Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
VIDESH SANCHAR NIGAM LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M.V. KAPITAN KUD & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/11/1995
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
KIRPAL B.N. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 516 1996 SCC (7) 127
JT 1995 (8) 166 1995 SCALE (6)339
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
K. Ramaswamy. J.
Leave granted.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order
dated October 13, 1995 passed by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in Appeal No.727 of 1995 in Notice of
Motion in Admiralty Suit No. 46 of 1995. By the impugned
order, the Division Bench modified the order of the learned
single judge and directed release of commercial ship M/s.
M.V. Kapita Kud. The facts not in dispute are that on July
21, 1995 at around 6.00 a.m. the International Cable which
extends on sea-route from Singapore to France having
branches at Bombay, experienced a break and the fault was
got identified by the appellant-plaintiff at a distance of
about 18.3 kms. from its office at Prabhadevi in Greater
Bombay whereat its cable station is situated. According to
the appellant, due to break of the cable, overseas
telecommunication was disrupted. They requisitioned the
services of Coast Guard authorities to identify whether any
ship had anchored in the vicinity of the break-point. The
appellant in that behalf wrote a letter to the Coast Guard
authorities on July 21, 1995 itself and requested "to survey
the area and identify if any vessel has anchored there". The
co-ordinates of the break point were indicated as 18 deg.
59.4’N and 72 deg 41.0’E. On July 22, 1995, Deputy
Commandant of the Coast Guard Region [West] had stated thus:
"A helicopter reported that a vessel named "Kapita Kud"
registered ODESSA was found anchored in position 310 PRONGS
- 0.9 miles, in 18 deg 58.5’North and 72 deg 40.7’ East".
The repairing vessel which repaired the faulted cable
found thus: "Cable fault caused by Shift anchor". The Coast
Guard further found that no other vessel was found in the
vicinity. It contacted the vessel on radio and confirmed the
position/mark co-ordinates as determined by the helicopter
from the vessel itself. On July 29, 1995, the appellant laid
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the Admiralty Suit No. 46 of 1995 against the respondent-
vessel claiming damages of about Rs.28 crores the break-up
whereof has been stated in Exh. ‘C’ of the plaint reproduced
at page 94 of Additional Documents filed as Volume I at the
exchange rate of Rs.32 per US Dollar. The appellants had
taken Notice of Motion for arrest of the vessel by order
dated July 29, 1995, the vessel was arrested and detained by
the sheriff of Bombay. It is also not in dispute that the
Captain of the vessel had not made any contact with the
appellants for more than one month and for the first time on
September 1, 1995 the vessel made an application for its
release from arrest by way of Notice of Motion. The learned
Trial judge having Admiralty jurisdiction dismissed the
Motion and released the vessel.
Section 140 of Civil Procedure Code 1908, [for short,
‘the Code’] provides that in any Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty
cause of salvage.... the court, whether it be exercising its
original or its appellate jurisdiction may, in its
jurisdiction on request by either party summon to its
assistance tow competent assessors in the manner stated
thereunder and such assessors shall attend and assist the
court accordingly. The Government of India exercising its
power under section 9 [1] of Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 [44
of 1958] has notified the officers specified in the
Schedule, to be assessors for the purposes of the said Act.
For the Port of Bombay, the officers are Nautical Surveyor,
Engineer and Ship Surveyor and Ship Surveyor attached to the
Mercantile Marine Department, Bombay District or to the
Directorate General of shipping, Bombay. The Division Bench
by its order dated September 26, 1995 directed the assessors
to give their estimate of the anchoring position and
probable involvement of the first-respondent in the breakage
of the cable and gave five direction in that behalf. When
the notice was issued, though initially the Captain of the
vessel and first respondent responded, later they declined
to participate in the proceedings before the assessors. On
the basis of the material available and the affidavit filed
by the Captain of the vessel, the assessors accepting the
statement of the Captain, opined that the distance between
the position of 3rd July and 29th July approximately was
7.50 nautical miles. The reason for the shifting was strong
winds then blowing from Southward. The vessel anchored was
not able to hold the ship in her position and the vessel was
either continuously or intermittently drifting in northerly
direction. The vessel should have dropped anchor in the
designated anchorage which was about 5 miles clear and
northward from the subject communication cable. The
possibility of the vessel having shifted her position after
mishap completely could not be ruled out. Merchant vessels
do not customarily anchor in the vicinity of the prohibited
positions. Coast Guard authorities were not able to locate
any other vessel within 3 nautical miles of the respondent-
vessel. They concluded that "based on the foregoing it is
quite clear that the subject cable has been damaged by the
anchor of an ocean going ship. The probability of that ocean
going vessel being the 1st Respondent vessel, as stated
above, is very high".
