Sanjay Kumar Upadhyay vs. The State Of Jharkhand

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1445

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14046 OF 2024
SANJAY KUMAR UPADHYAY …..APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ORS. …..RESPONDENTS
J U D G E M E N T
J.K. Maheshwari J.
1. Arising out of the judgement dated 30.03.2022 passed in LPA
No. 269 of 2012 wherein the judgement dated 14.12.2011 of the
learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 5743 of 2005 was set-aside by
Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, the
present appeal has been preferred by the Employee. The dispute
between the parties herein relates to grant of higher pay scale to the
Employee after removal of anomalies in pay scale, on parity with
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2025.12.16
18:30:38 IST
Reason:
other similarly situated persons who have been already granted the
said benefit by the Respondent – Employer.
1


2. The learned Single Judge relying upon judgement of High Court
1
of Patna in Nagendra Sahani v. State of Bihar and Alakh Kumar
2
Sinha v. State of Bihar , in the Writ Petition had directed the
Respondent – Employer to revise the pay scale of the Employee with
effect from the date of his appointment in the pay scale of Rs. 1600 –
2780 along with other consequential benefits, i.e., arrears of salary
etc. On filing a Letters Patent Appeal by the Respondent – Employer,
it came to be allowed by the impugned order, setting aside the
directions of the learned Single Judge, hence, the present appeal.
FACTUAL BACKDROP

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the present appeal arises out of
the recruitment process initiated by the State of Bihar for filling up
Graduate-level Non-gazetted Class-III vacancies of sixteen posts in
various departments, including the post of Industries Extension
Officer (hereinafter ‘IEO’ ), by way of common competitive
examination conducted by the Bihar State Subordinate Services
Selection Board in the year 1981. The Appellant participated in the

1
CWJC No. 8419 of 1992
2
CWJC No. 12301 of 2004
2


said process, was duly selected, and came to be appointed as IEO by
order dated 27.05.1992, in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2600 .
4. It is not in dispute that appointments for all sixteen posts were
made pursuant to a common examination and the allocation to
different departments was done purely by way of administrative
allotment without any option exercised by the candidates. It is also
not in dispute that prior to the 4th Pay Revision in April, 1981 all
th
these posts were placed in same pay-scale. However, after the 4 pay
revision, an anomaly arose when ten out of these sixteen posts were
accorded a higher revised pay scale of Rs. 850-1360, while six of
these posts were placed in the lower pay scale of Rs. 296-460. This
th
anomaly was considered by the 4 Pay Anomalies Committee in
1987, which recommended the same scale of pay for similarly
situated posts, but the Industries Department did not place the case
of Industries Extension Officers before the Committee, resulting in
the continuance of the lower scale.
th
5. Upon the implementation of the 5 Pay Commission in
December, 1989, the disparity persisted as ten posts were placed in
the higher pay scale of ₹ 1600-2780, while the remaining six posts
continued in the pay scale of ₹ 1500-2750. This differential treatment,
3


despite the common recruitment examination sans allotment based
on merit-cum-preference method, became the subject of litigation
before the Patna High Court in Nagendra Sahani (Supra), wherein
by judgment dated 22.09.1993 the Division Bench of High Court of
Judicature at Patna held that there was no reasonable classification
to justify the disparity caused by fixing two different pay scale for
these similarly situated persons recruited on the same posts and
directed that all incumbents of these sixteen posts be placed in the
higher pay scale of ₹ 1600-2780 with effect from 01.01.1986. It was
also observed that similarly situated persons need not approach the
Court individually for the same relief. Relevant paragraphs of the
same is reproduced as under –
“We do not find any reasonable nexus in fixing two revised scales of
pay for the aforesaid 16 types of posts. It is true that the State
Government could have made out a case that its decision is not
arbitrary or discriminatory. It could have also come out with a case
making reasonable classification in relation to the aforesaid 16 types
of posts, but no such attempt has been made on behalf of State as
would appear from the counter affidavit. In view of these facts, we
are clearly of the view that the persons who are working on 16 types
of posts, enumerated in Annexure 1, are entitled to the scale of Rs.
1600-2780/- with effect from 01.01.1986 and as decided by State
Government, while accepting the recommendations of the Fifth Pay
Revision Committee, they will be entitles to monetary benefits in the
scale with effect from 01.03.1989. Since the petitioner have been
appointed on the post or the other, enumerated in Annexure 1, they
are entitled to the said scale. It is stated that some of the petitioners
were appointed on 07.10.1988 and some after 01.03.1989. We direct
that those persons who were appointed on 07.10.88 will be granted
the scale of Rs. 1600-2790 with effect from that date but the benefit
4


