Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ADHUNIK GRAH NIRMAN SAHAKARI SAMITI LTD. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT28/02/1989
BENCH:
OZA, G.L. (J)
BENCH:
OZA, G.L. (J)
SAIKIA, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 867 1989 SCR (1) 848
1989 SCC Supl. (1) 656 JT 1989 Supl. 46
1989 SCALE (1)511
ACT:
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners
Estate Act, 1963: Sections 2(b), 2(d), 2(f) and
7--’Estate’--What is--’Land’ situated within boundaries of
Umaid Bhavan Palace--Held do not fall within definition of
’estate’.
Rajasthan Urban Property (Restriction of Transfers) Act,
1973: Section 3(2)--Prohibition on transfer of land--Trans-
fer effected after August 16, 1971--Held not void.
HEADNOTE:
After attainment of Independence, the rulers of the
erstwhile princely States of Rajasthan entered into a Cove-
nant with the Government of India for integrating their
States into one. Article 12 of the said Covenant provided
for the private properties of the rulers of the Covenanting
States, and clause (i) thereof prescribed that the ruler of
each of the Covenanting States; shall be entitled to full
ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties. The
immovable properties of the rulers were divided into three
categories, Category ’A’, ’B’ and ’C’.
The Maharaja of Jodhpur was one such ruler who integrat-
ed his State in the Union. Category ’C’ of the Covenant
listed the properties of the Maharaja as his absolute
property over which he had full rights of disposal, and the
property known as ’Umaid Bhavan Palace’ was included in this
category.
The Maharaja who was the signatory to the Covenant died
in 1952, and after his death he was succeeded by his son who
was a minor at that time. Because the successor was a minor
an administrator was appointed for the purpose of adminis-
tration of the estate.
In 1964, the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate
Act, 1963 which received the assent of the President on 6th
April, 1964. The Act was enacted to provide for the acquisi-
tion of the estates of land owners. Section 7 thereof pro-
vided for the issuance of a Notification by the State Gov-
ernment appointing a date for the vesting in the State
Government
849
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of the estates of all land owners situated anywhere in the
State. Exercising powers under the aforesaid section, a
Notification was issued on 11th August, 1964 by which the
State Government appointed 1st September, 1964 as the date
of vesting of all the estates of land owners.
The three petitioners in the writ petitions were parties
who had purchased respective areas of land for price by
registered sale deeds, two dated 4.11.71 and one dated
5.11.71 from the erstwhile ruler of Jodhpur state.
Notices under section 9A of the Act were issued on
19.11.1975 to these parties by the Collector stating that
the transfers of the lands were null and void and they shall
deliver possession before 28th September, 1975 or within 10
days of the receipt of the notice whichever is later to the
Sub-Divisional Officer. This was followed by another notice
on 8th December, 1975 by which possession of the lands were
taken by affixing a notice as required by Rule 8 of the
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners’
Estate Rules 1964.
The petitioners contended in the courts below that their
land was not liable to acquisition under the Act and sought
a direction that the orders and notices be quashed. It was
contended that in the definition of ’land’ as defined in
section 2F, provide for properties which shall not be in-
cluded within the definition of ’land’ and as the property
in the instant case was excluded from the definition of
’land’ the properties of the petitioners could not be ac-
quired under section 7 of the Land Reforms Act.
A Single Judge of the High Court on an examination of
the list of Category ’C’ to the Covenant, and the material
on the record came to the conclusion that the lands fell
within the property included in the Schedule of private
properties in Category ’C’ and therefore it being a private
property included in the Inventory according to the Covenant
the acquisition under the provision of the Act was bad. It
was further held that the transfer made by the ex-ruler in
favour of the petitioners was not bad.
The trustees of the Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of
Defence Service Personnel and Charitable Trust, the appel-
lants in one of the appeals also filed a Writ petition which
came up before the High Court. The High Court relying on its
earlier decision allowed the petition and quashed the noti-
fication.