When the correctness of the report was disputed the
Division Bench appointed two Commissioners who were nautical
advisors, one in service and the other having retired from
Government of India service. In this behalf, one
circumstance that becomes relevant to notice and could not
be disputed is that after appointment of the Commissioners
the proceedings of the Commissioners do indicate that
neither the advocate nor the solicitors were present at the
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time of inspection of the vessel. It would be relevant to
note that when the report of the surveyors was submitted and
when two Commissioners were appointed to assess the
anchoring position and probable involvement of the
respondent-vessel, it would be highly unlikely that the
counsel or the solicitors of the appellant would abstain
from participating in the proceedings before the
Commissioners. On the other hand, having had the copy of the
report of the surveyors, it would be, likely and highly
probable in ordinary human conduct that they would present
and press their case before the Commissioners. The case set
up by the appellant is that when they went into the vessels,
both, the advocate and the solicitor were wrongfully
confined in the cabin of the vessel and they were thereby
prevented to participate in the inspection and the report of
the Commissioners was one-sided. It would appear to be
probable though the objection came to be sent by Fax
belatedly. The delay by itself is not material in view of
the highly probable circumstance referred to earlier. The
Commissioners’ report is in favour of the vessel.
The Division Bench after considering the material held
that "it cannot be said that the claim of the
appellant/original plaintiff is vexatious. It cannot be said
that the matter does not warrant and trial." The Division
Bench was not inclined to draw any adverse inference for the
inordinate delay of more than a month in providing access to
the log book of the ship etc.
The crucial question is whether the appellant has made
out prima facie case. Rules on Admiralty Jurisdiction in
Part III were framed by Bombay High Court to regulate the
procedure and practice thereof on the original side of the
Bombay High Court. Equally, Original Side Rule 941 is
relevant in this regard which provides that party applying
under this rule in a suit in rem for arrest of the property
shall given an undertaking in writing or through advocate to
pay such sum by way of damages as the court may award as
compensation in the event of a party affected sustaining
prejudice by such order. In mahadeo Savlaram Shelke & Ors.
v. Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. [ (1995) 3 SCC 33],
even in case of civil court, exercising its power under
order 39 Rule 1, this Court held that while granting interim
injunction, the Civil Court or Appellate Court is enjoined
to impose as a condition that in the event of the plaintiff
failing to prove the case set up and if damages are caused
to the defendant due to the injunction granted by the court,
the court would first ascertain whether the plaintiff would
adequately be compensated by damages if injunction is not
granted. Equally the court should also impose condition for
payment of damages caused to the defendant in the same
proceeding without relegating the parties for a separate
suit. The plaintiff should give such an undertaking as a
part of the order itself. Rule 954 of Admiralty Rules
provides that subject to the provisions of Rule 952 [caveat
property not to be released unless notice is given to the
caveator], property arrested under a warrant may be ordered
to be released - [i] at the request of the plaintiff, before
an appearance in person or a vakalatnama is filed by the
defendant; or [ii] on the defendant paying into Court the
amount claimed in the suit; or [iii] on the defendant giving
such security for the amount claimed in the suit as the
Court may direct; or [iv] on any other ground that the Court
may deem just. Thus a ship arrested under warrant maybe
released on fulfilment of any of the conditions mentioned
hereinbefore. This could be done on the plaintiff showing
prima facie best case.
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Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume I [I], Fourth
Edition at page 436 on Admiralty jurisdiction, Para 386
states that "the usual step following an acknowledgement of
service in an action in rem is for the owner of the property
arrested to procure its release by giving security for the
plaintiff’s claim. This may be done either by paying the
amount of the plaintiff’s claim into court, or by providing
bail in a sufficient amount, or by furnishing a guarantee
acceptable to the plaintiff. The third method is nowadays
the most common in practice. Para 389 provides that "amount
should be sufficient to cover the plaintiff’s claim,
together with interest and costs on the basis of his
reasonably arguable best case."
