Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
INCOME TAX OFFICER, SHILLONG AND ANR. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
N. TAKIM ROY RYMBAI ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/02/1976
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION:
1976 AIR 670 1976 SCR (3) 413
1976 SCC (1) 916
CITATOR INFO :
R 1988 SC2062 (14)
RF 1989 SC 100 (31)
RF 1990 SC 913 (27)
R 1990 SC1637 (21)
ACT:
Income-tax Act, 1961 S. 10(26)(a) Scope of-Assessee, a
person belonging to Scheduled Tribe residing in the
specified area-lncome accruing or arising in a non-scheduled
area-If entitled to exemption.
HEADNOTE:
Section 10(26)(a), Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that a
person is entitled to exemption from income-tax if (1) he is
a member of a Scheduled Tribe as defined in Art. 366(25) of
the Constitution, (2) he is residing in any area specified
in Part A or Part of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of
the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, or the State or
Union- Territories mentioned in s. 10(26)(a). and (3) the
income in respect of which exemption is claimed is income
which accrues or arises to him from any source in the area,
State or Union Territories mentioned in the section.
The assessee belonged to the Jaintia Scheduled Tribe
and was a permanent resident of the United Khasi-Jaintia
Hills Autonomous District referred to in para 20 of the
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. He was employed in the
Secretariat of the Assam Government, and his place of work
was within the Shillong Municipality, and was not a part of
the area described in para 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution. The Income-tax officer held that . the income
of the assessee from his salary arose in the non-scheduled
area and was not covered by the tax exemption provided under
s. 10(26) (a). In a writ petition under Art. 226 the
assessee challenged the validity of 8. 10(26) (a) on the
ground that the classification of members of Scheduled
Tribes into those having income from a source within the
specified areas and those having income from the source
outside the areas was arbitrary. The High Court struck it
down as violative of Art. 14 on the ground that the
exemption clause which was enacted for the benefit of the
Scheduled Tribes would be frustrated if the income of such
person was made subject to tax merely because the source of
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that income was outside that area.
Allowing the appeals of the Department,
^
HELD: The High Court was in error in holding that the
classification contemplated by s. 10(26)(a), Income Tax Act,
1961, was artificial and was not based on any intelligible
differentia. [422D]
1 (a) . A taxation law, like any other law. has to pass
the equality test of Art. 14, but given the legislative
competence, the legislature has ample freedom to select and
classify persons, incomes and objects which it would or
would not tax. The mere fact that a tax falls more heavily
on some in the same category, is not by itself a ground to
render the law invalid. It is only when, within the range of
its selection. the law operates unequally and cannot be
justified on the basis of a valid classification, that there
would be a violation of Art. 14. [420B-D] "
East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
[1963] I S.C.R. 404; Vivan Joseph Ferriera v. Municipal
Council of Greater Bombay, [1972] 1 S.C.C. 70 and Jaipur
Hosiery Mills v. State of Rajasthan, [1970] 2 S.C.C. 27,
followed.
(b) Classification for the purpose of taxation or for
exempting from tax with reference to the source of the
income is integral to the fundamental scheme of the Income
Tax Act. The classification made by sub-cl. (a) for the
purpose of exemption is not unreal or unknown but conforms
to a well recognised pattern and is based on intelligible
differentia. The object of this differentiation between
income accruing or received from a source in the specified
areas and
12-522SCI/76
414
the income accruing or received from a source outside such
areas IS to benefit not only the members of the Scheduled
Tribes residing in the specified areas but also to benefit
such areas economically. [420F; 421E-F]
(c) If it is held that a member of the Scheduled Tribe
residing in a specified area was entitled to the exemption
irrespective of whether the source of his income lay within
or outside such area, it may lead to mischievous results. A
non-Tribal assessee in India may enter into a sham
partnership with a member of the Scheduled Tribe residing in
the specified area and ostensibly give him a substantial
share of the profits of the business but really give him
only a nominal amount and thus evade tax. Also a tribal
residing in the scheduled areas. earning large profits from
business located outside the specified areas would be
totally exempt while a non-tribal whose source of income is
a share in the same business would be taxed and thus the
exemption is likely to operate unequally between individuals
similarly situated. [421G-H]
(2) The decision in S. K. Datta. Income Tax officer and
or$. v. Lawrence Singh Ingty, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 165, on which
the High Court had relied is no authority for the
proposition that the exemption granted under s. 10(26) to
the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing in the
specified area, as a class, could not be validly subjected
to the condition contained in sub-cl. (a) of that provision.