850
Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the State Govern-
ment and the Trust and the Division Bench disposed of all
the appeals and came to a different conclusion than the
Single Judge’s who decided the writ petitions. The Division
Bench held that the repeal of the Rajasthan Urban Property
(Restrictions of Transfers) Act, 1973 by the Rajasthan Urban
Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978, the
cloud that had been cast on the title of the purchases had
been removed.
In the appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf
of the appellants that the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acqui-
sition of Land Owners’ Estate Act, 1963 was brought into
force in 1964 and that according to the definition of ’e-
state’, in section 2B it could refer to either land or
right, title or interest in land held by a land owner, and
’land’ was defined in section 2F which was an inclusive
definition, and that it first refers to land held for the
purpose of agriculture and that the lands in the instant
case, were not agricultural lands they do not fail within
the ambit of the definition of ’land’. It was also contended
that the Division Bench could not come to a different con-
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clusion than that which was reached by the Single Judge.
On behalf of the State, it was contended that the suit
property fails within the boundary of the Umaid Bhavan
Palace according to the site plan and that it could not be
conclusively held that the properties were not agricultural
lands.
Allowing the appeals, and setting aside the judgment
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, this Court,
HELD: 1. No action under the provisions of the Rajasthan
Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963
could be taken against the appellant and all notices or
actions taken are thus quashed. [864F-G]
2. It is clear that the lands in the instant case will
not fall within the definition of ’land’ as described in
sec. 2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the State not
it would be acquired under the provisions of the Act and in
that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands
and the question whether the lands are agricultural or not
is not very material. [858D-E]
3. Section 2B clearly talks of land or right, title or
interest in land held by land owner and land is defined in
Section 2F. It is therefore
851
clear that if this property did not fail within the ambit of
the definition of ’land’ it could not be said to be ’estate’
under Section 2B and therefore could not vest in the State
under Section 7. [861F]
4. The lands were within the boundaries of the Umaid
Bhavan Palace which is the private property in accordance
with the inventory prepared and approved by Government of
India, and therefore will not fail within the ambit of the
definition of ’land’ as defined in Section 2F and thus will
not fail within the ambit of the ’estate’ which could vest
under the provisions of this Section. [863D]
5. Section 3(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Property (Re-
strictions of Transfers) Act, 1973 was enacted keeping in
view the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act. Section 3(2)
did not provide that the transfer will be invalid but it
only provided that in spite of the transfer the property
will be deemed to be owned by such person thereby meaning
the transferor so that when the Ceiling Act is brought into
force the transferor may not take advantage of the transfer
to defeat the provisions of the Ceiling Act. [859C]
6. In fact, after the Ceiling Act was brought into force
a prohibition was again imposed on the transfer and admit-
tedly the transfers in the instant case are not after the
Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act 1972 which provided by
section 5 that the transfers made after the commencement of
the Act was null and void. It could not, therefore, be said
that the transfers in the instant case after August 16, 1971
were void. [859G]
(C.A. No. 1145/87--Naveen Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti
Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan was permitted to be withdrawn, as
the appellants had chosen to come to this Court when in fact
they were not parties in the judgment before the High
Court.). [864G-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1144-48
of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.1986 of the
Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal Nos. 3, 4,
5 of 1978 and 79 of 198 1 and 354 of 1984.
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Dr. L.M. Singhvi, G.L. Sanghi, V.M. Tarkunde, Dalveer
Bhandari, Ms. Rachna Joshi, K.N. Toshi, Lekh Rai Mehta,
Gopal Singh, Sushil K. Jain and Sudharshan Atreya for the
Appellants.
852
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General P.S. Poti,
Badridas Sharma, R.C. Maheshwari and Manoj Jain for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
OZA, J. These appeals have come to this Court against
the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of
Rajasthan dated 29.9.86 wherein the learned Judges disposed
of the following appeals by the impugned judgment and
against this after grant of leave these appeals are before
us:
(1) The State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. Prajapati Grah
Nirman Samiti Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 3 of 1978.
(2) The State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Adhunik Grah Nirman
Samiti Limited, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 4 of 1978.
(3) The State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. M/s. Jai Marwar
Company Pvt. Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 5 of 1978.
(4) Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of
Defence Service Personnel Charitable Trust v. The State of
Rajasthan and Others, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 79 of
1981.
