Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 637
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
(@ SLP (Crl.) No. 5416/2024)
PREM PRAKASH APPELLANT(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH
THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT RESPONDENT(s)
J U D G M E N T
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 22.03.2024
of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in B.A. No. 9863 of 2023.
By the said judgment, the High Court dismissed the bail application
of the appellant. The appellant sought for regular bail in connection
Signature Not Verified
with ECIR Case No. 5 of 2023 in ECIR-RNZO/10/2023 (hereinafter
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2024.08.29
14:34:30 IST
Reason:
referred to as ECIR Case No. 5 of 2023) registered for the offence
1
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’) and pending before the
Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi.
Brief Facts
3. The predicate offence on the basis of which ECIR No. 5 of
2023 was recorded on 07.03.2023 is an FIR bearing Sadar P.S. Case
No. 399 of 2022 registered on 08.09.2022 for offences punishable
under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 447, 504, 506, 341, 323 and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). The appellant was not
named as an accused there.
4. In view of Section 420 and 467 of IPC, being Scheduled
Offences, ECIR No. 5 of 2023 was registered and investigation under
the PMLA was initiated. Even here the appellant was not named
though the ECIR did mention certain unknown persons being
involved. It is alleged that the investigation revealed falsification of
the original records in the Circle Office, Bargain, Ranchi and the
Office of Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata respectively and as such
custody of the original registers were taken in accordance with law.
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5. The substratum of the allegation leading to the complaint
lodged under PMLA are as follows:- Umesh Kumar Gope
complained that Rajesh Rai, Imtiaz Ahmad, Bharat Prasad, Lakhan
Singh, Punit Bhargava and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal fraudulently
acquired one acre of land situated at Plot No. 28, Khata No. 37
Village Gari, Cheshire Home Road P.S. Sadar, Ranchi. The allegation
was that accused Rajesh Rai S/o Jagdish Rai illegally and
fraudulently made a Power of Attorney in the name of Imtiaz Ahmad
and accused Bharat Prasad and on the basis of said Power of
Attorney prepared a forged sale deed and sold the above-mentioned
parcel of land to accused Punit Bhargava, an accomplice of the
appellant for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/-. It is further alleged that
the said land was transferred by accused Punit Bhargava to accused
Bishnu Kumar Agarwal vide two sale deeds dated 01.04.2021 for a
total amount of Rs. 1,80,00,000/- (Rs.1,02,60,000/- and
Rs.77,40,000). According to the Enforcement Directorate, accused
Bishnu Kumar Agarwal paid Rs. 1,78,20,000/- to accused Punit
Bhargava in the account of his firm Shiva Fabcons (Proprietorship
firm of accused Punit Bhargava) and out of which Rs. 1,01,57,400/-
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was transferred to M/s Jamini Enterprises, which according to the
respondent-Investigating Agency, was a firm whose beneficial owner
is the appellant. The appellant was arrayed as Accused No.8 in the
Prosecution Complaint of the Investigating Agency.
6. According to the Investigating Agency, it was confirmed by the
Directorate of Forensic Science that Deed No. 184 of 1948, a
purported sale deed, by which the property was transferred by the
predecessors of Umesh Gope to Jagdish Rai, father of Rajesh Rai
was forged. A separate FIR bearing No. 137 of 2023 dated
10.05.2023 for offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and
471 of IPC came to be registered at Hare Street Police Station
Kolkata on the basis of the report of the Fact Finding Committee of
the Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata. It is stated that the said FIR
was also merged into ECIR No. 5 of 2023.
7. It is alleged that it was on the directions of the appellant that
the sale deed was executed in favor of Punit Bhargava by Rajesh Rai
for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/-; that only Rs. 25 lakhs were
transferred from Shiva Fabcons (Proprietorship firm of Punit
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Bhargava) to Rajesh Rai although the consideration amount was Rs.
1,78,55,800/- and it was shown to have been paid in the sale deed;
that out of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 25 lakhs, an amount of Rs. 18
lakhs were transferred from the Bank account of Rajesh Rai to the
Bank account of Green Traders (Partnership firm under the control of
Md. Saddam Hussain); that Rs. 7 lakh cash was withdrawn through
cheques by Rajesh Rai; that on the directions of the appellant,
mutation of the property was done in the name of Punit Bhargava,
who was an accomplice of the appellant; that Punit Bhargava sold the
property to the Bishnu Kumar Agarwal within a span of two months
for Rs. 1.80 crore; that an amount of Rs.56,62,600/- was paid from
the account of M/s Chalice Real Estate (Company of Bishnu Kumar
Agarwal) on 05.04.2021 to Punit Bhargava’s bank account and on
24.06.2021 an amount of Rs. 1,01,57,400/- was transferred from the
account of Adarsh Heights Pvt Ltd (Company of Bishnu Agarwal) to
Punit Bhargav’s bank account; that the entire payment was made in
the month of April and June, 2021 but the registration was done on
st
1 April, 2021 before the receipt of consideration. Finally, it is
alleged that an amount of Rs.1,01,57,400/- was transferred to the
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Bank account of M/s Jamini Enterprises, which is alleged to be a
firm controlled and beneficially owned by appellant - Prem Prakash.
8. It is alleged that the appellant conspired with the other accused
persons, namely, Afshar Ali @ Afsu Khan, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan
Singh, Imtiaz Ahmad, Bharat Prasad, Saddam Hussain, Punit
Bhargava, Chhavi Ranjan and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in the
acquisition of proceeds of crime in the form of landed property. It is
specifically alleged that the appellant being an accomplice of Bishnu
Kumar Agarwal used his connections to assist Bishnu Kumar
Agarwal in acquiring the land and that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal
transferred the money to Punit Bhargava and the amount was further
transferred to Jamini Enterprises.
