Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S. SWADESHI COTTON MILLS CO., LTD.,AND ANOTHER(and connec
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/11/1957
BENCH:
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
BENCH:
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
CITATION:
1958 AIR 187 1958 SCR 973
ACT:
Industrial Dispute-Awards made beyond specified time-
Validity-Provision for enlargement of time and validation-
Construction-Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.
P. 27 of 1947), s. 6-A--Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1953 (U. P. Ordinance 1 of 1953) s.
3.
HEADNOTE:
Clause 16 of the General Order No. 6,5 made by the Governor
on March I5, 195,, under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Disputes Act, 947, provided that the decision of the
Tribunal or
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Adjudicator shall be pronounced within 4o days from the date
of reference. By orders dated August 19, 1952, and January
20, 1953, the Governor referred two industrial disputes for
adjudication. The references did not specify the time
within which the awards were to be submitted but stated that
the disputes were to be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Order No. 615. In the first reference the
period for making the award was extendad from time to time
up to March 10, 1953, but in the second reference the time
was not extended. On February 18, 1953, before the awards
were made, cl. 16 of Order No. 615 was amended and the time
Of 4o days was altered to 18o days. The award in the first
case was made on April 17, 1953, beyond 180 days of the
reference, and in the second case on June 26, 953, beyond 40
,lays of the reference but within 180 days thereof. On May
22, 1953, the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1951, came into force which conferred, with
retrospective effect, power on the State Government to
enlarge, from time to time, the period for making an award
and which also validated certain awards not made within the
time originally fixed for making them. The Labour Appellate
Tribunal held that the two awards were not valid in law as
they had not been made within time. It was contended by the
appellant that as cl. 16 of the Order No. 6I5 had been
amended the orders of reference must be construed as
specifying 180 days within which the awards were to be
submitted, and that, in any case, the awards were validated
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by S. 3 of the Ordinance.
Held, that the award in the first case was submitted beyond
time and was invalid and could not be validated by s. 3 Of
the Ordinance but that the award in the second case, though
submitted beyond time, was validated by S. 3(2) of the
Ordinance.
The Act required the awards to be submitted within a speci-
fied time and although the orders of reference specified no
time it was stated therein that the references were to be
decided in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615,
and as such the orders must be read as specifying 4o days as
the time within which the awards had to be submitted. The
subsequent amendment of cl. 16 whereby 180 days were
substituted for 4o days could not affect an order of
reference previously made as cl. 16, as amended, could not
be held to have retrospective operation.
On a true construction Of S. 3 Of the Ordinance cl. (1) must
be held to validate all orders of extension of time for
submission of awards made prior to the commencement of the
Ordinance, cl. (3) applies to proceedings pending at the
commencement of the Ordinance and makes s. 6-A of the Act,
introduced by the Ordinance, applicable to such proceedings
and cl. (2) validatesawards against which no judicial
proceedings were pending at the commencement of the
Ordinance and not only awards which had become final.
Consequently, the award in the first case against which an
appeal had been filed before the commencement of the
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Ordinance and to which cl. (3) Of s. 3 of the Ordinance
applied was bad as it was made beyond the last date of the
enlargement of time. But the award in the second case
against which the appeal was filed after the commencement of
the Ordinance was validated by el. (2) Of S. 3 of the
Ordinance.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 14 and 15
of 1955.
Appeals by special leave from the decision dated September
30, 1953, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow
in Civil Appeals Nos. 111-198 of 1953 and III-321 of 1953.
S. S. Dhawan, G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the
appellants and respondent No. 2 (Unions) in both the
Appeals.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, and
S. P. Varma, for the respondent No. I in C. A. No. 14 of
1955.
N. C. Chatterjee and Radhey Lal Aggarwala, for the
respondent No. 1 in C. A. 15 of 55.
1957. November 20. The following Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
IMAM J.-These two appeals by special leave have been heard
together as they arise out of a single judgment of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow, dated September
30, 1953, passed in seven appeals before it. As the
question for consideration in the appeals before this Court
is the same, this judgment will govern both the appeals
before us. Civil Appeal Nos. 14 and 15 of 1955 arise out of
Appeal Nos. 111-198 of 1953 and 111-321 of 1953 respectively
before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The question for consideration before the Labour Appellate
Tribunal was whether the awards from which the seven appeals
had been filed before that Tribunal were valid in law and
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made with jurisdiction. It is this very question which
arises in the appeals before us.
Before dealing with the question raised in these appeals it
is necessary to state certain facts. On March 15, 1951, the
Governor of Uttar Pradesh made a, General Order consisting
of numerous clauses under
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powers conferred on him by cls. (b), (c), (d) and (g) of s.
