Mandeep Singh vs. State Of Punjab

2025 INSC 834
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 23141 OF 2024]
MANDEEP SINGH & ORS. …APPELLANTS
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 23324 OF 2024]
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 907 OF 2025]
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants before this Court have challenged the judgment
dated 23.09.2024, of the Division Bench of Punjab and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.07.14
17:57:09 IST
Reason:
Haryana High Court which has reversed the findings of the
learned Single Judge and has thereby upheld the selections
1

made by the State of Punjab for the posts of Assistant
Professors and Librarians in Government Degree colleges of
Punjab.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
a. In January 2021, the State of Punjab had sent separate
requisitions to the Punjab Public Service Commission
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Commission’), for recruitment
of 931 Assistant Professors (dated 15.01.2021) and 50
Librarians (dated 29.01.2021), in Government Degree
Colleges in the State. Consequent to this and based on
correspondences exchanged, the Commission engaged 24
subject experts to prepare the syllabus for the
competitive examinations and honorarium was paid to
them.
b. Later, an additional 160 posts of Assistant Professors
and 17 posts for Librarians were created and sanctioned
for newly established colleges, and on 15.09.2021, the
State’s Department of Higher Education (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Department’) sought Commission’s
consent to fill these posts through the Departmental
Selection Committee rather than the Commission.
c. The Commission replied by letter dated 16.09.2021,
expressing their inability to respond on the ground of the
2

Chairman having retired and the new appointment
having not taken place. The Government then by a
memorandum dated 17.09.2021 approved the
recruitment of 160 and 17 posts of Assistant Professors
and Librarians respectively, through Departmental
Selection Committees which though had to follow the
University Grants Commission (hereinafter ‘UGC’)
guidelines or regulations.
d. A change in Government happened on 20.09.2021 after
which on 09.10.2021, the selection process was reviewed
in a meeting chaired by the Secretary, Department of
Higher Education. In this meeting, the entire process of
recruitment was changed and it was decided that
selection would now be made only on the basis of a
Written Test, which will be conducted by two separate
selection committees of two State Universities: (a) Punjab
University, Patiala, and (b) the Guru Nanak Dev
University, Amritsar. Further, it was decided that all the
1091 posts (931 plus 160 posts) of Assistant Professors
and 67 posts (50 plus 17 posts) of Librarians; and not
just the posts recently created, are to be filled through
3

these departmental selection committees. This decision
was placed for approval before the Chief Minister on
12.10.2021, with the observation that it shall
subsequently be placed for approval before the Council of
Ministers; latter approval was never obtained.
e. On 18.10.2021, Government issued a memorandum
conveying to Director Public Instructions (Colleges)
(hereinafter ‘DPI’) the decision for recruitment of 1091
Assistant Professors and 67 Librarians on the basis of
two departmental selection committees of two State
Universities. On 19.10.2021, advertisements for the
above posts were issued.
f. In a little over a month, the exam was conducted and the
result was announced on 28.11.2021. Meanwhile, in the
first week of November, Writ Petitions were filed before
the High Court, challenging the memorandum dated
18.10.2021 and advertisements dated 19.10.2021. On
26.11.2021 in CWP No. 22446 of 2021, before the results
were published, while issuing notice, it was clarified that
the selection shall be subject to the result of the writ
petition.
4

g. Vide order dated 08.08.2022, the learned Single Judge
allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the entire
recruitment process for being in violation of law
inasmuch as the Commission not having been excluded
as per procedure prescribed and State having not
followed the UGC guidelines and adopting an arbitrary
process for the recruitment.
h. Against the order of the learned Single Judge, the State
of Punjab as well as the candidates who were
selected/appointed filed intra-court appeals. Vide the
impugned order dated 23.09.2024, the Division Bench of
the High Court allowed these intra-court appeals and
upheld the recruitment by quashing the order passed by
the learned Single Judge. Assailing the same, appellants
are before us.
4. Before the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench as well as
before this Court, the appellants’ have been consistent in
their submission that the recruitment process was vitiated
on more than one count. Most importantly the recruitment
was made in violation of UGC Regulations of 2010
(hereinafter ‘2010 UGC Regulations’) which were adopted by
the State of Punjab on 30.07.2013, and which mandated an
5

entirely different criterion and procedure for recruitment.
Further the selection to these posts ought to have been made
through the Commission, as admittedly these were the posts
within the purview of Commission [under Article 320 of the
Constitution of India read with Punjab Public Service
Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulations, 1955
(hereinafter ‘the 1955 Regulations’)]. In any case, the entire
process is arbitrary and was followed not in the interest of
the State or for the cause of higher education but for narrow
political gains.
5. The State and the private respondents would though argue that
Article 320(3) is directory and not mandatory in nature. They
would submit that the State government is empowered to
decide its own method and procedure of recruitment for the
posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians in Degree
colleges under the State government; and it is not bound to
make these selections through the Commission.
6. We have heard Senior Advocates Mr. Raju Ramchandran, Mr.
Nidhesh Gupta, Mr. Preetesh Kapur and Mrs. Rekha Palli
appearing for the appellants, and Senior Advocates Mr. Kapil
Sibal, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr. P.S. Patwalia for the
private respondents. We have also heard Mr. Shadan Farasat,
6

Additional Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State
of Punjab.
7. It is first necessary to narrate the sequence of events and their
context as this would give us a better perspective. A large
number of posts of Assistant Professor and Librarians in
Degree Colleges remained unfilled for the last 20 years or so
in Punjab. The last selection to these posts was only made in
the year 2002, and this too got into trouble due to allegations
of corruption which led to a protracted litigation. Later,
another recruitment was attempted in the year 2008 for 265
posts which was again stuck in litigation for many years. The
issue of large unfilled vacancies in Punjab had come earlier
before this Court by the guest/part-time faculties where a
Three-Judge Bench of this Court vide its order dated
02.12.2014 had directed the Commission to fill the
sanctioned vacant posts as soon as possible. The relevant
portion of that order reads as under:
“4. We do not intend to keep these Special
Leave Petitions on board. Accordingly, we
dispose of the Special Leave Petitions with an
observation that the Punjab Public Service
Commission, Patiala will take all effective
steps to fill up all the sanctioned posts of the
7

lecturers in the State of Punjab as
expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within
12 months’ time from today.”
The argument of the State is that the main reason for these
vacancies remaining unfilled for all these years was that
these posts were within the purview of the Commission
which had failed to fill these posts and hence the decision
taken by the State to remove these posts from the purview of
the Commission and to expedite the process of selection was
in public interest.
8. The Commission has a duty to make selections for different
services in response to the requisition of the State
government. In the present case, in January 2021, the State
government had sent two requisitions for the recruitment of
931 Assistant Professors and 50 Librarians respectively, yet
no decision had been taken by the Commission.
9. Article 320(3) of the Constitution provides that the Commission
shall be consulted in the recruitment of different services.
The relevant portion of Article 320 of the Constitution reads
as follows:
“Article 320: Functions of Public Service
Commissions-
(1)...
(2)...
8