of this scale will be given to them with effect from 01.03.1989. We
further direct that those persons who were appointed after
01.03.1989 will be granted the scale of Rs. 1600-2780/- from the date
of their appointment. We also direct that pursuant to this order,
arrears amount must be paid to the petitioners within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by Junior
Counsel to learned Standing Counsel No. 4.

We are told that there are several other persons whose case are
similarly situated but they have not moved this court. We are of the
view that if cases of those persons are similarly situated, they are not
required to move this court, but they shall be also granted the same
scale with similar monetary benefits within the aforesaid time. This
writ application is accordingly allowed.”

6. In the meantime, the Fitment Appellate Committee headed by
Hon’ble Mr. Justice (Retd.) Aftab Alam, on 15.01.2000, examined the
anomaly afresh and recommended the uniform revised scale of
₹ 5000-8000 for all sixteen posts. Relying on the judgment in
Nagendra Sahani (Supra) and the Fitment Appellate Committee’s
report, the Appellant addressed representations to the Respondent -
Employer, on 01.04.2001 and 27.04.2002, seeking grant of the
higher scale of pay from the date of his appointment. However, these
representations were rejected vide letter dated 13.09.2004. In the
3
meantime, by promulgation of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 ,
the State of Jharkhand was carved out of the territory of the State of

3
Act No. 30 of 2000.
5


Bihar, and the services of the Appellant, who was earlier appointed
by the State of Bihar were allocated to the State of Jharkhand.
7. The Appellant filed W.P.(S) No. 5743 of 2005 before the High
Court of Jharkhand praying for issuance of an appropriate writ to
the Respondent-Employer to grant him pay scale as genuine in place
of anomaly in pay scale in parity with other similarly situated
persons. Vide judgment dated 14.12.2011, the learned Single Judge
of the High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi allowed the writ petition,
holding that the case was squarely covered by the judgements of the
Patna High Court in Nagendra (Supra) and Alakh Kumar Sinha
(Supra) and directed the State to revise the Appellant’s pay scale
accordingly from the date of his appointment, with arrears and
consequential benefits.
8. Aggrieved by the judgement of the Single Judge, Respondent -
Employer preferred LPA No. 269 of 2012. The said LPA was initially
dismissed in default on 05.02.2015, however, later restored on
03.09.2015 upon condonation of delay.

9. Vide impugned judgment dated 30.03.2022, the Division Bench
of the High Court allowed the intra-court appeal and set aside the
6


judgement of the learned Single Judge. Relevant paragraphs of the
impugned judgement are reproduced as under –
“8. …..in the said order except recording the stand taken by
the respondent No.1 which was primarily based on the order passed
in CWJC No. 12301 of 2004 and “Nagendra Sahani and others v.
State of Bihar and others” we do not find any reference as regards
objection taken by the State of Jharkhand. From the counter-affidavit
filed before the writ Court records of which are attached along with
the present Letters Patent Appeal, we find that the representation
made by the respondent was rejected by the department of industries
vide letter dated 13th September 2004, however, the said order was
not impugned in WP(S) No. 5743 of 2005. We further observe that the
writ petitioner after more than 20 years of entering into the service
claimed the benefit from the date of appointment and, therefore, the
writ petition suffered from inordinate delay for which there was no
explanation offered by the respondent No.1 before the writ Court. The
direction issued by the writ Court to grant pay scale of Rs.1600-
2780/- to the respondent No.1, that is, from the year 1992 is wholly
wrong as the order has been passed without taking into consideration
the cascading effect that the said order may have on the entire cadre.

