Hanumantharaju B (Dead) By Lr. vs. M Akram Pasha

R E P O R T A B L E
2025 INSC 682


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO._____________ OF 2025
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 2841-2842 OF 2021)

HANUMANTHARAJU B (DEAD) BY LR. ...APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

M AKRAM PASHA & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGEMENT

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

Leave granted.
2. The present appeals have been preferred against the
common judgment and order dated 14.11.2019 passed by the
High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, in MFA No.3569/2016
(MV-I) and MFA No.4867/2016 (MV-I) whereby, the appeals
preferred against the judgment and order dated 21.03.2016
passed in MVC No. 5024/2010 by the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Bengaluru were partly allowed.
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.05.14
18:27:46 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
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The insurance company being Respondent No.2, which
filed the MFA No.4867/2016 before the High Court of
Karnataka, has not challenged the order of the High Court in
the aforesaid MFA No.4867/2016.
3. The facts of the case in brief as can be culled out from the
records are that on 10.05.2010, around 1:45 pm, the original
appellant (who died during the pendency of this appeal), who
was working as a Sub-Inspector (MIN) in the office of DIGP,
CRPF, Yelahanka Base, Bangalore, was driving his motor
cycle to Yelahanka, on Doddaballapur Main Road, Karnataka,
when he met with an accident with an Omni Car bearing
registration KA-04/C-826 owned by the Respondent No. 1 at
J. Valsal Road, CRPF Campus. When the driver of the said car
took a turn towards the right side, the original appellant’s
motorcycle collided with the car and he fell down, sustaining
grievous injuries. On the same day, FIR No. 86/2010 was
lodged against the driver of the car u/s 279, 337 IPC at P.S.
Yelahanka Tr. The medical record indicates that the original
appellant was admitted to the hospital on three different
occasions for nearly 15 days immediately after the accident
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and he underwent surgery on his left leg. He also suffered
heart attack due to stress and injuries.
4. Considering the injuries he suffered, a Medical Board was
constituted at the Composite Hospital, Bengaluru to examine
his physical fitness which certified him to be suffering from
physical disabilities at 61.94%. Because of the aforesaid
physical disability, he was unable to perform his duties
properly and did not get due promotion and was subsequently
discharged from service on 22.03.2012.
5. Prior to his discharge, the original appellant filed Motor
Accident Claim MVC No. 5024/2010 on 05.08.2010 claiming
compensation of Rs. 74 Lakhs from the Respondents. The
MACT, Bangalore awarded an amount of Rs. 3,28,422/- to the
original appellant along with 9% interest per annum as
compensation vide its order dated 31.01.2014, taking into
account his last drawn salary of Rs. 36,231/- at the time of
the accident as well as the disability at 61.94% as assessed
by the Medical Board.


6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the MACT, the
original appellant preferred an appeal being MFA
No.3965/2014(MV) before the High Court of Karnataka,
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seeking enhancement of the compensation. In that appeal, it
was agreed by both the parties, i.e. the original appellant and
insurance company, that the matter would require
reconsideration by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Karnataka
High Court, without expressing any opinion on the merits of
the case, remanded the matter to the Tribunal with the
direction to reconsider, vide order dated 12.01.2015.
Accordingly, the matter was again placed before the MACT.
7. When the matter was placed for reconsideration before the
MACT, in terms of the direction of the High Court, the
Tribunal appointed a Commissioner, namely, Dr. Shankar R.
Krupad, who had examined the original appellant in Columbia
Asia Referral Hospital where he was initially treated, to give
his opinion on the extent of disability of the appellant. Dr.
Shankar R. Krupad, who testified as CW1, assessed the total
disability of the original appellant at 77.72%. Dr. CS Albal,
the then Chief Medical Officer at Composite Hospital,
C.R.P.F., Yelahanka, Bengaluru was also examined as PW3,
who, as a member of the Medical Board, gave the opinion that
the appellant was suffering from total disability of 61.94%.
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Thus, two views on disabilities were available before the
Tribunal.

8. The MACT, in view of lack of material to show whether
the original appellant was wholly rendered incapacitated for
any work or whether he was doing any job post-retirement,
instead of relying either on the assessment made by the
Medical Board (61.94% disability) or the Tribunal appointed
Commissioner (77.72%), held that it would be just and proper
to take the disability at 50% to meet the ends of justice.
9. The Tribunal also deducted income tax and professional
tax from the salary of Rs.36,231/-, thus, assessing the
monthly income to be Rs. 33,761/-.
The Tribunal then applied 50% disability to this figure
and held that the monthly loss of earning of the original
appellant would be Rs. 16,880/-, and Rs. 2,02,560/-
annually. Thereafter, by applying the multiplier of 14 to the
aforementioned amount as the original appellant was about
43 years, the Tribunal held that the original appellant was
entitled to a compensation of Rs.28,35,840/- under the head
of disability, which included the loss of income during the
period of treatment and loss of amenities in life.
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10. As regards future medical expenses, though, CW1 had
projected an estimated cost for knee replacement surgery at
Rs.2,75,000/-, the Tribunal found the said amount to be on a
higher side and fixed it at Rs. 50,000/- as just and proper,
even though the opinion of CW1 was not questioned before
the Tribunal by any of the respondents as observed by the
Tribunal itself.
11. Thus, the MACT, after reconsideration, awarded a total
amount of Rs.31,64,896/-, along with interest at the rate of
9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claims petition and after
the determination of the compensation under various heads
as follows:

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12. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid award made by the
MACT on reconsideration, both the opposite parties preferred
their respective appeals before the High Court. The original
appellant preferred the appeal which was registered as
M.F.A.No.3569/2016(MV-I) and the appeal filed by the
insurance company was registered as M.F.A.No.4867/2016.
Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by a
common judgment and order dated 14.11.2019 by the High
Court allowing the appeals partly, which is the subject matter
of challenge by the original appellant before this Court.
13. While partly allowing the said appeals, the High Court,
reduced the amount of compensation to Rs.27,47,634.25/-
rounding off to Rs.27,47,700/-, which is lower than the
amount awarded by the MACT, and the interest was awarded
at 6% per annum. The original appellant, thus aggrieved, has
filed the instant SLP. The insurance company has not
challenged the order of the High Court.
14. From a perusal of the impugned order of the High Court,
it is evident that there was no dispute that the original
appellant was employed as a Sub-Inspector in CRPF with
monthly salary of Rs. 36,231/- and due to the accident, he
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was on leave for about a year and a half. Subsequently, on the
basis of the finding of the Medical Board, the original
appellant was discharged from service on which he was given
the monthly pension of Rs.15,247/-. Since the original
appellant was drawing the monthly pension, to determine the
monthly loss of earning, the High Court deducted the said
pension amount from the salary. Thus, the High Court held
that the effective monthly loss of earnings of the claimant was
Rs. 20,984/- i.e. by deducting the pension amount from the
salary.
15. The High Court, based on the opinion of the Medical
Board which assessed the disability of the original appellant
at 61.94%, held that the loss of his earning capacity was
61.94% and accordingly, the same was calculated at
Rs.1,55,969.87/- per annum. Since the original appellant was
about 43 years of age at the time of the accident, the multiplier
of 14 was applied and accordingly, the total loss of earning
was calculated as Rs.21,83,178.25/-.
The High Court, thereafter, added the amounts under
various heads, and computed the compensation amount at
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Rs.27,47,63.25/-, which was less than what had been
awarded by the MACT.
16. Before this Court, the original appellant has raised the
following grounds in challenging the order of the High Court:
(i) That the High Court has erroneously reduced the loss
of earning by deducting the pension amount from the
salary.
(ii) Though the total permanent physical disability of
appellant was earlier assessed at 61.94% by the
Medical Board, it was subsequently revised to 77.8%
by the Commissioner appointed by the Tribunal,
which ought to have been accepted by the Tribunal
and High Court.
(iii) The rate of interest of 9% p.a. which was awarded by
the Tribunal was reduced by the High Court to 6%
p.a.
(iv) No amount was awarded in respect of loss of future
prospects.
17. At this juncture, it may be apposite to examine the legal
position regarding the methodology of computation of
compensation in motor accident claims. For computation of
compensation arising out of injury or death due to motor
accidents, a certain amount of uniformity and a consistency
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has been arrived at following a series of decisions of this
Court, as well as by amendments of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (“Act”).
As observed in Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. v. Delhi
Transport Corporation & Anr. 2009 6 SCC 121, there are
certain factual aspects which have to be ascertained for
proper calculation of the compensation. Firstly, the age of the
deceased, secondly, the income of the deceased, and,
thereafter, ascertain the loss of earning thirdly, selection of
the proper multiplier to compute the loss and fourthly, other
accidental expenses like travelling/transportation etc.
18. The concept future prospects, though was considered in
Sarla Verma (supra), got firmly settled in the case of
National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16
SCC 680. Hence, this has to be taken into consideration while
computing the loss suffered by the original appellant. In
Pranay Sethi (supra)¸ it was held that while determining the
income, the addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of
the deceased towards future prospects, where deceased had
permanent jobs and was below the age of 40 years should be
made. This, however, would be reduced to 30% if the age of
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the deceased was between 40 to 50 years and in case of the
deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years the addition
should be 15%.
However, in the present case, neither the MACT nor the
High Court took into account awarded any compensation on
account of future prospects.
19. It is also now well settled that the amount of
compensation is to be calculated on the basis of last drawn
salary of the injured/deceased in respect of salaried persons
and pension and such retirement benefits enjoyed cannot be
deducted for computing the income, these being statutory
rights receivable by the employee or his legal heirs irrespective
of any unforeseen incident of accidents, fatal injuries etc. and
such pensionary benefit is not directly relatable to the motor
accident. Hence, pensionary benefit could not have been
treated as “pecuniary advantage” liable to be deducted for the
purpose of computation of compensation within the scope of
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
For this proposition of law, we may refer to the decision
in Vimal Kanwar & Ors. v. Kishore Dan & Ors. (2013) 7
SCC 476, wherein this Court, by referring to the earlier
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decision in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999)
1 SCC 90, held as follows:-
“19. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before this
Court in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC [(1999) 1
SCC 90: 1999 SCC (Cri) 197]. In the said case, this Court
held that provident fund, pension, insurance and
similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits,
etc. are all a “pecuniary advantage” receivable by the
heirs on account of one's death but all these have no
correlation with the amount receivable under a statute
occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an
amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor
Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable
for deduction. The following was the observation and
finding of this Court: (SCC pp. 111-12, para 35)
“35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of
the provident fund which is a deferred payment out
of the contribution made by an employee during the
tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs
are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of
the accidental death. This amount is secured, is
certain to be received, while the amount under the
Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable
only on the happening of the event viz. accident,
which may not take place at all. Similarly, family
pension is also earned by an employee for the
benefit of his family in the form of his contribution
in the service in terms of the service conditions
receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs
receive family pension even otherwise than the
accidental death. No co-relation between the two.
Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by
the insured or the heirs of the insured on account
of the contract with the insurer, for which the
insured contributes in the form of premium. It is
receivable even by the insured if he lives till
maturity after paying all the premiums. In the case
of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to
the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the
premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by
the claimant not on account of any accidental death
but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only
a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to
receive the amount. Similarly, any cash, bank
balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all
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a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on
account of one's death but all these have no co-
relation with the amount receivable under a statute
occasioned only on account of accidental death.
How could such an amount come within the
periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as
‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction. When
we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be
on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter
se, between them and not to which there is no
semblance of any co-relation. The insured (the
deceased) contributes his own money for which he
receives the amount which has no co-relation to the
compensation computed as against the tortfeasor
for his negligence on account of the accident. As
aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation
under the Act is on account of the injury or death
without making any contribution towards it, then
how can the fruits of an amount received through
contributions of the insured be deducted out of the
amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act.
The amount under this Act he receives without any
contribution. As we have said, the compensation
payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory
while the amount receivable under the life
insurance policy is contractual.”