(3) The Union Public Service Commission or
the State Public Service Commission, as the
case may be, shall be consulted—
(a) on all matters relating to methods of
recruitment to civil services and for civil
posts;
(b) on the principles to be followed in
making appointments to civil services
and posts and in making promotions
and transfers from one service to
another and on the suitability of
candidates for such appointments,
promotions or transfers;
(c) on all disciplinary matters affecting a
person serving under the Government of
India or the Government of a State in a
civil capacity, including memorials or
petitions relating to such matters;
(d) on any claim by or in respect of a
person who is serving or has served
under the Government of India or the
Government of a State or under the
Crown in India or under the Government
of an Indian State, in a civil capacity,
that any costs incurred by him in
defending legal proceedings instituted
against him in respect of acts done or
purporting to be done in the execution of
his duty should be paid out of the
Consolidated Fund of India, or, as the
case may be, out of the Consolidated
Fund of the State;
(e) on any claim for the award of a
pension in respect of injuries sustained
by a person while serving under the
Government of India or the Government
9

of a State or under the Crown in India or
under the Government of an Indian
State, in a civil capacity, and any
question as to the amount of any such
award, and it shall be the duty of a
Public Service Commission to advise on
any matter so referred to them and on
any other matter which the President, or,
as the case may be, the Governor of the
State, may refer to them:
Provided that the President as respects the all-
India services and also as respects other
services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union, and the Governor, as
respects other services and posts in
connection with the affairs of a State, may
make regulations specifying the matters in
which either generally, or in any particular
class of case or in any particular
circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a
Public Service Commission to be consulted.”
Public Service Commission at the Union and at the State
levels are constitutional bodies. There is a purpose for which
these institutions have been created, which we shall discuss
in a while. All the same, it is not necessary that all posts in
the States or Union must be filled through Commission. It is
not mandatory. But there is a method prescribed under the
law to take out these posts from the purview of the
10

Commission. This has been violated in the present case; is
the argument. But first, for the role of the Commission.
10. Impartiality, fairness and recognition of merit while selecting
Public Servants are absolutely necessary in modern
democracies. The basic purpose of a Union Public Service
Commission or State Public Service Commission(s) for that
matter, is to remove impartiality and political influence while
making selection on Public Posts. It is necessary to have an
impartial Public Service Commission in a Democracy, or
1
everything will be reduced to a mere scramble for jobs . The
concept is not new. It goes back to the Government of India
Act, 1919, and even earlier to the pre 1857 era. The East
India Company, which had under its administration a vast
area, felt the need to replace the system based on
recommendations and nominations to a merit-based system,
which was also the recommendation of the Macaulay
2
Committee Report . A Civil Service Commission was then
established in 1854 to conduct competitive examinations
which were held for the first time in the year 1855.
1 Dr. Naresh Chandra Roy, The Working of the Public Service Commission in Bengal, Indian
Political Science Conference, Third Session, Mysore, Dec 1940, p.192.
2 See Macaulay Report on the Indian Civil Service 1854.
11

11. It was the Government of India Act, 1919 that formally
introduced the concept of Public Service Commissions in
3
India. Section 96C provided for the establishment of a
Central Public Service Commission in India. But the Public
Service Commission was not set up immediately till its need
was emphasized by the Lee Commission in its report of 1924:
“Wherever democratic institutions exist,
experience has shown that to secure an
efficient Civil Service it is essential to protect it
so far as possible from political or personal
influences and to give it that position of
stability and security which is vital to its
successful working as the impartial and
efficient instrument by which Governments, of
whatever political complexion, may give effect
to their policies. In countries where this
principle has been neglected, and where the
“spoils system” has taken place, an inefficient
and disorganized Civil Service has been the
inevitable result and corruption has been
rampant. In America a Civil Service
Commission has been constituted to control
recruitment of the Services, but, for the
purposes of India it is from the Dominions of
3 Section 96C: Public Service Commission- (1) There shall be established in India a
public service commission, consisting of not more than five members, of whom one shall be
chairman, appointed by the Secretary of State in Council. Each member shall be removed
before the expiry of his term of office, except by order of the Secretary of State in Council.
The qualifications for the appointment, and the pay and pension (if any) attaching to the
office of chairman and member, shall be prescribed by rules made by the Secretary of State
in Council.
(2) The public service commission shall discharge, in regard to recruitment and
control of the public services in India, such functions as may be assigned thereto by rules
made by the Secretary of State in Council
12

the British Empire that more relevant and
useful lessons can perhaps be drawn.
Canada, Australia and South Africa now
possess Public or Civil Services Acts regulating
the position and control of the Public Services,
and a common feature of them all is the
constitution of a Public Service Commission, to
which the duty of administering the Acts is
entrusted. It was this need which framers of
the Government of India Act had in mind
when they made provision in Section 96C for
the establishment of a Public Service
Commission to discharge “in regard to
recruitment and control of the Public Services
in India such functions as may be assigned
thereto by rules made by the Secretary of
State in Council”. Since the passing of the Act,
a prolonged correspondence, extending over
nearly four years, has been passed between
the Secretary of State, the Government of
India, and Local Governments, regarding the
function and machinery of the body to be set
up. No decisions have, however, been arrived
at, and the subject has been referred to this
4
Commission for consideration”
12. It was based on the recommendation of the Lee Commission
that the Commission was formed as contemplated under the
Government of India Act, 1919. The Central Public Service
Commission was thus established in the year 1926, and its
functions were governed by the Public Service Commission
4 Report of the Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services in India, dated 27th March,
1924 at pp.13-14 and 16.
13