(5) State of Rajasthan and another v. Maharaja Gaj Singh
Ji, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 354 of 1984.
Initially the three writ petitions were filed before the
High Court of Rajasthan by i) Prajapati Grah Nirman Samiti
Limited, ii) Adhunik Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. and iii) M/s.
Jai Marwar Company Private Limited. It was alleged that
these three parties purchased respective areas of land for
price by registered sale deeds two dated 4.11.71 and one
dated 5.11.71 from Shri Gaj Singh, the erstwhile ruler of
the Jodhpur State. These lands form part of Khasra No. 42 1
in the revenue records. There is yet another adjacent land
which also was in dispute in other matters than these three
which was Khasra No. 426.
Facts which are not in dispute are that after attainment
of independence on 15th August, 1947 the rulers of the
erstwhile princely States of Banswara, Bikaner, Bundi,
Dungarpur, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Jodhpur, Kishangarh,
Kota, Mewar, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk entered into a
Covenant with the Government of India
853
integrating these states into one. Article 12 of the said
Covenant provided for the private properties of the rulers
of the Covenanting States. In clause (1) of this article it
was prescribed that the ruler of each of the Covenanting
State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and
enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State
properties), belonging to him on the date of his making over
the administration of the State. In accordance with the
aforesaid clause in the Covenant, a list of private proper-
ties of the ruler of the former State of Jodhpur was pre-
pared and.it was approved by the Government of India on 24th
March, 1949. In the said list of private properties the
immovable properties were divided into three categories.
Category ’A’ consists of properties which were to be regard-
ed as the family property of the Maharaja of Jodhpur and
which will not be transferred. Category ’B’ consists of
properties which were to be regarded as family properties of
Maharaja of Jodhpur but which will be disposable by him if
he and his heir agree to do so. Category ’C’ consists of
property which is the absolute property of the Maharaja of
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Jodhpur with full rights of disposal. In the case in hand we
are only concerned with Category ’C’ property and in this
category Umaid Bhawan Palace alongwith the area as per plan
attached including the Chittar Tank and the Bijolai Tank and
buildings was included.
Maharaja Hanwant Singh who was the signatory to the
Covenant died in 1952 and after his death he was succeeded
by his son Shir Gaj Singh who was minor at that time. During
the minority of Shri Gaj Singh an administrator was appoint-
ed for the purpose of administration of the estate of the
minor Maharaja.
In 1964 the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the
Act which received the ascent of the President of India on
6.4.1964 and was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated
13.4.1964. The Act was enacted to provide for the acquisi-
tion of the estates of landowners. Under Section 7 of the
Act a provision was made for issuing a notification by the
State Government appointing a date for the vesting in the
State Government of the estates or all landowners situated
anywhere in Rajasthan. In exercise of the powers under
Section 7 a notification was issued on 11th August, 1964
which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 13.8.1964
and by this notification the State Government appointed
1.9.1964 as the date of vesting of all the estates of land-
owners situated within the State.
Notice under Section 9A of the said Act were issued on
19.11.1975 to the petitioners by Collector, Jodhpur stating
that trans-
854
fers of the aforesaid lands are null and void and they shall
deliver possession before 29.11.1975 or within 10 days of
the receipt of the notice whichever is later, to the Sub
Divisional Officer, Jodhpur. It appears that one more notice
dated 8.12.1975 was issued by the Sub Divisional Officer,
Jodhpur by which he appears to have taken the possession of
the aforesaid lands by affixing a notice as required by Rule
8 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land
Owners Estate Rules, 1964.
The petitioner’s case before the Court below was that
this land is not liable to acquisition under the said Act
and therefore they sought a direction that the said orders
and notices be quashed. It was contended before the Court
below that in the definition of ’land’ as defined in Section
2F after sub-clause (d) of this Act provide for properties
which shall not be included in the definition of ’land’ and
as this property fell within the ambit of that property
which was excluded from the definition of ’land’ it was
contended that it could not be acquired under the provisions
of Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of
Land-owners’ Estate Act.