9. We further find that the respondent decided to approach
this Court only after the judgment was delivered in CWJC No. 12301
of 2004 and “Nagendra Sahani and others v. State of Bihar and
others”. The orders passed by the Hon'ble Patna High Court may have
persuasive value when a similar issue is dealt with by this Court, but
then, there would be several other considerations which would weigh
with the Court while making a final decision in the case, such as,
whether the matter pertains to some policy decision of the State of
Jharkhand.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, order dated 14th December
2011 passed in WP(S) No. 5743 of 2005 is set-aside. ”

10. The Division Bench reasoned that the writ petition suffered from
inordinate delay of 20 Years after the respondent’s initial
appointment, the learned Single Judge’s judgment had not addressed
the objections taken by Respondent-Employer in the Counter
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Affidavit, and that the relief granted could have a cascading effect on
the entire cadre. It was also observed that the judgment of High Court
of Patna in Nagendra (Supra) may have a persuasive value when a
similar issue is involved, however, several other considerations would
also have to be weighed in while making a final decision in a case
involving policy decisions of the State.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT - EMPLOYEE
11. Learned counsel for the Appellant – Employee, Mr. S.S. Pandey,
contended that the Appellant’s case is squarely covered by the
judgment of the Patna High Court in Nagendra Sahani (Supra) and
Alakh Kumar Sinha (Supra), wherein it was held that all 16
categories of posts arising from the same recruitment process were
entitled to the higher revised pay scale of ₹ 1600–2780 with effect from
01.01.1986. Additionally, it was held therein that similarly situated
persons need not individually approach the Court for the same relief.
To buttress the said argument, he relied on the judgement of this
4
Court in Suprita Chandel v. Union of India .

12. It was urged that the Appellant, being identically placed, was
entitled to parity in pay scale from the date of his appointment.

4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3664
8


Reliance was also placed on the recommendations of the Fitment
Appellate Committee headed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice (Retd.) Aftab
Alam, which recommended uniform revised pay scale for all 16 posts.
It was submitted that the rejection of the Appellant’s representation
on 13.09.2004 was arbitrary and contrary to the law laid down in
Nagendra Sahani (Supra). Moreover, the claim did not suffer from
delay or laches inasmuch as the right to parity in pay scale is a
continuing cause of action, and in any case, similarly situated
employees had already been granted such benefits. The counsel
emphasized that the Division Bench erred in observing that there was
a delay of 20 years and ignoring the binding effect of the earlier
judgments while setting aside the well-reasoned judgement of the
learned Single Judge.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT - EMPLOYER
13. Learned Counsel for the Respondent - Employer, Mr. Kumar
Anurag Singh, supported the impugned judgment of the Division
Bench, contending that the Appellant had approached the Court after
an inordinate and unexplained delay of over two decades from the
date of his appointment in 1992, seeking retrospective monetary
9


benefits from the said date. It was urged that such belated claims, if
allowed, would have a cascading financial repercussion on the entire
cadre and upset the settled position of service benefits. It was
Nagendra Sahani
submitted that the (Supra) judgment of the Patna
High Court, delivered in a different factual context and against the
State of Bihar, could at best have persuasive value, and could not be
automatically applied to the State of Jharkhand without examining
relevant policy considerations. It was also pointed out that the
rejection of the Appellant’s representation in 2004 was never
challenged in the writ petition, and thus had attained finality. The
counsel contended that the learned Single Judge overlooked these
objections and granted relief without considering the State’s stand or
the potential administrative repercussions, which was rightly
interfered with by the Division Bench.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions and examined the record in detail. The central issue for
determination is whether the Appellant, appointed as Industries
Extension Officer pursuant to a common competitive examination in the
year 1981 and allocated to the State of Jharkhand upon state
10