(Function) Rules, 1926. Till this stage, the role of a similar
Commission at Provincial level was not much in discussions.
13. It was only with the Simon Commission Report that we have
an official recommendation for the first time for the setting
up of Provincial Public Service Commissions. It is well-
known that the formation of the Simon Commission was
resented by the leaders of the Indian freedom struggle,
primarily because it had no Indian representative, and
because senior officials of the British Raj had questioned the
very ability of Indians to draft a Constitution. In response, an
all-party committee under the chairmanship of Congress
stalwart Motilal Nehru was formed, which was tasked with
drafting a Constitution for India. The report submitted by
this committee (which came to be known as the Nehru
Report) also favoured the creation of a Permanent Public
Service Commission to deal with issues such as the
recruitment, appointment, emoluments etc. of civil servants
in India.
14. Finally, a Federal Public Service Commission and Public
Service Commissions for Provinces were established under
5
Section 264 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and their
5 264.Public Service Commission : (1) Subject to the provisions of this Section, there shall
be a Public Service Commission for the Federation and a Public Service Commission for
each Province.
14

functions were given in Section 266, which was pari materia
to Article 320 of the Constitution.
15. While the Constituent Assembly was busy in drafting the
Constitution for free India, the Public Service Commission at
the Centre and in some of the States were already
functioning.
16. During discussion on Public Service Commissions in the
Constituent Assembly Debates, Dr. P.S Deshmukh
highlighted the purpose and importance of the Public Service
Commissions in these words:
“...these Commissions are said to be a
necessity of a modern State. These
Commissions are primarily meant to keep
appointments away from day to day politics,
party preferences and influences and the
attempt is made, by having recourse to these
Commissions, that the appointments shall be
as far as possible on merit and there shall be
no interference in their choice or in their
selection from day to day by the executive
authorities of the State.”
(2) Two or more Provinces may agree-
(a) that there shall be one Public Service Commission for that group of
Provinces; or
(b) that the Public Service Commission for one of the Provinces shall serve
the needs of all the Provinces,
and any such agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provisions
as may appear necessary or desirable for giving effect to the purposes of the agreement and
shall, in the case of an agreement that there shall be one Commission for a group of
Provinces, specify by what Governor or Governors the functions which are under this Part
of this Act to be discharged by the Governor of a Province are to be discharged.
(3) The Public Service Commission for the Federation, if requested so to do by the
Governor of a Province, may, with the approval of the Governor-General, agree to serve all or
any of the needs of the Province…
15

17. Our entire purpose here of giving this background to the
formation of Public Service Commission in India both at the
Union as well as State level, was to emphasize the purpose
for its establishment, which was to have an impartial and
autonomous body which should select the best possible
persons for Government posts, and to have fairness and
transparency in the procedure. The present dispute which is
before this Court reflects this concern.
18. Article 320(3)(a) of the Constitution, inter alia , states that the
State Public Service Commission “shall be consulted on all
matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and
for civil posts” . The provision appears to be mandatory as the
words “shall be consulted” suggest. All the same, the learned
counsel for the respondents would rely on a 1957
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of U.P v.
Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4 which
had laid down that the provision is not mandatory but merely
directory.
19. The above decision is binding on us. Yet, we must examine
the context in which the above judgment was rendered. The
context is important. Although the findings in the judgment
are generally worded, this Court in
Manbodhan Lal
16

Srivastava was not dealing with Article 320(3)(a), as is the
case before us, but was concerned with Article 320(3)(c) i.e. a
disciplinary matter in an individual case. In
Manbodhan Lal
, a government servant who was posted as an
Srivastava
officer-on-special-duty in the Education Department from
1948 to 1951 was accused of giving favours to his friends
and relatives, while working in a Book Selection Committee,
as he had approved books written by his 14 year old nephew
and other publishers from whom he had taken certain money
on interest. In August 1952, he was suspended from service
and a departmental enquiry was conducted against him. On
the recommendations of the departmental enquiry report, the
Government issued a show cause notice under Article 311(2)
of the Constitution and finally, after hearing the concerned
employee, the Government issued a notification reducing his
rank and compulsorily retiring him. These were the facts of
the case before this Court.
20. Article 320(3) speaks of a variety of matters where the
Commission is to be consulted- (a) Recruitment in Service
and (c) disciplinary matters, being two such instances.
Whereas Article 320(3)(c) is generally concerned with
17

individual matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, Article
320(3)(a) deals with policy issues where an entire
recruitment process is at stake.
Manbodhan Lal
, was a case dealing with Article 320(3)(c), and
Srivastava
not with Article 320(3)(a), which is before us.
21. Another question in Manbodhan Lal Srivastava , was
whether Article 311 of the Constitution of India is subject to
Article 320(3)(c). Para 4 of the Judgment reads like this:
“Hence, the main question in controversy in
Appeal No. 27 of 1955, is whether the High
Court was right in taking the view that Article
311 was subject to the provisions of Article
320(3)(c) of the Constitution, which were
mandatory, and as such, non-compliance with
those provisions in the instant case, was fatal
to the proceedings ending with the order
passed by the Government on September 12,
1953.”
22. The judgment also restricts itself to the facts relating to
Article 320(3)(c). This is how it concludes :
“13. In view of these considerations, it must
be held that the provisions of Article 320(3)(c)
are not mandatory and that non-compliance
with those provisions, does not afford a cause
of action to the respondent in a court of law. It
is not for this Court further to consider what
other remedy, if any, the respondent has.
18

Appeal No. 27 is, therefore, allowed and
Appeal No. 28 dismissed. In view of the fact
that the appellant did not strictly comply with
the terms of Article 320(3)(c) of the
Constitution, we direct that each party bear its
own costs throughout.”

23. Thus, it was in the background of the above facts that it was
held by this Court that consultation with the Commission to
be directory and not mandatory. Manbodhan Lal
Srivastava also emphasized the purpose of the proviso to
Article 320(3) of the Constitution which states that the
Governor of a State is empowered to make regulations
specifying the matters in which it is not necessary for the
State to consult the Public Service Commission. This is what
was said by this Court:
“7…Perhaps, because of the use of the word
“shall” in several parts of Article 320, the High
Court was led to assume that the provisions of
Article 320(3)(c) were mandatory, but in our
opinion, there are several cogent reasons for
holding to the contrary. In the first place, the
proviso to Article 320, itself, contemplates that
the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, “may make regulations specifying the
matters in which either generally, or in any
particular class of case or in particular
circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a
Public Service Commission to be consulted”.
19

