Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1390 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Orient Paper & Industries Ltd.
RESPONDENT:
The State of M.P. and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/11/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(With T.P. (C) No. 216 of 2006)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
The Civil Appeal and the Transfer Petition are inter-
linked and are taken together for disposal.
Background facts involved are essentially as follows:
A writ petition was filed by the appellant under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short ’the
Constitution’) before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The
basic stand of the appellant was that it is not eligible to pay
any market fee under the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act). Before the High
Court it was projected that appellant is a Public Limited
Company having its registered Head Office at Brajrajnagar
(Orissa) and has a paper manufacturing plant at Amlai in the
district of Shahdol in State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant
-company uses bamboos, wood dyes, starch rosin, talcum and
several chemicals as raw material for production of paper. The
manufacturing process consists of crushing bamboos and
wood pieces into pulp to which chemicals are added at a
subsequent stage. Elaborate description was given how the
manufacturing process takes place. It was paying without any
demur the market fee to the Mandi Samiti whenever the
appellant bought or sold any agricultural produce either
within the market area or the market yard. It had never
disputed the liability to pay such fee for purchase made in the
area in question. No market fee is payable on the agricultural
produce when they are neither bought or sold or brought into
the market area for the purpose of sale. Appellant has been
getting the agricultural produce from outside the State to its
manufacturing unit at Amlai for being used as one of the raw
material and hence, the same would not be covered under the
provisions of the Act. It is not disputed that the Bamboo as
well as the wood are specified agricultural produce within the
meaning of the Act.
Stand of the appellant was that when it brought the
agricultural produce a demand was raised in exercise of power
under the Act that it has been brought inside the market area
for the purpose of process on the ground that Amlai Paper
Mills is included within the area of the respondent Mandi
Samiti, Budhar. A notice was issued by the Director, Krishi
Upaj Mandi Samiti, Budhar to which the appellant has filed
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his show-cause. It was also averred that the Director, Krishi
Upaj Mandi Samiti issued a general circular fixing the liability
of persons who are liable to pay the market fee. At that
juncture, the appellant moved the High Court by filing a writ
petition challenging the view taken by the authorities in the
matter.
The writ petition was resisted by the State and the
Market Committee, inter-alia, taking the stand that the levy of
market fee is in order. The High Court upheld the stand of
the State and the Committee and dismissed the writ petition.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the levy can be made only in respect
of the notified agricultural produce which is brought into
market areas for processing. In the instant case, the notified
agricultural produce brought inside the market area is not
used for the purpose of processing, and the end-user is
manufacturer. Therefore, the High Court has clearly erred in
holding that the Market Committee was authorized to levy
market fee.
Per contra, learned counsel for the Market Committee
and the State submitted that the end user may be
manufacturer, but in the process of manufacture processing is
involved and, therefore, the levy is in order.
Though reference was made to a decision of this Court in
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Ors. v. Orient Paper &
Industries Ltd. (1995 (1) SCC 655) by learned counsel for the
respondents, the issue really has no relevance so far as the
present dispute is concerned.
The stand of the respondent further is that in the
process of manufacture bamboo is processed to pulp which is
primary raw material for the purpose of manufacture of paper.
In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it is
necessary to take note of few provisions of the Act.
"Processing" is defined in Section 2(mmm). The same read as
follows :
"Section 2 (mmm): "Processing" means
powdering, crushing, decoraticating, husking,
parboiling, polishing, ginning, pressing,
curing or any other treatment to which an
agricultural produce or its product is
subjected to before final consumption."
Section 19 deals with the power to levy market fee. The
provision reads as follows:
"19. Power to levy market fee: (1) Every Market
Committee shall levy market fee\027
(i) on the sale of notified agricultural produce
whether brought from within the State or
from outside the State into the market area;
and
(ii) on the notified agricultural produce
whether brought from within the State or
from outside the State into the market areas
and used for processing;
at such rates as may be fixed by the State
Government from time to time subject to a
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minimum rate of fifty paise and a maximum of two
rupees for every one hundred rupees of the price in
the manner prescribed:
Provided that no Market Committee other than
the one in whose market area the notified
agricultural produce is brought for sale or
processing by an agriculturist or trader, as the case
may be, for the first time shall levy such market
fee.
