Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 10564 of 1996
PETITIONER:
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.
RESPONDENT:
GRAM PANCHAYAT AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/03/2002
BENCH:
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI & R.P. SETHI
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2002 (2) SCR 283
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment of the Division Bench
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing
appellant’s CWP No. 5436 of 1995 on February 27, 1996, following the
judgment of this Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder
Singh and Ors., [1985] Suppl 2 SCR 28.
To appreciate the controversy involved in this case it would be necessary
to notice the facts giving rise to this appeal. The first respondent filed
application before the Development and Panchayat Officer-cum-Collector,
Ludhiana (for short. ’the Collector’) under Section 7 of the Punjab Village
Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 (for short, ’the Act’) for possession
of the land in dispute on the ground that the land has vested in it and the
same was mutated in the name of Panchayat by order of the Tehsildar dated
September 4, 1986. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 contested the claim of the first
respondent pleading; that the land belonged to the Government of Punjab and
it was allotted in their favour under a package deal in lieu of which the
amount was also deposited in the Treasury; that the possession of the land
was given to them as per the order of the Tehsildar in the year 1970 and on
that basis they have been in possession of the same; that the mutation in
the name of Panchayat was done without notice to them, therefore, it is
illegal; that by mutation the Panchayat did not become the owner of the
land in which there was potato farm which was Government Agency; that the
Government of Punjab established the potato farm by spending crores of
rupees; that pucca buildings were constructed on the site and 27 crores and
9 electric motors were also installed there; and that there are 12 tractors
of the farm on the site. It was further averred that the Government was
spending about 10 to 11 lakhs per year on the potato farm.
The Collector, after discussing the evidence placed on record by the
parties, pointed out the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 (the respondents therein)
had not produced any proof to show that the disputed land was allotted by
the Punjab Government or that the potato farm was purchased from the
Government; that from the beginning the disputed land was being shown in
Jamabandi as shamilar den and on September 4, 1986, the mutation of the
land was effected in favour of the Gram Panchayat. With regard to dispute
of title to the land it was noted that appellants never brought to his
notice that the title dispute should be decided first nor was any
application filed for that purpose before him. It was held that the
disputed land was owned by Gram Panchayat and in that view of the matter he
ordered delivery of possession of the land to the Gram Panchayat. Appellant
Nos. 2 and 3 herein filed an appeal against the said order before the
Director Rural Development and Panchayat, Punjab (exercising the powers of
Commissioner under the Act) (hereinafter referred to as, ’the
Commissioner’). The Commissioner, on examining record in the light of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4
contentions of the parties, held that the documents brought on record did
not link up the case with the land in question and that nothing was placed
on record to support the package deal and as to how and when the land was
allotted to the Horticulture Department and accordingly dismissed the
appeal on January 11, 1995. The correctness of the order of the
Commissioner was assailed in the Writ Petition by the said appellants and
the State of Punjab, which as stated above, was dismissed by the High Court
by the order under challenge in this appeal.
Mr. Shiv, Pujan Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants, has
contended that after the amendment of Section 3 by Act 8 of 1995 the land
in question stood excluded from the land vested in the Panchayat,
therefore, the order of the High Court has to be set aside.
It may be useful to refer to the amended Section 3 of the Act, insofar as
it is relevant, which reads as follows:-
"Lands to which this Act applies-
(1) This Act shall apply and before the commencement of this Act, the
Shamilat Law shall be deemed always to have applied, to all lands which are
shamilat deh as defined in clause (g) of Section 2.
(2) Notwithstanding anything ccntained in sub-section (1) of Section 4-
(i) Where any land has vested in a Panchayat under the Shamilat Law, but
such land has been excluded from shamilat deh under clause (g) of Section 2
other than the land so excluded under sub-clause (ii-a) of that clause, all
rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land as from the
commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act,
1995, shall cease and all such rights, title and interest shall vest in the
person or persons in whom they were vested, immediately before the
commencement of the shamilat law.
(ii) where any land has vested in a Panchayat under this Act, but such land
has been excluded from shamilat deh under sub-clause (ii-a) of clause (g)
of Section 2, all rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land,
as from the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation)
Amendment Act, 1995, shall cease, and all such rights, title and interest
shall on or before the 9th day of July, 1 985, revest in the person or
persons to whom the land so excluded has been allotted or otherwise
transferred by sale or by any other manner whatsoever, subject to the
condition that-
(a) *
(b)
shall be paid by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab
to the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats for onward
disbursement to the Panchayat to which such shamilat deh belonged."