The words quoted above give a clear indication
of the intention of the Constitution makers that
they did envisage certain cases or classes of
cases in which the Commission need not be
consulted. If the provisions of Article 320 were
of a mandatory character, the Constitution
would not have left it to the discretion of the
Head of the Executive Government to undo
those provisions by making regulations to the
contrary. If it had been intended by the makers
of the Constitution that consultation with the
Commission should be mandatory, the proviso
would not have been there, or, at any rate, in
the terms in which it stands. That does not
amount to saying that it is open to the
Executive Government, completely to ignore the
existence of the Commission or to pick and
choose cases in which it may or may not be
consulted. Once, relevant regulations have been
made, they are meant to be followed in letter
and in spirit and it goes without saying that
consultation with the Commission on all
disciplinary matters affecting a public servant
has been specifically provided for, in order,
first, to give an assurance to the Services that a
wholly independent body not directly
concerned with the making of orders adversely
affecting public servants, has considered the
action proposed to be taken against a
particular public servant, with an open mind;
and secondly, to afford the Government
unbiased advice and opinion on matters vitally
affecting the morale of public services. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the Executive
Government, when it proposes to take any
disciplinary action against a public servant, to
20

consult the Commission as to whether the
action proposed to be taken was justified and
was not in excess of the requirements of the
situation.”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, even if, for arguments sake, consultation with
Commission is held to be directory then also there is no
doubt that once Regulations are framed these are to be
followed, “in letter and spirit”.
24. In other words, this Court in ,
Manbodhan Lal Srivastava
had recognised the importance of Regulations framed under
the proviso to Article 320(3) of the Constitution and had
cautioned against the casual bypassing of the Regulations. In
the case at hand, Regulations as contemplated under the
Proviso were already in existence in Punjab known as Punjab
Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions)
Regulations, 1955. For our purposes, it is relevant to note
that with these Regulations the State had taken out certain
posts outside the purview of the Commission. Admittedly,
the posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians in Degree
Colleges were not amongst them. In other words, these posts
were within the purview of the Commission. Thus, selection
of these posts was within the purview of the State
21

Commission, and it was mandatory that it ought to be
consulted.
25. The respondents have tried to meet this deficiency by stating
that the State had amended the 1955 Regulations in March
2022 (by retrospective effect), by mentioning these posts in
the 1955 Regulations and these posts were then taken out
from the purview of Commission. All the same, we are unable
to accept this argument inasmuch as the amendment was
made after concluding the entire recruitment process and
giving appointment letters to the selected candidates. It was
hence a post facto exercise. The Government had already
made its selections on the posts which could only have been
done by the Commission under Article 320 of the
Constitution of India.
26. This apart, the 1955 Regulations prescribed a procedure
under which posts within the purview of the Commission
could be withdrawn. Part III-B and Part III-C of the
‘Regulations and Instructions Governing the Work of the
Punjab Public Service Commission’ provide a procedure for the
exclusion of posts/services from the purview of the
Commission. Regulation 20 reads as under:

22

“20. For exclusion of posts/services and other
matters from the purview of the Punjab Public
Service Commission, the following procedure
is to be followed:
(i) Individual proposals for taking out posts
from the purview of the Commission would be
processed by the Administrative Departments
concerned. After the Department had taken a
tentative decision to take out certain posts
from the purview of the Commission, the
Department would obtain the
views/comments of the Public Service
Commission by making a self-contained
reference to the Commission.
(ii) On receipt of the comments/views of the
Commission, the matter would further be
examined by the Department concerned
keeping in view the comments/views so
received and the advice of the Department of
Personnel and Administrative Reforms. If the
Department comes to a definite conclusion
that the posts in question must be taken out of
the purview of the Commission, the
Department would take the matter to the
Council of Ministers incorporating the advice
of the Department of Personnel and
Administrative Reforms in the Memorandum to
be placed before the Council of Ministers.
(iii) After the proposal of the Administrative
Department is approved by the Council of
Ministers, necessary action to amend the
Punjab Public Service Commission (Limitation
of Functions) Regulations, 1955 would be
taken by the Department of Personnel and
Administrative Reforms.”
23

27. Further, Part III-C of the Regulations provides that in cases
where a difference of opinion between a Department of
Government and Public Service Commission arises then
what is to be done. Regulation 21 reads as under:

“21. In order to secure uniformity of practice in
cases of difference of opinion between a
Department of Government and the
Commission and to ensure that the
Commission is duly consulted in all cases in
which such consultation is necessary, all
cases, in which there is difference of opinion
between a Department and the Commission,
should be referred to the Chief Minister.
22. The procedure for submitting cases to the
Chief Minister should be that whenever as
department finds itself unable to arrive at an
agreement with the Commission, the cases
should be sent over to the Chief Secretary on
an early stage, if possible before any decisive
action is taken…”
28. It is admitted that in the present case the required
procedure was not followed. In relation to 160 posts of
Assistant Professor and 17 posts of Librarians, the
Department had sent a reference to take the posts out of
the purview of the Commission, but the Commission could
24

not take any decision, in the absence of its Chairperson; a
post which remained unfilled for long years. Meanwhile the
concerned department proceeded without the views of the
Commission. 931 posts of Assistant Professors and 50
posts of Librarians; admittedly with the Commission,
pending recruitment as requisitioned by the State itself,
and not taken out of the purview of the Commission, were
also added and the advertisement inviting applications for
the posts was issued on 19.10.2021. On the same day, the
Department wrote to Commission to return its requisition
sent to Commission for these posts. The Commission,
however, on 16.11.2021 wrote to the Department
disagreeing with the idea of taking the posts out of the
purview of the Commission since the action as required at
the end of the Government was not followed. Without any
further action, the examinations were conducted between
th nd
20 to 22 November, 2022.
29. It was after the selection and appointments were made that
retrospectively on 26.03.2022 an amendment was made
taking out these posts out of the purview of the
Commission. The learned Single Judge has rightly
25

observed that the retrospective amendment to the 1955
Regulations, which was made much after the conclusion of
the recruitment process, was nothing but a response to the
Writ Petitions which had been filed by this time by the
appellants. The learned Single Judge also notes that in the
last 30 years, five advertisements had been issued for
6
filling of posts of Assistant Professors/Lecturers and these
selections were to be conducted by the Commission. The
State never took the recruitment for these posts in its
hands.
30. What was the need to bypass the Commission in the present
case? The learned counsel who appear for the appellants
would argue that a new Government was formed in Punjab in
September, 2021 which had to face elections in February,
2022 and the burning hurry to make selections and
appointments to more than 1000 such posts, on the eve of
State elections was an act of political pragmatism, and
nothing more.
31. In case the State government was dissatisfied with the
manner in which the Commission was conducting the
recruitment (an argument which appears to have found
6 Now the posts of Lecturers have been re-designated as Assistant Professors.
26

favour with the Division Bench), then it ought to have
followed the due procedure and withdrawn the posts from the
purview of the Commission in accordance with the 1955
Regulations. The case at hand is a prime example where
Commission’s role was totally eliminated in the recruitment
and well considered selection parameters, prescribed by an
expert body, like UGC, were replaced with a simple Multiple-
Choice Question type test, which is unheard of where
appointments for the posts of Assistant Professor in degree
colleges are concerned.
32. Let us for the moment keep aside the ground of political
expediency and look at what transpired leading to the volte
face insofar as the selection entrusted to the Commission as
early as in January 2021. At the risk of repetition, the
decision of the Council of Ministers on 17.09.2021, as
approved by the Chief Minister was to take out 160 posts of
Assistant Proffesors and 17 posts of Librarians from the
purview of the Commission, which were the freshly created
posts in the newly established Colleges. The selection
committee proposed for the said exercise was also to be
Chaired by a Former Chairman of the UGC. On 20.09.2021,
27