The question, therefor, is whether the appellant has
reasonably arguable best case in an admiralty action. As
stated earlier, the damage to the International Cable of the
appellant is not in dispute. The report of the Cable
repairing ship shows that damage was done due to anchoring.
The report of the survey conducted by helicopter which had
flown over the vessel immediately after the notice of
breakage of the cable found the vessel in the vicinity. It
found no other vessel in the vicinity. The question is
whether the vessel was anchored in the prohibited area. The
map showing that inner approach to Bombay Port depths in
meters would indicate the designated anchorage area. The
survey conducted by the helicopter shows that cable break
had occurred three nautical miles of the respondent-vessel.
The bottle-green color marked in the map is the area
surveyed by the helicopter. The survey conducted by the
helicopter is contemporaneous to the proximately to the date
of occurrence. It is seen that as for the plan, the original
position of anchoring on July 3, 1995 at 1850 hours was at
point 1. Immediately thereafter at 1230 hours the vessel had
anchored at point 2. It had moved to point 3 by 1030 hours
on July 6, 1995. It moved towards point 4 on 12th July,
1995. Thereafter, it was found at point 5 between 13th and
29th July, 1995. The crucial disputed area is at point 6
where the vessel was alleged to have been anchored.
According to the appellant-plaintiff, she was anchored at
point 6 on July 21, 1995 as per as report of the helicopter
of the Coast Guard authorities. The cable was found damaged
in the early hours of the said day. It is seen that till
September 1, 1995 the Captain of the vessel had not given
access to the log book etc and other relevant record
maintained by the vessel. The surveyors have stated that it
was not in dispute that during the mansoon season in July
the blow of strong winds is very high in the West Coast. The
report of the repairing ship shows that damage to the cable
was done due to anchoring of a commercial vessel.
The question, therefore, is whether the respondent-
vessel was one probably involved in causing the damage to
the cable. It is true as contended by Shri Harish N. Salve,
learned senior advocate that the Commissioners appointed by
the Division Bench are advisors of nautical matters but
prima facie the credibility of the report lost its efficacy
when the advocate and the solicitor were not permitted to be
present at the time of the inspection. According to the
appellant they were wrongfully confined in the cabin of the
ship. Therefore, much of the stream of the report lost its
vitality. We have the report of the surveyors, the
Government officials appointed by the Government of India by
statutory notification. They are enjoined to assit the court
under Section 140 of C.P.C. They have given reasons in their
report to which we have been taken through. Prima facie we
are satisfied that the reasons given by them cannot be said
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to be partial or one-sided. They have stated at more than
one place that they had no access to the log book and other
records since they were not placed before them. They relied
on the affidavit filed by the Captain of the ship. They also
relied on the helicopter’s report, Coast Guard authorities’
report and also repairing vessel’s report. The respondent-
vessel was the one highly probable for the breakage of the
cable. They also opined that no other vessel was found in
the vicinity of the helicopter.
In M.V. Elisabeth & Ors. etc. v. Harwan Investment &
Trading Pvt. Ltd., Goa [(1993) Supp. 2 SCC 433] this Court
held thus:
"Maritime law is as much a part of the
general legal system as any other branch
of the law. It is within the competence
of the appropriate India Courts to deal,
in accordance with the general
principles of maritime law and the
applicable provisions of statutory law,
with all persons and things found within
their jurisdiction. The power of the
court is plenary and unlimited unless it
is expressly or by necessary implication
curtailed. Absent such curtailment of
jurisdiction, all remedies which are
available to the courts to administer
justice are available to a claimant
against a foreign ship and its owner
found within the jurisdiction of the
High Court concerned. This power of the
court to render justice must necessarily
include the power to make interlocutory
orders for arrest and attachment before
judgment. Power to enforce claims
against foreign ships is an essential
attribute of admiralty jurisdiction and
it is assumed over such ships while they
are within the jurisdiction of the High
Court by arresting and detaining them.
This jurisdiction can be assumed by the
High Court concerned, whether or not the
defendant resides or carries on
business, or the cause of action arose
wholly or in part, within the local
limits of its jurisdiction. Once a
foreign ship is arrested within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the
High Court, and the owner of the ship
has entered appearance and furnished
security to the satisfaction of the High
Court for the release of the ship, the
proceedings continue as a personal
action."
In The Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. vs. Sub-Lt.