Thus, this Court has categorically held that any amount
receivable on account of PF, pension or insurance cannot be
deducted from the salary of the victim for the purpose of
determining the income or loss of earning for calculating
compensation. This principle was reiterated in Reliance
General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma & Ors. (2016)
9 SCC 627 and National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Birender
& Ors. (2020) 11 SCC 356 .

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20 . Keeping the aforesaid legal position in mind, we shall
examine the issues at hand.
21. As regards computing the loss of income, in the light of the
above referred decisions, it would not be permissible to deduct
the pensionary amount of Rs. 15,247/- from the salary of Rs.
36,231/- as was done by the High Court. Hence, for the purpose
of computing the loss of earning, the said monthly salary of Rs.
36,231/- has to be accepted without deducting the pension
amount.
22. As far as future prospects is concerned, the same cannot be
denied in the teeth of the judgments in Sarla Verma (supra)
and Pranay Sethi (supra), wherein this Court had held that
there should be an addition of 30% of the salary where the age
of the claimant is within 40 to 50 years.
As can be seen from the Signal/SELO message dated
09.01.2012, the original appellant was considered for
promotion. However, because of his discharge from the service
on 22.03.2013, the promotion could not fructify. In any event,
in view of the dictum in Pranay Sethi (supra) , the original
appellant would be entitled to an addition of 30% of the income
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towards loss of future prospects as the original appellant was 43
years when he met with the accident.
23 . Coming to the issue of disability, it may be apposite to
recollect that while the Medical Board had assessed the disability
at 61.94%, the Commissioner appointed by the Tribunal had
assessed it to be 77.72% which was rounded off to 78%. It is
significant to note that while considering the evidence of the
Commissioner (CW1), the Tribunal had noted that the
Commissioner was cross-examined by the Counsel for the
Insurance Company and the Tribunal proceeded to observe that
nothing worth had been elicited to disbelieve or discredit his
evidence. Thus, the Tribunal could not have doubted the
correctness of the assessment made by the Commissioner and
could have accepted the same, yet for a strange reason that there
was no material evidence to show that the original appellant was
rendered completely incapacitated or that he was doing any job
after his discharge from the services, the Tribunal reduced the
disability to 50% holding that it would meet the ends of justice.
24. In spite of the credibility of the subsequent medical opinion
given by the Commissioner as regards the physical disability of
the original appellant not being challenged by the Insurance
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Company, nor being doubted by the Tribunal itself, we see no
reason as to why the Tribunal did not accept the same to the
effect that the disability was 78%. What we have also noted is
that the High Court has treated the physical disability of the
original appellant at 61.94%, which was the initial assessment
made by the Medical Board, by ignoring the assessment by the
Tribunal appointed Commissioner, correctness of which was not
doubted even by the Tribunal. No reason has been assigned by
the High Court why it chose to accept the assessment of 61.94%
disability made by the Medical Board over the subsequent
assessment of 78% disability by the Commissioner. It may be
also noted that the subsequent assessment was made during the
pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal and the
concerned Doctor/Commissioner who had treated the original
appellant made the assessment and had testified before the
Tribunal and cross examined by the Insurance Company and his
evidence had remained unshaken.
Under the circumstances, we are of the view that it would
be just and proper to accept 78% disability in the present case
as assessed by the Tribunal appointed Commissioner.