The learned Judge Justice M.L. Jain, after examining the
list of private properties and the material placed on record
by both the parties came to the conclusion that these lands
failing within Survey No. 421 which fell within the property
included in the schedule of private properties in category
’C’ and therefore it being a private property included in
the inventory prepared according to the Covenant, the acqui-
sition under the provisions of this Act was held to be bad.
The learned Judge on the basis of documents also came to the
conclusion that on 1.9.64 which was the relevant date noti-
fied as the date of vesting this property was not agricul-
tural land and was also included in the private property of
the ruler of Jodhpur shown within the boundary of the site
plan of Umaid Bhawan Palace. Consequently the learned Judge
came to the conclusion that the transfer made by the ex-
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ruler in favour of these petitioners was not bad.
The learned Judge considering the submissions came to
the conclusion:
"Now, Shri Gaj Singh is an Ex-Ruler and therefore a landown-
er. The Schedule I of the Inventory of his private proper-
ties also specified the properties which are his absolute
property with full rights of disposal. Item No. 1(a) relat-
ing to Jodhpur is as follows:
855
(a) Umaid Bhawan Palace as per. plan attached including the
Chittar Tank.
A plan was attached to the inventory which contains the
heading "site plan of Umaid Bhawan Palace. Private property
of His Highness and Maharaja Sahib Sahadir, Jodhpur, is
shown in the red." It is admitted that the land in dispute
to which these writ petitions relate fails within the area
bounded by the red line in the said site plan. It is, there-
fore futile on the part of the State Government to contend
that the land though covered by the site plan, is not part
of the palace as specified in the inventory. The State
maintains that the Umaid Bhawan Palace has its own walled
enclosure and further a long line of hills separates the
land in dispute from the main palace. The learned Dy. Gov-
ernment Advocate urged that what the law excludes is the
palace and not all the lands which are shown in the site
plan. The Word ’palace’ should be constructed only to in-
clude the area of the palace which is bounded by walls. I do
not see any force in this argument because the definition of
land excludes the palace as specified in the inventory and
the inventory specifies the area of the Umaid Bhawan Palace
as per plan attached and the attached plan includes the land
in dispute. I am, therefore unable to give the word "palace"
a restricted meaning as convassed by the learned Dy. Govern-
ment Advocate. That being so, the disputed land fails out-
side the estate and has consequently not vested in the State
Government."
The learned Judge after considering various documents which
were filed and which were the records of the Government as
regards the nature of the land as to whether it is agricul-
tural land or not came to the conclusion that:
"The documents clearly demonstrate that the land in dispute
is not an agricultural and rather it forms part of the Abadi
land. In the revenue records, Khasra Nos. are allotted not
only to agricultural plot but they are also allotted to
Banjar land and to Abadi land as well. The copies of the
Jamabandi and Girdwari filed by the State shows that the
land is Padat and does not carry and land revenue. It is,
therefore, clear that the land in question being an Abadi
land is not covered by the provisions of the Act. It appears
856
as has been contended that the land in order that it vests
in the State Government, should be an agricultural land. The
amended long title of the Act states that it is an Act to
provide for the acquisition of the Estates of landowners and
for other measures of agrarian reforms removal of intermedi-
aries allotment of land to landless person, development of
agriculture. If the acquired land is meant for allotment to
agriculturist then the land must be an agricultural land as
indicated above. The land in question was not an agricultur-
al land and if at all it was so at any time in the past, it
long ago ceased to be so at least as early as in 1948, when
according to the private property settlement, it was includ-
ed in the Umaid Bhawan Palace premises."
Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence
Service Personnel Charitable Trust also filed a petition
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before the Rajasthan High Court. This pertains to Survey No.
426 and this came up for heating before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice of Rajasthan Shri K.D. Sharma who while considering
the matter observed:
"At the outset, I may observe that it is not disputed before
me that Umaid Bhawan Palace situated in Jodhpur is the
absolute property of Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur, who has
full rights of disposal thereof. This fact is borne out by
the inventory marked Annexure 1 which was prepared and
approved by the Government of India in pursuance of Article
12 of the Covenant entered into by late Maharaja Hanwant
Singh with the Government of India at the time of accession
of the former Jodhpur State to the Union of India. It will
not be out of place to mention that the term ’land’ defined
in section 2 of the Act as amended by the amendment Act,
1975, does not include forts, palaces, buildings and build-
ing plots specified in the inventory. Hence, Umaid Bhawan
Palace of which Maharaja Gaj Singh is the absolute owner,
does not fall within the purview of the definition of the
word ’land’ given in the section 2 of the Act as amended
upto date."