reorganization in the year 2001, is entitled to removal of anomalies in
his pay scale from the date of his appointment, on parity with other
similarly situated employees and, whether the Division Bench was
justified in reversing the Single Judge’s judgement which granted such
relief?
15. The order impugned was passed mainly on the ground that
except for recording the stand taken by employee, which was
primarily founded upon the decision Nagendra Sahani (Supra),
there is no reference therein to any of the objections raised by the
Respondent - Employer. It also weighed to the mind of Division Bench
that the representation of the Appellant had, in fact, been rejected by
the Department of Industries vide letter dated 13th September 2004,
however, the said rejection order was never assailed in WP(S) No.
5743 of 2005. The Appellant approached the writ court after a lapse
of more than two decades from the date of initial appointment,
seeking benefits retrospectively from that very date, without offering
any explanation for the inordinate delay. Consequently, the writ
petition was clearly hit by laches. It was also observed that the
respondent approached this Court only after the pronouncement of
Nagendra Sahani (supra) and, while the decisions of the Patna High
11


Court may have persuasive value, they are not binding precedents on
the Jharkhand High Court, particularly when the controversy
concerns a policy decision of the State of Jharkhand.
16.
In view of the foregoing, the main issue raised in the present
appeal may be examined with ancillary issues i.e., whether the
judgment of the Patna High Court in Nagendra Sahani (Supra), as
affirmed in subsequent proceedings, was binding upon the State of
Jharkhand in respect of present Appellant-Employee allocated to it
under the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000? And whether the
Appellant’s writ petition was liable to be dismissed on account of delay
and laches?
17. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the
judgment in Nagendra Sahani (Supra) would be binding upon the
State of Jharkhand in respect of employees who were originally
appointed by the State of Bihar but subsequently allocated to
Jharkhand under the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000. In this
respect, Section 34 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 assumes
significance, which is reproduced as thus –

34. Transfer of proceedings from High Court at Patna to High
Court of Jharkhand. — (1) Except as hereinafter provided, the High
12


Court at Patna shall, as from the appointed day, have no jurisdiction
in respect of the transferred territory.

(2) Such proceedings pending in the High Court at Patna immediately
before the appointed day as are certified, whether before or after that
day, by the Chief Justice of the High Court, having regard to the
places of accrual of the cause of action and both other circumstances,
to be proceedings which are ought to be heard and decided by the
High Court of Jharkhand shall as soon as may be after such
certification, be transferred to the High Court of Jharkhand.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of
this section or in section 27, but save as hereinafter provided, the High
Court at Patna shall have, and the High Court of Jharkhand shall not
have, jurisdiction to entertain, hear or dispose of appeals,
applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, applications for
review and other proceedings where any such proceedings seek any
relief in respect of any order passed by the High Court at Patna before
the appointed day:

Provided that if after such proceedings have been entertained
by the High Court at Patna, it appears to the Chief Justice of the High
Court that they ought to be transferred to the High Court of
Jharkhand, he shall order that they shall be so transferred, and such
proceedings shall thereupon be transferred accordingly.

(4) Any order made by the High Court at Patna—

(a) before the appointed day, in any proceeding to the High
Court of Jharkhand by virtue of sub-section (2), or

(b) in any proceedings with respect to which the High Court at
Patna retains jurisdiction by virtue of sub-section (3) shall for all
purposes have effect, not only as an order or the High Court at Patna,
but also as an order made by the High Court of Jharkhand.