By Act 8 of 1995, sub-sections (2) and (3) are inserted in Section 3. But
before reading the said sub-sections it would be necessary to notice that
by virtue of Section 4 of the Act all rights, title and interest whatsoever
in the land which is included in the shamilat deh of any village had vested
in the Panchayats except to the extent indicated therein. Clause (g) of
Section 2 defines shamilat deh. It is an inclusive definition and is in two
parts: the first part enumerates five categories of land which are included
within its meaning and the second part excludes as many as ten items of
land which would fall outside the ambit of shamilat deh. By the same
Amendment Act, (ii-a) is inserted in clause (g) of Section 2 in the list of
the excluded items. Now adverting to the provisions of amended Section 3,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
we are concerned here with sub-section (2). It opens with non obstante
clause and says that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
of Section 4 (which deals with vesting of rights in Panchayat and non-
proprietors), any land which has vested in Panchayat shall cease and all
such rights, title and interest will revest in the person or persons in
whom they were earlier vested. It has two limbs: (i) deals with a case
where the land has vested in a Panchayat under the Shamilat Law but such
land has been excluded from shamilat deh under clause (g) of Section 2
(other than the land so excluded under sub-clause (ii-a) of that clause)
and as from the commencement of Act 8 of 1995 all rights, title and
interest of the Panchayat in such land shall cease and vest in the person
or persons in whom they were vested immediately before the commencement of
such law; and (ii) provides, where any land has vested in a Panchayat under
the Act but such land has been excluded from shamilat deh under sub-clause
(ii-a) of clause (g) of Section 2, then as from the commencement of Act 8
of 1995 all rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land shall
cease on or before July 9, 1985 and revest in the person or persons to whom
the land so excluded has been allotted or otherwise transferred by sale or
by any other manner whatsoever, subject to the conditions specified in
clauses (a) and (b) therein (which are not relevant for the present
discussion). Section 3(2)(i) has no application as the land in question
does not fall under any of the items excluded under clause (g) of Section 2
other than sub-clause (ii-a). For purposes of application under Section
3(2)(ii), it has to be shown that the land falls within Section 2(g)(ii-a)
which reads as follows:
"2(g) ’shamilat deh’ includes-
(1) to (5) *
But does not include land which-
(ii-a) was shamilat deh, but, has been allotted on quasi-permanent basis to
a displaced person, or, has been otherwise transferred to any person by
sale or by any other manner whatsoever after the commencement of this Act,
but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985."
This sub-clause excludes the land which was shamilat deh and had been
allotted on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person, or has been
otherwise transferred to any person by sale or by any other manner
whatsoever after the commencement of the Act (4th May, 1961) but on or
before July 9, 1985. For invoking sub-section (2) of Section 3, quoted
above, it has to be shown that the land in question had vested in the
appellants immediately before the commencement of the Shamilat Law or has
been allotted or otherwise transferred by sale or by any other manner
whatsoever. We have pointed out above that the question of dispute as to
the title of the appellant was not referred to the competent authority
under Section 11 of the Act, but on the application of the Panchayat under
Section 7 both the Collector as well as the Commissioner found that the
appellant Nos. 2 and 3 had not produced any material or any documentary
evidence to show that the land had vested in them or had been transferred
by sale or otherwise in their favour. In view of the above findings of fact
the said amended provision would have no application.
In Gram Panchayat of Village, Jamalpur ’s case (supra), a Constitution
Bench of this Court held:
"....The law passed by the State Legislature being a measure of agrarian
reform is conducive to the welfare of the community and there is no reason
why that law should not have effect in its full amplitude. By this process,
the village Panchayats will be able to meet the needs of the village
Panchayat community and secure its welfare. Accordingly, the Punjab Act of
1953 would prevail in the State of Punjab over the Central Act of 1950 even
in so far as shamilat deh land are concerned...."
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4
From the above observation of the Constitution Bench judgment it follows
that no right can be claimed by the appellants on the basis of vesting of
land under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 as under the
Punjab Act of 1953 shamilat deh would vest in the Panchayat.
It is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the
case may be remanded to the Collector to enable the appellants to place
necessary material on record. We are afraid we cannot accede to the
contention of the learned counsel. As the litigation is pending for more
than fifteen years we do not want to put the clock back after such a long
time.
It is brought to our notice that with the huge investment of corers of
rupees the potato farm has been set up by the State Government in which
many persons are working and the Government is spending Rs.10-12 lakhs per
year and that the land was handed over to the Horticulture Department of
the Government as an agency of the Government; there are constructed
buildings and that the appellants would suffer grave hardship if the
Panchayat would resort to demolish the same for purposes of taking
dispossession. On instructions, the learned counsel for the Panchayat
submits that the respondents would lease out the area on which the building
of the appellants are existing together with land necessary for ingress or
egress to reach the said land. We record this submission.
However, we make it clear that nothing said in this judgment shall preclude
the State Government from taking such steps as may be considered necessary
to establish its title, if any, to project the farms and the buildings in
accordance with law.
Subject to the above observations the appeal is dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.