3 and s. 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (Act XXVIII of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the
Act, in supersession of the general Order No. 781 (L)/XVIII
dated March 10, 1948. The Order of March 15, 1951, was
numbered 615 (LL)/ XVIII-7 (LL) of 1951, hereinafter
referred to as Order No. 615. Under cl. 16 of Order No.
615, the decision of the Tribunal or Adjudicator was to be
pronounced within 40 days, excluding holidays but not annual
vacations observed by courts subordinate to the High Court,
from the date of reference made to it by the State
Government concerning any industrial dispute. The proviso
to it authorised the State Government to extend the period
for the submission of the award from time to time. On
February 18, 1953, this clause was amended and the time of
40 days was altered to 180 days. On December 17, 1952, the
judgment of this Court in the case of Strawboard
Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union (1),
was pronounced. In consequence of this decision the Act was
amended by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1953 (Ordinance No 1 of 1953), hereinafter
referred to as the Ordinance, promulgated by the Governor of
Uttar Pradesh. The Ordinance came into force on May 22,
1953. By the provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance s. 6-A was
introduced into the Act. Section 2 of the Ordinance states
"After section 6 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), the
following shall and be deemed always to have been added as
section 6-A
"6-A. Enlargement of time for submission of awards. Where
any period is specified in any order made under or in
pursuance of this Act referring any industrial dispute for
adjudication within which the award shall be made, declared
or submitted, it shall be competent for the State
Government, from time to time, to enlarge such period even
though the period originally fixed or enlarged may have
expired."
(1)[1953] S. C. R. 439.
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Section 3 of the Ordinance states :
"Removal of doubts and validation-For the removal of doubts
it is hereby declared that :
(1)any order of enlargement referred to in section 6A made
prior to the commencement of this Ordinance under the
Principal Act or any order passed thereunder which would
have been validly and properly made under the Principal Act
if section 6-A had been part of the Act shall be deemed to
be and to have been validly and properly made thereunder;
(2)no award whether delivered before or after the
commencement of this Ordinance in any industrial dispute
referred prior to the said commencement for adjudication
under the Principal Act shall be invalid oil the ground
merely that the period originally specified or any
enlargement thereof had already expired at the date of the
mkaing, declaring or submitting of the award and any action
or proceeding taken, direction issued or jurisdiction
exercised in pursuance of or upon such award be good and
valid in law as if section 6-A had been in force at all
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material dates;
(3)every proceeding pending at the commencement of this
Ordinance before any court or tribunal against an award
shall be decided as if the provisions of section 6-A bad
been in force at all material dates." The following chart
will show the date of reference, the date on which the
period of 40 days expired, the dates and the periods of
enlargement, the date of submission of the award and the
date of filing of the appeal, in the seven appeals before
the Labour Appollate Tribunal:
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976
Date on which 40
Appeal No. Date of days, available for Date & Period
reference the initial sub- of enlargement
mission of the if any
award expired * $
-----------------------------------------------------------
111-186/53 13-2-1953 3-4-1953 Nil 6-4-1953 5-5-1953
111-187/53 28-1-1953 18-3-1953 Nil 13-4-1953 5-5-1953
111-321/53 28-1-1953 18-3-1953 Nil 26-6-1953 18-7-1953
111-183/53 28-1-1953 18-3-1953 Nil 13-4-1953 4-5-1953
111-323/53 9-2-1953 29-3-1953 Nil 22-6-1953 20-7-1953
111-209/53 15-1-1953 5-3-1953 13-3-1953 9-4-1953 8-5-1953
(up to 31-3-1953)
17-4-1953
111-198/53 19-8-1952 10-10-1953 (i) 4-11-1952 13-5-1953
up to 11-11-1952
(ii) 26-12-1952)
(up to 31-12-1952)
(iii) 13-1-1953
(up to 31-1-1953)
(iv) 11-2-1953
(up to 10-3-1953)
*) Date of submission of the award.
$) Date of filing of the appeal.
125
977
The Labour Appellate Tribunal found that the award in appeal
No. 111-198 of 1953 was made not only on the expiry of the
period of enlargement but also long after the expiry of 180
days from the date of reference. In the case of the other
appeals the awards were made on the expiry of 40 days but
within 180 days of the reference. Appeals Nos. 111-321 and
323 of 1953 were filed after the commencement of the
Ordinance and the others before its commencement.
In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd. (Civil
Appeal No. 14 of 1955), the Governor by an order dated
August 19, 1952, referred the dispute between the said Mills
and its workmen to the Additional Regional Conciliation
Officer, Kanpur for adjudication, on the issue stated
therein, in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615.