(2) The market fees shall be payable by the buyer of
the notified agricultural produce and shall not be
deducted from the price payable to the seller:
Provided that where the buyer of a notified
agricultural produce cannot be identified, all the
fees shall be payable by the person who may have
sold or brought the produce for sale in the market
area:
Provided further that in case of commercial
transaction between traders in the market area, the
market fees shall be collected and paid by the
seller:
Provided further also that no fees shall be
levied upto 31st March, 1990 on such agricultural
produce as may be specified by the State
Government by notification in this behalf if such
produce has been sold outside the market yard or
sub-market yard by an agriculturist to a co-
operative society of which he is a member.
Provided also that for the Agricultural Produce
brought in the market area for commercial
transaction or for processing the market fee shall
be deposited by the buyer or processor, as the case
may be, in the market committee office within
[fourteen] days if the buyer or processor has not
submitted the permit issued under sub-section (6)
of Section 19.
xxx xxx xxx
(Underlined for emphasis)
Undisputedly, the notified agriculture produce in the
instant case is "Bamboo". During the pendency of the appeal,
it was brought to the notice of this Court that in the judgment
impugned in the appeal certain directions were given more
particularly para 18 thereof. Directions read as follows:
18. Submission of Mr. Gupta is that the
bamboos are brought into the market area and
used in manufacturing as one of the raw
material and, therefore, concept of processing
as has been defined under the statute would
not attracted. Learned counsel submitted that
if the agricultural produce is brought inside the
market area and is not used for processing,
market fee cannot be levied. The aforesaid
submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner has substantial force. We are
inclined to hold that if Section 19(1)(ii) is read
in proper perspective it becomes plain as noon
day that the market fee is leviable on the
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notified agricultural produce it is brought into
the market area and used for processing,. If the
goods are brought only into the market area
and are not used for processing certainly it
cannot be liable to the levy of market fee. Both
the aspects are to be read in a composite
manner. To put it differently it has to be given
the cumulative effect of bringing in and used
for processing would give create the factum of
liability. In absence of the produce being used
for processing the liability cannot be saddled or
fastened. While we are accepting the
submission of Mr. Gupta are not inclined to
adjudicate the fact whether the petitioner is
engaged in processing or not as in our
considered view that lies in the realm of factual
aspect and would be adjudicated by the
competent authority. Needless to emphasize it
would be open to the competent authority to
delve upon the fact whether the produce which
is brought inside the market area is used for
processing and is brought for some other
purpose, and take a decision. If the Petitioner
seeks a personal hearing the same shall be
afforded to it. Mr. Saxena, learned Senior
Counsel, has no objection to the aforesaid
hearing given to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the directions, the Additional Director,
Madhya Pradesh State Agriculture Marketing Board, Bhopal
considered the matter. By order dated 7.2.2006 he held that
the appellant is liable to pay market fee as process of
agricultural produce.
The distinction between ’manufacturing’ and ’processing’
has been examined by this Court in several cases.
According to Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of
the word ’process’ is "a continuous and regular action or
succession of actions taking place or carried on in a definite
manner and leading to the accomplishment of some result".
The activity contemplated by the definition is perfectly general
requiring only the continuous or quick succession. It is not
one of the requisites that the activity should involve some
operation on some material in order to effect its conversion to
some particular stage. There is nothing in the natural
meaning of the word ’process’ to exclude its application to
handling. There may be a process, which consists only in
handling and there may be a process, which involves no
handling or not merely handling but use or also use. It may be
a process involving the handling of the material and it need
not be a process involving the use of material. The activity
may be subordinate but one in relation to the further process
of manufacture. Any activity or operation, which is the
essential requirement and is so related to the further
operations for the end result, would also be a process in or in
relation to manufacture. (See: C.C.E. v. Rajasthan State
Chemical Works (1991) 4 SCC 473).
In Black’s Law Dictionary, (5th Edition), the word
’manufacture’ has been defined as,
"The process or operation of making goods or
any material produced by hand, by machinery or by
other agency; by the hand, by machinery, or by art.
The production of articles for use from raw or
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prepared materials by giving such materials new
forms, qualities, properties or combinations, whether
by hand labour or machine".
Thus by manufacture something is produced and brought into
existence which is different from that out of which it is made
in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercial
commodity capable of being sold or supplied. The material
from which the thing or product is manufactured may
necessarily lose its identity or may become transformed into
the basic or essential properties. (See Deputy Commissioner
of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v.
M/s. Coco Fibres (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 290).
