textile exports which have expanded
considerably, and the duties entrusted to the Committee to
ensure the quality of all textiles whether made wholly or
partly of cotton wool, silk, artificial fibre or silk,
particularly when Indian Textiles by and large and
artificial silk or man-made fibres like rayon yarn, viscose
staple fibres and nylon yarn as well as fabrics made of
artificial silk, are facing ever increasing competition in
PG NO 906
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the international market from other exporting countries like
Japan, China etc. and the production and export of textiles
having substantially increased, the legislature thought it
necessary to make adequate provision and accordingly created
a Textiles Fund under s. 7 of the Act to meet the
expenditure of the Textiles Committee which necessarily has
to be on a larger scale. At the time when the Textiles
Committee was established under s. 3, the legislature
accordingly provided for the establishment of a Textiles
Fund constituted under s. 7 of the Act from out of which the
expenditure of the Committee has to be defrayed. Sub-s. ( 1)
of s. 7 provides that the Committee shall have a Fund to be
called the Textiles Fund and there shall be credited thereto
various items specified in cls. (a) to (d), apart from all
the moneys standing to the credit of the Cotton Textiles
Fund established under the repealed Ordinance, immediately
before the date on which the Textiles Committee came to be
established, which by virtue of s. 24(2)(a) stood
transferred to and formed part of the Textiles Fund, and
such sums of money as the Central Government after due
appropriation made by Parliament in that behalf, pays to the
Committee in each financial year by way of grant, loan or
otherwise for purposes of enabling the Committee to
discharge its functions under the Act. There are only two
other sources of income. One of the main sources of revenue,
as indicated in cl. (c), is the income derived from the levy
of the fee under r. 21 of the Rules, and the other that
indicated in cl. (d) viz. all moneys received by the
Committee by way of grant, gift, donation, contribution,
transfer or otherwise. After the imposition of the duty of
excise as a cess by s. 5A of the Act introduced by Act No.
51/73, the income derived from such cess becomes another
source. Sub-s. (2) of s. 7 provides that the moneys in the
Fund shall be applied for (a) meeting the pay and allowances
of the officers and other employees of the Committee and
administrative expenses of the Committee, and (b)
carrying out the purposes of the Act. Sub-s. (3) of s. 7
provides that all moneys in the Fund shall be deposited in
the State Bank of India or be invested in such securities,
as may be approved by the Central Government.
From these provisions, it is amply clear that all the
income derived from the levy of the fee under r. 21 of the
Rules has to be credited to the Textiles Fund and the said
income is utilised in defraying the expenditure of the
Textiles Committee in carrying on its manifold duties. No
part of the fee levied under r. 21 goes into the
Consolidated Fund of India. It is only by s. 5F introduced
by Act No. 51/73 which provides that proceeds of the duty of
excise collected under s. 5A reduced by the cost of
collection as determined by the Central Government, shall
PG NO 907
first be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and the
Central Government may, after due appropriation made by
Parliament by law, pay to the Committee from out of such
proceeds, such sums of money as it thinks fit for being
utilised for the purposes of the Act. We are not here
concerned with the duty of excise recovered as a cess under
s. 5A but only with the question whether levy of the fee
under r. 21 is sustainable as a fee. That is to say,
whether- there is sufficient quid pro quo between the levy
of the fee and the services rendered. It has not been
suggested that any part of the fees levied under r. 21 can
be diverted to any other purpose. When the entire proceeds
of the fee are utilised in financing the various projects
undertaken by the Textiles Committee, as also the inspection
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of all textiles including man-made fibres and textile
machinery, the appellants cannot be heard to say that there
is no reasonable and sufficient correlation between the levy
of the fee and the services rendered. The learned Additional
Solicitor General drew our attention to the various
averments made in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of
the Textiles Committee as well as the Government of India
showing the extent of income from the fee levied under r. 21
and the expenditure of Textiles Committee in each financial
year. From the material on record it is amply clear that the
levy of the fee under r. 21 is not commensurate with the
expenditure incurred by the Textile Committee. It is not in
dispute that the Textiles Committee has over the years built
up a huge infrastructure and the Central Government has
spent crores of rupees to make the legislation effective and
meaningful and to bring about an overall improvement in the
quality and standard of the textiles including man-made
fibres or artificial silk so that our country may continue
to retain its rightful place in the world market in a
fiercely competitive international trade.