9. The appellant was taken into custody on 11.08.2023. He was
already in custody from 25.08.2022 in ECIR No. 4 of 2022. His
application for bail was rejected by the Special Judge on 20.09.2023.
He preferred a bail application before the High Court. The High
Court has declined bail to the appellant. Aggrieved, the appellant is
before us.
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10. We have heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Learned Senior counsel for
the appellant, ably assisted by Mr. Indrajit Sinha and Mr. Siddharth
Naidu, learned advocates. We have also heard Mr. S.V. Raju, Learned
Additional Solicitor General, ably assisted by Mr. Zoheb Hussain
and Mr. Kanu Agarwal for the respondents. Learned Senior Counsels
on both sides have placed their respective contentions and also filed
detailed written submissions.
SECTION 45 PMLA-CONTOURS
11. Considering that the present is a bail application for the offence
under Section 45 of PMLA, the twin conditions mentioned thereof
become relevant. Section 45(1) of PMLA reads as under:-
“45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable . (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence
[under this Act] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose
the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is
a woman or is sick or infirm or is accused either on his own or
along with other co-accused of money-laundering a sum of less than
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one crore rupees, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so
directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of
any offence punishable under Section 4 except upon a complaint in
writing made by-
(i) the Director; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government or a State Government
authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a
general or special order made in this behalf by that Government.”
In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs Union of India
and Ors. reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929, this Court
categorically held that while Section 45 of PMLA restricts the right
of the accused to grant of bail, it could not be said that the conditions
provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of
bail. Para 131 is extracted hereinbelow:-
“131. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided
under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the
accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions
provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant
of bail. The discretion vests in the court, which is not arbitrary or
irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided
under Section 45 of the 2002 Act. …”
These observations are significant and if read in the context of the
recent pronouncement of this Court dated 09.08.2024 in Criminal
Appeal No. 3295 of 2024 [ Manish Sisodia (II) Vs. Directorate of
8
Enforcement ], it will be amply clear that even under PMLA the
governing principle is that “ Bail is the Rule and Jail is the
Exception ”. In para 53 of [ Manish Sisodia (II) , this Court observed
as under:-
“53…..From our experience, we can say that it appears that the
trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of
grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an
exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant
of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, this Court is
flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the
huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High
Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is
exception.”
All that Section 45 of PMLA mentions is that certain conditions are
to be satisfied. The principle that, “ bail is the rule and jail is the
exception ” is only a paraphrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to the procedure established by
law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and deprivation is the
exception. Deprivation can only be by the procedure established by
law, which has to be a valid and reasonable procedure. Section 45 of
PMLA by imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle
to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the exception. As
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set out earlier, all that is required is that in cases where bail is subject
to the satisfaction of twin conditions, those conditions must be
satisfied.
12. Independently and as has been emphatically reiterated in
Manish Sisodia (II) (supra) relying on Ramkripal Meena Vs
Directorate of Enforcement (SLP (Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024 dated
30.07.2024) and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Another, 2024 SCC online 1693, where the
accused has already been in custody for a considerable number of
months and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a
short span, the rigours of Section 45 of PMLA can be suitably
relaxed to afford conditional liberty. Further, Manish Sisodia (II)
(supra) reiterated the holding in Javed Gulam Nabi Sheikh (Supra) ,
that keeping persons behind the bars for unlimited periods of time in
the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive the
fundamental right of persons under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India and that prolonged incarceration before being pronounced
guilty ought not to be permitted to become the punishment without
trial. In fact, Manish Sisodia (II) (Supra) reiterated the holding in
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Manish Sisodia (I) Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (judgment dated
30.10.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 3352 of 2023) where it was held
as under:-
“28. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an offence
should not become punishment without trial. If the trial gets
protracted despite assurances of the prosecution, and it is clear that
case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for
bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an
economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate these cases
with those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten years
or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnaping for
ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where 100/1000s
of depositors have been defrauded. The allegations have to be
established and proven. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled
with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the
allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code and
Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional
mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person
charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and
given a speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for reasons
not attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are good
reasons, may well be guided to exercise the power to grant bail.
This would be truer where the trial would take years.”
It is in this background that Section 45 of PMLA needs to be
understood and applied. Article 21 being a higher constitutional
right, statutory provisions should align themselves to the said higher
constitutional edict.
Scope of Inquiry under Section 45 of PMLA
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13. Coming back to the scope of inquiry under Section 45, Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (Supra), while reiterating and agreeing with
the holding in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State of
Maharashtra and Another reported in (2005) 5 SCC 294, held that
the Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail in
PMLA need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a
view of the Court based on the available material available on record
is required. It held that the Court is only required to place its view
based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected
during investigation. The words used in Section 45 are “ reasonable
grounds for believing ” which means that the Court has to see only if
there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not
required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. We deem it fit
to extract the relevant portion (Para 131) from Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra):
“131. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided
under section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the
accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions
provided under section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of
bail. The discretion vests in the court which is not arbitrary or
irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided
under section 45 of the 2002 Act. While dealing with a similar
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provision prescribing twin conditions in MCOCA, this court in
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra), held as under:
"44. The wording of section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to
the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that
the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act.
If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail
must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such
an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the
prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant.