In Misc. Petition No. 1872/75 filed by Maharaja Shri Gai
Singh came up for consideration before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice of Rajasthan Shri Justice Banerjee and by order
dated 20.12. 1983 relying on the judgment passed by Justice
M.L. Jain in the case of Prajapati
857
Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan allowed the
petition of Maharaja Gaj Singh and quashed the notices which
were issued.
It is thereafter that the State Government in the mat-
ters decided by Justice M.L. Jain and by Justice Banerjee
and the trust, in the case decided by Justice K.D. Sharma
went up in appeal under Letters Patent and by the impugned
judgment, the Division Bench disposed of all these appeals
and hence these appeals have come before us after grant of
leave.
Learned counsel for the appellants contended that this
Act i.e. Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land-
owners Estate Act, 1963 was brought into force in 1964.
According to the definition of ’Estate’ it could refer to
either land or right, title or interest in land held by
landowner. The land, according to the learned counsel, is
defined in section 2 sub-clause (f). This definition is an
inclusive definition and it first refers to land held for
the purpose of agriculture. Thereafter it has been further
stated that it does not include forts, palaces, buildings,
building plots specified in the inventory and the inventory
has also been defined in Section 2 sub-clause (g) which
refers to the inventory of the private properties made in
pursuance of the Covenant and finally approved by the Cen-
tral Government. Learned Counsel for the appellants mainly
raised two questions: i) that as these lands were not agri-
cultural lands they do not fall within the ambit of this
definition of ’land’. It was also contended that in any
event as it fails within the boundaries of Umaid Bhawan
Palace which is a property included in the inventory as the
private property of the rulers of Jodhpur approved by the
Government of India, this will not fall within the ambit of
the definition of ’land’ in Section 2F. Consequently it
could not be said to be an estate as defined in Sec. 2b and
as such by application of this Act this could not vest in
the State Government and in this view it was contended that
the judgment delivered by the Division Bench has omitted to
decide this question and for no reason felt that let a
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reference under Section 12 be decided. It was also contended
that the Division Bench could not come to a different con-
clusion then one which was reached by Justice M.L. Jain and
Hon’ble Chief Justice Shri Banerjee.
Learned counsel appearing for the State of Rajasthan
attempted to contended that this property falls within the
boundary of the Umaid Bhawan Palace according to the site
plan could not be conclusively held as an attempt was also
made to suggest that the original plan should have been
summoned from the Central Government but the
858
learned counsel could not explain the admissions made at the
various stages in these proceedings about the plan which was
filed in these petitions and also could not give any expla-
nation as to why when these proceedings have been going on
since 1975, the State Government could not obtain an offi-
cial copy of the site plan from the Government of India and
produce it before the High Court. In fact the admission in
the documents and affidavits filed before the High Court and
the orders passed by the revenue authorities which have been
at length dealt with by the learned counsel and relied upon
by the High Court could not be explained by the learned
counsel appearing for the State. Similarly the question as
to whether this land was agricultural or not also was dis-
puted by the learned counsel on the basis that the revenue
record entry showed that this has been agricultural land
although the record referred to by the counsel for the
appellants also indicated that this area during the State
times was included in the development plan of the Jodhpur
town.
Counsel for parties frankly conceded that if the lands
in dispute fail within the boundaries of the Umaid Bhawan
Palace as shown in the site plan which was part of the
inventory prepared at the time of the Covenant and approved
by Government of India, it is clear that these lands will
not fall within the definition of ’land’ as described in
Sec. 2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the State nor
it could be acquired under the provisions of this Act and in
that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands
and the question whether the lands are agricultural or not
is not very material.