a new Government took over and on 09.10.2021, a committee
headed by the Secretary, Department of Higher Education
reviewed the earlier decisions and constituted two separate
Committees, each headed by the Vice-Chancellors of the two
Universities and the selection criteria was confined to a
written test. The proposal was put up before the Chief
Minister, with the observation that it shall subsequently be
placed before the Council of Ministers. Though the Chief
Minister accepted the proposal on 13.10.2021, it was never
placed before the Council of Ministers and a Memo was
issued on 18.10.2021 including the entire posts of Assistant
Professors and Librarians available, to be filled up. As noticed
above the decision to remove the said posts from the purview
of the Commission was taken much later, after the selection
process stood completed.
33. Let us also understand the scheme of UGC Regulations.
Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution
empowers Union to make laws relating to “Co-ordination and
determination of standards in institutions for higher education
or research and scientific and technical institutions” . Under
this entry, the Parliament had enacted the UGC Act, 1956
28

setting up an expert body named UGC for the purposes of
the Act, which is clear from the Preamble of the UGC Act
which reads as follows:
“An Act to make provision for the co-ordination
and determination of standards in
Universities and for that purpose, to establish
a University Grants Commission.”
34. Under provisions of the UGC Act, UGC frames Regulations
from time to time setting qualifications and other standards
for teaching and non-teaching staff. Under Section 26(1)(e)
7
and (g) , the UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment
of Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities and
Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in
Higher Education) Regulations, 2010 were framed. These
Regulations set the minimum eligibility criterion for the
appointment to various posts including Assistant Professors
and Librarians. A method of selection to these posts is also
provided in the 2010 UGC Regulations which has not been
7 The Commission may, by notification in Official Gazette, make regulations consistent with
this Act and the rules made thereunder-
(a) …
(b) …
…
(e) defining the qualifications that should ordinarily be required of any person to
be appointed to the teaching staff of the University, having regard to the branch of
education in which he is expected to give instruction.
(f) …
(g) regulating the maintenance of standards and the co-ordination of work or
facilities in Universities.
29

followed in the present case. To this, the private respondents
as well as the State have taken the stand that these
Regulations are directory in nature and non-compliance of
these Regulations would not vitiate the recruitment.
35. The respondents would place reliance upon
Kalyani
v. to
Mathivanan KV Jeyaraj & Ors. (2015) 6 SCC 363
contend that UGC Regulations are not binding on the State if
the State has not adopted the UGC Regulations 2018 which
were in force at the relevant time, as was the case here.
What were adopted by the State in the present case were the
2010 UGC Regulations, which stood superseded by this time
by the subsequent Regulations of 2018 of UGC which were
not adopted by the State till the completion of recruitment
process.
36. All the same, the adoption of 2010 UGC Regulations by the
State vide order dated 30.07.2013 was an adoption by
incorporation and not an adoption by mere reference. This
means that the 2010 UGC Regulations were in force in the
State of Punjab despite its repeal by the 2018 Regulations by
the UGC. This is clear from the intention and purpose of the
order dated 30.07.2013 where it was stated in no uncertain
terms that the 2010 Regulations are being adopted with a
30

view to raise the standard of Higher Education in the State,
with a specific mention of adoption of API Scores. Now API as
we know means Academic Performance Indicator which is a
method used in Higher Education to assess the quality and
merit of teachers in Higher Education which would include
teaching experience and research and academic contribution,
which are extremely relevant factors to judge the merit of a
teacher in Higher Education. The relevant part of the order
dated 30.07.2013 reads as follows:
“With a view to raise the standard of Higher
Education in the State of Punjab, the
Notification issued by the U.G.C dated
30.06.2010 and 14.06.2013 pertaining to
governing the appointment and promotion of
Principals/Professors/Associate
Professors/Asst. Professors, the relevant API
scores with modifications mentioned below
are ordered to be applied in the Universities,
Govt, aided and private colleges : -
1. The term/tenure of the Principal of a private
college is raised from 5 to 10 years.
2. D.P.T. Punjab or his representatives will be
associated with the selection committee
constituted for the appointment of
Principals/Asst. Professors (covered under
Grant-in-aid posts) in private colleges.”
31

37. The distinction between adoption by incorporation as
opposed to reference has been explained by Bhagwati, J.,
speaking for a three-judge Bench of this Court in
Mahindra
, in
& Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529
the following terms:
“…It ignores the distinction between a mere
reference to or citation of one statute in
another and an incorporation which in effect
means bodily lifting a provision of one
enactment and making it a part of another.
Where there is mere reference to or citation of
one enactment in another without
incorporation. Section 8(1) applies and the
repeal and re-enactment of the provision
referred to or cited has the effect set out in
that section and the reference to the provision
repealed is required to be construed as
reference to the provision as re-enacted. Such
was the case in Collector of Customs v.
Nathella Sampathu Chetty [AIR 1962 SC 316 :
(1962) 3 SCR 786] and New Central Jute Mills
Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise
[(1970) 2 SCC 820 : AIR 1971 SC 454 : (1971)
2 SCR 92] . But where a provision of one
statute is incorporated in another, the repeal
or amendment of the former does not affect
the latter. The effect of incorporation is as if
the provision incorporated were written out in
the incorporating statute and were a part of it.
Legislation by incorporation is a common
legislative device employed by the legislature,
32

38. The distinction here is that in case of adoption by
incorporation, the subsequent amendment or repeal of the
incorporated statute will be of no consequences on the
incorporation. The adoption then becomes frozen at the point
in time when the incorporation was made. But the question
whether a provision of law is adopted by reference or
incorporation also depends upon the language of the
order/statute in which such provision is being adopted. It
may also depend upon the conduct of the State and how it
has been recognised and accepted in that State. 2018 UGC
Regulations may have repealed the 2010 UGC Regulations
but still they were being considered and recognised in the
State of Punjab for all purposes, even after its repeal. We
33

have already referred above the order dated 30.07.2013
whereby the State Government had adopted 2010
Regulations and the reasons assigned by the State
Government in doing so which was to uplift the standard of
higher education.
39. Further the memorandum passed by Council of Ministers on
17.09.2021 makes it clear that the State of Punjab was still
referring to the 2010 UGC Regulations irrespective of the fact
that 2010 UGC Regulations had been repealed in 2018. In
this memorandum, the Council of Ministers has explicitly
mentioned the 2010 UGC Regulations and also admitted that
the 2010 UGC Regulations have to be followed strictly since
they were adopted by the State of Punjab. The relevant
portion of the said memo reads as under:

34

40. Thus, officially the 2010 UGC Regulations were in force in
the State of Punjab as these were adopted by way of
incorporation and not by reference. The repeal of 2010
Regulations by the UGC Regulations of 2018 had no impact
insofar as applicability of 2010 Regulations in the State of
Punjab was concerned. Also, it is on record that after the
impugned order of the Division Bench, the State adopted the
2018 UGC Regulations. This shows that the State recognises
the importance of the UGC Regulations. The chief intention
35

of the G.O. dated 30.07.2013 is that while making selection
to the posts of Assistant Professors API Scores are to be seen.
This was the purpose; which negates a simple objective type
test.
Doing away with the 2010 Regulations was also a last minute
41.
decision. In January 2021 requisition for recruitment of 931
Assistant Professors and 50 Librarians was sent by the State
government to the Commission. Then, a meeting of the
Council of Ministers was held on 17.09.2021 in relation to
the recruitment of additional 160 posts of Assistant
Professors and 17 posts of Librarians which had come up in
16 new Government Colleges where a decision was taken to
remove these posts from the purview of the Public Service
Commission so that recruitment can be made through a
Departmental Selection Committee, which we have already
mentioned above, but what is significant here is that till this
time the Government had all the intentions of following the
2010 Regulations as the memorandum dated 17.09.2021
inter-alia states :-
1.4 The UGC has already notified rules and
regulations for recruitment of Assistant
Professors and Librarians in its notification
36

“UGC Regulation on Minimum Qualifications
for Appointment of Teachers and Other
Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges
and Measures for the Maintenance of
Standards in Higher Education” of 2010,
which has been adopted by the Government
of Punjab along with the subsequent
amendments.
The Departmental Selection Committee will
strictly follow the guidelines as per above
UGC notification for recruitment of 160
Assistant Professors and 17 Librarians. The
relevant portion of the notification for short
listing”/appointment of candidates to the post
of Assistant Professor and Librarians under
the University System (in University and
colleges) in Appendix III Table II-C is
reproduced as under:

(Emphasis provided)
Till 17.09.2021, therefore, the Government had full
intentions of following the 2010 Regulations. The decision
37

earlier was only to remove the posts out of the purview of
Commission.

in Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5
SCC 179 , it is held that UGC Regulations have a mandatory
character and are binding on all universities, State or
Central, that have opted to receive the financial assistance of
the UGC under its Scheme dated 31.12.2008 (which later
came to be incorporated as Appendix I of the 2010 UGC
Regulations). In that case, what weighed in the mind of the
Division Bench of this Court was the fact that the concerned
University had availed of the above-mentioned UGC Scheme,
and as part of the same, it had agreed to adhere to UGC
regulations (2010 and 2018 regulations, in that case). As a
result, the University was bound to follow the UGC
Regulations for the purposes of appointment of Vice-
Chancellors, and it had to amend the relevant rules/statutes
to bring them in line with the UGC Regulations. This is what
was said:
38

“29. It is not in dispute that the SP University
is receiving Central financial assistance under
the Scheme and it is included in the State
Universities receiving Central financial
assistance as per Section 12(b) of the UGC
Act, 1956. Therefore, having adopted the UGC
Scheme and implemented the same and
getting Central financial assistance to the
extent of 80% of the maintenance expenditure,
the State Government and the SP University
are bound by the UGC Regulations, 2010. The
UGC Regulations, 2010 are superseded by the
UGC Regulations, 2018. However, the
eligibility criteria for the post of Vice-
Chancellor and the constitution of the Search
Committee for appointment of a Vice-
Chancellor remains the same. Therefore, the
State of Gujarat and the universities
thereunder including the SP University are
bound to follow UGC Regulations, 2010 and
UGC Regulations, 2018.”
43. It was held that UGC Regulations became a part of the
parent Act i.e. the UGC Act, being a piece of subordinate
legislation that is laid before both Houses of Parliament. As a
result, these would prevail in case there is any inconsistency
between State legislation and UGC regulations, by application
of the doctrine of repugnancy:
“50. It cannot be disputed that the UGC
Regulations are enacted by the UGC in
exercise of powers under Sections 26(1)(e) and
39

26(1)(g) of the UGC Act, 1956. Even as per the
UGC Act every rule and regulation made
under the said Act, shall be laid before each
House of Parliament. Therefore, being a
subordinate legislation, UGC Regulations
becomes part of the Act. In case of any conflict
between the State legislation and the Central
legislation, Central legislation shall prevail by
applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as
enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution
as the subject “education” is in the Concurrent
List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. Therefore, any appointment as a
Vice-Chancellor contrary to the provisions of
the UGC Regulations can be said to be in
violation of the statutory provisions,
warranting a writ of quo warranto.”
(Emphasis provided)

enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of the
Schedule VII, whereas State Governments exercise powers
under Entry 25 of the List III of the Schedule VII to make
laws relating to “education”. Further, it is to be noted that
Entry 25 of the List III is subject to Entry 66 of List I. Hence,
laws, including the subordinate legislations as in the present
case, made under Entry 66 of the Union List would prevail
over any law made under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List.
40

Entry 66 and Entry 25 of the Union List and Concurrent
List, respectively, observed thus:
“41. What emerges from the above discussion
is as follows:
(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry
66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution does not merely mean
evaluation. It means harmonisation with a
view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted
action according to a certain design, scheme
or plan of development. It, therefore, includes
action not only for removal of disparities in
standards but also for preventing the
occurrence of such disparities. It would,
therefore, also include power to do all things
which are necessary to prevent what would
make ‘coordination’ either impossible or
difficult. This power is absolute and
unconditional and in the absence of any valid
compelling reasons, it must be given its full
effect according to its plain and express
intention.
(ii) To the extent that the State legislation is in
conflict with the Central legislation though the
former is purported to have been made under
Entry 25 of the Concurrent List but in effect
encroaches upon legislation including
subordinate legislation made by the Centre
under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List or to
41

give effect to Entry 66 of the Union List, it
would be void and inoperative.
(iii) If there is a conflict between the two
legislations, unless the State legislation is
saved by the provisions of the main part of
clause (2) of Article 254, the State legislation
being repugnant to the Central legislation, the
same would be inoperative.
(iv) Whether the State law encroaches upon
Entry 66 of the Union List or is repugnant to
the law made by the Centre under Entry 25 of
the Concurrent List, will have to be
determined by the examination of the two
laws and will depend upon the facts of each
case…”
(Emphasis provided)
46. In short, in the present case the UGC Regulations would be
binding particularly when the State of Punjab vide its order
dated 30.07.2013 had adopted 2010 UGC Regulations.
47. We may add here that what also weighed with the Division
Bench of the High Court was the fact that it was the Punjab
Educational Service (College Cadre) (Class II) Rules, 1976
(hereinafter ‘1976 Rules’) which were applicable, and not the
UGC Regulations. While it is true that the 1976 Rules were
applicable to the recruitment but a perusal of the same
shows that these only mandate that the recruitment to posts
of Assistant Professors and Librarians should be through
42