The sentence that "the exemption in question was not given
to individuals either on the basis of their social status or
economic resources. it was given to a class" occurring in
that case could not be torn out of the contest and used for
spelling out a proposition different from what was actually
decided in that case. [419H; F]
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(3) The State is the best judge to formulate its
policies and to decide how far and for what period and in
what situations, the members of a particular Scheduled Tribe
residing in a particular Tribal area should be afforded ‘
the protection and benefit in the matter of promotion of
their educational and economic interests embodied in Art. 46
of the Constitution. [422C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 579 to
594 of 1975.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 11 October 1974 of the High Court at Gauhati in
Civil Rule Nos. 252, 293, 305, 640 and 730 of 1976, and 24,
405, 507 & 510/71, 515 to 517 of 1972 and 165-166 of 1975.
N. M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.
(in all the appeals)
N. M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee, for respondents in
CAs 579 & 583-586/75.
S. Chaudhuri for respondents in CAs 588 to 590/75
D. N. Mukherjee & R. P. Agarwala, for respondents in
CAs 587-590
N. M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee & R. P. Agarwala for
the respondents in CAs 591-592/75
N. M. Lahiri with D. N. Mukherjee for respondents in
CAs 593-594 of 1975
Ex parte, for respondents in CAs 580-582, 593-594 of
1975
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J. These appeals directed against a judgment
of the High Court of Judicature at Gauhati raise a common
question in regard
415
to the interpretation and constitutional validity of sub-
clause (a) of A clause (26) of s. 10 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (for short, called the 1961 Act). The appeals will be
disposed by a common judgment.
R. Takin Roy Rymbai (respondent in Civil Appeal 579 of
,1975) belongs to Jaintia Scheduled Tribe and is a permanent
resident of United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District
under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution within the
State of Meghalaya. He joined service under the Government
of Assam in 1941. In the previous year relevant to the
assessment year 1970-71, he was posted at Shillong as
Secretary to the Government of Assam. The Assam Secretariat
building and office, which constitute his place of work was
within that quarter of the town which is included in
Shillong Municipality and is not a part of the area
described in para 20 of the Sixth Schedule. C
The Income-tax officer took the view that the
assessee’s income from salary in the relevant year arose in
the non-scheduled area and as such, is not covered by the
exemption provided under s. 10(26) (a) of the Act.
The assessee claimed that his income from salary had
accrued or arisen within the specified area and, as such, he
was entitled to the exemption. In the alternative, he
contended that this was not a valid condition for denying
him the benefit of the exemption under s. 10 (26). The
Income-tax officer over-ruled these contentions and
completed the assessment subjecting the assessee’s salary to
tax.
The assessee thereupon filed a petition under Article
226 of The Constitution in the High Court for impugning the
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assessment orders and the notices of demand for the
assessment year 1970-1971, on the ground that sub-clause (a)
of s. 10(26) of the Act is invalid and ultra vires Article
14 of the Constitution.
The writ petition was heard by a Bench of three learned
Judges of the High Court, which held that this exemption
clause has been enacted for the benefit of the Scheduled
Tribes residing in specified areas. The object of this
exemption clause, according to the High Court, will be
frustrated and made nugatory if the income of a member of
the Scheduled Tribe residing in the specified areas, is made
subject to tax merely because the source of such an income
is outside that area. In its view, the classification
between members of the Scheduled Tribes having income which
accrues or arises to them from any source from the Tribal
area or the specified territories on the one hand, and the
members of Scheduled Tribe having income which accrues or
arises to them from any source outside the Tribal areas or
specified territories on the other, is not based on any
intelligible differentia; the classification is artificial
and is not based on any substantial distinction having a
rational nexus to the purpose of the law. On the contrary,
the condition contained in sub-clause (a) would defeat the
very object of the exemption clause in s. 10 (26). For this
enunciation, the High Court has sought support from this
Court’s observations in S. K. Dutta, Income-tax officer and
ors. v. Lawrence Singh Ingty ( 1 ) .
