RAVI DHINGRA vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA

REPORTABLE 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.987 OF 2009

VERSUS

WITH

AND

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T   NAGARATHNA,   J. Leave granted in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.5296 of Signature Not Verified 2012. In all other cases, leave has already been granted. Digitally signed by Nidhi Ahuja Date: 2023.05.20 12:59:31 IST Reason: 1

convictions were confirmed by the impugned judgement of the Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   dated   13.02.2008,   under Sections 148, 149 and 364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’, for short). The details of the cases are as under:

2  Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2009, filed by Raman Goswami

08.04.2019. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2009, is considered in respect of Ravi Dhingra alone. All these matters were  heard  together and  they are  being  disposed  of  by this common judgment. 

Station, City Thanesar lodged at the instance of complainant, Dr.   H.K.   Sobti   (PW­20)   are   that   the   appellants   accused kidnapped Harsh (PW­21), aged 14 years, son of Dr H.K. Sobti and Smt Indra Sobti (PW­5) when he was going to school, at about 8:15 a.m. on the aforesaid date. The Station House Officer had   filed   the   FIR   with   a   remark   that   a   case   under   Section 364/34 of the IPC seems to be made out from the facts.  As per the statement of PW­21, he was intimidated by co­accused Ravi Dhingra to ride as a pillion rider on his scooter and upon his refusal, he was forcibly put inside a car. Upon screaming for safety, he was threatened to be killed with a knife and pistol if he cried. They also told him that his affluent father could even pay the ransom of Rs.50 lakhs.  It  emerged   in   the   investigation   that   PW­21   was   kept   in House No.772, Sector­13, Kurukshetra. Smt. Kanta Goyal (PW­ 3 2) who was a resident of house No. 1653/13 which was near the

Manish   (PW­4)   told   them   that   at   8:15   a.m.,   two   boys   with muffled faces had put Harsh in a Maruti car without a number plate and having tinted window glass. Later, on the same day, calls demanding ransom were received, acting on which, PW­20 reached   the   concerned   location   with   the   ransom   demanded. While he was waiting for the appellants accused to receive the ransom and release his child, PW­21 Harsh Sobti was released between 04:00 a.m. and 04:30 a.m. on 16.2.2000 and dropped near the house of PW­11 Suraj Bhan Rathee. He made a phone call to his mother, who took him to his house at around 5:30 a.m.

through   letters   and   telephonic   messages   to   PW­20   on 09.03.2000, 12.03.2000, 13.03.2000 and 14.03.2000. Another

15.03.2000 at 2:30 p.m. He informed the appellants that while he could not arrange Rs.15 lakhs, he had arranged Rs.12 lakhs. Acting on the instructions received in these messages, PW­20, after intimating the police, boarded the train at 8:15 p.m. with a bag of money. When the train stopped at Ambala, he got down. 4 He went back to Kurukshetra wherefrom he was asked to leave his house with the bag of money and come to Karnal. PW­20 went in his car with two sub­inspectors in civil dress. Upon the delivery of the cash in a bag near a bridge, it was discovered that calls were made from a mobile phone registered in the name   of   an   engineering   student,   Ravi   Duhan   (PW­19).   He revealed that his friends, appellants herein, had borrowed his phone. On 17.03.2000, upon receiving secret information about the   whereabouts   of   four   accused   persons,   namely,   Ravi Dhingra, Baljit Pahwa, Parvej Khan and Raman Goswami, were apprehended by the police except accused Laxmi Narain who was apprehended on 03.04.2000. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial on 06.06.2000.

Kurukshetra, (‘Trial Court’, for the sake of convenience) tried the appellants   accused   for   the   commission   of   offences   under Sections 364, 364A, 342, 506 read with Section 148 of the IPC. The prosecution presented 27 witnesses and 72 documentary Exhibits, including statements of the appellants under Section 164   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter ‘Cr.PC’, for short) and 5 case properties. From the appellants’ 5 side, 13 documentary exhibits were presented. The Trial Court recorded   the   appellants’­accused’s   statements   under   Section 313 of the Cr. PC.

and   had   been   kept   in   illegal   confinement   after   being apprehended. They also argued that they were produced before the   Court   after   their   pictures   had   been   widely   publicised through local media and confronted with prosecution witnesses. Further, it was submitted that they were tortured before being presented before the court on 18.03.2000. They also stated that they were forced to sign statements prepared by Investigating Officer on 20.03.2000.

