M/S Balaji Traders vs. The State Of U.P.

2025 INSC 806
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.3159/2025)


M/S. BALAJI TRADERS ... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF U.P. & ANR. ... RESPONDENT(S)



J U D G M E N T



SANJAY KAROL, J.

Leave Granted.
1. The instant appeal, preferred by appellant-complainant,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by th
NAVEEN D
arises out of the judgment and order dated 28 June, 2024 passed
Date: 2025.06.06
16:09:10 IST
Reason:
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by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
Miscellaneous Application No.19550/2024 whereby the
th
summoning order dated 28 August, 2023 as well as entire
proceedings of Complaint Case No.58 of 2022 under Section 387
1
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 has been quashed.
2. Brief facts that led to the present appeal are :
The complainant, namely, Prof. Manoj Kumar Agrawal, is
a proprietor of a firm M/s. Balaji Traders, carrying out the
2
business of betel nut leaves. Sanjay Gupta , allegedly started a
business under the same name, and litigations are pending
between the parties with respect to Trademark and Copyright
nd
claims. On 22 May, 2022, when the complainant was heading
towards his house, the accused, along with three unknown
persons carrying rifles in their hands, stopped and threatened him
to close down his business of betel nut. They further threatened
that he could carry on the business only if he would pay five lakhs
per month to the accused person. On the complainant's refusal,
the accused persons not only beat him but also tried to kidnap
3
him. On failure of police to register First Information Report , he
approached the Court by filing a complaint u/s 200 of the Code
4
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 .

1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
2
Hereinafter ‘accused’
3
FIR
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’
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5
3. Pursuant to this complaint, the Trial Court after analyzing
the oral and documentary evidence available, found a prima facie
case against the accused person and issued summons to him u/s
387 IPC.
4. Being aggrieved, the accused person approached the High
Court by filing a Miscellaneous Application under section 482
th
CrPC for quashing of summoning order dated 28 August, 2023.
5. The High Court, while referring to various judicial
pronouncements, observed that to make out a case of extortion,
one of the essential ingredients is to deliver any property or
valuable security under threat by the complainant to the accused;
and that such ingredient was missing in the instant case as no
money was handed over to the accused person. It further
observed that since no offence of extortion under Section 383
IPC is made out, consequently, no offence under Section 387 IPC
would be made out, thus, finding it a fit case to be quashed.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Trial
Court rightly issued summons on the basis of the statements of
witnesses and the complainant, and the High Court wrongly
relied on the judgments dealing with 384 IPC and not 387 IPC.

5
Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge(Dacoit Prabhav Area) Jalaun Place
Orai
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7. Learned Counsel for respondent No.2, while relying on
6
Dhananjay @ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar
submits that since the essential ingredient of extortion, i.e.,
delivery of property, is not met, consequently, the charge under
Section 387 IPC cannot be sustained. Respondent No.2, who is
running a similar business to that of the complainant, had lodged
an FIR against the complainant, as such the instant FIR is directly
linked to the respondent's enforcement of his Intellectual
Property Rights and made as a counterblast to the respondent's
lawful actions. Further reliance is placed on State of Haryana v.
7
Bhajan Lal ; and Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
8
Uttaranchal , submitting that criminal prosecution should not be
used as an instrument of harassment, or for seeking personal
vendetta with an ulterior motive of pressurizing the accused.
Further, placing reliance on Motibhai Fulabhai Patel & Co. v.
9 10
R. Prasad ; Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of M.P. ; and Tolaram
11
Relumal v. State of Bombay , it is submitted that since penal
statutes have to be construed and interpreted strictly, section 387
IPC is an aggravated form of extortion and cannot be stretched to

6
2007 (14) SCC 768
7
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
8
2007 (12) SCC 1
9
1968 SCC OnLine SC310
10
(1976) 1 SCC 560
11
(1954) 1 SCC 961
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cover mere threats, without any delivery of property or valuable
security.

POSITION OF LAW

8. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is
imperative to acknowledge that IPC provides for offences, their
ingredients, and their distinct punishments. The relevant Sections
of extortion defined in Chapter XVII of IPC are reproduced
below :

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imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine

Section 387 Putting person in fear of death or of grievous
hurt, in order to commit extortion: Whoever, in order to
the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any
person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person
or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 388. Extortion by threat of accusation of an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life,
etc.—Whoever commits extortion by putting any person
in fear of an accusation against that person or any other,
of having committed or attempted to commit any offence
punishable with death, or with imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten
years, or of having attempted to induce any other person
to commit such offence, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and,
if the offence be one punishable under Section 377 of
this Code, may be punished with imprisonment for life.