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R.165.
416
On the above reasoning, the High Court has struck down
the aforesaid sub-clause (a) as violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution, allowed the writ petition and quashed the
impugned notices and the orders of assessment.
The Department has now come in appeal before us after
obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
The provisions of s. 10 of the 1961 Act are in the
nature of exemptions. The various clauses of this section
indicate the incomes which are to be excluded from
computation of the total Income of a person under this Act.
For a proper perspective, it will be useful to have a look
at the historical background of this provision.
The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 did not contain any
provision specifically exempting members of the Scheduled
Tribes from the levy of income-tax. It was the Finance Act
1955 that first incorporated in the Income-tax Act, 1922
provisions for exemption of the Tribal people of the eastern
region from payment of the tax. These provisions relating to
such exemptions were further amended and recast by s. 3 of
the Finance Act 1958 as follows:
"S. 4(3) XXI. Any income of a member of a
Scheduled Tribe defined in clause (25) of Article 366
of the Constitution, residing in any area specified in
Part A or Part of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of
the Sixth Schedule , to the Constitution or in the
Union Territories of Manipur and Tripura, provided that
such member is not in service of Government." J
The 1961 Act then re-enacted this clause as under:
"10 (26) In the case of a member of a Scheduled
Tribe as deemed in clause (25) of Article 366 of the
Constitution, residing in any area specified in Part A
or Part of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution or in the Union
Territories of Manipur and Tripura, who is not in the
service of Government.
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any income which accrues or arises to him.
(a) from any source in the area or Union
Territories aforesaid, or
(b) by wag of dividend or interest on
securities."
The State of Nagaland (Adaptation of Laws on Union
Subjects) order 1965 added with effect from the 1st December
1963, the State of Nagaland also, to the areas, the Tribal
people of which could claim this exemption.
The validity of the exclusion of the Government
servants from the exemption given under s. 10(26), as it
stood before the amendment of 1970, came up for
consideration before this Court in S. K. Datta, Income-tax
officer and ors. v. Lawrence Singh Ingty (supra). It was
held that the classification of Tribals into Government
servants
417
and others for purposes of this exemption was violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, invalid.
Thereafter, Parliament passed the Taxation Laws
(Amendment) Act 42 of 1970 whereby the words "who is not in
the service of the Government" appearing in s. 10(26), were
deleted. The North Eastern Areas (Reorganization)
(Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects), order 1974 amended
this provision further with effect from January 25, 1972 so
that it now reads as follows:
"(26) in the case of a member of a Scheduled Tribe
as defined in clause (25) of Article 366 of the
Constitution, residing in any area supecified in Part A
or Part of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (or in the State of
Nagaland) Manipur and Tripura or in the Union
Territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram or in the
areas covered by Notification No. TAD/R/35/50/109,
dated the 23rd February 1951, issued by the Governor of
Assam under the provisions to sub paragraph (3) of the
said paragraph 20 (as it stood immediately before the
commencement of the North Eastern Areas
(Reorganization) Act 1971 (81 of 1971) any’ income
which accrues or arises to him, (a) from any source in
the (area, State or Union territories) aforesaid, or
(b) by way of dividend or interest, on securities". An
analysis of this provision shows that in order to
entitle a person to the exemption, three conditions
must co-exist: (i) He should be as member of a
Scheduled Tribe as defined in Clause (25) of Article
366 of the Constitution; (ii) He should be residing in
any area specified in Part A or Part of the Table
appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution; or the State or Union Territories
mentioned in this provision; (iii) The income in
respect of which exemption is claimed must be an income
which accrues or arises to him-
(a) from any source in the (area, State or Union
territories) aforesaid, or.
(b) by way of dividend or interest, on
securities".