direct recruitment. It does not prescribe any mode or method
of recruitment. This aspect was rightly noticed by the learned
Single Judge. As discussed in detail above, the State of
Punjab itself adopted the standards and process laid down by
the UGC. Therefore, it was bound to follow these Regulations,
notwithstanding the 1976 Rules.
48. In short, we find that there is a total arbitrariness in the
present selection. The memo of Council of Ministers dated
17.09.2021 shows that State wanted to recruit only on 160
posts of Assistant Professors and on 17 posts of Librarians
through departmental selection committee on an urgent
basis as these were for the newly opened colleges. As we have
already stated, even in those cases, the recruitment was to be
made by following the UGC Regulations. Next, the 931 and
50 posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians, which were
lying vacant and in regard to which requisition had already
been sent to Commission, were added and it was decided
that the sole basis of the selection would be a single exam.
Moreover, a mere 45-day deadline was set for the
commencement and conclusion of the whole recruitment
process and ultimately within a span of two months, not only
43

was the recruitment process concluded, but even
appointment letters were issued. One cannot fail to notice the
burning haste with which this entire exercise was
undertaken by the powers that be. It has thus been
repeatedly pressed by the appellants that all this was
motivated by political exigency in the form of the impending
Assembly elections in the State of Punjab.
49. An attempt was made by the State and the private
respondents to argue that the selection process which was
ultimately adopted was in any case better than the one
prescribed by the UGC. The logic given is that a written test
would be impartial and will be same to all, whereas there are
always chances of abuse, favouritism, nepotism, even
corruption in a test based on API. Written test is also less
time consuming it was argued. However, we are not at all
convinced with this argument. The recruitment for teaching
posts in higher education on the basis of scores in an
objective type written test, on grounds that such a test is non
viva voce
arbitrary whereas and appreciation of other
aspects such as academic work could be abused and could
be unfairly applied, is an argument which is puerile to say
44

the least. Abandoning a time tested and uniformly followed
method of selecting Assistant Professors in higher education
with Multiple-Choice Questions based written examination is
unacceptable ; especially when the State itself has adopted
the selection process laid down by the expert body which is
also the apex statutory body, the UGC constituted under
Entry 66 in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution.
50. The State cannot defend such an arbitrary practice in the
garb of a policy decision. We have to keep in mind that these
were the posts of Assistant Professors for which a specialized
body like UGC has prescribed a process for the selections,
which includes appreciation of academic work of a candidate,
viva-voce
his/her performance in , amongst others. Just a
simple Multiple-Choice Question based written exam cannot
be sufficient to check the suitability of such candidates. Even
if it is, then also, in the present case, the sudden
replacement of a time tested recruitment process with a new
process, was not only arbitrary but was done without
following the due procedure, which vitiates the entire
process. Even if we ignore the argument of political
45

expediency, we cannot but notice the executive hegemony in
reversing a decision of the Council of Ministers, without
reference to the said body. It also undermines the quality of
selection, since there was no comprehensive exercise to
examine the merit of a candidate. The written test did not
challenge the innovative faculty of a candidate. One was not
required to give an elaborate answer to a question as is done
in a subjective type of test. Instead, it was an objective type of
test in which the correct answer was to be given from
multiple-choice of answers. The elimination of the viva-voce ,
which is such a vital component in the overall appreciation of
merit of a candidate, who has to teach in a higher education
institute, was another grave error.
51. All this goes on to show that the intention of the authorities
was to conclude the exercise as quickly as possible; which
though sought to be justified on grounds of expediency in
filling up the posts, undermines the selection by reason of no
qualitative assessment of the candidates carried out. The
learned Single Judge rightly observed that this approach
casts serious doubts on the fairness of the process and the
impartiality of the selectors, who were likely to be under
46

pressure to complete the exercise within the timeline,
regardless of the quality of the selections. The selection
process is further impaired by the inclusion of posts already
requisitioned to the Commission, which as per the
Regulations were required to be filled up by the Commission
and the apparent deviation from the UGC Guidelines which
were adopted by the State and required to be followed, in this
very selection, by the Council of Ministers.
52. The State and its instrumentalities have a duty and
responsibility to act fairly and reasonably in terms of the
mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Any decision taken
by the State must be reasoned, and not arbitrary. This Court
has consistently held that when a thing is done in a post-

that anything done in undue haste can also be termed as
arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law. We may refer here
to a few judgments of this Court which lay down this

manner could be arbitrary State action cannot be condoned

47

“25. Before parting with the case, it may be
pertinent to mention here that the allotment
had been made to the appellant within 48
hours of submission of her application though
in ordinary cases, it takes about a year. The
appellant had further been favoured to pay
the aforesaid provisional price of Rs. 93,000 in
four instalments in two years, as is evident
from the letter dated 8-4-1987. Making the
allotment in such a hasty manner itself is
arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit by
Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court has
consistently held that “when a thing is done in
a post-haste manner, mala fides would be
presumed”. Anything done in undue haste can
also be termed as “arbitrary and cannot be
condoned in law”. [Vide S.P. Kapoor (Dr.) v.
State of H.P. [(1981) 4 SCC 716 : 1982 SCC
(L&S) 14 : AIR 1981 SC 2181] , M.P. Hasta
Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar
Jain [(1995) 1 SCC 638 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 364
: (1995) 29 ATC 159] , Bahadursinh
Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia
[(2004) 2 SCC 65 : AIR 2004 SC 1159] and
ZenitMataplast (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra [(2009) 10 SCC 388] .] Thus,
such an allotment in favour of the appellant is
liable to be declared to have been made in
arbitrary and unreasonable manner. However,
we are not inclined to take such drastic steps
as the appellant has developed the land
subsequent to allotment.”
(Emphasis provided)
48

54. In Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M.
Kamalia (2004) 2 SCC 65 , this Court reiterated the above
principle while dealing with a case where the change in the
office-bearer had resulted in a hasty and arbitrary change in
the policy, which is also the case here. The relevant
observations in the said judgment are as follows:
“24. The impugned order was preceded by a
direction of the Home Minister on 7-9-1996. A
change in the opinion came into being only
upon change in the holder of the office and
that too within a few days. Not only had the
matter not been admittedly placed on the
agenda of the meeting dated 25-7-1997, the
same was considered showing undue haste.
25. In S.P. Kapoor (Dr) v. State of H.P. [(1981)
4 SCC 716 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 14 : AIR 1981
SC 2181] this Court held that when a thing is
done in a post-haste manner, mala fide would
be presumed, stating: (SCC p. 739, para 33)
“33. … The post-haste manner in which these
things have been done on 3-11-1979 suggests
that some higher-up was interested in pushing
through the matter hastily when the Regular
Secretary, Health and Family Welfare was on
leave.”
(Emphasis provided)
55. In Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009)
10 SCC 388 , this Court laid down the general principle that
49