In the case of Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills (Civil Appeal
No. 15 of 1955), the Governor by his order dated January 28,
1953, referred the dispute between the said Mills and its
workmen, on the issue mentioned therein, to the Regional
Conciliation Officer, Lucknow for adjudication in accordance
with the provisions of Order No. 615. In both these orders
of reference no date was specified within which the Regional
Conciliation Officers of Kanpur and Lucknow were to submit
their awards. All that was stated in these orders was that
they shall adjudicate the dispute in accordance with the
provisions of Order No. 615. It is only by reference to cl.
16 of Order No. 615 that it is possible to say that the
decisions of these Conciliation Officers were to be
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pronounced within the time specified in the Orders of
reference and that would be 40 days from the date of
reference. In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills, there
were several periods of enlargement of time but in the case,
of the Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills there was no enlargement
of time, as will appear from the above-mentioned chart.
Under s. 3 of the Act the State Government, for the purposes
mentioned therein, could, by general or special order, make
provisions for appointing Industrial Courts and for
referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or
adjudication in the manner provided
978
in the order. Order No. 615 was a general order made by
virtue of these provisions. Clause 10 of that Order
authorized the State Government to refer any dispute to the
Industrial Tribunal or if the State Government, considering
the nature of the dispute or the convenience of the party,
so decided, to any other person specified in that behalf for
adjudication. Clause 16 specified the time within which the
decision of the Tribunal or the Adjudicator had to be
pronounced, provided the State Government could extend the
period from time to time. Section 6(1) of the Act
specifically stated that when an authority to which an
industrial dispute had been referred for award or
adjudication had completed its enquiry, it should, within
such time as may be specified, submit its award to the State
Government. It would appear therefore, that the Act
required the submission of the award to be made within a
specified time, which time, in the absence of a special
order of reference of an industrial dispute for conciliation
or adjudication under s. 3 of the Act, would be determined
by the provisions of a general order made by the Government
in that behalf. An order of reference of an industrial
dispute for adjudication without specifying the time within
which the award had to be submitted would be an invalid
order of reference. In fact, the orders of reference in the
cases under appeal specified no time within which the award
had to be submitted. All that they directed was that the
dispute shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Order No. 615. If these orders of reference
are read along with cl. 16 of Order No. 615, then it must be
deemed that they specified the time within which the award
had to be submitted as 40 days from the dates of reference.
The proviso to cl. 16 of Order No. 615 empowering the State
Government to extend the period from time to time within
which the award had to be submitted was found to be an
invalid provision, having regard to s. 6(1) of the Act, by
this Court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union (1). If the matter had stood
there
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 439.
979
only, the awards, having been submitted beyond forty days
from the dates of reference, would be invalid as the periods
of extension granted from time to time by the State
Government for their submission could not be taken into
consideration. The Act, however, was amended by the
Ordinance and s. 6-A was added to the Act and according to
the provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance, s. 6-A of the Act
must be deemed to have formed a part of the Act at the time
of its enactment. Section 6(1) and s. 6-A of the Act must
therefore be read together. Section 6(1) of the Act
specifically stated that the award must be submitted within
a specified date in an industrial dispute referred for
adjudication after the completion of the enquiry. Under s.
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6-A, however, the State Government was empowered from time
to time to enlarge the period even though the period
originally fixed or enlarged might have expired. The orders
of reference in these appeals, as stated above, specified 40
days within which the awards had to be submitted. The State
Government could, however, enlarge the periods within which
the awards had to be submitted under s. 6-A by issuing other
orders in the case of each reference extending the time
within which the awards had to be submitted.
Admittedly, .no such order was, in fact, passed in the case
which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, and in
the case which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 14 of
1955, although orders extending the time for the submission
of the award were made and the last order extended the time
to March 10, 1953, yet the award was submitted on May 13,
1953. The awards in these cases were, therefore, made in
the one case beyond the time specified in the order of
reference and in the other beyond the extended period within
which the award had to be submitted.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant, the State of Uttar
Pradesh, that as cl. 16 of Order No. 615 had been amended
whereby 180 instead of 40 days had been provided as the
period within which an award had to be submitted, the orders
of reference in the cases before as must be construed as
specifying
980
180 days within which the awards had to be submitted. In
other words, cl. 16, although amended on February 18, 1953,
was retrospective in operation. Order No. 615 is a general
order under which conciliation boards and industrial
tribunals may be set up to deal with industrial disputes.
It is true that el. 16 enjoins that the decisions by the
tribunal or the adjudicator must be pronounced within a
specified number of days but this is a general direction.