Section 389. Putting person in fear or accusation of
offence, in order to commit extortion.—Whoever, in
order to the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to
put any person in fear of an accusation, against that
person or any other, of having committed, or attempted
to commit, an offence punishable with death or with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and,
if the offence be punishable under section 377 of this
Code, may be punished with imprisonment for life.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

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9. A glance over all the Sections related to extortion would
reveal a clear distinction being carried out between the actual
commission of extortion and the process of putting a person in
fear for the purpose of committing extortion.
10. Section 383 defines extortion, the punishment therefor is
given in Section 384. Sections 386 and 388 provide for an
aggravated form of extortion. These sections deal with the actual
commission of an act of extortion, whereas Sections 385, 387 and
389 IPC seek to punish for an act committed for the purpose of
extortion even though the act of extortion may not be complete
and property not delivered. It is in the process of committing an
offence that a person is put in fear of injury, death or grievous
hurt. Section 387 IPC provides for a stage prior to committing
extortion, which is putting a person in fear of death or grievous
hurt ' in order to commit extortion', similar to Section 385 IPC.
Hence, Section 387 IPC is an aggravated form of 385 IPC, not
384 IPC.
11. Having deliberated upon the offence of extortion and its
forms, we proceed to analyze the essentials of both Sections, i.e.,
383 and 387 IPC, the High Court dealt with.
12. The essential ingredients of extortion under Section 383
12
IPC, as laid down by this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay ,
are :

12
(1986) 2 SCC 716
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“ 60. …The main ingredients of the offence are:

( i ) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to
that person or any other person;

( ii ) the putting of a person in such fear must be
intentional;

( iii ) the accused must thereby induce the person so put
in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable
security or anything signed or sealed which may be
converted into a valuable security; and

( iv ) such inducement must be done dishonestly.

Before a person can be said to put any person in
fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he
has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is
legally bound to do in future. If all that a man does is to
promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do
and says that if money is not paid to him he would not
do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence
of extortion. …”

13. But a perusal of Section 387 IPC reveals its essential
ingredients, to be :
(a) Accused must have put a person in fear of death or
grievous hurt;
(b) Such an act must have been done in order to commit

extortion;
The expression 'in order to ' has been defined in the following
ways:
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13
“ in order to ” : for the purpose of
14
“ in order to ” : with the purpose of doing

‘ in order to commit extortion ’ clearly reveals that it is in
the process of committing the offence of extortion.
14. Thus, it can be said in terms of Sections 386 (an aggravated
form of 384 IPC) and 387 IPC that the former is an act in itself,
whereas the latter is the process; it is a stage before committing
an offence of extortion. The Legislature was mindful enough to
criminalize the process by making it a distinct offence.
Therefore, the commission of an offence of extortion is not sine
qua non for an offence under this Section. It is safe to deduce
that for prosecution under Section 387 IPC, the delivery of
property is not necessary.
15
15. In Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P. , this Court, while
dealing with a case wherein ransom was demanded for releasing
the child, observed that it could not be punishable under Section
386 IPC as no ransom was extorted. Therefore, the conviction
was correctly made under Section 387 IPC. Similarly, in
16
Gursharan Singh v. State of Punjab , the Court upheld the
conviction under Section 387 IPC where money extorted was not
paid.

13
Merriam-Webster
14
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth Edition 1999
15
1995 Supp (3) SCC 119
16
(1996) 10 SCC 190
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17
16. Further, in Somasundaram v. State a three-Judge Bench
of this Court upheld the conviction under Section 387 IPC, along
with other provisions, on the facts, where the deceased was tied
with an iron chain and rope to a cot and threatened to part with
crores of rupees or else execute the document in their favour. On
his failure to do so, the deceased was killed. Thus, even though
there was no delivery of property, the conviction was upheld by
observing that Section 387 IPC is a heightened, more serious
form of the offence of extortion in which the victim is put in fear
of death or grievous hurt.
17. After going through the penal provisions related to
extortion, it is also imperative to peruse the necessary principles
of quashing, laid down by this Court through various judicial
pronouncements which govern the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC.
18
18. This Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , reiterated
several principles of quashing criminal cases/complaints/FIR as
laid down, back in the days in Bhajan Lal (supra) :

“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and
of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the

17
(2020) 7 SCC 722
18
2025 SCC OnLine SC 7
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following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
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11. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High
Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when
one or the other propositions of law, as laid down in R.
Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [(2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 567] is attracted, which are as under: (SCC p.
523, para 15)

“(1) The High Court ordinarily would not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a
criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first
information report unless the allegations
contained therein, even if given face value and
taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no
cognizable offence.

(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and
except in very exceptional circumstances,
would not look to any document relied upon by
the defence.

(3) Such a power should be exercised very
sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR
disclose commission of an offence, the Court
shall not go beyond the same and pass an order
in favour of the accused to hold absence of any
mens rea or actus reus.