State action should be grounded in sound principles and
should not be unpredictable or without basis. This Court
noted as follows:
“27. Every action of the State or its
instrumentalities should not only be fair,
legitimate and above-board but should be
without any affection or aversion. It should
neither be suggestive of discrimination nor
even apparently give an impression of bias,
favouritism and nepotism. The decision
should be made by the application of known
principles and rules and in general such
decision should be predictable and the citizen
should know where he is, but if a decision is
taken without any principle or without any
rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is
antithesis to the decision taken in accordance
with the rule of law (vide S.G. Jaisinghani v.
Union of India [AIR 1967 SC 1427] , AIR p.
1434, para 14 and Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther
v. Kerala Financial Corpn. [(1988) 1 SCC 166 :
AIR 1988 SC 157] ).”
(Emphasis provided)
56. In the present case there are multiple deficiencies, as stated
above. The giving away of a rigorous criteria laid down in the
UGC regulations with a single, multiple-choice question
based written test, and the complete elimination of the viva-
voce , all establish the arbitrary nature of the exercise which
50

cannot pass the test of reasonableness laid down under
Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, the learned Single
Judge had rightly struck down the entire selection process,
and the Division Bench of the High Court erred in interfering
with that conclusion.
57. Lastly we need to state that it is a settled principle that when
the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner,
then it should be done in that manner alone. [ See:
Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Govt of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. (2015) 13 SCC 722, Dharmin Bai
Kashyap v. Babli Sahu (2023) 10 SCC 461, Nazir
Ahmed v. King-Emperor (LR 63 IA 372 ), Babu Verghese &
Ors. v. Bar Council of India & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 422]
58. True, the State is entitled to change its policy, yet a sudden
change without valid reasons will always be seen with
suspicion. Even in cases where there is no statutory
prescription of any particular way of doing a thing, the
executive must observe the long-standing practice, and a
deviation from such a practice would require passing the
muster of reasonableness, which is a facet of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In this regard, this Court in Bannari Amman
Sugars Ltd. v. CTO (2005) 1 SCC 625 observed that:
51

“9. While the discretion to change the policy in
exercise of the executive power, when not
trammelled by any statute or rule is wide
enough, what is imperative and implicit in
terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy
must be made fairly and should not give the
impression that it was so done arbitrarily or
by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of
Article 14 and the requirement of every State
action qualifying for its validity on this
touchstone irrespective of the field of activity
of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic
requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action
by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence
and substance is the heartbeat of fair play.
Actions are amenable, in the panorama of
judicial review only to the extent that the State
must act validly for discernible reasons, not
whimsically for any ulterior purpose…”
In the case at hand, the State did not adhere to UGC
Regulations and took the posts out of the purview of the
Commission without following the procedure prescribed
under the law. And this was done suddenly without any
valid reason and thus, it would amount to arbitrariness and
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. In Sivanandan C.T.
v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799 , the
Constitution Bench of this Court observed that:
52

“45. The underlying basis for the application
of the doctrine of legitimate expectation has
expanded and evolved to include the
principles of good administration. Since
citizens repose their trust in the State, the
actions and policies of the State give rise to
legitimate expectations that the State will
adhere to its assurance or past practice by
acting in a consistent, transparent, and
predictable manner. The principles of good
administration require that the decisions of
public authorities must withstand the test of
consistency, transparency, and predictability
to avoid being regarded as arbitrary and
therefore violative of Article 14.”
59. As far back as in the year 1979, this Court in Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of
India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, speaking through Justice PN
Bhagwati, had said that government jobs are also a kind of
wealth and the State cannot distribute or withhold such
wealth on the basis of arbitrary principles. The relevant
portion from the said case law is as follows:
“ 11. Today the Government in a welfare State,
is the regulator and dispenser of special
services and provider of a large number of
benefits, including jobs, contracts, licences,
quotas, mineral rights, etc. The Government
pours forth wealth, money, benefits, services,
53

contracts, quotas and licences. The valuables
dispensed by Government take many forms,
but they all share one characteristic. They are
steadily taking the place of traditional forms
of wealth…..The discretion of the Government
has been held to be not unlimited in that the
Government cannot give or withhold largesse
in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. It
is insisted, as pointed out by Prof. Reich in an
especially stimulating article on “The New
Property” in 73 Yale Law Journal 733, “that
Government action be based on standards
that are not arbitrary or unauthorised”. The
Government cannot be permitted to say that it
will give jobs or enter into contracts or issue
quotas or licences only in favour of those
having grey hair or belonging to a particular
political party or professing a particular
religious faith…
12 …It must, therefore, be taken to be the law
that where the Government is dealing with the
public, whether by way of giving jobs or
entering into contracts or issuing quotas or
licences or granting other forms of largesse,
the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its
sweet will and, like a private individual, deal
with any person it pleases, but its action must
be in conformity with standard or norms
which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant.
The power or discretion of the Government in
the matter of grant of largesse including
award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc.
must be confined and structured by rational,
relevant and non-discriminatory standard or
norm and if the Government departs from
54

such standard or norm in any particular case
or cases, the action of the Government would
be liable to be struck down, unless it can be
shown by the Government that the departure
was not arbitrary, but was based on some
valid principle which in itself was not
irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.”
In the present case, the State has miserably failed to
justify the departure from the standard norms of the
recruitment process. It has failed to give any valid reason for
not adopting the UGC Regulations and avoiding the Public
Service Commission in the recruitment in question.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the reason for this departure
were narrow political and clearly arbitrary.
60. Before parting, we would like to observe that we are aware of
the fact that quashing of the entire recruitment process may
cause hardships for the selected candidates, but at the same
time, there is no equity in the favour of selected candidates
as challenge to the recruitment was made during the
pendency of the process and appointments were subject to
the Court orders. A gross illegality like the present
recruitment cannot be ignored.
55

61. Thus, considering the entire facts of the case, we allow these
appeals and set aside the order dated 23.09.2024 passed by
the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
and quash the entire recruitment and direct the State to
initiate the recruitment process as per the 2018 UGC
Regulations which are now in force in the State of Punjab.
62. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
………………………………J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

………………………………J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 14, 2025.
56