Full Judgment Text
$~09
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 1171/2015
th
Date of decision: 17 March, 2016
RADHA KISHAN MEENA ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. M. Atyab Siddiqui, Advocate.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondent
Through Ms. Neha Rastogi, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
SANJIV KHANNA, J. (ORAL)
With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, we take up the
present writ petition for final hearing and disposal.
2. Radha Kishan Meena, a Physical Education Teacher in the Directorate
of Education, Government of NCT of Delhi, in this writ petition impugns
th
order dated 16 December, 2014 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi, whereby his OA No.639 of 2014 was
dismissed, upholding the order under Rule 19(1) of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 [CCS(CCA)
Rules, for short].
3. By the judgment of the Sessions Court, district Dausa, Rajasthan
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 1 of 10
th
dated 14 September, 2012, the petitioner was convicted under Sections
308, 324 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC, for short].The
petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No.797/2012, before the High Court of
st
Rajasthan, which is pending. By order dated 1 February, 2013, the said
High Court had disposed of an interim application filed by the petitioner for
stay of conviction, recording:-
“2) Counsel submits that this application for stay of
conviction of the order dated 14.09.2012 for offences
under the trial court arises in the circumstance that the
accused-applicant is a highly qualified person and is
presently employed as PET, GBSSS, No.1, Molarband,
New Delhi. It is submitted that the accused-applicant has
been terminated from service under the order dated
17.12.2012 issued under the hand of the Director of
Education, Government of National Capital Territory of
Delhi, Directorate of Education, Old. Sectt. Delhi
(Vigilance Branch-HQ) and a bare look at the order
indicates that the termination is founded upon the order of
the applicant’s conviction dated 14.09.2012 for offences
under Sections 323, 341, 324/34, 325/34 & 308/34 IPC.
3) x x x x x x
4) x x x x x x
5) Having heard the counsel for the parties, in the facts
of the case, it is directed that judgment of conviction dated
14.09.2012 against the accused-applicant for offences
under Sections 323, 341, 324/34, 325/34 & 308/34 IPC
passed by the learned trial court shall remain stayed during
the pendency of the appeal.”
th
4. Thus, the High Court has stayed the judgment of conviction dated 14
September, 2012. This is not a case, where the sentence stands suspended
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 2 of 10
and the petitioner has been granted bail, but one in which the judgment of
conviction has been stayed.
th
5. After the judgment of conviction was pronounced on 14 September,
th
2012, the petitioner was dismissed from service, vide order dated 17
December, 2012 under Rule 19 of the CCS(CCA) Rules. This order dated
th st
17 December, 2012, was before the stay of conviction order dated 1
February, 2013 passed by the High Court. However, the petitioner had
preferred a statutory appeal under the CCS(CCA) Rules, which was
th
disposed of on 6 December, 2013. By then the order of stay of conviction
th
had been passed by the High Court. The appellate order dated 6 December,
2013 does not refer to and examine the effect and consequence of the order
st
dated 1 February, 2013.
th
6. There is another aspect, as to why the two orders dated 17
th
December, 2012 and 6 December, 2013 suffer from procedural
irregularities for they are contrary to the mandate and stipulations of Rule
19(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The said Sub- Rule reads as under:-
“19. Special procedure in certain cases
(2) Action on conviction .- (a) On a criminal
charge.-The following principles should apply in regard
to action to be taken in cases where Government servants
are convicted on a criminal charge:-
(i) In case where a Government servant has been
convicted in a Court of Law of an offence which is such
as to render further retention in public service of a
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 3 of 10
Government servant prima facie undesirable, the
Disciplinary Authority may, if it comes to the conclusion
that an order with a view to imposing a penalty on the
Government servant on the ground of conduct which had
led to his conviction on a criminal charge should be
issued, issue such an order without waiting for the period
of filing an appeal, or, if an appeal has been filed,
without waiting for the decision in the first Court of
appeal. Before such an order is passed, the Union Public
Service Commission should be consulted where such
consultation is necessary.
(ii) As soon as a Government servant is convicted
on a criminal charge, he may, in appropriate cases, be
placed under suspension, if not already suspended.
(iii) In case where the conviction is not for an
offence of the type referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above,
the Disciplinary Authority should call for and examine a
copy of the judgment with a view to decide on taking
such further departmental action, as might be deemed
appropriate.”