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25. As far as the multiplier is concerned, since there is no
dispute about the age of the original appellant at the time of the
accident, i.e., 43 years, we are also of the view that the
appropriate multiplier would be 14 as had been applied by the
Tribunal and the High Court.
26. We, thus, find merit in the submissions made by the
appellants for enhancement of the compensation amount.
In order to redetermine the quantum of compensation,
the monthly income of the deceased original appellant has to be
ascertained by not deducting the pension from the monthly
income, consequently, it is fixed at Rs. 36,231/- which is the
salary.
Further, since the High Court had failed to award
appropriate amount towards future prospects, and as the
original appellant lost his promotional opportunities because of
the accident and as he was 43 years, we deem it appropriate to
add 30% of his annual income to the income.
27. Since, there is no challenge to the compensation with
reference to other heads as determined by the High Court, we
have not disturbed the same except as regards monthly income,
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extent of disability, future prospects and rate of interest.
Accordingly, we are of the view that the compensation awarded
to the original appellant should be enhanced as per the
computation mentioned below –
CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION


(i) Monthly Income
Salary Rs. 36,231/-



Annual Income
Rs. 36,231 x 12

Rs. 4,34,772/-
(ii) Add: Future Prospects @30% of his
annual income.
30% of Rs.4,34,772/-


Rs. 1,30,432/-

----------------------
Rs. 5,65,204
----------------------
Total:

(iii) Apply Multiplier 14 to his annual

income
Rs. 5,65,204 x 14
Rs. 79,12,856/-
(iv) Loss of earning capacity (by applying

the disability to the extent of 78%)
Rs. 79,12,856 x 78%

Rs. 61,72,028/-


(v) Add: Injury, pain and suffering as
granted by the High Court


Rs. 1,00,000/-
(vi) Add: Medical expenditure as
Rs. 2,14,056/-
granted by the High Court

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(vii) Add: Attendant, conveyance &

misc. expenses as granted by the
High Court
Rs. 50,000/-

(viii) Add: Loss of amenities as granted


Rs. 1,00,000/-
by the High Court
(ix) Add: Future Medical Expenses as

granted by the High Court

Rs. 1,00,000/-


Rs. 67,36,084/-
Total Compensation amount


28 . As far as the rate of interest is concerned, what we have noted
is that Tribunal in the first award made on 31.01.2014 awarded
interest of 9% per annum, and subsequently, when it was
remanded for fresh consideration the Tribunal again awarded
interest at the rate of 9% per annum vide award dated 31.01.2016.
However, the High Court, vide the impugned order dated
14.11.2019, reduced the said interest to 6% per annum, which is
on a lower side. However, we are of the view that it would serve the
ends of justice if the interest is enhanced to 7% per annum.
29. Accordingly, the aforesaid amount of Rs. 67,36,084/- is to be
released in the favour of the appellants at the rate of interest of 7%
simple interest per annum which, according to our view, would
meet the ends of justice, and the interest is to be calculated from
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the date of the filing of the claim application till the realization of
the enhanced compensation.
30. Since both the respondents are jointly and severally liable,
Respondent No. 2 is directed to pay the enhanced compensation
of Rs. 67,36,084/-, with simple interest at the rate of 7% per
annum as directed above, within a period of six weeks from the
date of this order to the appellants. Respondent No. 2 is at
liberty to recover its share from the Respondent No. 1, if any, in
accordance with law.
31. The appeals are accordingly allowed in the above terms
and the common impugned order dated 14.11.2019 passed in
MFA No. 3569/2016 and MFA No.4867/2016 by the Karnataka
High Court is modified to the extent indicated above.


……………………………J.
(SURYA KANT)



….……………….…………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 13, 2025
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