For a proper appreciation of the point involved, it is
necessary to set down the activities of the Committee in
discharge of its functions conferred upon it by s. 4 of the
Act. The Committee with a view to maintaining and stepping
up the export of Indian Textiles, has introduced a number of
pre-shipment inspection schemes covering a wide range of
textiles to ensure that only quality textiles and yarns are
exported from India. Inspection and certification of Art
Silk and Wollen Textiles have also been undertaken by the
Committee in pursuance of various Export Incentive Schemes
introduced by the Government from time to time. The
Committee has set up an Inspectorate with a large technical
staff qualified in the various disciplines of textile
technology. The Inspectorate has carried out inspection of
various types of textiles large quantities. Inspection of
mill-made cotton cloth and mill-made cloth yarn has been
PG NO 908
made compulsory and export thereof without a certificate
issued by the Committee has been banned. In order to carry
out the inspection as expeditiously and smoothly as
possible, the Committee besides its head office at Bombay
has established its regional offices at fourteen different
textile centres, namely, at Ahmedabad, Amritsar, Bangalore,
Calcutta, Coimbatore, Indore, Kanpur, Ludhiana, Madras,
Madurai, Nagpur, New Delhi, Sholapur and Surat. Besides
these, wherever necessary, the Committee staff are also
attached to the textile mills at other places to render
immediate service to the mills and exporters on the spot.
The learned Additional Solicitor General placed before us
the counter-affidavit of Shri C.G. Shivdasani, Acting
Secretary of the Textiles Committee. It is averred under the
heading ’Inspection’ that for ensuring standard qualities of
textiles and to satisfy that they have the characteristics
necessary for satisfactory performance, necessary tests such
as identification of fibres, fibre composition, fibre
finances, shrinkage, chemical degradation, resistance to
milldew and fungus etc. are carried out quite often by the
Committee. A statement showing the income and expenditure of
the Textiles Committee for the period commencing from March
l, 1965 and ending with March 31, 1971 as well as the
estimated budget for the years 1971-72 to 1973-74 are set
out to verify the ratio between the fee collected and the
expenditure incurred for achieving the object and purpose of
the Act. The statements are as detailed below:
EXPENDITURE AND FEES REALISED DURING THE PERIOD FROM
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1.3.1965 T O 31.3.71
Accounting Revenue Capital Market Fees
Year Expenditure Expenditure Research Realised
on Inspectorate. on Inspectorate.
March 1965 00.89 lakhs --lakhs 0.08 lakhs-lakhs
1965-66 17.71" 0.64 " 2.00" 21.90"
1966-67 23.05" 1.28" 2.32" 44.00"
1967-68 24.29" 0.91" 2.05" 30.38"
1968-69 24.73" 0.60" 2.66" 34.79"
1969-70 28.95" 1.87" 3.82" 32.39"
1970-71 34.62" 3.14" 4.55" 29.79"
------------------------------------------------------------
Total:-- 154.24" 8.44" 17.48" 193.25"
------------------------------------------------------------
PG NO 909
STATEMENT SHOWING THE ESTIMATED REVENUE AND
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE FOR THE YEARS
1971 72 TO 1973-74
Year Estimated Revenue Capital Expenditure Estimated
Expenditure on on Inspectorate Fees
Inspectorate.
Realisable
------------------------------------------------------------
1971-72(RE) 37.35 lakhs 22.66 lakhs 53.35 lakhs
1972-73(BE) 43.78" 19.93" 53.76"
1973-74 52.00" 30.00" 55.00"
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 133.13 " 72.59" 162.11"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Under the heading ‘Collection of Fees’, the necessary
averments are there showing that the entire amount of fees
levied and collected under r. 21 of the Rules is utilised in
meeting the expenses of the Committee on account of pay and
allowances of the officers and other employees of the
Committee and for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The
following is the table showing the fees realisable, fees
actually realised and the total expenditure of the
Inspectorate during the period from April 1, 1965 to March
31, 1971:
-----------------------------------------------------------
Period Fees Fees Total Expenditure on the
Realisable Realised Inspectorate, (in lakhs)
------------------------------------------------------------
1.3.65 to
31.3.71 Rs.290.51 Rs.193.25 Revenue Rs.154.24
Capital Rs.8.44
Total Rs.162.68
(Actuals)
1.4.71 to
31.3.72 Rs.53.35 Rs.31.03 Revenue Rs.37.35
Capital Rs.22.66
Total Rs.60.61
(Revised Estimate)
1.4.72 to
31.3.72 Rs. 53.76 Rs.31.00 Revenue Rs.43.73
(Estimated) Capital Rs.19.93
Total Rs.63.71
(Budget Estimates)
------------------------------------------------------------
Total Rs.397.62 Rs.255.28 Rs.286.40
------------------------------------------------------------
PG NO 910
On these facts, there is no doubt whatever that the
entire proceeds of the amount collected by way of fee under
r. 21 of the Rules are spent in carrying on the functions of
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the Textiles Committee. It cannot be doubted that the
activities of the Committee in furtherance of the object and
purpose of the Act are to ensure the quality of all textiles
whether made wholly or partly of cotton, wool, silk,
artificial fibre or silk. The functions of the Committee
should generally be to ensure standard qualities of textiles
for internal as well as external marketing and manufacture
and use of standard type of textile machinery. The grievance
of the appellants and the petitioners that there is no
inspection of the rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by
them at the stage of production is belied by the fact that
there is pre-shipment inspection of the fabrics manufactured
from such fibres for export. The provision for the levy of
fees for inspection and examination of textiles under s.