Such cannot be the intention of the Legislature. Section 21(4) of
the MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be
so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance
between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order
granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the
court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his
committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence
in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other
offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an
accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the
matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his
propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to
have committed the offence.
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an
application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not
necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate
application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant
has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence
meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad
probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like
MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section
(4) of section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the
matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the
materials collected against the accused during the investigation
may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded
by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be
tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit
of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the
case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any
manner being prejudiced thereby".
We are in agreement with the observation made by the court in
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra). The court while
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dealing with the application for grant of bail need not delve deep
into the merits of the case and only a view of the court based on
available material on record is required. The court will not weigh
the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is, of course,
the work of Trial Court. The court is only required to place its
view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material
collected during investigation and the said view will not be taken
into consideration by the Trial court in recording its finding of the
guilt or acquittal during trial which is based on the evidence
adduced during the trial. As explained by this court in
Nimmagadda Prasad (supra), the words used in section 45 of the
2002 Act are "reasonable grounds for believing" which means the
court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused
and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond
reasonable doubt.”
(emphasis supplied)
Importance of the foundational facts-under Section 24 PMLA
14. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) dealing with Section 24
of the PMLA, the three-Judge Bench held as under:-
“97. Be that as it may, we may now proceed to decipher the purport
of section 24 of the 2002 Act. In the first place, it must be noticed
that the legal presumption in either case is about the involvement of
proceeds of crime in money-laundering. This fact becomes relevant,
only if, the prosecution or the authorities have succeeded in
establishing at least three basic or foundational facts. First, that the
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence has been
committed. Second, that the property in question has been
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a
result of that criminal activity. Third, the person concerned is,
directly or indirectly, involved in any process or activity
connected with the said property being proceeds of crime. On
establishing the fact that there existed proceeds of crime and
the person concerned was involved in any process or activity
connected therewith, itself, constitutes offence of money-
laundering. The nature of process or activity has now been
elaborated in the form of Explanation inserted vide Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019. On establishing these foundational facts in terms of
14
section 24 of the 2002 Act, a legal presumption would arise that
such proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering. The fact
that the person concerned had no causal connection with such
proceeds of crime and he is able to disprove the fact about his
involvement in any process or activity connected therewith, by
producing evidence in that regard, the legal presumption would
stand rebutted.
99. Be it noted that the legal presumption under section 24(a) of the
2002 Act, would apply when the person is charged with the offence
of money-laundering and his direct or indirect involvement in any
process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is
established. The existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a
foundational fact, to be established by the prosecution, including
the involvement of the person in any process or activity connected
therewith. Once these foundational facts are established by the
prosecution, the onus must then shift on the person facing charge of
offence of money-laundering-to rebut the legal presumption that the
proceeds of crime are not involved in money-laundering, by
producing evidence which is within his personal knowledge. In
other words, the expression "presume" is not conclusive. It also
does not follow that the legal presumption that the proceeds of
crime are involved in money-laundering is to be invoked by the
Authority or the court, without providing an opportunity to the
person to rebut the same by leading evidence within his personal
knowledge.
100. Such onus also flows from the purport of section 106 of the
Evidence Act. Whereby, he must rebut the legal presumption in the
manner he chooses to do and as is permissible in law, including by
replying under section 313 of the 1973 Code or even by cross-
examining prosecution witnesses. The person would get enough
opportunity in the proceeding before the Authority or the court, as
the case may be. He may be able to discharge his burden by
showing that he is not involved in any process or activity connected
with the proceeds of crime. In any case, in terms of section 114 of
the Evidence Act, it is open to the court to presume the existence of
any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had
to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public
and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular
case. Considering the above, the provision under consideration
[section 24(a)] by no standards can be said to be unreasonable much
less manifestly arbitrary and unconstitutional.”
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(Emphasis supplied)
Importance of the counter to the bail application – filed in the
original Court
15. In view of the importance of the three basic foundational facts
that the prosecution needs to establish, the counter/response to the
bail application in the original Court is very significant in PMLA bail
matters. In cases where the Public Prosecutor takes a considered
decision to oppose the bail application, the counter affidavit of the
Investigating Agency should make out a cogent case as to how the
three foundational facts set out hereinabove are prima facie
established in the given case to help the Court at the bail application
stage to arrive at a conclusion within the framework laid down in
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) . It is only thereafter the
presumption under Section 24 would arise and the burden would
shift on the accused. The counter to the bail application should
specifically crystallize albeit briefly the material sought to be relied
upon to establish prima facie the three foundational facts. It is after
the foundational facts are set out that the accused will assume the
burden to convince the court within the parameters of the enquiry at
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the Section 45 stage that for the reasons adduced by him there are
reasonable grounds to believing that he is not guilty of such offence.
