Full Judgment Text
ITEM NO.5 COURT NO.8 SECTION II
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 848/2014
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 02/05/2013
in SBCRA No. 446/1986 passed by the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan at Jaipur)
MAHESH JOGI Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondent(s)
(With application for bail and exemption from filing Official
Translation and office report)
Date : 16/12/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Mohan Pandey, A.O.R.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G.
Mr. Ankit Shah, Adv.
Mr. Shrey Kapoor, Adv.
Ms. Ruchi Kohli,A.O.R.
UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal stands disposed of in terms of the
signed reportable order.
[KALYANI GUPTA]
[SHARDA KAPOOR]
Signature Not Verified
COURT MASTER
COURT MASTER
Digitally signed by
Kalyani Gupta
Date: 2014.12.20
12:35:09 IST
Reason:
[SIGNED REPORTABLE ORDER IS PLACED ON THE FILE.]
CRL.A. NO.. OF 2014 @ SLP(CRL) NO. 848 OF 2014
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2014
ARISING OUT OF
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.) NO. 848 OF 2014
MAHESH JOGI ….. APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN ….. RESPONDENT
O R D E R
In this Special Leave Petition, while ordering
th
notice on 20 January, 2014, such notice was confined to
the question as to whether the petitioner was a juvenile
at the time of the commission of the offence. By our
nd
subsequent order dated 2 July, 2014, after hearing
learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the
respondent-State, we directed the Additional Sessions
Judge, Dausa Camp, Jaipur to hold an inquiry to find out
as to whether the petitioner was a juvenile on the date
th
of the commission of the offence i.e. 20 January, 1985.
The learned Sessions Judge was directed to give an
Page no. 1 Of 6
CRL.A. NO.. OF 2014 @ SLP(CRL) NO. 848 OF 2014
opportunity to the petitioner to produce all requisite
materials in support of the claim that he was a juvenile
on the date of the occurrence and also to call for
necessary documents from school authorities for
ascertaining the said question.
2. Pursuant to our order, the learned Sessions Judge
after holding an inquiry has submitted his Report dated
th
16 October, 2014. After detailed reference to the
various materials placed before him, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Dausa Camp, Jaipur, Rajasthan
has submitted as under:-
“It is, therefore, having determined the age
of petitioner/accused Mahesh Jogi son of
Parasram, Caste-Jogi, resident of Bagwada,
Police Station-Aamer, District-Jaipur(Raj.)
order is passed that in Session Case No.
18/86(58/85) titled State v. Mahesh, the age
of petitioner/accused on the date of
commission of offence i.e. 20.01.1985 was
about 17 years 04 months, meaning thereby
that he had attained the age of 16 years and
therefore he is not a juvenile delinquent.”
[underlying is ours]
3. Leave granted.
4. Having perused the Report of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, we find that the appellant was about 17
years and 4 months as on the date of the occurrence
th
namely 20 January, 1985. The conclusion of the learned
Additional Sessions Judge that since accused-appellant
Page no. 2 Of 6
CRL.A. NO.. OF 2014 @ SLP(CRL) NO. 848 OF 2014
was above 16 years of age he was not a juvenile is not
correct. This Court has held in a number of decisions
as to what would be the effect of the Juvenile
Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
[hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2000']. The age
of a juvenile has been amended by which the age which
was prescribed as 16 years to be a juvenile was revised
as 18 years under the Act of 2000.
5. A question arose as to when conviction came to be
imposed on an accused, prior to the coming into force of
the Act of 2000, and a claim as to his status as a
juvenile at the subsequent stages as to whether the
protection or the benefits can be made available to him
as a juvenile by virtue of the coming into force of the
Hariram v.
Act of 2000. In the decision reported in
State of Rajasthan
(2009) 13 SCC 193, it was ultimately
held:-
“.....a juvenile who had not completed
eighteeen years on the date of commission
of the offence was also entitled to the
benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act,
2000, as if the provisions of Section 2(k)
had always been in existence even during
the operation of the 1986 Act.”
6. The said judgment was subsequently followed in the
decisions reported in Ajay Kumar v. State of Madhya
Page no. 3 Of 6
CRL.A. NO.. OF 2014 @ SLP(CRL) NO. 848 OF 2014
Pradesh (2010) 15 SCC 83, Abuzar Hussain @ Gulzar
Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489,
Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and another v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11 SCC 193 and Yakub Abdul Razak
Memon v. State of Maharashtra 2013(13) SCC 1. One of
us, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla, in the judgment reported in JT (2014) 9 SC
243 titled Hakkim v. State represented through Deputy
Superintendent of Police
had occasion to follow the
above said principle while dealing with a convict in
Criminal Appeal No. 1410 of 2009(one of the three
appeals). Therefore, after the coming into force of the
Act of 2000, a juvenile who had not completed 18 years
of age on the date of the commission of the offence was
entitled to the benefits of the said Act.
7. Keeping the above legal principle consistently held
by this Court in the above referred to decisions, when
we consider the Report of the Additional Sessions Judge,
Dausa Camp, Jaipur, Rajasthan, inasmuch as the appellant
was only 17 years 4 months on 20th January, 1985, he was
entitled for the benefit of the Act of 2000. Since
notice was issued in this appeal by way of special leave
confining to the question as to whether the appellant
Page no. 4 Of 6
CRL.A. NO.. OF 2014 @ SLP(CRL) NO. 848 OF 2014
was entitled for the benefit as a juvenile and by a
Jitendra Singh's case (supra)
decision reported in , it
was made clear that such benefit would only enure to
the extent of the sentence imposed on the appellant,
there is no scope for interfering with the conviction
imposed on the appellant.
8. Therefore, even while affirming the conviction we
hold that the appellant was a juvenile and has to be
dealt with on that basis for imposition of sentence. We
wish to follow the direction issued by this Court in the
Ajay Kumar's case (supra)
decision reported in .
9. Paras 6 of the said decision is reproduced
hereunder:-
“6. Rule 98 of the Juvenile Justice (care and
Protection of Children Rules, 2007
(hereinafter referred to as “the Juvenile
Justice Rules, 2007”) provides the procedure
as to how a case of a juvenile who is in
conflict with law should be disposed of. The
same reads as follows:
“98. Disposed off cases of juveniles in
conflict with law – Government or as the case
may be the Board may, either suo motu or on an
application made for the purpose, review the
case of a person or a juvenile in conflict
with law, determine his juvenility in terms f
the provisions contained in the Act and Rule
12 of these Rules and pass an appropriate
order in the interest of the juvenile in
conflict with law under Section 64 of the Act,
for the immediate release of the juvenile in
conflict with law whose period of detention or
imprisonment has exceeded the maximum period
provided in Section 15 of the said Act.”
Page no. 5 Of 6
CRL.A. NO.. OF 2014 @ SLP(CRL) NO. 848 OF 2014
10. In the light of the said decision, the appellant is
referred to the Juvenile Justice Board and while setting
aside the sentence awarded to him without interfering
with the conviction, the Juvenile Justice Board is
directed to pass appropriate orders under Section 15 of
the Act as regards the sentence to be undergone by the
appellant. The said exercise shall be carried out by
the Juvenile Justice Board expeditiously preferably
within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of
this order.
11. The appeal stands disposed of on the above terms.
…...................................J
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]
…...................................J
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 16, 2014.
Page no. 6 Of 6