Arabinda Chakravarti [(1959) Supp. 1 SCR 979] this Court
held that the function of the nautical assessors is to
advise the court upon nautical matters. Their advise is
admissible in admiralty courts on all issues of facts about
the seamanship. The decision, however, rests entirely with
the courts even on purely nautical matters. The Court is not
bound to follow the advice of the assessors but on questions
of nautical science and skill greater attention must
obviously be paid to the opinion of the assessors since they
are the only source of information on those points and some
reason should be given for disregarding them.
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In Schwarz & Co. [Grain] Ltd. v. St. Elefterio EX Arion
[Owners]. [(1957) Probate Division 179], Willmer, J.
considering the scope of prima facie case held at page 185
that "it has not been suggested that the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, so as to call for the exercise of
the court’s inherent jurisdiction to halt such proceedings
in limine. The defendants argument is founded on the
proposition that section 3 [4] of the Act of 1956 introduced
a new restriction on the right to proceed in rem and that a
plaintiff cannot arrest a ship under that subsection unless
he can prove - and prove at the outset - that he has a cause
of action sustainable in law. In my judgment that
proposition rests upon a misconception of the purpose and
meaning of section 3 [4]". It was held that the scope of the
Act was to enlarge the jurisdiction of admiralty court but
not to restrict its jurisdiction. At page 187 it was held
that "it is possible [these things have been known to
happen] that a higher court might take a different view; but
in the meantime the shop, which is a foreign ship, has been
freed from arrest, has gone, and may never return to this
country. It might be that in those circumstances the
plaintiffs would have lost their right for ever to entertain
proceedings in rem in this country. The remedy for the
defendants is to release their ship is to be put in appeal.
The action will then by tried at the appropriate time when
all the facts have been ascertained due consideration will
be given to the arguments at law which the defendants desire
to advance. Accordingly the motion for release of the ship
was dismissed.
In The Moschanthy [(1971) 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 37 at
42] where the question was whether the admiralty action was
vexatious, following the ratio of Willmer, J. in St.
Elefterio [supra] it was held that action could not be
successful. It was held that courts should only stay the
action on the ground when the hopelessness of the
plaintiff’s claim is beyond doubt. If it is not beyond doubt
but on the contrary the plaintiff has arguable, even though
difficult, case even in law the action would be allowed to
proceed to trial. The application for stay was accordingly
rejected.
The admiralty action is an action in rem. The Division
Bench found that the claim was not vexatious but is triable.
There is strong evidence to show that at the relevant time
the respondent-vessel was within the vicinity of the damaged
cable. The Division Bench declined to interfere on the
ground that the Captain of the vessel filed an undertaking
that the vessel belonged to the Black Sea Shipping Company
which is wholly owned by the Ukrainian Government. The
undertaking given by the Captain of the vessel that in the
event of the suit being decreed they would honour the
decree, was accepted by the Court and it directed the
release of the vessel. We think that neither the approach of
the Division Bench of the High Court nor the finding of the
learned Trial Judge on the admiralty jurisdiction that no
prima facie case is made out, is right. It is seen that
there is strong triable case for the reasons stated earlier.
The ship is a foreign ship and if it leaves the shores of
Indian territorial waters it is difficult to get hold of it
and it may not return to the jurisdiction of Indian courts.
The claim thereby, even if sucessful, would remain
unexecutable or land in trouble in private international law
in its enforcement. Under these circumstances, we are of the
firm opinion that the vessel may be released on the certain
conditions, viz., [i] the respondent shall deposit a sum of
Rs.10 crores; [ii] the Ukrainian Government shall give an
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undertaking through its accredited authority, more
particularly may be its Ambassador attached to its Embassy
in India in writing duly undertaking that in the event of
the suit being decreed they would comply with the decree
without reference to the execution; [iv] the undertaking
should be for balance amount of Rs.18 crores and towards
costs and other expenses roughly put at Rs.25 crores. It
would be open to them to comply with these directions at any
time. We are not fixing any time limit because it would be
open to them to comply with it at any time and until then
the ship shall remain arrested and shall not leave the
shores of the Indian territorial waters. On deposit of Rs.10
crores and on furnishing of undertakings to the satisfaction
of the Division Bench of the High Court, as stated above,
the High Court would give appropriate direction for
releasing the vessel in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The notice of
motion is made absolute subject to the above conditions. In
the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their
own costs.