Learned counsel for the respondent State distinguished
the case of Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti on a different footing
as they claimed to be the transferees from Jai Marwar Compa-
ny Private Limited and this transfer Was at a time when the
transfer was prohibited and that question has not been gone
into by the High Court as these petitioners have chosen to
come to this Court when in fact they were not parties in the
judgment before the High Court. Learned counsel for the
petitioner in the petition by Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti in
view of the objections raised by learned counsel for the
respondent State frankly conceded that this petition was not
before the High Court and in view of this he submitted that
he may be permitted to withdraw this petition.
Learned counsel for the respondent also raised an objec-
tion about the transfer of these lands in view of Section
3(2) of Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of Transfers)
Act, 1973. Section 3(2) of
859
this Act provided that after the 16th day of August, 1971 if
any person has transferred any urban property owned by such
person such transfer shall be deemed to be a transfer made
to defeat the provisions of this Act and the property so
transferred shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to
be owned by such person. On this basis it was contended that
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as the transfers have been effected by Maharaj Shri Gaj
Singh after 16th August, 1971 they will be void whereas
learned counsel for the appellants contended that this Act
was enacted in contemplation of the Rajasthan Urban Property
Ceiling Act which was to be enacted and it was for the
purpose of that Act that Sec. 3(2) of this Act was enacted
to restrict transfer of urban property but it did not de-
clare transfer to be void but said that in spite of the
transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such
person i.e. transferor. The idea was that while applying the
law of ceiling the holder of the property may not defeat the
provisions of that Act by these transfers and ultimately
this Act was repealed and the repeal was by Rajasthan Urban
Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978 and
that Act did not protect anyone of these provisions. In fact
this question was raised before the Division Bench and the
learned Judges of the Division Bench in the impugned judg-
ment observed:
"In view of the repeal of 1973 Act the cloud which has been
cast on the title of the petitioners in the writ petitions
giving rise to these. appeals by section 3(2) of the 1973
Act, was removed, and, therefore, we are unable to accept
the contention of the learned Government Advocate."
It is apparent that this Section prohibiting transfers was
enacted keeping in view the Act on ceiling in contemplation
and that is why as indicated earlier Section 3(2) did not
provide that the transfer will be invalid but it only pro-
vided that in spite of the transfer the property will be
deemed to be owned by such person thereby meaning the trans-
feror so that when the ceiling Act is brought into force the
transferor may not take advantage of the transfer to defeat
the provisions of the Ceiling Act. In fact after the Ceiling
Act was brought into force a prohibition was again imposed
on the transfer and admittedly the transfers with which we
are concerned are not after that as it is clear that the
Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act, 1972 when was enacted
provided by Section 5 of that Act that the transfers which
were made after the commencement of the Act was declared
null and void. In fact the learned Judges of the Division
Bench considered this aspect of the matter and negatived the
contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respond-
ents in the words indicated above and in our opinion that
conclusion could not be assailed.
860
As regards the question as to whether the lands in
dispute i.e which fail within Khasra Nos. 421 and 426 fall
within the purview of the definition of ’land’ as contained
in Section 2F of the Act is concerned it is consistently
held by the High Court that as the land fell within the
exception of Section 2F it would not fail within the defini-
tion of ’land’ (Section 2(f) reads:
"land" means and land held or let for purposes of agricul-
ture or for purposes ancilliary thereto including waste
land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings
and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agri-
cultural labourers and village artisans and includes--
(a) tanks, lakes, ponds, river and water channels held for
purposes of irrigation.
(b) surface of hills,
(c) landing grounds or strips, and
(d) shikargah
but does not include forts, palace buildings and building
plots, specified in the inventory."
The last part of this provisions "but does not include
forts, palace buildings, building plots specified in the
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inventory" is the relevant portion of the definition which
was considered by the Court below and is the question which
deserves to be considered. The Inventory has also been
defined in Section 2(d) which means inventory of the private
property of the ruler prepared in pursuance of Article 12 of
the Convenant and finally approved by the Government of
India.