19
(2009) 14 SCC 696
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(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the
same by itself may not be a ground to hold that
the criminal proceedings should not be allowed
to continue.”

(Emphasis supplied)


A three-Judge Bench of this Court, while summarizing the
principles of quashing in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v.
20
State of Maharashtra , has held that the power of quashing
should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the 'rarest
of rare cases' and not as an ordinary rule :

20
(2021) 19 SCC 401
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OUR VIEW


19. It is a well-settled principle of law that penal statutes must
be given strict interpretation. The Court ought not to read
anything into a statutory provision that imposes penal liability.
20. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Tolaram Relumal
(supra) has observed :

reiterated the observations made by the Privy Council in respect
of the interpretation of penal statutes :

“ 10. A decision of the Judicial Committee in ‘ Francis
Hart Dyke (Appellant) and Henry William Elliott , and

21
1962 SCC OnLine SC 85
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22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court has also observed in
Dilip Kumar Sharma (supra) that a penal provision must be
strictly construed; that is to say, in the absence of clear,
compelling language, the provision should not be given a wider
interpretation.
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22
23. This Court in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta , while
discussing the strict interpretation of penal statutes has held :

“ 37. Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes (12th
Edn.) says:

“The strict construction of penal statutes
seems to manifest itself in four ways: in the
requirement of express language for the
creation of an offence; in interpreting strictly
words setting out the elements of an offence;
in requiring the fulfilment to the letter of
statutory conditions precedent to the
infliction of punishment; and in insisting on
the strict observance of technical provisions
concerning criminal procedure and
jurisdiction.”

38. In Craies Statute Law (7th Edn. at p. 529) it is said
that penal statutes must be construed strictly. At p. 530
of the said treatise, referring to U.S. v. Wiltberger [5 L
Ed 37 : 18 US (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820)] it is observed, thus:

"The distinction between a strict
construction and a more free one has, no
doubt, in modern times almost disappeared,
and the question now is, what is the true
construction of the statute? I should say that
in a criminal statute you must be quite sure
that the offence charged is within the letter
of the law. This rule is said to be founded on
the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals, and on the plain principle that
the power of punishment is vested in the
Legislature, and not in the judicial
department, for it is the Legislature, not the
Court, which is to define a crime and ordain
its punishment."



22
(2009) 1 SCC 516
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24. The scope of the provision cannot be extended by reading
into it words which are not there. Section 387 IPC, being a penal
provision, has to be strictly interpreted, and no
condition/essential ingredient can be read into it that the
Statute/Section does not prescribe. Since there is no ambiguity in
the ingredients of Section 387 IPC, the observations of Tolaram
Relumal (supra) as contended by the learned counsel appearing

for Respondent No.2 would not come to his rescue.
25. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is, on the face of
it, flawed and misplaced. When the Legislature has created two
separate offences with distinct ingredients and punishments, then
assigning the essential ingredient of one to another is not a
correct approach adopted by the High Court. Nowhere does the
Section say that extortion has to be committed while putting a
person in fear of death or grievous hurt. Instead, it is the other
way around, that is to say, putting a person in fear of death or
grievous hurt to commit extortion. Extortion is not yet
committed; it is in the process of committing it that a person is
put in fear. Putting a person in fear would make an accused guilty
of an offence under Section 387 IPC; it need not satisfy all the
ingredients of extortion provided under Section 383 IPC. The
High Court ought not to have relied on Dhananjay (supra) as that
case, on the face of it, is clearly distinguishable on facts, the
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reason being it dealt with allegations of 384 IPC not 387 IPC, and
discussed the elements of extortion.
26. Without going into the merits of the case, we are of the
view that the instant case is not fit for quashing as the two
essential ingredients for prosecution under Section 387 IPC, as
discussed supra have been prima facie disclosed in the
complaint, (a) that the complainant has been put in fear of death
by pointing a gun towards him; and (b) that it was done to
pressurize him to deliver Rs.5 lakhs. The High Court, while
quashing, has wrongly emphasized the fact that the said amount
was not delivered; it failed to consider whether the
money/property was delivered or not, is not even necessary as the
accused is not charged with Section 384 IPC. The allegations of
putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt would itself
make him liable to be prosecuted under Section 387 IPC. The
natural corollary thereof is that the allegation of the criminal case
being a counterblast is negated.
27. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is accordingly
th
allowed. The impugned order dated 28 June, 2024 is set aside,
and the proceedings emanating from Complaint Case No.58 of
2022 are restored to the file of the Trial Court. Parties are
th
directed to appear before the Trial Court on 12 August, 2025.
Parties are further directed to fully cooperate and the hearing is
expedited.
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Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.


……………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)




……….…….…….J.
(MANOJ MISRA)

New Delhi;
th
5 June, 2025.
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