12(1)(a) of the Act or the levy of the fee under r. 21 of
the Rules cannot be challenged on the ground that there is
no reasonable relationship between the levy of the fee and
the services rendered by the Committee to the entire textile
industry to which the appellants and the petitioners before
us owning large textile mills belong. When the levy of the
fee is for the benefit of the entire textile industry, there
is sufficient quid pro quo between the levy recovered from
the appellants and the petitioners and the services rendered
to the industry as a whole. In the premises, the principles
laid down by this Court in Sreeniwasa General Traders are
clearly attracted. One of us (Sen, J.) speaking for the
Court had observed:
"The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro
quo for a fee has undergone a sea change in the subsequent
decisions. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies
primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a
common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific
benefit or privilege although the special advantage is
secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public
interest. If the element of revenue for general purpose of
the State predominates, the levy becomes a tax. In regard to
fees there is, and must always be, correlation between the
fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. In
determining whether a livy is a fee, the true test must be
whether its primary and essential purpose is to render
specific services to a specified area or class; it may be of
no consequence that the State may ultimately and indirectly
be benefitted by it. The power of any legislature to levy a
fee is conditioned by the fact that it must be by and large
PG NO 911
a quid pro quo for the services rendered. However,
correlationship between the levy and the services rendered
or expected is one of general character and not of
mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there
should be a "reasonable relationship" between the levy of
the fee and the services rendered. If authority is needed
for this proposition, it is to be found in the several
decisions of this Court drawing a distinction between a
‘tax’ and a ‘fee’. See The Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Edowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; H.H. Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar
v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowments, Mysore, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 302; The Hingir-
Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1961] 2 SCR 537;
H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt v. Commissioner Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, [1980] 1 SCR
368; South Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Trichur v. State
of Kerala, [1982] 1 SCR 519 and Municipal Corporation of
Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin, [l963] 2 SCR 999.
There is no generic difference between a tax and a free.
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Both are compulsory exactions of money by public
authorities. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is
enforceable by law against a person in spite of his
unwillingness or want of consent. A levy in the nature of a
fee does not cease to he of that character merely because
there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in
it. nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct
relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to
each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. It
is now increasingly realised that merely because the
collections for the services rendered or grant of a
privilege or licence are taken to the consolidated fund of
the State and not separately appropriated towards the
expenditure for rendering the service is not by itself
decisive. Presumably, the attention of the Court in the
Shirur Mutt case was not drawn to Article 226 of the
Constitution. The Constitution nowhere contemplates it to
be an essential element of fee that it should be credited to
a separate fund and not to the consolidated fund. It is also
increasingly realised that the element of quid pro quo in
the strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee. It
is needless to stress that the element of quid pro quo is
not necessarily absent in every tax."
PG NO 912
See also M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash & Ors. v. State of Punjab
& Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 72; City Corporation of Calicut v.
Thachambalath Sadalinan & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 1009; I.T.C.
Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (per Fazal Ali &
Mukharji, JJ) ( 1985) SUPP1. SCR 476 and Om Parkash Agarwal
& Ors. v. Giri Raj Kishori & Ors., [1986] 1 SCR 149.
Viewed from this perspective, the conclusion is
inevitable that the levy of the fee under r. 21 of the
Textiles Committee Rules, 1965 by the Textiles Committee
under sub-s. (1) of s. 12 of the Textiles Committee Act,
1963 is valid and constitutionally permissible.
All the appeals and connected writ petitions filed by
the textile mills in India must fail and are dismissed with
costs. Civil appeal No. 1281 of 1973 preferred by the
Textile Committee, Bombay against the judgment and order of
the Kerala High Court dated March 3, 1979, is however
allowed and the writ petition filed by the respondent, M/s.
Travancore Rayons Limited is dismissed with costs.
R.S.S.