In the High Court in all these petitions the plea raised
was that the inventory of the private property of the ex-
ruler of the Jodhpur State Maharaj Shri Gaj Singh contained
an item of property shown as Umaid Bhawan Place and the
boundaries therein were indicated to be in red in the site
plan attached alongwith it. So far as the inventory and
inclusion of this property in the .inventory of the private
property is concerned it is not disputed even before us. In
the High Court the site plan and the properties included in
the red boundary forming part of the property Umaid Bhawan
Palace was also not disputed. All the judgments in the High
Court are based on this admission and appa-
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rently the affidavits filed on behalf of the State before
the High Court clearly and categorically admitted this
position and even went to the extent of saying that this was
verified and found to be correct and the plan filed with the
petition having a red boundary was admitted and therefore it
was not disputed that Khasra Nos. 42 1 and 426 fell within
the boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace which in accordance with
the definition of ’land’ quoted above will be excluded from
the definition and what is excluded from the definition of
’land’ in Section 2F could not vest in the State in view of
language of Section 7. Section 7 reads:
Acquisition of estates-(1) As soon as may be after the
commencement of this Act, the Government may for the purpose
of carrying out agrarian reform in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, by notification in the Official
Gazette,appoint a date for the acquisition of landowner’s
estates in the State and for their vesting in the State
Government.
(2) The date appointed under this Section in relation to the
acquisition of landowners’ estates in the State in this Act
referred to as the date of vesting of such estates."
This talks of the vesting of the estate and the estate
itself has been defined in Sec. 2B which reads:
"estate" means land or right, title or interest in land held
by a landowner;"
This clearly talks of land or right, title or interest in
land held by landowner and land as already discussed above
is defined in Section 2F it is therefore clear that if this
property did not fall within the ambit of the definition of
land it could not be said to be estate under Section 2B and
therefore could not vest in the State under Section 7.
It was in this view that counsel for both the parties
frankly conceded that if this falls within the exception to
the definition of ’land’ provided in Section 2F the further
question about the land being agricultural or not is of no
consequence.
An attempt was made by the learned counsel during the
course of arguments to suggest that it is no doubt true that
all through the State Government and on behalf of the State
Government the affidavits that were filed in the High Court
this was admitted that these lands in
862
dispute fell within the red boundary of the site plan and
the site plan is the site plan of the Umaid Bhawan Palace
which is included in the inventory of the private property
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of the ruler finally approved by the Government of India. It
is also not seriously disputed that there are orders passed
by some revenue officers in respect of these matters where
it has been held that these lands fell within the red bound-
ary which is the correct boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace in
the inventory approved by the Government of India as the
private properties of the ex-ruler. Only an attempt was made
by Additional Solicitor General who appeared for the State
to suggest that the Central Government alone may have the
original and therefore wanted this Court to summon the
original but learned counsel had no explanation why this
could not be done in all these years to which he had no
answer and therefore it is plain that so far as these facts
are concerned the State could not now be permitted to raise
any objection in respect of the site plan and the boundary
in red of Umaid Bhawan Palace.
After the hearing was concluded an attempt has been made
on behalf of the State and certain papers have been filed
which pertains to some returns filed in connection with the
assessment in respect of the building Umaid Bhawan Palace
which has been described as Hotel Marudhar and on that basis
probably a suggestion is made that in this the ex-ruler has
submitted a plan for assessment of the property tax wherein
he has not showed this part of the property which is the
subject matter of the dispute. Apparently these papers
pertain to some proceedings of assessment of property per-
taining to Marudhar Hotel with which we are not concerned
and on that basis it could not be said that what has been
admitted all through as the boundary of the Umaid Bhawan
Palace is not correct. No reliance could be placed on these
additional papers.
Before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1924/75
Additional Collector Jodhpur who is also described as the
Officer Incharge of the case has filed a counter in return
and in this it is stated:
That the Photostat copy and the true copy of the Covenant
and the site plan submitted by the petitioner alongwith the
aforesaid application have been got verified to be the true
and exact copies of the original covenant and the plan
attached with the inventory of the private properties of the
Ex-ruler of Jodhpur. The duly verified copy of the plan is
being submitted for your perusal."