The Rule 19(2) empowers the disciplinary authority to impose
penalty on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to
his conviction on the criminal charge. The crucial aspect required to be
examined by the disciplinary authority is whether the conduct of the
Government servant, which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge,
warrants punishment of dismissal from service on the ground that retaining
the public servant in Government service is undesirable. This safeguard and
protection ensures that a government servant is not dismissed from service
for technical offences. It is not mandatory or automatic that the Government
servant upon conviction on a criminal charge be dismissed from service.
The conduct of the Government servant, which had led to his conviction,
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 4 of 10
has to be examined and a considered decision taken. This is clear from sub-
clause (iii) to Rule 19(2), which refers to conviction of a Government
servant for an offence of the type not referred to in sub-clause (i), i.e., the
conviction should be for an offence which would render further retention of
public servant undesirable.
7. The legal issue is not res integra and was examined by the Supreme
Court, when they dealt with a similar provision in Divisional Personnel
Officer, Southern Railway Vs. T.R. Chellappan , (1976) 3 SCC 190 and had
observed:-
“9 An analysis of the provisions of Article
311(2) (a ) extracted above would clearly show that this
constitutional guarantee contemplates three stages of
departmental inquiry before an order of dismissal,
removal or reduction can be passed Proviso (a )
to Article 311(2), however, completely dispenses with
all the three stages of departmental inquiry when an
employee is convicted on a criminal charge. The
reason for the proviso is that in a criminal trial the
employee has already had a full and complete
opportunity to contest the allegations against him and
to make out his defence. In the criminal trial charges
are framed to give clear notice regarding the
allegations made against the accused, secondly, the
witnesses are examined and cross-examined in his
presence and by him; and thirdly, the accused is given
full opportunity to produce his defence and it is only
after hearing the arguments that the Court passes the
final order of conviction or acquittal. In these
circumstances, therefore, if after conviction by the
Court a fresh departmental inquiry is not dispensed
with, it will lead to unnecessary waste of time and
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 5 of 10
expense and a fruitless duplication of the same
proceedings all over again. It was for this reason that
the founders of the Constitution thought that where
once a delinquent employee has been convicted of a
criminal offence that should be treated as a sufficient
proof of his misconduct and the disciplinary authority
may be given the discretion to impose the penalties
referred to in Article 311(3), namely, dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank. It appears to us that
proviso (a ) to Article 311(2) is merely an enabling
provision and it does not enjoin or confer a
mandatory duty on the disciplinary authority to pass
an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
the moment an employee is convicted. This matter
is left completely to the discretion of the disciplinary
authority and the only reservation made is that
departmental inquiry contemplated by this provision
as also by the Departmental Rules is dispensed with.
In these circumstances, therefore, we think that Rule
14 (i ) of the Rules of 1968 only incorporates the
principles, enshrined in proviso (a ) to Article 311(2)
of the Constitution. The words “where any penalty is
imposed” in Rule 14 (i ) should actually be read as
“where any penalty is imposable”, because so far as
the disciplinary authority is concerned it cannot
impose a sentence. It could only impose a penalty
on the basis of the conviction and sentence passed
against the delinquent employee by a competent
court. Furthermore the rule empowering the
disciplinary authority to consider circumstances of
the case and make such orders as it deems fit clearly
indicates that it is open to the disciplinary authority
to impose any penalty as it likes. In this sense,
therefore, the word “penalty” used in Rule 14 (i ) of
the Rules of 1968 is relatable to the penalties to be
imposed under the Rules rather than a penalty given
by a criminal court.”
In a subsequent portion of the same judgment, it was held:-
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 6 of 10
“21 ....... The word “consider” merely connotes
that there should be active application of
the mind by the disciplinary authority after
considering the entire circumstances of the case in
order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to
be imposed on the delinquent employee on his
conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be
objectively determined only if the delinquent employee
is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority
regarding the final orders that may be passed by the
said authority. In other words, the term “consider”
postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and
cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person.
Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held
by the disciplinary authority after hearing the
delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the
disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental
inquiry which is dispensed with under Rule 14 of the
Rules of 1968 which incorporates the principle
contained in Article 311(2) proviso ( a ) . This provision
confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide
whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular
case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the
delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering
this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take
into account the entire conduct of the delinquent
employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by
him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have
on the administration and other extenuating
circumstances or redeeming features if any present in
the case and so on and so forth. It may be that the
conviction of an accused may be for a trivial offence as
in the case of the respondent T.R. Chellappan in Civil
Appeal No. 1664 of 1974 where a stern warning or a
fine would have been sufficient to meet the exigencies
of service. It is possible that the delinquent employee
may be found guilty of some technical offence, for
instance, violation of the transport rules or the rules
under the Motor Vehicles Act and so on, where no
major penalty may be attracted. It is difficult to lay
down any hard and fast rules as to the factors which the
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 7 of 10
disciplinary authority would have to consider, but I
have mentioned some of these factors by way of
instances which are merely illustrative and not
exhaustive. In other words, the position is that the
conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken
as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority
will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the
nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the
delinquent employee and in the course of the inquiry if
the authority is of the opinion that the offence is too
trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse to impose
any penalty in spite of the conviction. This is a very
salutary provision which has been enshrined in these
Rules and one of the purposes for conferring this power
is that in cases where the disciplinary authority is
satisfied that the delinquent employee is a youthful
offender who is not convicted of any serious offence
and shows poignant penitence or real repentance he
may be dealt with as lightly as possible. This appears to
us to be the scope and ambit of this provision. We must,
however, hasten to add that we should not be
understood as laying down that the last part of Rule 14
of the Rules of 1968 contains a licence to employees
convicted of serious offences to insist on
reinstatement………”
8. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India
Vs. Tulsiram Patel , (1985) 3 SCC 398, Union of India Vs. Sunil Kumar
Sarkar , (2001) 3 SCC 414 and Union of India Vs. P. Chandra Mouli ,
(2003) 10 SCC 297.
th
9. In the present case, the order of the disciplinary authority dated 17
December, 2012, reads as under:-
“Whereas, Sh. Radha Kishan Meena, PET, GBSSS,
No.1, Molarband, New Delhi has been convicted under
section 307/34 & 341, 323, 324/34, 325/34 of Indian
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 8 of 10
Penal Code, Vide Session Case No.22/2007 at
Bandikui, District Dausa, Rajasthan and has been
awarded a Rigorous imprisonment of four years and
with a fine of Rs. Five Thousand u/s 307/34 & 341,
323, 324/34, 325/34 of Indian Penal Code by the
Hon’ble Court, Addl. Session Judge, Bandikui, Distt.
Dausa, Rajasthan vide judgment dated 14.09.2012.
And whereas, it is considered that conduct of the
said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena, PET, which has led to
his conviction, is such as to render his further retention
in the public service undesirable.
And whereas, that said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena,
PET, has been given an opportunity, vide Show Cause
Notice No. F.DE.50(1)/Vig/South/2011/573-574 dated
12.10.2012, for submitting his written explanation.
And whereas, the said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena,
PET has given a written explanation dated 17.10.12,
which has been duly considered by the undersigned
and found not satisfactory.
No, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
Rule 19(i) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the undersigned
hereby dismisses the said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena,
PET from service with immediate effect.”
th
10. The order of the appellate authority dated 6 December, 2013, is
equally bereft of any reasoning or due consideration and application of mind
as required under Rule 19 and as per the ratio of the aforesaid decisions.
th
The relevant portion of the order dated 6 December, 2013, reads:-
“5. In the instant case the penalty of dismissal has
been imposed by the disciplinary authority under Rule
19(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 after giving him
the opportunity to make representation and considering
the representation made by him. After having gone
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 9 of 10
through the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of
the view that the conclusions of the Disciplinary
Authority are valid and that as such penalty imposed
by him is justified.”
11. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the impugned order
th
of the Tribunal dated 16 December, 2014 as well as the orders of the
th
disciplinary authority dated 17 December, 2012 and the appellate authority
th
dated 6 December, 2013, and pass an order of remit to disciplinary
authority to decide the issue afresh in accordance with law. The ratio of the
aforesaid judgments will be kept in mind. If required and necessary
consequential orders as regards treatment of the period post order dated 17th
December,2012, whether an order of suspension can and should be passed,
arrears etc. will be examined and addressed. We have refrained and not
commented on merits i.e. acts and conduct subject of the judgment of
conviction.
