RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. BHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 30-09-2022

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Full Judgment Text

1 REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6942 of 2022 Rajasthan State Road Transport  Corporation     … Appellant Versus Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu  Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr.                  … Respondents J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.645 of 2020 by which the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the Signature Not Verified said appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Single Digitally signed by SNEHA Date: 2022.09.30 16:26:24 IST Reason: Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   filed   by   the   appellant 2 confirming the order passed by the Labour Court setting aside the   order   of   termination   passed   against   the   workman,   the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation has preferred the present appeal. 2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as under: 2.1 The workman was serving on the post of Conductor.  A departmental enquiry was initiated against him alleging not issuing the tickets to 10 passengers though he collected the amount of tickets.   In the department inquiry he was found guilty for the misconduct alleged.  The employer – Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation terminated his services vide Order dated 31.07.2001. 2.2 An application for approval of punishment order under Section   33(2)(b)   of   Industrial   Dispute   Act,   1947   (hereafter referred   to   as   “the   I.D.   Act”)   was   submitted   before   the Industrial   Tribunal   on   31.07.2001.   The   Industrial   Tribunal 3 held the enquiry bad.   However, the Industrial Tribunal vide Order dated 12.12.2012 allowed the appellant – Corporation to prove the charges before the Tribunal.  Both the parties led the evidence   before   the   Tribunal   on   the   charges   alleged.   The appellants led, both, oral as well as documentary evidences. That   on   appreciation   of   entire   evidence   on   record   and considering   the   submissions   made   on   behalf   of   both   the parties, the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.07.2015 allowed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act and granted the approval of the order of termination.   That thereafter and after a period of approximately 19 years from the date of passing the order of termination, the workman again raised the Industrial Dispute challenging the order of termination   of   2001.     By   Judgment   and   Award   dated 19.11.2019   the   Labour   Court,   Jaipur   allowed   the   said reference and set aside the order of termination.   As in the meantime the workman died and the dispute was raised after a   period   of   19   years,   the   Labour   Court   passed   an   order awarding 50% back wages from the date of termination till his 4 death i.e. 10.12.2018.   The Judgment and Award passed by the Labour Court was challenged before the learned Single Judge of the High Court.  The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.   Against the award passed by the learned Single   Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   the   appellant preferred the appeal before the Division Bench.  By impugned judgment and order the High Court has dismissed the said appeal which has given rise to the present appeal. 3. Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant   has   vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Hon’ble   High   Court   has   committed   a   serious   error   in dismissing   the   writ   appeal/writ   petition   confirming   the judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court. 3.1 It is submitted that once in an application under Section 33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act   and   pursuant   to   the   earlier   order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct and thereafter when the order of termination was approved by the 5 Industrial   Tribunal,   thereafter   it   was   not   open   for   the workman to again raise the Industrial Dispute that too after a period of 19 years.  It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court has materially erred in confirming the judgment and award passed   by   the   learned   Labour   Court   quashing   and   setting aside the order of termination which as such was approved by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015. 3.2 Making   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the present appeal. 4. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   H.D. Thanvi,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the respondents.  4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of John   D’Souza   vs.   Karnataka   State   Road   Transport (2019) 14 Scale 57, it is vehemently submitted Corporation,   that   as   observed   and   held   by   this   Hon’ble   Court   the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 10 of the I.D. 6 Act are distinct and different.  It is submitted that as observed and held by this Hon’ble Court in the aforesaid decision the proceedings   under   Section   33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act   are summary in nature and findings recorded while deciding the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act shall not affect the substantive right in a reference under Section 10 of the I.D. Act.   4.2 It is submitted that therefore, the Labour Court did not commit any error in considering the validity of the order of termination   and   thereafter   quashing   and   setting   aside   the same and ordering 50% back wages. 4.3 It   is   submitted   that   considering   the   fact   that   the workman has died and his heir ­ widow is awarded 50% back wages only, the same may not be interfered by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 7 5. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel  for   the   respective parties at length. 5.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the workman was subjected to departmental enquiry and the charge against the   deceased   workman   was   not   issuing   the   tickets   to   10 passengers though he collected the fare.  On conclusion of the departmental   enquiry   his   services   were   terminated.     The termination was the subject matter of the approval application before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section 33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act.     In   the   said   proceedings   the management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct   before   the   Tribunal.     In   the   said application the parties led the evidence, both, oral as well as documentary.     Thereafter   on   appreciation   of   evidence   on record,   the   Industrial   Tribunal   by   order   dated   21.07.2015 approved   the   order   of   termination.     That   thereafter   the workman raised the Industrial Dispute challenging the order of termination which as such was proved by the Industrial 8 Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.  Therefore, once the order of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal and the management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the   misconduct   before   the   Court   and   thereafter   on appreciation   of   evidence   the   order   of   termination   was approved, thereafter the fresh reference under Section 10 of the   I.D.   Act   challenging   the   order   of   termination   was   not permissible.   It is required to be noted that the order dated 21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such is a   higher   forum   than   the   Labour   Court   had   attained   the finality.  Though the aforesaid fact was pointed out before the High Court, the High Court has not at all considered and/or appreciated the same and has confirmed the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court for setting aside the order of termination which as such was approved by the Industrial Tribunal. 5.2 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of  John D’Souza  (supra) by the learned 9 counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is concerned, on facts the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand.   In the present case by specific order the Industrial   Tribunal   permitted   the   management   to   lead   the evidence and prove the misconduct before the Court which as such was permissible.  That thereafter the Industrial Tribunal approved   the   order   of   termination.   Once   the   order   of termination   was   approved   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal   on appreciation of evidence led before it, thereafter the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding between the parties.     No   contrary   view   could   have   been   taken   by   the Labour   Court   contrary   to   the   findings   recorded   by   the Industrial Tribunal. 6. In view of the above, the judgment and award passed by the   Labour   Court   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   is unsustainable.  The High Court has committed a very serious error in dismissing the writ petition/writ appeal confirming the 10 judgment and award passed by the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination. 7. In view of the above and for the reason stated above the present appeal succeeds.  The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court confirming the judgment and award passed   by   the   Labour   Court   setting   aside   the   order   of termination   and   the   judgment   and   award   passed   by   the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination are hereby quashed and set aside. The Present Appeal is Allowed to the aforesaid extent. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. …………………………………J.             (M. R. SHAH) …………………………………J. New Delhi,     (KRISHNA MURARI) September 30, 2022.