18. It is apparent that Section 34 of Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000
provides for procedure to be adopted while transferring the
proceedings from High Court at Patna to High Court of Jharkhand.
Section 34(1) provides that the High Court at Patna would have no
13


jurisdiction in respect of the transferred territory with effect from the
appointed day, subject to certain exceptions. Section 34(2) empowers
the Chief Justice of the High Court at Patna to certify and transfer
pending proceedings to the High Court of Jharkhand having regard
to the place of accrual of cause of action and other circumstances.
Section 34(3) creates exceptions preserving the jurisdiction of the
High Court at Patna to deal with appeals, applications for leave to
appeal, review applications, and other proceedings seeking relief in
respect of orders passed by it before the appointed day, though even
such proceedings could be transferred to the High Court of
Jharkhand if the Chief Justice so directed.
19. Most significantly, Section 34(4) provides for the dual effect of
orders passed by the High Court at Patna. It stipulates that any order
made by the High Court at Patna, whether before the appointed day
in proceedings subsequently transferred to the High Court of
Jharkhand under sub-section (2), or in proceedings with respect to
which the High Court at Patna retained jurisdiction under sub-
section (3) "shall for all purposes have effect, not only as an order of
the High Court at Patna, but also as an order made by the High Court

of Jharkhand."
14


20. The legislative intent behind this provision was to ensure
continuity of judicial authority and prevent any vacuum arising from
the re-organisation of the State. As a corollary, the deeming provision
under Section 34(4) operates to treat those judgments or orders as
those of the High Court of Jharkhand, entitled to the same respect,
obedience, and implementation as any order passed by the High
Court of Jharkhand.
21. This deeming provision is of seminal importance to the present
case. The judgment in Nagendra Sahani (supra), though rendered
by the High Court at Patna on 22.09.1993 i.e., before the State re-
organization, nonetheless, it must be treated by virtue of Section
34(4) as binding precedent of the High Court of Jharkhand.
22. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that this aspect
of law was not taken into account by the Division Bench. Once the
provision of law deems that all the orders and judgements of the High
Court of Patna shall have same effect as an order passed by
Jharkhand High Court, the Division Bench had limited options qua
manner in which it could have treated the judgement in Nagendra
Sahani (Supra) - one, to follow the said judgement as a binding
precedent or, in case it considered the said judgement to be bad
two,
15


in eyes of law, it could have referred the said matter to a larger bench
for further adjudication. This position of law is also reflected by a
recent judgement of this court in Mary Pushpam v. Telvi
5
Curusumary ,
wherein it was observed as thus –
“ 1. The rule of “Judicial Discipline and Propriety” and the doctrine
of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in
judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the
consequences of their actions. The Constitution Benches of this Court
have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from judicial
discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of the
same High Court is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is to be
respected and is binding subject to right of the Bench of such co-equal
quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger
Bench. It is the only course of action open to a Bench of co-equal
strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a Bench
with same strength.” (emphasis supplied)


23. In other words, the Division Bench could not have ignored the
ratio of Nagendra Sahani (Supra) while stating it to have merely a
persuasive value. Once it is established that the factual matrix is
identical and the legal issue involved is the same, the principle of
judicial discipline demands that similar relief be granted to similarly
situated persons.
24. The next question is whether the writ petition filed by the
Appellant in the year 2005 suffered from delay and laches, having
been instituted approximately 13 years after his appointment in the

5
(2024) 3 SCC 224
16


years 1992. It is well-established that in matters involving pay scale
parity based on removal of anomalies, the cause of action continues
from month to month as long as the anomaly persists. Every month
when the employee receives lesser pay than his similarly situated
counterparts constitutes a fresh cause of action. In M.R. Gupta v.
6
Union of India , while adjudicating on the issue of whether claim of
correct pay-fixation was barred by delay and limitation, this court
observed as follows –
“6.
The Tribunal misdirected itself when it treated the appellant's
claim as “one time action” meaning thereby that it was not a
continuing wrong based on a recurring cause of action. The claim to
be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay
fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service
and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the salary when
the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance
with the rules. This right of a government servant to be paid the correct
salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in
accordance with the rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is
an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the
mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is
extinguished. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind.
(See Thota China Subba Rao v. Mattapalli Raju [AIR 1950 FC 1 : 1949
FCR 484 : 50 Bom LR 181 : (1950) 1 MLJ 752] ).” (emphasis supplied)

25. In the present case, Appellant filed writ petition before High
Court praying for issuance of an appropriate writ to the Respondent-
Employer to grant him pay scale as genuine in place of anomaly in
pay scale in parity with other similarly situated persons. Therefore,