12. The writ petition is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J.
MARCH 17, 2016
NA/VKR
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 10 of 10
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 1171/2015
th
Date of decision: 17 March, 2016
RADHA KISHAN MEENA ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. M. Atyab Siddiqui, Advocate.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondent
Through Ms. Neha Rastogi, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
SANJIV KHANNA, J. (ORAL)
With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, we take up the
present writ petition for final hearing and disposal.
2. Radha Kishan Meena, a Physical Education Teacher in the Directorate
of Education, Government of NCT of Delhi, in this writ petition impugns
th
order dated 16 December, 2014 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi, whereby his OA No.639 of 2014 was
dismissed, upholding the order under Rule 19(1) of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 [CCS(CCA)
Rules, for short].
3. By the judgment of the Sessions Court, district Dausa, Rajasthan
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 1 of 10
th
dated 14 September, 2012, the petitioner was convicted under Sections
308, 324 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC, for short].The
petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No.797/2012, before the High Court of
st
Rajasthan, which is pending. By order dated 1 February, 2013, the said
High Court had disposed of an interim application filed by the petitioner for
stay of conviction, recording:-
“2) Counsel submits that this application for stay of
conviction of the order dated 14.09.2012 for offences
under the trial court arises in the circumstance that the
accused-applicant is a highly qualified person and is
presently employed as PET, GBSSS, No.1, Molarband,
New Delhi. It is submitted that the accused-applicant has
been terminated from service under the order dated
17.12.2012 issued under the hand of the Director of
Education, Government of National Capital Territory of
Delhi, Directorate of Education, Old. Sectt. Delhi
(Vigilance Branch-HQ) and a bare look at the order
indicates that the termination is founded upon the order of
the applicant’s conviction dated 14.09.2012 for offences
under Sections 323, 341, 324/34, 325/34 & 308/34 IPC.
3) x x x x x x
4) x x x x x x
5) Having heard the counsel for the parties, in the facts
of the case, it is directed that judgment of conviction dated
14.09.2012 against the accused-applicant for offences
under Sections 323, 341, 324/34, 325/34 & 308/34 IPC
passed by the learned trial court shall remain stayed during
the pendency of the appeal.”
th
4. Thus, the High Court has stayed the judgment of conviction dated 14
September, 2012. This is not a case, where the sentence stands suspended
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 2 of 10
and the petitioner has been granted bail, but one in which the judgment of
conviction has been stayed.
th
5. After the judgment of conviction was pronounced on 14 September,
th
2012, the petitioner was dismissed from service, vide order dated 17
December, 2012 under Rule 19 of the CCS(CCA) Rules. This order dated
th st
17 December, 2012, was before the stay of conviction order dated 1
February, 2013 passed by the High Court. However, the petitioner had
preferred a statutory appeal under the CCS(CCA) Rules, which was
th
disposed of on 6 December, 2013. By then the order of stay of conviction
th
had been passed by the High Court. The appellate order dated 6 December,
2013 does not refer to and examine the effect and consequence of the order
st
dated 1 February, 2013.
th
6. There is another aspect, as to why the two orders dated 17
th
December, 2012 and 6 December, 2013 suffer from procedural
irregularities for they are contrary to the mandate and stipulations of Rule
19(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The said Sub- Rule reads as under:-
“19. Special procedure in certain cases
(2) Action on conviction .- (a) On a criminal
charge.-The following principles should apply in regard
to action to be taken in cases where Government servants
are convicted on a criminal charge:-
(i) In case where a Government servant has been
convicted in a Court of Law of an offence which is such
as to render further retention in public service of a
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 3 of 10
Government servant prima facie undesirable, the
Disciplinary Authority may, if it comes to the conclusion
that an order with a view to imposing a penalty on the
Government servant on the ground of conduct which had
led to his conviction on a criminal charge should be
issued, issue such an order without waiting for the period
of filing an appeal, or, if an appeal has been filed,
without waiting for the decision in the first Court of
appeal. Before such an order is passed, the Union Public
Service Commission should be consulted where such
consultation is necessary.
(ii) As soon as a Government servant is convicted
on a criminal charge, he may, in appropriate cases, be
placed under suspension, if not already suspended.
(iii) In case where the conviction is not for an
offence of the type referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above,
the Disciplinary Authority should call for and examine a
copy of the judgment with a view to decide on taking
such further departmental action, as might be deemed
appropriate.”