and   the   other   evidence   on   record   and   held   that   appellants formed an unlawful assembly and in pursuance of a common object, kidnapped PW­21 to compel his father to pay a ransom amount of Rs.15 Lakhs. The Trial Court also concluded that the appellants sought to take advantage of PW­21’s confinement and the threat to cause death to him for compelling PW­20 to pay the ransom. 6 The Trial Court found no reason to disbelieve the statement of the PW­21. Thus, appellants were held guilty for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 148 and 364A read with

sentence on the ground that they had old parents and there was no one else to look after them. The Trial Court concluded the trial and rendered its verdict on 29.05.2003. The Trial Court sentenced   the   accused­appellants   to   undergo   rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 148 of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/­ each under Section 364A read with Section 149 of the IPC. The Trial   Court   further   clarified   that   the   period   of   under­trial detention   would   be   set   off   and   both   sentences   shall   run concurrently. 

sentence before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court   considered   the   question   as   to   whether   there   existed reliable evidence to identify and connect the appellants with the offence of kidnapping for ransom under Section 364A of the IPC. The High Court termed PW­21’s statement to be crucial, and 7 placing reliance on the same, held that all ingredients of Section 364A of the IPC had been satisfied. The High Court rejected the plea that there was material discrepancy in the prosecution’s case and held that there was no reason to cast any doubt on the veracity of the versions of prosecution   witnesses.   Regarding   PW­21,   the   High   Court

his version. It rejected the contention as to the contradictions in

cannot by itself a ground to reject the testimony of a reliable

accused with the crime stands established beyond reasonable doubt.”

modify the conviction to that for an offence under Section 363 or 365 of the IPC or under Section 506 IPC, which did not provide for a minimum sentence of life imprisonment on the ground of prolonged detention of over seven years. Being aggrieved by the judgement and sentence of the High Court, the accused have approached this Court by filing their 8 respective   Special   Leave   Petitions,   in   which   leave   has   been granted and are now considered Criminal Appeals. On 11.05.2009, this Court noted that the appellants had served seven years in prison and could be granted bail on the satisfaction of the Trial Court of necessary conditions. It also granted   leave   to   appeal   in   the   Special   Leave   Petitions   and admitted the matters.

there is grave doubt about the fact that the appellants herein are the very persons who had kidnapped Harsh Sobti, PW­21, but the Courts below have found reasons to believe the evidence of PW­21. Thus,  without   conceding  the  arguments  made for acquittal   by   raising   questions   about   the   investigation, appellants  have urged that judicial notice may be taken of the long period of their incarceration and their conviction under Section   364A   of   the   IPC   be   modified   to   a   conviction   under

the   appellants   appointed   by   Supreme   Court   Legal   Services Committee,   placed   reliance   on   Sk.   Ahmed  vs.  State   of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59 (“SK Ahmed”) , to contend that the essential ingredients of Section 364A of the IPC have not 9 been proved in this case. The crux of his argument was that the Sessions’ Court as well as the High Court have disregarded the fact that PW­21’s statement  before the Court on 15.04.2002 was a  substantial   improvement   upon  the  statement   made   to  the police on 15.02.2000.  Therefore, he submitted that  no threat to cause death or hurt has been proven. He also submitted that  n o demand for ransom on the basis of the cause of death or hurt could   be   proven   as   these   emanated   from   the   police.   He submitted that PW­12 turned hostile and PW­13 was only a chance   witness.   Hence,   the   judgments   impugned   may   be interfered   with   and   the   appellants   may   be   granted   relief   by modifying the sentences imposed on them even if acquittal of the appellants may not be possible. On the other hand, Sri Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG for the respondent­State supported the judgment of the High Court and contended that there is no merit in these appeals and the same may   be   dismissed.   He   submitted   that   the   High   Court   was justified in its reasoning and in dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants herein.

the   parties,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   limit   the   point   for consideration in this appeal to whether the facts, in this case, 10 attract the offence under Section 364A of the IPC and if the answer is in the negative, would it be just and proper to modify the conviction to a sentence under Section 363 of the IPC. To put the matter in perspective, the provisions of Section 361   read   with   Sections   363,   364   and   364A   ought   to   be compared. The said provisions read as under:

11

12. We note  that  Section 363 of the IPC punishes the act of kidnapping  and   Section   364  thereof   punishes   the  offence  of kidnapping or abduction of a person in order to murder him. Section   364A   further   adds   to   the   gravity   of   the   offence   by involving an instance of coercive violence or substantial threat thereof,   to   make   a   demand   for   ransom.   Accordingly,   the maximum   punishment   for   the   three   crimes   is   seven   years 12 imprisonment; ten years’ imprisonment and imprisonment for life or death, respectively.  The   nuanced,   graded   approach   of   the   Parliament   while criminalising   the   condemnable   act   of   kidnapping   must   be carefully interpreted.  Before interpreting the varying ingredients of   crime   and   rigours   of   punishment,   and   appraising   the judgments impugned, we deem it appropriate to reiterate the

under:

13 ingredients   to   order   a   conviction   for   the   commission   of   an offence under Section 364A of the IPC in the following manner:

those cases where the accused is convicted for the offence in respect of which no charge is framed. In the said case, the question   was   whether   appellant   therein   could   have   been convicted   under   Section   364A   of   the   IPC   when   the   charge framed was under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The relevant passages which can be culled out from the said

14

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“   …   Section   364­A   IPC   has   three   distinct 25. components viz. ( i ) the person concerned kidnaps or abducts   or   keeps   the   victim   in   detention   after kidnapping   or   abduction;   ( )   threatens   to   cause ii death or hurt or causes apprehension of death or hurt or actually hurts or causes death; and ( iii ) the kidnapping, abduction or detention and the threats of death or hurt, apprehension for such death or hurt or actual death or hurt is caused to coerce the person concerned or someone else to do something or   to   forbear   from   doing   something   or   to   pay ransom. These   ingredients   are,   in   our   opinion, distinctly   different   from   the   offence   of   extortion under   Section   383   IPC.   The   deficiency   in   the existing legal  framework was noticed by the Law Commission and a separate provision in the form of Section   364­A   IPC   proposed   for   incorporation   to cover   the   ransom   situations   embodying   the ingredients mentioned above.” It is necessary to prove not only that such kidnapping or abduction   has   taken   place   but   that   thereafter,   the   accused threatened to cause death or hurt to such person or by his conduct   gave   rise   to   a   reasonable   apprehension   that   such person may be put to death or hurt or cause hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign 16 State or international, inter­governmental organization or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom.

that Section 364A of the IPC has three stages or components, namely, 

detention;

abduction, or detention with a demand to pay the ransom; and 

The relevant portions of the said judgement are extracted as under:

17

18

19

Thus, this Court in     set aside the conviction SK Ahmed   under   Section   364A   of   the   IPC   and   modified   the   same   to conviction under Section 363, for the reason that the additional conditions were not met by observing as follows:  “ 42.  The second condition having not been proved to   be   established,   we   find   substance   in   the submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the appellant   that   conviction   of   the   appellant   is unsustainable under Section 364­A IPC. We, thus, set   aside   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   under Section   364­A.   However,   from   the   evidence   on record regarding kidnapping, it is proved that the accused   had   kidnapped   the   victim   for   ransom, demand of ransom was also proved. Even though offence under Section 364­A has not been proved beyond   reasonable   doubt   but   the   offence   of kidnapping   has   been   fully   established   to   which effect the learned Sessions Judge has recorded a categorical finding in paras 19 and 20. The offence of kidnapping having been proved, the appellant deserves   to   be   convicted   under   Section   363. Section   363   provides   for   punishment   which   is imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a   term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” 20

to the present case and deal with appellants’ argument about contradictions in the statements of the PW­21. We agree with the High Court that the statements are crucial. We also note that the Courts below, as is usual in kidnapping cases, have placed singular reliance on the testimony of PW­21 to prove the element   of   ‘threat   to   cause   death   or   hurt’,   or   to   determine whether   the   appellants’   conduct   gives   rise   to   a   reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. We have perused the statement of PW­21 made to the police on 18.02.2000, i.e., two days after he had returned home from the captivity of appellants­herein. The statements record that he was   threatened   at   night   by   the   appellants   with   a   ‘revolver,’ which   was   claimed   to   be   possessed   by   them.   The   exact

on the eyes and said to me they have revolver and they will kill

Trial Court dated 15.04.2002, nearly two years after the initial statement, includes a substantial detail that was omitted in the previous   statement.   After   mentioning   that   the   PW­21   was forcibly put inside the car and gagged, the statement reads,