An order of reference is a special order. It could have
stated the manner in which the industrial dispute was to be
adjudicated and it could also have specified the time within
which the decision had to be pronounced. As the orders of
reference in the cases before us merely stated that they
were to be decided in accordance with the provisions of
Order No. 615, the disputes had to be adjudicated in the
manner so provided and the orders of reference must,
accordingly, be read as having specified 40 days as the time
within which the awards had to be submitted. Subsequent
amendment of cl. 16, whereby 180 days instead of 40 days was
provided as the time within which the award had to be
submitted, could not affect an order of reference previously
made according to which the award had to be submimitted
within 40 days. We cannot agree with the submission made on
behalf of the appellant that cl. 16, as amended, must be
given retrospective effect and the orders of reference
previously issued must be regarded as specifying the time of
180 days for the submission of the awards. Section 6(1) of
the Act is to the effect that the authority to which an
industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication must
submit its award within such time as may be specified. This
section read with s. 6-A of the Act, on a proper
interpretation of their provisions, makes it clear that the
time within which the award shall be submitted is the period
specified in the order of reference. Mere amendment of cl.
16 would not, therefore, affect the period already specified
in the order of reference. It seems to us, therefore, that
the amendment to el. 16 did not materially affect the
position and the awards in the cases before us had to be
submitted within
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981
40 days from the dates of the orders of reference or within
the enlarged time for the submission of the awards.
What is the effect of s. 3 of the Ordinance is a matter
which now remains to be considered. This section purported
to remove doubts and to validate orders of extension of time
for the submission of an award. It also purported to
validate certain awards. There is no difficulty in
construing cl. (1) of this section. It validates all orders
of extension made prior to the commencement of the Ordinance
as if s. 6-A of the Act had been a part of the Act always.
In other words, orders of extension of time made under the
general order, promulgated under s. 3 of the Act, would be
regarded as made under s. 6-A. Clause (3) of s. 3 of the
Ordinance also does not present any difficulty in construing
its provisions. It directs that every proceeding pending
before any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the
Ordinance against an award shall be decided as if s. 6-A of
the Act had been in force at all material dates. Clauses
(1) and (3) of this section merely re-emphasise the
provisions of s. 6-A of the Act, which, in our opinion, are
clear enough even in the absence of the aforesaid clauses.
It is cl. (2) of s. 3 of the Ordinance which requires
careful examination. Learned Counsel for the appellants
contended that el. (2) was sufficiently wide in its terms to
include all awards and not merely awards which bad become
final as held by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The words
at the end of the clause " as if s. 6-A had been in force at
all material dates " were redundant and they should be
ignored. Indeed, according to him, there was no need for
the existence of el. (3) in view of the provisions of cl.
(2). Clause (2) validated all awards whether made before or
after the commencement of the Ordinance even if the period
specified within which they were to be submitted or any
enlargement thereof had already expired in so far as they
could not be questioned merely on that ground alone and this
would cover even a proceeding pending in any Court or
Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance against an
award,
982
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, appearing for respondent No. 1, in
Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, contended that the Labour
Appellate Tribunal took the correct view that cl. (2) of s.
3 of the Ordinance covered cases where the awards had become
final. He further developed his argument in support of the
decision of that Tribunal on the following lines. Such
clarification, as was sought to be made, by s. 3 of the
Ordinance must be construed in relation to s. 6-A of the Act
and not independently of it. If an award were made outside
the ambit of s. 6- A then the whole of s. 3 of the Ordinance
could not apply to such a case. Section 3(1) of the
Ordinance validated all orders of enlargement of time which
were made prior to the commencement of the Ordinance. Such
orders should be deemed to have been validly made as if s.
6-A had been a part of the Act. Section 3(2) of the
Ordinance was enacted to prevent the validity of an award
being questioned when it had been submitted after the
specified period for its submission or any enlargement
thereof. The words " as if section 6-A had been in force at
all material dates " merely connote that there must be an
order of enlargement made by the Government in the exercise
of its powers under s. 6-A of the Act. Section 3(2) of the
Ordinance had no application to a case where an award was
made independently of the exercise of the powers of the
Government under s. 6-A. Section 3(2) and (3) of the
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Ordinance were subservient to s. 6-A of the Act.
The Tribunal apparently took the view that there was
repugnance between sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 3 of the
Ordinance and so it made an attempt to avert that repugnance
by putting an artificial restriction on the scope of sub-s.
(2) of s. 3. In holding that s. 3(2) applied only to awards
that have become final, the Tribunal overlooked the fact
that this sub-section referred to awards which may be made
even after the commencement of the Ordinance and it is not
easy to appreciate how finality could be said to attach to
these awards on the date when the Ordinance was promulgated.