The Rule 19(2) empowers the disciplinary authority to impose
penalty on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to
his conviction on the criminal charge. The crucial aspect required to be
examined by the disciplinary authority is whether the conduct of the
Government servant, which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge,
warrants punishment of dismissal from service on the ground that retaining
the public servant in Government service is undesirable. This safeguard and
protection ensures that a government servant is not dismissed from service
for technical offences. It is not mandatory or automatic that the Government
servant upon conviction on a criminal charge be dismissed from service.
The conduct of the Government servant, which had led to his conviction,
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 4 of 10
has to be examined and a considered decision taken. This is clear from sub-
clause (iii) to Rule 19(2), which refers to conviction of a Government
servant for an offence of the type not referred to in sub-clause (i), i.e., the
conviction should be for an offence which would render further retention of
public servant undesirable.
7. The legal issue is not res integra and was examined by the Supreme
Court, when they dealt with a similar provision in Divisional Personnel
Officer, Southern Railway Vs. T.R. Chellappan , (1976) 3 SCC 190 and had
observed:-
“9 An analysis of the provisions of Article
311(2) (a ) extracted above would clearly show that this
constitutional guarantee contemplates three stages of
departmental inquiry before an order of dismissal,
removal or reduction can be passed Proviso (a )
to Article 311(2), however, completely dispenses with
all the three stages of departmental inquiry when an
employee is convicted on a criminal charge. The
reason for the proviso is that in a criminal trial the
employee has already had a full and complete
opportunity to contest the allegations against him and
to make out his defence. In the criminal trial charges
are framed to give clear notice regarding the
allegations made against the accused, secondly, the
witnesses are examined and cross-examined in his
presence and by him; and thirdly, the accused is given
full opportunity to produce his defence and it is only
after hearing the arguments that the Court passes the
final order of conviction or acquittal. In these
circumstances, therefore, if after conviction by the
Court a fresh departmental inquiry is not dispensed
with, it will lead to unnecessary waste of time and
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 5 of 10
expense and a fruitless duplication of the same
proceedings all over again. It was for this reason that
the founders of the Constitution thought that where
once a delinquent employee has been convicted of a
criminal offence that should be treated as a sufficient
proof of his misconduct and the disciplinary authority
may be given the discretion to impose the penalties
referred to in Article 311(3), namely, dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank. It appears to us that
proviso (a ) to Article 311(2) is merely an enabling
provision and it does not enjoin or confer a
mandatory duty on the disciplinary authority to pass
an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
the moment an employee is convicted. This matter
is left completely to the discretion of the disciplinary
authority and the only reservation made is that
departmental inquiry contemplated by this provision
as also by the Departmental Rules is dispensed with.
In these circumstances, therefore, we think that Rule
14 (i ) of the Rules of 1968 only incorporates the
principles, enshrined in proviso (a ) to Article 311(2)
of the Constitution. The words “where any penalty is
imposed” in Rule 14 (i ) should actually be read as
“where any penalty is imposable”, because so far as
the disciplinary authority is concerned it cannot
impose a sentence. It could only impose a penalty
on the basis of the conviction and sentence passed
against the delinquent employee by a competent
court. Furthermore the rule empowering the
disciplinary authority to consider circumstances of
the case and make such orders as it deems fit clearly
indicates that it is open to the disciplinary authority
to impose any penalty as it likes. In this sense,
therefore, the word “penalty” used in Rule 14 (i ) of
the Rules of 1968 is relatable to the penalties to be
imposed under the Rules rather than a penalty given
by a criminal court.”
In a subsequent portion of the same judgment, it was held:-
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 6 of 10
“21 ....... The word “consider” merely connotes
that there should be active application of
the mind by the disciplinary authority after
considering the entire circumstances of the case in
order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to
be imposed on the delinquent employee on his
conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be
objectively determined only if the delinquent employee
is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority
regarding the final orders that may be passed by the
said authority. In other words, the term “consider”
postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and
cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person.
Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held
by the disciplinary authority after hearing the
delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the
disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental
inquiry which is dispensed with under Rule 14 of the
Rules of 1968 which incorporates the principle
contained in Article 311(2) proviso ( a ) . This provision
confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide
whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular
case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the
delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering
this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take
into account the entire conduct of the delinquent
employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by
him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have
on the administration and other extenuating
circumstances or redeeming features if any present in
the case and so on and so forth. It may be that the
conviction of an accused may be for a trivial offence as
in the case of the respondent T.R. Chellappan in Civil
Appeal No. 1664 of 1974 where a stern warning or a
fine would have been sufficient to meet the exigencies
of service. It is possible that the delinquent employee
may be found guilty of some technical offence, for
instance, violation of the transport rules or the rules
under the Motor Vehicles Act and so on, where no
major penalty may be attracted. It is difficult to lay
down any hard and fast rules as to the factors which the
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 7 of 10
disciplinary authority would have to consider, but I
have mentioned some of these factors by way of
instances which are merely illustrative and not
exhaustive. In other words, the position is that the
conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken
as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority
will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the
nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the
delinquent employee and in the course of the inquiry if
the authority is of the opinion that the offence is too
trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse to impose
any penalty in spite of the conviction. This is a very
salutary provision which has been enshrined in these
Rules and one of the purposes for conferring this power
is that in cases where the disciplinary authority is
satisfied that the delinquent employee is a youthful
offender who is not convicted of any serious offence
and shows poignant penitence or real repentance he
may be dealt with as lightly as possible. This appears to
us to be the scope and ambit of this provision. We must,
however, hasten to add that we should not be
understood as laying down that the last part of Rule 14
of the Rules of 1968 contains a licence to employees
convicted of serious offences to insist on
reinstatement………”
8. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India
Vs. Tulsiram Patel , (1985) 3 SCC 398, Union of India Vs. Sunil Kumar
Sarkar , (2001) 3 SCC 414 and Union of India Vs. P. Chandra Mouli ,
(2003) 10 SCC 297.
th
9. In the present case, the order of the disciplinary authority dated 17
December, 2012, reads as under:-
“Whereas, Sh. Radha Kishan Meena, PET, GBSSS,
No.1, Molarband, New Delhi has been convicted under
section 307/34 & 341, 323, 324/34, 325/34 of Indian
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 8 of 10
Penal Code, Vide Session Case No.22/2007 at
Bandikui, District Dausa, Rajasthan and has been
awarded a Rigorous imprisonment of four years and
with a fine of Rs. Five Thousand u/s 307/34 & 341,
323, 324/34, 325/34 of Indian Penal Code by the
Hon’ble Court, Addl. Session Judge, Bandikui, Distt.
Dausa, Rajasthan vide judgment dated 14.09.2012.
And whereas, it is considered that conduct of the
said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena, PET, which has led to
his conviction, is such as to render his further retention
in the public service undesirable.
And whereas, that said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena,
PET, has been given an opportunity, vide Show Cause
Notice No. F.DE.50(1)/Vig/South/2011/573-574 dated
12.10.2012, for submitting his written explanation.
And whereas, the said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena,
PET has given a written explanation dated 17.10.12,
which has been duly considered by the undersigned
and found not satisfactory.
No, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
Rule 19(i) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the undersigned
hereby dismisses the said Sh. Radha Kishan Meena,
PET from service with immediate effect.”
th
10. The order of the appellate authority dated 6 December, 2013, is
equally bereft of any reasoning or due consideration and application of mind
as required under Rule 19 and as per the ratio of the aforesaid decisions.
th
The relevant portion of the order dated 6 December, 2013, reads:-
“5. In the instant case the penalty of dismissal has
been imposed by the disciplinary authority under Rule
19(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 after giving him
the opportunity to make representation and considering
the representation made by him. After having gone
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 9 of 10
through the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of
the view that the conclusions of the Disciplinary
Authority are valid and that as such penalty imposed
by him is justified.”
11. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the impugned order
th
of the Tribunal dated 16 December, 2014 as well as the orders of the
th
disciplinary authority dated 17 December, 2012 and the appellate authority
th
dated 6 December, 2013, and pass an order of remit to disciplinary
authority to decide the issue afresh in accordance with law. The ratio of the
aforesaid judgments will be kept in mind. If required and necessary
consequential orders as regards treatment of the period post order dated 17th
December,2012, whether an order of suspension can and should be passed,
arrears etc. will be examined and addressed. We have refrained and not
commented on merits i.e. acts and conduct subject of the judgment of
conviction.
12. The writ petition is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J.
MARCH 17, 2016
NA/VKR
W.P.(C) No.1171/2015 Page 10 of 10