6
(1995) 5 SCC 628
17


the claim having a continuous cause of action, the plea of limitation
or laches cannot be sustained in this case.
26. Furthermore, the Appellant had made representations to the
employer on 01.04.2001 and 27.04.2002, which were rejected only
on 13.09.2004. The writ petition was filed on 30.09.2005, within a
reasonable time after the rejection of his representations. While
observing that the writ-petitioner claimed the benefits after 20 years
of entering into service, the Division Bench failed to appreciate that
the Appellant was not sleeping over his rights but was pursuing the
remedies available to him through appropriate representations before
approaching the Court.
27. Additionally, we also note that the respondents did not produce
any material on record to show that the case of the present Appellant
is different from those with whom he seeks parity. Therefore, when
other similarly situated employees have already been granted the
benefit through judicial pronouncement, it would be grossly unjust
to deny the same relief to the Appellant. This conclusion is further
substantiated by judgement in Suprita Chandel (Supra), wherein
this court observed as thus -
“14. It is a well settled principle of law that where a citizen
aggrieved by an action of the government department has approached
18

should be extended the benefit of judicial declarations without
approaching the court individually finds full application in the
present case. To hold otherwise would be to encourage multiplicity of
litigation and deny the beneficial effect of judicial pronouncements to
those who are entitled to it.
29. The Division Bench, in our considered view, erred in failing to
Nagendra Sahani
appreciate the binding nature of the (Supra)
judgment on identically placed employees while also erroneously
applying the doctrine of delay and laches to a continuing cause of
action. Moreover, it gave undue weightage to financial considerations
while ignoring constitutional principles and failed to examine the
merits of the case and the recommendations of various committees
that had acknowledged the anomaly. The judgment of the learned
Single Judge, on the other hand, correctly applied the ratio of
Nagendra Sahani (Supra) to the Appellant's case and granted
appropriate relief. The Division Bench's interference with such well-
reasoned judgment was unwarranted and legally unsustainable.
19


CONCLUSION
30. In view of the foregoing detailed discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the principle of equality enshrined in Article
14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 brooks no discrimination
between persons who are similarly situated, and any differential
treatment must be based on intelligible differentia having a rational
nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In the present case, it
is undisputed that the Appellant was appointed pursuant to the same
competitive examination as other employees who have been granted
the higher pay scale on basis of the recommendations of the Fitment
Committee, Fitment Appellate Committee and directions in
Nagendra Sahani (Supra). The allocation of all the similarly placed
persons along with the Appellant to different departments was purely
administrative and did not involve any merit-based selection or
differentiation in qualifications although their selection was based on
a Common Examination.
31. The statutory provisions of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000,
particularly Section 34(4), mandate that judicial orders of the Patna
High Court continue to bind the Successor State. The judgment in
Nagendra Sahani (Supra), which granted identical relief to similarly
20


situated employees inducted through a common recruitment process
that took place in erstwhile Bihar, therefore has binding effect to an
employee of the same recruitment allocated to the State of Jharkhand
in respect of the Appellant.
32. The plea of delay and laches cannot be sustained in a case
involving continuing violation of rights that too in the light of the
nature of directions issued in rem. The Appellant's consistent pursuit
of his claim through representations and the timely filing of the writ
petition after their rejection shows that he was not sleeping over his
rights. Moreover, financial implications and administrative
convenience cannot override constitutional guarantees against
arbitrary discrimination. The State, being the model employer,
cannot plead its own inefficiency or negligence to deny legitimate
rights to its employees. The recommendations of various committees
acknowledging the anomaly only reinforces the constitutional
obligation to remove the discrimination.
33. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench dated 30.03.2022, restoring the
judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 14.12.2011. The
directions as contained in the judgement of the learned Single Judge
21


be now complied within three months from the date of this
judgement. The appellant is also entitled to the cost of litigation as
per rules.
34.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.


…….…………….…………J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)



…….…………….…………J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 16, 2025.
22