The Tribunal also felt impressed by the argument that if s.
6-A applied to appeals or
983
proceedings against awards pending at the date of the
commencement of the Ordinance, there was no reason why the
same provision should not apply to appeals or proceedings
which may be taken against the awards after the commencement
of the Ordinance. In giving expression to this view,
however, the Tribunal clearly overlooked the fact that s. 3
(3) is deliberately confined to proceedings against an award
pending at the commencement of the Ordinance and no others.
There can be little doubt, in our opinion, that the main
purpose of the Ordinance was to validate orders of extension
of time within which an award had to be submitted as well as
to prevent its validity being questioned merely on the
ground that it had been submitted beyond the specified time
or any enlargement thereof. Apart from an order of
extension of time the Ordinance purported to deal with at
least three situations so far as the submission of an award
was concerned. One was where an award was submitted before
the commencement of the Ordinance and against which no
proceeding was pending before any Court or Tribunal at the
commencement of the Ordinance; another was where an award
was submitted after the Ordinance came into force. These
cases were dealt with by cl. (2) of s. 3 of the Ordinance.
The third was the case where an award was submitted before
the commencement of the Ordinance against which a proceeding
was pending before a Court or a Tribunal before the
Ordinance came into force. Section 3(3) of the Ordinance
was so drafted that it should not interfere with judicial
proceedings already pending against an award. It merely
directed that such a proceeding must be decided as if s. 6-A
had been a part of the Act from the date of its enactment.
Where, however, no judicial proceedings against an award
were pending it was the intention of the Ordinance that the
award shall not be questioned merely on the ground that it
was submitted after the specified period for its submission
or any enlargement thereof. Although s. 3(2) of the
Ordinance is not happily worded and appears to have been the
result of hasty legislation, we think, that upon a
reasonable construction of
125
984
its provisions its meaning is clear and there is no real
conflict between its provisions and the provisions of cl.
(3) of the section. The words " as if section 6-A had been
in force at all material dates " have to be given some
meaning and they cannot be regarded as redundant as
suggested on behalf of the appellants. Grammatically they
should be regarded as referring to any action or proceeding
taken, direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in
pursuance of or upon an award. Section 6-A of the Act,
however, has nothing to do ’With this and these words car
not apply to that part of the clause. These words also
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cannot refer to a case where the award has been made beyond
the specified period and in which there has been no order of
enlargement of time as s. 6-A of the Act does not apply to
such a -lase. The words in question, therefor, can only
apply to that part of the clause which refers to an
enlargement of time for the submission of the award, which
is the only purpose of s. 6-A of the Act. In our opinion,
if s. 3(2) of the Ordinance is read in this way an
intelligible meaning is given to it which is consistent with
s. 6-A of the Act and not in conflict with s. 3(3) of the
Ordinance. The awards referred to in s. 3(2) are awards
against which no judicial proceeding was pending at the
commencement of the Ordinance. In our opinion, the
provisions of s. 3(2) and (3) are not in conflict with each
other. We cannot accept the view of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal that s. 3(2) refers only to awards that had
become final.
Having construed the provisions of s. 3 of the Ordinance, it
is now necessary to deal specifically with the appeals
before us. Appeal No. III-198/53 of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal, out of which Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955 arises,
was filed before the commencement of the Ordinance and by
virtue of s. 3(3) of the Ordinance the appeal had to be
decided as if the provisions of s. 6-A had been in force at
all material dates. To such an appeal the provisions of cl.
(2) of s. 3 of the Ordinance would not apply. This appeal
would, therefore, be governed by cl. (3). As in this case,
the award had been submitted on May 13, 1953,
985
and the last date of enlargement gave time for the
submission of the award up to March 10, 1953, the award was
submitted beyond time and, therefore, was invalid as having
been made without jurisdiction.
In Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, arising out of Appeal No.
111-321 of 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the appeal
was filed before that Tribunal after the commencement of the
Ordinance. The award was submitted long after the period,
namely, 40 days, within which it had to be submitted and
there were no orders of enlargement of time. Section 3(2)
of the Ordinance and not s. 3(3) would, therefore, apply to
this appeal. The award in this case consequently has been
validated by virtue of the provisions of s. 3(2) of the
Ordinance and its validity cannot be questioned merely on
the ground that it was submitted after the period within
which it should have been submitted.
In the result, Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955 is dismissed with
costs and Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955 is allowed with costs
and the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Appeal
No. 111-321/53 before it is set aside.
Appeal No. 14 of 1955 dismissed.
Appeal No. 15 of 1955 allowed.
986