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noticed: first, a change in the exact timing of the threat; second, the specificity of the delivery of the threat to kill; and third, omission of the intent behind the threat i.e. to prevent PW­21 from crying out. These details are crucial to proving the second ingredient of the charge under Section 364A and essential to bring home the guilt under this section namely, threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. It is clear that this ingredient has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Courts below did not   thoroughly   address   this   doubt   before   convicting   the appellants. For proving the ingredient of threat, the intimidation of the child victim, for the purpose of making him silent, cannot be enough. If the sentence carrying a maximum sentence of death and a minimum sentence of life sentence has such a low evidentiary threshold, the difference between punishments for kidnapping   under   363,   364   and   364A   shall   become meaningless.

the precedent in   Malleshi  vs.  State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC   95   (“Malleshi”)   properly.   The   facts   in   the   said   case, concerning the kidnapping of a major boy, revolved around the 22 party to whom the demand for ransom ought to be made to bring home the guilt under Section 364A. It was observed in  SK Ahmed   that the   Malleshi   case dealt with demand for ransom and   held   that   demand   originally   was   made   to   the   person abducted and the mere fact that after making the demand the same   could   not   be   conveyed   to   some   other   person   as   the accused was arrested in the meantime does not take away the effect of conditions of Section 364A. As clarified by this Court in ,   was merely concerned with ransom and SK   Ahmed Malleshi  its ratio would be of no assistance to cases where the fulfilment of other ingredients of crime under Section 364A is brought into question.   17. In the   facts   of the present case, we therefore agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Gaurav   Agrawal,   that   the   conviction   of   the   appellants   is unsustainable under Section 364A of the IPC. 18. This   Court   has   wide   power   to   alter   the   charge   under Section 216 of the Cr.PC whilst not causing prejudice to the accused, as reiterated in  Jasvinder Saini vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC 256, para 11; Central Bureau of Investigation  vs.  Karimullah   Osan   Khan   (2014)   11   SCC The following observations of 538, paragraph Nos. 17 and 18.  23 this Court in    Dr. Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy vs. State of are Andhra Pradesh (2020) 12 SCC 467, paragraph No. 21   also instructive: “ 21.  From   the   above   line   of   precedents,   it   is clear   that   Section   216   provides   the   court   an exclusive and wide­ranging power to change or alter any charge. The use of the words “at any time before judgment   is   pronounced”   in   sub­section   (1) empowers the court to exercise its powers of altering or   adding   charges   even   after   the   completion   of evidence, arguments and reserving of the judgment. The alteration or addition of a charge may be done if in the opinion of the court there was an omission in the   framing   of   charge   or   if   upon   prima   facie examination   of   the   material   brought   on   record,   it leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The test to be adopted by the court while deciding upon an addition or alteration of a   charge   is   that   the   material   brought   on   record needs   to   have   a   direct   link   or   nexus   with   the ingredients   of   the   alleged   offence.   Addition   of   a charge merely commences the trial for the additional charges, whereupon, based on the evidence, it is to be   determined   whether   the   accused   may   be convicted for the additional charges. The court must exercise   its   powers   under   Section   216   judiciously and   ensure   that   no   prejudice   is   caused   to   the accused and that he is allowed to have a fair trial. The   only   constraint   on   the   court's   power   is   the prejudice likely to be caused to the accused by the addition   or   alteration   of   charges.   Sub­section   (4) accordingly prescribes the approach to be adopted by the courts where prejudice may be caused.” Therefore, we allow the appeals in part and set aside the conviction under Section 364A of the IPC. 24    The judgments of the learned Trial Court and the High Court are modified to the above extent. The appellants are now convicted for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC; i.e., kidnapping and sentenced to imprisonment for seven years and a   fine   of   Rs.2000/­.   If   the   appellants   have   completed imprisonment   of   more   than   seven   years   with   remission   and have paid the fine of Rs.2000/­, we direct the appellants to be released forthwith; if not on bail. If not, the appellants shall surrender within a period of four weeks and serve the remainder of the sentence. ..………….………..…………J.  (SANJAY KISHAN KAUL) ..……..………….……………J.                  (B.V. NAGARATHNA)   NEW DELHI; st 1  March, 2023. 25