Analysis and Reasons
16. The contention of the prosecution is that (i) the appellant
connived with accused persons, namely, Afshar Ali, Saddam Hussain
and others who created a forged Sale Deed No. 184 of 1948, and on
the strength of the sale deed the property was sold by Rajesh Rai
(associate of Afshar Ali) to Punit Bhargava a close associate of the
appellant; (ii) that Rs. 25 lakhs were transferred to the bank account
of Rajesh Rai and later Rs. 18 lakh (out of the 25 lakhs) was
transferred to the bank account of M/s Green Traders, a firm
controlled by Md. Saddam Hussain even though the sale
consideration was Rs. 1,78,55,800/-; (iii) that the appellant is aware
of the forgery committed by Afshar Ali & others and intentionally
acquired the property in the name of Punit Bhargava, who later sold
the property within 2 months to Bishnu Agarwal for Rs. 1.80 crore
and out of the said amount, Rs. 1,01,57,400/ - was transferred by
Punit Bhargava to M/s Jamini Enterprises, a firm controlled and
17
beneficially owned by the appellant; (iv) that the accused persons
had full knowledge of the transaction, inasmuch as though the sale
deed was executed in favor of Punit Bhargava through accused
Rajesh Rai on 06.02.2021, payment was made on 12.02.2021 and
that only 25 lakh was paid to Rajesh Rai and mutation was done and
thereafter sold to Bishnu Agarwal and all payments were received by
Punit Bhargava; (v) that no subsequent payments were to be made
further, as according to the prosecution, all concerned knew that the
deeds were fake, and (vi) that Bishnu Agarwal made the payment in
the month of April and June 2021, but the registration was done on
st
1 April, 2021 and as such the registration was done before
consideration. (Emphasis supplied)
17. The prosecution relies on the statements under Section 50 of
the PMLA of Afshar Ali, Rajdeep Kumar, Md. Saddam Hussain,
Punit Bhargava and of the appellant himself. They also rely on the
call detail records of the other accused, namely, Afshar Ali and
Rajdeep Kumar. They also alleged that the appellant, with the help
of another accused person Chhavi Ranjan, by influencing the circle
18
officials got the land mutated and hence, according to the
prosecution, the role of the appellant is pivotal.
18. Learned ASG for the respondent has taken us through summary
of the statements of the persons mentioned hereinabove, as adverted
to in the complaint, filed by the Enforcement Directorate.
Admissibility of the Statement of the Appellant
19. In the oral submissions and also as elaborated in the detailed
written submissions by the respondent-Enforcement Directorate,
reliance is sought to be placed on the statements of the appellant.
This is stoutly resisted on the side of the appellant by contending that
the appellant was in custody from 25th August 2022 in ECIR No.
th
4/2022; that his arrest was shown in the present case on 11 August
2023 and it is submitted that statements recorded while in custody
(although in ECIR No.4/2022) will not be admissible and will be hit
by Section 25. The statement of the appellant-Prem Prakash, the
summary of which, as given in the complaint, reads as under:-
“ 8.23 Prem Prakash - In his statement dated 04.08.2023 (RUD
No.41) recorded in judicial custody at Birsa Munda Central Jail,
Hotwar, Ranchi, he stated that he knows Bishnu Kumar Agarwal as
a businessman and sometimes, he has met him during marriage
19
events. He further stated that Punit Bhargava is like his younger
brother and he is from his native place, so he knows him since
childhood.
From his statement dated 03.08.2023, (RUD No.40) it reveals those
three persons including Afshar Ali used to visit him for the Cheshire
Home Road property. He introduced them with Rajdeep Kumar and
got the property verified. After some time, with the consent of Punit
Bhargava, he got the property registered in the name of Punit
Bhargava and later this property was sold to Bishnu Kumar
Agarwal at a consideration price of Rs. 1.78 crores. His statement
also reveals that Rajdeep used to visit Chhavi Ranjan on his
instructions for the landed properties. However, in his statement
dated 15.08.2023, he started concealing facts regarding meeting
between Afshar Ali, Md. Saddam Hussain and others with Chhavi
Ranjan.
It may be mentioned that Rajdeep is a person who worked under
Prem Prakash as his employee and had visited the office of the
accused Chhavi Ranjan on directions of Prem Prakash with the
accused persons Afshar All and Md. Saddam Hussain. This fact has
also been admitted by Rajdeep Kumar in his statement under
section 50 of PMLA, 2002 recorded on 24.04.2023. (RUD No. 76)
Further, several calls have also been identified to have taken place
during the scrutiny of the CDR which have also been mentioned
below in the relevant para.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. In his statement of 04.08.2023, he stated that he knew Bishnu
Kumar Agarwal and has met him during Marriage Events; that Punit
Bhargava was like his younger brother who hailed from his native
place, and he had known him since childhood. That in his statement
of 03.08.2023, he stated that persons including Afshar Ali used to
visit him for the Cheshire Home property and that he introduced him
to Rajdeep Kumar and got the property verified. That with the
consent of Punit Bhargava, he got the property registered in the name
20
of Punit Bhargava and later the property was sold to Bishnu Kumar
Agarwal at a consideration of Rs. 1.78 crore. The statement, as
summarized, taken as it is does not prima facie make out a case of
money laundering against the appellant. It also does not point to the
involvement of the appellant prima facie in the forgery.
21. Independent of the above, there is one important issue which
arises in this case. It has to be pointed out that the appellant has been
in judicial custody from 25.08.2022 in connection with another
ECIR, namely, ECIR No. 4 of 2022 and while in judicial custody his
arrest was shown in the current ECIR, namely, ECIR No. 5 on
11.08.2023. The statements of the appellant were recorded on
03.08.2023, 04.08.2023, 11.08.2023, 12.08.2023, 14.08.2023,
15.08.2023 and 30.08.2023.
22. The question that arises is when a person is in judicial
custody/custody in another case investigated by the same
Investigating Agency, whether the statements recorded (in this case
the statements dated 03.08.2023, 04.08.2023, 11.08.2023) for a new
case in which his arrest is not yet shown, and which are claimed to
21
contain incriminating material against the maker, would be
admissible under Section 50?
23. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), addressing the scope of
Section 50, following has been held:-
“159….However, if his/her statement is recorded after a formal
arrest by the ED official, the consequences of Article 20(3) or
Section 25 of the Evidence Act may come into play to urge that
the same being in the nature of confession, shall not be proved
against him.’