An analysis of this provision shows that in order to
entitle a person to the exemption, there conditions must co-
exist:
(i) He should be a member of a Scheduled Tribe as
defined in Clause (25) of Article 366 of the
Constitution;
(ii) He should be residing in any area specified
in Part A or Part B of the Table appended to
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paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution; or the State or Union
Territories mentioned in this provision;
(iii)The income in respect of which exemption is
claimed must be an income which accrues or
arises to him-
(a) from any source in the area, State or
Union territories mentioned in the
provision or
(b) by way of dividend or interest, on
securities".
Article 366(25) of the Constitution provides:
"Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or tribal
communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or
tribal communities as are deemed under article 342 to
be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this
Constitution." H
Article 342 empowers the President with respect to any
State or Union Territory, and where it is a State, after
consultation with the
418
Governor thereof, by public notification, to specify Tribes
or Tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes of
tribal communities which shall for the purpose of this
Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes, as the case
may be. Clause (2) of this Article empowers the Parliament
to exercise the some power by enacting a law
The respondent belongs to Jaintia Scheduled Tribe which
is one of the Scheduled Tribes notified under Art. 342(1).
The first condition for applicability of s. 10(26) was thus
indubitably satisfied.
Part II of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution inter alia specifies the
United Khasi Jaintia Hills District as one of the Tribal
Areas. According to the averments in the writ petition, the
respondent is a permanent resident of the United Khasi-
Jaintia Hills autonomous District. This allegation has not
been denied by the other side. Indeed, in the petition for
special leave to appeal filed by the appellant the- fact
that he is a resident of a Tribal area specified in
Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, is
admitted. ,.
The first two conditions necessary for claiming
exemption under s. 10(26) existed in the present case.
Whether on the facts of the case, the third condition
embodied in sub-clause (a) was satisfied or not, is a
question which still remains to be determined. The High
Court has advisedly left it open. The controversy has thus
narrowed down into the legal issue: whether the
classification made by sub-clause (a) for the purpose of the
exemption under s. 10(26) between the income of a member of
a Scheduled Tribe accruing or arising from any source in the
area, State or Union Territories specified in the aforesaid
Clause (26), and the income from a source outside such area,
State or Union Territories is constitutionally valid?
In answering this question in the negative, the High
Court has propounded the proposition that the object of
clause (26) of s. 10 r is to grant a blanket exemption to
members of Scheduled Tribes as a class residing in the
specified areas, and that the condition contained in sub-
clause (a) is destructive of that object. In propounding
this proposition, the learned Judges seem to have relied on
certain observations of this Court in Lawrence Singh Ingty’s
case (supra)
Mr. Lahiri appearing for the respondent, also,
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reiterates the reasoning of the High Court that the
exemption was given to the Tribal people as a class, and not
on the basis of their economic resources or sources of
income. In this connection Counsel has cited a few sentences
from this Court’s judgment in Lawrence Singh Ingty’s case ,,
(supra) .
With due respect to the learned Judges of the High
Court, we are unable to accept this reasoning. The matter
now in controversy was, not even obliquely in issue before
this Court in Lawrence Singh Ingty’s case. Therein, the only
question for decision was, whether the exclusion of the
Government servants from the exemptions given in s. 4(3)
(XXI) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and later on in s.
10 (26) of the Income-tax Act 1961. was violative of Article
14 of the Constitution
419
Although sub-clause (a) was very much there, its validity
was not, even indirectly questioned. The contention of the
Revenue, therein, was that the exemption from income-tax was
given to members of certain Scheduled Tribes, due to their
economic and social backwardness; that it was not possible
to consider Government servants as socially and economically
backward and hence the exemption was justly denied to the
assessee, who was a Government servant having income from
salary. It was further urged by the Revenue that once a
Tribal becomes a Government servant, he is lifted out of his
social environment and assimmilated into forward sections of
society and therefore he needs no more any crutch to lean
on.
These arguments were found to be irrelevant and
unsustainable. In that context, the Court observed:
"The exemption in question was not given to
individuals either on the basis of their social status
or economic resources. It was given to a class. Hence
individuals as individuals do not come into the
picture.
We fail to see in what manner the social status
and economic resources of a government servant can be
different from that of another holding a similar
position in a corporation or that of a successful
medical practitioner, lawyer architect, etc. To over-
paint the picture of a government servant as the
embodiment of all power and prestige would sound
ironical. Today his position in the society to put at
the highest is no higher than that of others who in
other walks of life have the same income. For the
purpose of valid classification what is required is not
some imaginary difference but a reasonable and
substantial distinction having regard to the purpose of
the law."