Manufacture implies a change but every change is not
manufacture, yet every change of an article is the result of
treatment, labour and manipulation. Naturally, manufacture
is the end result of one or more processes through which the
original commodities are made to pass. The nature and extent
of processing may vary from one class to another. There may
be several stages of processing, a different kind of processing
at each stage. With each process suffered the original
commodity experiences a change. Whenever a commodity
undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed
on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to
processing of the commodity; but it is only when the change or
a series of changes takes the commodity to the point where
commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original
commodity but instead is recognized as a new and distinct
article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Process
in manufacture or in relation to manufacture implies not only
the production but also various stages through which the raw
material is subjected to change by different operations. It is
the cumulative effect of the various processes to which the raw
material is subjected to that the manufactured product
emerges. Therefore, each step towards such production would
be a process in relation to the manufacture. Where any
particular process is so integrally connected with the ultimate
production of goods that but for that process processing of
goods would be impossible or commercially inexpedient, that
process is one in relation to the manufacture. (See Collector of
Central Excise, Jaipur v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works,
Deedwana, Rajasthan (1991 (4) SCC 473).
’Manufacture’ is a transformation of an article, which is
commercially different from the one, which is converted. The
essence of manufacture is the change of one object to another
for the purpose of making it marketable. The essential point
thus is that in manufacture something is brought into
existence, which is different from that, which originally existed
in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially
different commodity whereas in the case of processing it is not
necessary to produce a commercially different article. (See
M/s. Saraswati Sugar Mills and others v. Haryana State Board
and others (1992 (1) SCC 418).
The prevalent and generally accepted test to ascertain
that there is ’manufacture’ is whether the change or the series
of changes brought about by the application of processes take
the commodity to the point where, commercially, it can no
longer be regarded as the original commodity but is, instead,
recognized as a distinct and new article that has emerged as a
result of the process. There might be borderline cases where
either conclusion with equal justification can be reached.
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Insistence on any sharp or intrinsic distinction between
’processing and manufacture’, results in an oversimplification
of both and tends to blur their interdependence. (See Ujagar
Prints v. Union of India (1989 (3) SCC 488).
To put differently, the test to determine whether a
particular activity amounts to ’manufacture’ or not is: Does
new and different goods emerge having distinctive name, use
and character. The moment there is transformation into a new
commodity commercially known as a distinct and separate
commodity having its own character, use and name, whether
be it the result of one process or several processes
’manufacture’ takes place and liability to duty is attracted.
Etymologically the word ’manufacture’ properly construed
would doubtless cover the transformation. It is the
transformation of a matter into something else and that
something else is a question of degree, whether that something
else is a different commercial commodity having its distinct
character, use and name and commercially known as such
from that point of view is a question depending upon the facts
and circumstances of the case. (See Empire Industries Ltd. v.
Union of India (1985 (3) SCC 314).
These aspects were highlighted in Kores India Ltd.,
Chennai v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai (2005 (1)
SCC 385).
The stand of leaned counsel for the respondents that the
levy is under two circumstances i.e. (i) on the buying and
selling of notified agricultural produce when brought within
the State into the market area (ii) on the notified agriculture
produce when brought from within the State or from outside
the State into the market areas. The case at hand, it is
submitted, relates to the second category.
Had it been only that the goods notified are brought into
the market area to be covered by the second category then the
stand of the respondents would have been acceptable. But the
further condition it must be "used for processing" shows that
the emphasis is on end-user. In this case that makes the
difference. Therefore, the appellant is correct in its stand that
levy on the notified agriculture produce being brought within
market area where end-user is manufacture does not attract
levy of market fee.
Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that by
accepting the interpretation suggested by them, the object of
the statute shall be achieved.
When the words of a statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning
irrespective of consequences. (See: State of Jharkhand v.
Govind Singh AIR 2005 SC 294, Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi
Gupta (2005 (2) SCC 271).
In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CI&F 85, at page 143
Tindal C.J. observed as follows:
"If the words of the statute are in themselves
precise and unambiguous, then no more can
be necessary than to expound those words in
their natural and ordinary sense. The words
themselves do alone in such cases best
declare the intent of the lawgiver."
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When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits
of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute
arises, for the Act speaks for itself.
As observed in Nathi Devi’s case (supra) if the words
used are capable of one construction, only then, it would not
be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical
construction on the ground that such construction is more
consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The
spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and
the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in
opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.
The appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. In
view of the order in the appeal no further order is necessary to
be passed in the transfer petition. Same is disposed of. No
costs.