(Emphasis supplied)
The three-judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) has
apart from Article 20(3) also adverted to Section 25 of the Evidence
Act. Section 25 of the Evidence Act reads as under:-
“25 . Confession to police officer not to be proved .- No confession
made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused
of any offence.
24 . Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) though held that the
authorities under the PMLA are not police officers, did anticipate a
scenario where in a given case, the protection of Section 25 of the
Evidence Act may have to be made available to the accused. The
Court observed that such situations will have to be examined on a
22
case-to-case basis. We deem it appropriate to extract Para 172 of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra).
“172. In other words, there is stark distinction between the scheme
of the NDPS Act dealt with by this court in Tofan Singh (supra) and
that in the provisions of the 2002 Act under consideration. Thus, it
must follow that the authorities under the 2002 Act are not
police officers. Ex-consequenti, the statements recorded by the
authorities under the 2002 Act, of persons involved in the
commission of the offence of money-laundering or the witnesses
for the purposes of inquiry/investigation, cannot be hit by the vice
of article 20(3) of the Constitution or for that matter, article 21
being procedure established by law. In a given case, whether the
protection given to the accused who is being prosecuted for the
offence of money-laundering, of section 25 of the Evidence Act
is available or not, may have to be considered on case-to-case
basis being rule of evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. This Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) anticipated
the myriad situations that may arise in the recording of the Section
50 statement and discussed the parameters for dealing with them. In
Rajaram Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar , AIR 1964 SC 828, a judgment
quoted in extenso in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), this Court
observed that the expression "police officer " in Section 25 of the
Evidence Act is not confined to persons who are members of the
regularly constituted police force. Further, setting out the test for
determining whether an officer is a "police officer " for the purpose
of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, this Court in Rajaram Jaiswal
23
(supra) held (quoted from para 165 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra)
“165(ii) It may well be that a statute confers powers and imposes
duties on a public servant, some of which are analogous to those of
a police officer. But by reason of the nature of other duties which he
is required to perform he may be exercising various other powers
also. It is argued on behalf of the State that where such is the case
the mere conferral of some only of the powers of a police officer on
such a person would not make him a police officer and, therefore,
what must be borne in mind is the sum total of the powers which he
enjoys by virtue of his office as also the dominant purpose for
which he is appointed. The contention thus is that when an officer
has to perform a wide range of duties and exercise correspondingly
a wide range of powers, the mere fact that some of the powers
which the statute confers upon him are analogous to or even
identical with those of a police officer would not make him a police
officer and, therefore, if such an officer records a confession it
would not be hit by S. 25 of the Evidence Act. In our judgment
what is pertinent to bear in mind for the purpose of
determining as to who can be regarded a ‘police officer’ for the
purpose of this provision is not the totality of the powers which
an officer enjoys but the kind of powers which the law enables
him to exercise . The test for determining whether such a person is a
“police officer” for the purpose of S. 25 of the Evidence Act would,
in our judgment, be whether the powers of a police officer which
are conferred on him or which are exercisable by him because he is
deemed to be an officer in charge of police station establish a direct
or substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by S. 25,
that is, the recording of a confession. In other words, the test
would be whether the powers are such as would tend to
facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect or
delinquent. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the
dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as
to what other powers he enjoys. These questions may perhaps
be relevant for consideration where the powers of the police
officer conferred upon him are of a very limited character and
are not by themselves sufficient to facilitate the obtaining by
him of a confession .”
(Emphasis supplied)
24
26. Four decades ago, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style,
speaking for this Court in Nandini Satpathy Vs P.L. Dani and
Another , (1978) 2 SCC 424 observed as under:-
“50. We, however, underscore the importance of the specific
setting of a given case for judging the tendency towards guilt.
Equally emphatically, we stress the need for regard to the
impact of the plurality of other investigations in the offing or
prosecutions pending on the amplitude of the immunity. “To
be witness against oneself” is not confined to particular
offence regarding which the questioning is made but extends
to other offences about which the accused has reasonable
apprehension of implication from his answer. This conclusion
also flows from “tendency to be exposed to a criminal
charge”. “A criminal charge” covers any criminal charge
then under investigation or trial or which imminently
threatens the accused. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
“57. We hold that Section 161 enables the police to examine the
accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Article
20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation- not, as
contended, commencing in court only. In our judgment, the
provisions of Article 20(3) and Section 161(1) substantially cover
the same area, so far as police investigations are concerned. The
ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one
investigation or trial is under way, goes beyond that case and
protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or
imminent, which may deter him from voluntary disclosure of
criminatory matter. We are disposed to read ‘compelled
testimony’ as evidence procured not merely by physical
threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric
pressure, environmental coercion tiring interrogative
prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like
– not legal penalty for violation. So, the legal perils following
upon refusal to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be regarded
as compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect
of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a
constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a
25
calculated risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of
pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or
indirect, but sufficiently substantial, applied by the
policeman for obtaining information from an accused
strongly suggestive of guilt, it becomes ‘compelled testimony’,
violative of Article 20(3). ”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. In the facts of the present case, we hold that the statement of
the appellant if to be considered as incriminating against the maker,
will be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act since he has given the
statement whilst in judicial custody, pursuant to another proceeding
instituted by the same Investigating Agency. Taken as he was from
the judicial custody to record the statement, it will be a travesty of
justice to render the statement admissible against the appellant.
28. The appellant accused cannot be told that after all while giving
this statement:- " you were wearing a hat captioned 'ECIR 5/2023'
and not the hat captioned 'ECIR 4/2022' ".