The sentences which have been underlined are the sheet-
anchor of the arguments advanced by Mr. Lahiri. In our
opinion, they cannot be torn out of the context and used for
spelling out a proposition different from what was actually
decided in that case. The ratio of that decision is that
within the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing in
specified areas selected by the State for the purpose of
exemption, the mini classification between individuals who
were government servants deriving income from salary and
those who were not such government servants, was not based
on intelligible differentia. Since there was no rational
whatever for this differentiation, it was held that within
the range of the selection, the government servants had been
unfairly discriminated against lawyers, medical
practitioners, private servants, businessmen, etc. whose
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income was derived from non-government sources, and that the
exclusion of government servants from the exemption under s.
10(26) was bad and unconstitutional. This vice of
discrimination from which s. 10(26) was then suffering, was
removed when the Amending Act 42 of 1970 exercised the
obnoxious limb of the provision.
The decision in Lawrence Singh Ingty is thus no
authority for the proposition that the exemption granted
under s. 10 (26) to the members of the Scheduled Tribes
residing in the specified areas, as a class,
420
could not be validly subjected to the condition contained in
subclause (a) of the provision.
While it is true that a taxation law, cannot claim
immunity from the equality clause in Article 14 of the
Constitution, and has to pass like any other law, the
equality test of that Article, it must be remembered that
the State has in view of the intrinsic complexity of fiscal
adjustments of diverse elements, a considerably wide
discretion in the matter of classification for taxation
purposes. Given legislative competence, the legislature has
ample freedom to select and classify persons, districts,
goods, properties, incomes and objects which it would tax,
and which it would not tax. So long as the classification
made within this wide and flexible range by a taxing statute
does not transgress the fundamental principles underlying
the doctrine of equality, it is not vulnerable on the ground
of discrimination merely because it taxes or exempts from
tax some incomes or objects and not others Nor the mere fact
that tax falls more heavily on some in the same category, is
by itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is only
when within the range of its selection, the law operates
unequally and cannot be justified on the basis of a valid
classification, that there would be a violation of Article
14. (See East India Tobacco Co. v State of Andhra Pradesh(l)
Vivian joseph Ferriera v. Municipal Council of Greater
Bombay;(2) Jaipur Hosiery Mills v. State of Rajasthan.(3)
The validity or otherwise of the classification of
income envisaged by sub-clause (a), with reference to the
source of income, for the purpose of the exemption under s.
10(26) is to be judged in the light of the above principles.
Classification for purposes of taxation or for
exempting from tax with reference to the source of the
income is integral to the fundamental scheme of the Income-
tax Act. Indeed, the entire warp and woof of the 1961 Act
has been woven on this pattern.
Section 2(45) defines total income to mean "the total
amount of income referred to in s. 5 computed in the manner
laid down in this Act".
Section 5 makes the chargeability of income dependent
upon the locality of accrual or receipt of the income. It
defines the extent total income with reference to the
residence of the assessee, and thus makes the incidence of
taxation dependent upon whether the assessee is a resident
in India. It is the residence in India which entails
liability to tax. A non-resident is not liable in India to
get his income assessed, but if any part of his income
accrues or arises whether directly or indirectly through any
business connection in India or from any property in India,
the same would be assessable. An ordinary resident as
defined in s. 6, does not attract additional chargeability
but being "not ordinarily resident" entitles a person to
partial exemption from
(1)[1963] I S.C.R. 404. (2) [1972] I S.C.C. 70. (3)
[1970] 2 S.C.C. 27.
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421
chargeability as a resident, to which exemption a person who
is "ordinarily resident" is not entitled-(see Kanga and
Palkhivala Vol. I-Income-tax 6th Edn. p. 162).
The 1961 Act abounds in instances whereby certain
sources of income have been exempted from tax, while others
are assessable.