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and the same reply filed by the said Additional Collector
has been verified on affidavit by the same officer who in
his affidavit states:
"That the photostat copy of the convenant as also the true
copy of the plan referred in the Schedule of the inventory
of the private properties of Ex-ruler. Ex-ruler Jodhpur
supplied to the respondents have been got verified from the
Chief Engineer P.W.D. B & R Rajasthan, Jaipur and the office
of the General Administration Department, Rajasthan, Secre-
tariat, Jaipur."
In view of these circumstances therefore so far as the land
in dispute i.e. Khasra Nos. 421 and 426 is concerned the
admission made by the State and which was also clear from
various documents which have been considered by the High
Court in their judgments in these petitions clearly show
that these lands were within the boundaries of the Umaid
Bhawan Palace which is the private property in accordance
with the inventory preparted and approved by Government of
India and therefore which will not fall within the ambit of
the definition of the ’land’ as defined in Section 2F and
thus will not fall within the ambit of the ’estate’ which
could vest under the provisions of this Section and in this
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view of the matter even without going into the the question
about whether land being agricultural or not the view taken
by Justice M.L. Jain is the only view which could be sus-
tained.
Even as regards the question as to whether this land is
agricultural or not it will be relevant to note. Learned
counsel for the State has relied on some Khasra, Girdwari
and Jamabandi of Sam vat 2030to 2032 relating to Khasra No.
421. It is described as Padat and it is contended that this
land will be agricultural land as it also includes waste
land. Even on the basis of the record on which reliance is
placed by the learned counsel for the State that no land
revenue is assessed on this land. On the contrary counsel
for the appellant referred to a notification published in
the Jodhpur Government Gazette dated February 10, 1934 and
this notification states that the Development Department
shall have control over the disposal of land for building
sites and the building regulation shall operate over the
area within a radius of three miles from the Sojati Gate and
it is not disputed that these lands fell within three miles
radius from Sojati Gate. Learned counsel also referred to a
letter written to Urban Improvement Trust. The Settlement
Officer is alleged to have stated that the plan was careful-
ly perused, checked and tallied with the corresponding old
settlement record of Samvat 1979 together with the site plan
of Umaid
864
Bhawan Palace which indicates the private property of His
Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur Jodhpur duly verified on
12.11.1958 by the then Deputy Secretary, G.A.D. and the
Commissioner, Jodhpur Division, Jodhpur wherein the said
land is included in the premises of Umaid Bhawan Palace. The
Settlement Officer further added that the fact that this
land had never been assessed to rents, that it never has
been cultivated and that it is included within the Umaid
Bhawan Palace is sufficient to show that it is "abadi land"
within the meaning and definition under Section 158 of the
Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The view expressed by the
Government that this land does not appear to be agricultural
land is fully established and it was on the basis of these
documents that the learned Judge Shri M.L. Jain came to the
conclusion that:
"The documents clearly demonstrate that the land in dispute
is not an agricultural and rather it forms part of the Abadi
land. In the revenue records, Khasra Nos. are allotted not
only to agricultural plot but they are also allotted to
Banjar land and to Abadi land as well. The copies of the
Jamabandi and Girdwari filed by the State shows that the
land is Padat and does not carry any land revenue. It is,
therefore, clear that the land in question being an Abadi
land is not covered by the provisions of the Act."
It is clear that the contention raised by the learned coun-
sel for the respondent that this land is an agricultural
land also cannot be accepted and in view of our conclusions
reached above it is clear that the view taken by learned
Judge Shit M.L. Jain is the only view which could be taken.
Consequently the appeals filed by the appellants including
Prajapati Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. are allowed. The judgment passed by the
Division Bench of High Court of Rajasthan in the appeals is
set aside and it is held that no action under the provisions
of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Landowners’
Estate Act, 1963 could be taken against the appellants and
all notices or actions taken are hereby quashed. The appel-
lants shall be entitled to costs of these appeals. Costs
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quantified at Rs. 10,000.
So far as Civil Appeal No. 1145/87 Naveen Grah Nirman
Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan is concerned we
see no reason not to permit him to withdraw. The petition
and appeal is therefore permitted to be withdrawn.
N.V.K. Appeals
allowed.
864