29. A complete reading of Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (supra),
particularly, paragraphs 159, 165 and 172 mandate us to ask
ourselves the query: Is a reasonable inference legitimately
possible that, due to the vulnerable position in which the appellant
was placed and the dominating position in which the
26
Investigating Agency was situated, in view of the arrest in the other
proceeding that, there obtained a conducive atmosphere to obtain a
confession? We certainly think so. The question is not whether it
actually happened. The question is could it have been possible.
30. We are supported in this view by two old judgments of the
Madras High Court. In Re Elukuri Seshapani Chetti (ILR 1937 Mad
358) Justice Mockett following the judgment of Justice Jackson In
Kodangi V. Emperor, (AIR 1932 Mad 24.) held as under:-
“In my judgment this is clearly a confession, as I have already
said, and, as has been pointed out by Jackson J. In Kodangi V.
Emperor, (AIR 1932 Mad 24.) a confession made to the Police in
the course of investigating crime A, although it relates to
another crime B, is equally inadmissible. The whole spirit of
section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is to exclude confessions
to the police and, the moment a statement is found to amount to
a confession, I do not think it matters in the slightest of what
crime it is said to be a confession.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. We feel that the principle laid down there on is applicable. In
fact, the three-Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (supra),
in the para extracted hereinabove, expressly refers to Section 25 of
the Evidence Act while dealing with statements recorded when the
person is in custody.
27
32. We have no hesitation in holding that when an accused is in
custody under PMLA irrespective of the case for which he is under
custody, any statement under Section 50 PMLA to the same
Investigating Agency is inadmissible against the maker. The reason
being that the person in custody pursuant to the proceeding
investigated by the same Investigating Agency is not a person who
can be considered as one operating with a free mind. It will be
extremely unsafe to render such statements admissible against the
maker, as such a course of action would be contrary to all canons of
fair play and justice.
33. We also draw support from the way Section 50 is structured.
Section 50 reads as under:-
“ Section 50. Powers of authorities regarding summons,
production of documents and to give evidence, etc .
(1) The Director shall, for the purposes of section 13, have the
same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the
following matters, namely:--
(a) discovery and inspection;
(b) enforcing the attendance of any person, including any officer
of a reporting entity and examining him on oath;
(c) compelling the production of records;
(d) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(e) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses and
documents; and
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed.
28
(2) The Director, Additional Director, Joint Director, Deputy
Director or Assistant Director shall have power to summon any
person whose attendance he considers necessary whether to give
evidence or to produce any records during the course of any
investigation or proceeding under this Act.
(3) All the persons so summoned shall be bound to attend in
person or through authorised agents, as such officer may direct,
and shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting
which they are examined or make statements, and produce such
documents as may be required.
(4) Every proceeding under sub-sections (2) and (3) shall be
deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section
193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(5) Subject to any rules made in this behalf by the Central
Government, any officer referred to in sub-section (2) may
impound and retain in his custody for such period, as he thinks
fit, any records produced before him in any proceedings under
this Act:
Provided that an Assistant Director or a Deputy Director shall
not--
(a) impound any records without recording his reasons for so
doing; or
(b) retain in his custody any such records for a period exceeding
three months, without obtaining the previous approval of the
Joint Director.”
Section 50 (1)(b) speaks of enforcing the attendance of any person,
Section 50 (2) speaks of the authorized officials having the power to
summon any person whose attendance they consider necessary
whether to give evidence or to produce any records during the course
of any investigation or proceeding under the Act. Section 50 (3)
states that all persons so summoned shall be bound to attend in
person or through authorized agents, as such officer may direct, and
shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which
29
they are examined or make statements, and produce such documents
and Section 50(4) states that every proceeding under sub-Sections (2)
and (3) shall be deemed to be in judicial proceeding. A person in
judicial custody being not a free person cannot be summoned and
any statement to be recorded will be after obtaining the permission of
the Court which has remanded him to the judicial custody in the
other case.
34. In view of the above and keeping the salutary principle of
Article 21 in mind, we hold that since the words ‘ procedure
established by law ’ occurring in Article 21 has to be a reasonable and
valid procedure, the statement of the appellant under Section 50
cannot be relied upon against the appellant in ECIR No. 5 of 2023
even though the appellant was at that point in custody in ECIR No. 4
of 2022.
Statement of Afshar Ali - Co-accused
35. The appellant was not named in FIR No. 399 of 2023. It
appears from the complaint of the respondent-Enforcement
Directorate at para 6 that Afshar Ali, Saddam Hussain, Imtiaz Ahmad
30
were arrested on 14.04.2023 in ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 though in the
summary of the statements at para 8.12 it is mentioned that Afshar
Ali was arrested on 14.04.2023 read with prayer (c) of the complaint
it appears that the arrest that is referred to in para 8.12 is the arrest in
ECIR/RNZO/18/2022.
36. Accused Afshar Ali was arrested on 14.04.2023 in
ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 (a different ECIR) and his statement was
recorded on 17.04.2023 in the present ECIR. Afshar Ali is supposed
to have stated that since he came to know that the land was under
vigilance by the Police and the land had certain disputes. He met
with the appellant and the appellant was informed about the disputes
and the vigilance of the Police. According to the statement of Afshar
Ali, the appellant took stock of the status of the land and called the
then Deputy Commissioner - Chhavi Ranjan and told him that the
registry of the Cheshire Home property was to be done after
removing the vigilance observed by the Police. Thereafter, the
appellant fixed the consideration of Rs. 1.5 crores and after accepting
the consideration as fixed, he requested the appellant to arrange for
unblocking the two plots of land, which were blocked by the Deputy
31
Commissioner Office. That the appellant demanded Rs. 1 crore for
the above work and the amount was adjusted in the said
consideration and that it was appellant who asked to do the
registration in the name of Punit Bhargava. He also stated that it was
the appellant who fixed the deal with Bishnu Kumar Agarwal.