Section 10 of the 1961 Act, itself contains no less
than 30 instances of such classification for the purpose of
granting exemptions from tax. This is so, in spite of the
fact that another source of the same person’s income may be
assessable. A person may have agricultural income apart from
salary or business income. The income from the former source
is not to be included in the total income of the assessee
(vide s. 10(1) ); while income from the latter source is not
so exempted. Again, interest realised from Scheduled banks
on deposits upto a certain limit is exempt, while interest
realised from non- banking concerns is assessable.
Sections 80A to 80U further provide exemptions from tax
to incomes derived from certain sources. A business man’s
income is assessable, but if it is from a newly established
industrial undertaking or priority industry, to that extent,
the same is exempted. Section 80H provides for deductions in
cases of new industrial undertakings employing displaced
persons etc.
It is not necessary to multiply such instances. Suffice
it to say that classification of sources of income is
integral to the basic scheme of the 1961 Act. It is nobody’s
case that the entire scheme of the Act is irrational and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such an
extravagant contention has not been canvassed before us.
Thus the classification made by the aforesaid sub-clause (a)
for purposes of exemption is not unreal or unknown. It
conforms to a well recognised pattern. It is based on
intelligible differentia. The object of this differentiation
between income accruing or received from a source in the
specified areas and the income accruing or received from a
source outside such areas is to benefit not only the members
of the Scheduled Tribes residing in the specified areas but
also to benefit economically such areas. If the contention
advanced by Mr. Lahiri is accepted and a member of the
Scheduled Tribe residing in a specified area is held
entitled to the exemption irrespective of whether the source
of his income lies within or outside such areas, it will
lead to potentially mischievous results and evasion of tax
by assessees who do not belong to the Scheduled Tribes. All
that a non-tribal assessee in India need do would be to
enter into a sham partnership with a member of the Scheduled
Tribe residing in the specified area and ostensibly give him
under the partnership a substantial share of the profits of
the business while, in reality, pay the tribal only a
nominal amount. Moreover, but for the condition provided in
sub-clause (a), the exemption granted under s. 10(26) is
likely to operate unequally and cause inequality of
treatment between individuals similarly situated. A Tribal
residing in the Scheduled areas earning large income from
business located outside the specified areas, would be
totally exempt while the non-tribal whose source of income
is a share in the same business would be taxed although with
reference to the source of the income, both were similarly
situated.
422
We are not persuaded to accept Mr. Lahiri’s argument
that the making of the exemption conditional upon the
classification envisaged by sub-clause (a) would deter the
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members of the Scheduled Tribes from joining the mainstream
of national life, or, would be inconsistent with the
Directive Principle embodied in Article 46. This Article
contains a Directive Principle of State Policy for promotion
of educational and economic interests of the weaker sections
of the people, particularly the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. Its primary objective is to provide
protection to the "weaker sections" of society. Members of
the Scheduled Tribes who are enterprising and resourceful
enough to move out of the seclusion of the tribal areas and
successfully compete with their Indian brethern outside
those areas and rise to remunerative positions in service or
business, cease to be "weaker sections". In any case, the
State is the best judge to formulate its policies and to
decide how far and for what period and in what situations,
the members of a particular Scheduled Tribe residing in a
particular Tribal area should be afforded the protection and
benefit in the matter of promotion of their educational and
economic interests.
In view of what has been said above, we are of opinion
that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in
holding that the classification contemplated by sub-clause
(a) of cl. (26) of s. 10 of the 1961 Act is artificial and
is not based on any intelligible differentia. We would
therefore, reverse the judgment of the High Court and hold
that the aforesaid sub-cause (a) is constitutionally valid
Before we part with this judgment, we may note that Mr.
Lahiri made a detailed survey of the history of the Tribal
areas of Assam and Scheduled Tribes residing in those
’autonomous’ areas. Counsel also argued that virtually the
source of the salary received by the assessee lay in the
Tribal areas forming the State of Meghalaya, notwithstanding
the fact that on account of the exigencies of service, the
office of the assessee was located in those Wards of
Shillong which are not a part of the tribal areas. In our
opinion, it is not necessary to go into this question which,
as already noticed, still remains open and undetermined.
In the result we allow these appeals, but in the
circumstances ofthe case, leave the parties to pay and bear
their own costs.
P.B.R. Appeals allowed.
423