37. Being a co-accused with the appellant, his statement against the
appellant assuming there is anything incriminating against the
present appellant will not have the character of substantive evidence.
The prosecution cannot start with such a statement to establish its
case. We hold that, in such a situation, the law laid down under
Section 30 of the Evidence Act by this Court while dealing with the
confession of the co-accused will continue to apply. In Kashmira
Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , [1952] SCR 526, this Court
neatly summarized the principle as under:-
“…. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to
marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession
altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a
conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief
independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to
call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge is
not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if
believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an
event the judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend
assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing
32
what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to
accept.”
Hence, insofar as Afshar Ali’s statement is concerned, the
Investigating Agency will have to first marshal the other evidence
and can at best look at the statement for lending assurance.
Independently, the statement of Afshar Ali does not prima facie
indicate anything about the role of the appellant in the forgery of sale
deed and other documents or being involved in the offence of money
laundering.
Statement of Rajdeep Kumar
38. We have perused the statement, as summarized in the
complaint, of Rajdeep Kumar. Rajdeep Kumar merely states that he
worked for the appellant and has met Afshar Ali after the appellant
introduced him at the house of the appellant regarding dealing of a
land situated at Cheshire Home. He further states that he has met
Saddam Hussain at the house of the appellant on the above stated
land. He further adds that he has also seen Imtiaz Ahmed and Bharat
Prasad, close associates of Afshar Ali and Saddam Hussain. Prima
33
facie, we conclude that there is hardly any evidence to implicate the
appellant for the offence under Section 3 and 4 of PMLA.
Statement of Md. Saddam Hussain – Co-accused
39. Md. Saddam Hussain was arrested on 14.04.2023 also in
ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 (a different ECIR), in his statement of
26.04.2023, in the present ECIR he only speaks of knowing Rajdeep
Kumar and meeting him for the purpose of unblocking a piece of
land measuring 3.81 acres and about Rajdeep Kumar arranging a
meeting with the then Deputy Commissioner - Chhavi Ranjan. His
statement like that of Afshar Ali will not have the status of being a
substantive evidence and will be of the same character as Afshar’s
insofar as the co-accused are concerned. In the complaint, the
prosecution infers that it was Rajdeep Kumar who was the link
between the Deputy Commissioner, Chhavi Ranjan and Prem
Prakash and who acted on the instructions of the appellant - Prem
Prakash and helped Saddam Hussain for unblocking the land. Prima
facie, in our opinion, this statement carries the case of the
prosecution no further. The corroboration drawn from his further
34
statement of 29.08.2023 recorded in judicial custody of the above
statement adds nothing further to support the prosecution apart from
the fact that the statement of 29.08.2023 lacked the character of
substantive evidence.
Statement of Punit Bhargava
40. Insofar as the statement of Punit Bhargava is concerned, it was
recorded on 09.12.2022. He is supposed to have stated that he knew
Bishnu Agarwal since March, 2021 when on the directions of
appellant, he sold 1 acre of land to Bishnu Agarwal. He is supposed
to have further stated that he had bought the piece of land under the
supervision of Prem Prakash and that under the instructions of Prem
Prakash, he acquired a land in his name and accordingly on the
instructions of the appellant, he sold it to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal. He
stated that on the directions of the appellant, he gave Rs. 25 lakhs to
Rajesh Rai through cheque after which the registration and mutation
of the property was done but, further added that six post-dated
cheques were given for encashing the balance amount later. He is
supposed to have stated further that he was not aware as to why rest
35
of the payment was not made even after the registration and mutation
and that appellant could perhaps, give a reply. On being asked as to
why the property was purchased in his name when it was sold within
two months to Bishnu Agarwal, he stated that it was only done on the
instructions of Prem Prakash.
41. The statement mentions that apart from 25 lakhs, six post-dated
cheques were also given. Thereafter, it only speaks of the appellant
advising the purchase and sale of the land. Prima facie, they do not
detract from the reasonable grounds of belief that we entertain to the
effect that the appellant is not guilty of the offence under Section 3
and 4.
Bishnu Kumar Agarwal (A9) on bail – Order has attained
finality
42. We, prima facie, find that from the statements of the appellant
and also from the other statements and other material relied upon by
the investigating agency, there is nothing to indicate that the
petitioner was involved in the creation of the forged deed nor had
any knowledge of the forged sale deed of 1948. In the order
36
enlarging Bishnu Kumar Agarwal on bail it was observed that-it was
a plausible view to hold that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal was a bonafide
purchaser of the property concerned in the present matter. It has also
been held therein that no criminality could have been found against
Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in the making of the sale consideration later
and registration of the sale earlier. Support has been drawn from
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The same order also
makes a reference to para 10.6.6 of the complaint filed by the ED
where it has been mentioned that the investigation of the
Enforcement Directorate has revealed that complainant in FIR No.
399 of 2022, Umesh Kumar Gope was himself frivolously exerting
his claim over the said property. Be that as it may, the order of bail
granted to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal has attained finality.
43. Moreover, there is no material placed on record to show as to
on what basis it is claimed that the beneficial interest in M/s Jamini
Enterprises lies with the appellant. Hence, the statements relied upon
do not prima facie make out a case of money laundering against the
appellant.
37
44. The complaint also adverts to two other transactions with
which Bishnu Kumar Agarwal is being investigated. Nothing can be
elicited from the record about the involvement of the appellant and
as to the initiation of any proceeding against him with regard to the
other transactions with which Bishnu Kumar Agarwal is involved.
45. In this scenario, we hold that the appellant has satisfied the
twin conditions under Section 45. Inasmuch as from the material on
record, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the appellant is not guilty of the offence of Money
Laundering as alleged under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA and the
Court is further satisfied that the appellant is not likely to commit
any offence, if enlarged on bail.
Arguments about criminal antecedents.
46. The Investigating Agency have also referred to ECIR No. 4 as a
criminal antecedent. A reference was made to ECIR No. 4 of 2022
pertaining to illegal Stone Mining and related activities in Saheb
Ganj, Jharkhand, where the petitioner was arrested on 25.08.2022
and the prosecution complaint was filed on 16.09.2022. Insofar as
38
the bail pertaining to ECIR No. 4 of 2022, which is pending in this
Court in SLP (Criminal) No. 691 of 2023, at the after notice stage,
the merits of the bail in that case will be independently examined.
Having examined the facts of the present case arising out of ECIR
No. 5 of 2023 and in view of the findings recorded hereinabove, we
do not think that the appellant can be denied bail based on the
pendency of the other matter. We say so in the facts and
circumstances of the present case as we do not find any justification
for his continued detention. The appellant has already been in
custody for over one year. The Trial is yet to commence. There is a
reference to one more ECIR which the Investigating Agency refers to
in their counter, namely, ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 but nothing is
available from the record as to whether any proceedings have been
taken against the appellant.
Allegation of misuse of Jail facilities by the Appellant
47. Elaborate contentions have been made on the conduct of the
appellant about certain facilities having been extended to him in jail.
We do not comment on them and if at all there is any violation of the
39
prison Rules, the Investigating Agency ought to take up with the
higher officials of the Jail. On the facts of the present case, they are
not reasons enough to deny the appellant his liberty.
48. For the reasons stated above, while allowing the appeal, we set
aside the judgment dated 22.03.2024 of the High Court of Jharkhand
at Ranchi in B.A. No. 9863 of 2023. We clarify that the observations
made in this judgment are only for the purpose of disposing of the
bail application and they shall not influence the Trial Court, which
would proceed in accordance with law and on the basis of the
evidence on record.
Conclusion
49. In the result, we pass the following order:-
(i) The appeal is allowed and impugned order dated 22.03.2024 is
quashed and set aside.
(ii) The Trial Court is directed to release the appellant on bail in
connection with ED Case No. ECIR No. 5 of 2023 on furnishing bail
bonds for a sum of Rs. 5 lakh with 2 sureties of the like amount.
40
(iii) The appellant shall surrender his passport with the Trial Court
and the appellant shall report to the Investigating Officer on every
Monday and Thursday between 10 and 11 A.M.
(iv) The appellant shall not make any attempt to influence the
witnesses and tamper with the evidence.
Pending applications shall stand disposed of.
………........................J.
[ B.R. GAVAI ]
……….........................J.
[ K. V. VISWANATHAN ]
New Delhi;
th
28 August, 2024.
41
1
ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.3 SECTION II-A
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 5416/2024
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 22-03-2024
in BA No. 9863/2023 passed by the High Court Of Jharkhand At
Ranchi)
PREM PRAKASH Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH
THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT Respondent(s)
Date : 28-08-2024 This matter was called on for pronouncement of
today.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Adv.
Ms. Sneh Singh, Adv.
Ms. Anusuya Sadhu Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Sowjhanya Shankar, Adv.
Mr. Harsh Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Naidu, Adv.
M/S. KSN & Co., AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Suryaprakash V.Raju, A.S.G.
Mr. Zoheb Hussain, Adv.
Mr. Annam Venkatesh, Adv.
Mr. Kanu Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. Mrigank Pathak, Adv.
Mr. Vivek Gurnani, Adv.
Mr. Samrat Goswami, Adv.
Mr. Hitarth Raja, Adv.
Mr. Harsh Paul Singh, Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Sarkar, Adv.
Mr. Animesh Upadhyay, Adv.
Mr. Sathvik Reddy, Adv.
Ms. Abhipriya, Adv.
Mr. Kartik Sabarwal, Adv.
Mr. Vivek Gaurav, Adv.
Mr. Kshitiz Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR
2
1. Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.V. Viswanathan
pronounced the judgment comprising the Bench of
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai and His Lordship.
2. Leave granted.
3. The appeal is allowed; the impugned order is
quashed and set aside and; the Trial Court is
directed to release the appellant on bail in terms
of the signed reportable judgment.
4. The operative portion of the judgment, inter
alia, held as under:-
“ 49. In the result, we pass the
following order:-
(i) The appeal is allowed and impugned
order dated 22.03.2024 is quashed and set
aside.
(ii) The Trial Court is directed to
release the appellant on bail in connection
with ED Case No. ECIR No. 5 of 2023 on
furnishing bail bonds for a sum of Rs. 5
lakh with 2 sureties of the like amount.
(iii) The appellant shall surrender his
passport with the Trial Court and the
appellant shall report to the Investigating
Officer on every Monday and Thursday
between 10 and 11 A.M.
(iv) The appellant shall not make any
attempt to influence the witnesses and
tamper with the evidence.”
3
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
(SNEHA DAS) (ANJU KAPOOR)
SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)