Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MADHAVRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
10/04/1968
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
SHAH, J.C.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
MITTER, G.K.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
HEGDE, K.S.
CITATION:
1968 AIR 1395 1968 SCR (3) 712
CITATOR INFO :
E 1970 SC1972 (6)
RF 1972 SC 425 (16,33)
R 1972 SC2027 (51)
D 1972 SC2301 (33)
RF 1975 SC1193 (4)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 31B-Maharashtra Act 13 of
1962 amending the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961)-1961 Act mentioned in
Ninth Schedule, but not amending Act-Amending Act it
protected by Art. 31B-Seventeenth Amendment, if valid-Entry
35, of List II of Seventh Schedule-Scope of--Order passed
under Defence of India Rules, r, 125B-If overrides s, 28 of
the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961.
HEADNOTE:
The Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on
Holdings) Act, 1961, as amended by Act 13 of 1962, was
passed for securing the distribution of agricultural land to
subserve the common good by imposing a ceiling on the
holding of agricultural land. Section 28 of the Act is,
intrer alia, concerned with ensuring supply of sugarcane to
factories and ensuring that the persons to whom surplus land
is granted, after it has vested in the State Government,
also supply it at fair price.
The Godavari Sugar Mills was a public limited company
owning two factories for the manufacture of sugar and allied
products and held large areas of land for the purpose of
cultivation of sugarcane for its factories. in proceedings
under the Act, large areas of land held by the Mills were
declared surplus. The validity of the Act was challenged on
the following grounds : (1) Article 31B does not protect the
Amending Act 13 of 1962 from challenge on the ground of
violation of fundamental rights, because, in the Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the Constitution
(Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964, only the Maharashtra
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Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, was
included and not the Amending Art of 1962, (2) in spite of
the decision of this Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,
[1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, the Seventeenth Amendment is invalid;
(3) The State Legislature was not competent to enact the
impugned Act; and (4) The order passed by the Stale Govern-
ment under r. 125B of the Defence of India Rules, reserving
certain areas for the factories mentioned by the schedule to
the order-one of which was Mills-and prohibiting (a) the
working of certain power crushers, (b) the export of
sugarcane from the reserved areas except in accordance with
a permit issued by the Collector, and (c) the purchase of
sugarcane for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or
jaggery by a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to
a grower or body of growers of sugarcane except in
accordance with a permit issued by the Collector, rendered
ineffective s. 28 of the impugned Act.
HELD : (1) Even on a strict interpretation of Art. 31B the
only requirement laid down by the- Article for protecting an
enactment from challenge on the ground of violation of
fundamental rights is that the Act should be specified in
the Ninth Schedule. Ordinarily, if an Act is referred to by
its title, it means the Act with all the amendments made in
it up to the date of reference, and there is no reason for
not applying this rule of interpretation to the Ninth
Schedule. Certain amending Acts are, -no doubt, mentioned
in the Ninth Schedule, but the only reason for
713
inserting them expressly was that some States, out of
abundant caution, recommended their amending Acts to be
specifically inserted in the Ninth Schedule. [719 D-E, F, H;
720 C-D]
Observations in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and
Industrial Co. Ltd., [1956] S.C.R. 603, 614, explained.
(2) The result arrived at in Golaknath’s case was that the
Seventeenth Amendment was valid and this result is binding
on this Bench of this Court. [721 C]
(3) The impugned Act, apart from s. 28, is a law with
respect to Entry 18 of List 11 which deals with ’Land etc.’
and Entry 42 of List III, which deals with Acquisition and
Requisition of Property.’ Section 28 itself falls within
Entry 35 of List II which deals with ’Works, lands and
buildings vested in or in the possession of the State,’ as
that section only deals with lands which have vested in the
State. Therefore, the State Legislature was competent to
pass the enactment. [721 F-G; 722 A-C]
(4) If an order made under the Defence of India Rules is in
conflict with the provisions of s. 28 of the impugned Act,
the order would override the section. But the order passed
by the State Government, in the instant case, was not in
conflict with the section and the two could stand together.
[7--2 G-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2239 to
2250 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated October 25, 1963
of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos.
970, 884, 692, 963, 959 and 1124 to 1130 of 1963 and Civil
Appeal No. 694 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 9, 10, 1965
of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No.
1642 of 1963.
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C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, M. S. K. Sastri and S.
P.Nayar, for the appellant (in C.A. Nos. 2239 to 2250 of
1966).
F. S. Nariman, D. S. Nargolkar and K. R. Chaudhuri, for
the respondents (in C.A. No. 2239 of 1966).
R. V. S. Mani, for intervener No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2239 of
1966).
D. P. Singh, for intervener No. 2 (in C.A. No. 2239 of
1966).
F. S. Nariman, Bhuvanesh Kumari, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder
Narain, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore and B. Parthasarathy, for
the appellants (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General and S. P. Nayar, for res-
pondents Nos. 1 to 3 (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).
S. K. Mehta, for the intervener (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).
714
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J.-This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal No. 694
of 1967 and Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966.
In September 1963, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 694 of
1967 filed a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution (Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) in
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the
validity of the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of
1961) as amended by Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962-hereinafter
referred to as the impugned Act. The first appellant is a
public limited company and owns two factories for the
manufacture of sugar and allied products situate at Taluka
Kopergaon in Ahmednagar District of the State of
Maharashtra. The first appellant also held large areas of
land in several villages in Taluka Kopergaon for the purpose
of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories. In the
proceedings under the impugned Act large areas held by the
first appellant were, declared surplus.
Various persons had earlier filed similar petitions in the
High Court challenging the validity of the impugned Act.
The High Court by its judgment dated October 25, 1963,
disposed of them. The High Court held that "the Maharashtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act, 1961, is a
valid piece of legislation and within the competence of the
State Legislature to enact, except that the provisions of s.
28 thereof offend Art. 14 of the Constitution and are void.
The effect of our decision however would not be to entitle
the petitioners to get any declaration that their lands
which are held by an industrial undertaking are exempt from
the operation of the Act nor that the orders passed by the
first respondent on the 28th of February 1963 are null and
void and have no legal effect. The lands will vest in the
State but they will not be entitled to deal with the lands
under any of the provisions of s. 28." The High Court,
subject to the above declaration, dismissed the petitions.
The State having obtained certificates of fitness under Art.
132(1) of the Constitution filed appeals Nos. CA 2239-2250
of 1966 against the above mentioned judgment.
After this judgment, the Constitution was amended by the
Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964-hereinafter
referred to as the Seventeenth Amendment-which came into
force on June 20, 1964. This amendment included 44 more
Acts, as items 21 to 64, in the Ninth Schedule of the
Constitution. Item 34 in the Schedule as amended reads
"Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act,
1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961).
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The petition of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 694 of
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1967 (Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) was
dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated March 10,
1965. The High Court held that the Seventeenth Amendment
had put S. 28 and other provisions of the impugned Act
beyond challenge on -the ground that they were inconsistent
with or take away or abridge any fundamental rights. The
High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered
inoperative because of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and
the Rules made thereunder.
The appellants having obtained certificate of fitness under
Art. 133(1) (a) have appealed.
Mr. F. S. Nariman, who appears for the appellants in Civil
Appeal No. 694 of 1967 and for the respondents in Civil
Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966 submits the following points
before us
(1) That Art. 31B does not protect from
challenge on the ground of violation of
fundamental rights the provisions of Acts
amending the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
(Ceilings on Holdings) Acts, 1961, as origi-
nally enacted :
(2) That the Seventeenth Amendment in spite
of the decision of this Court in I. C. Golak
Nath v. State of Punjab(1) is invalid;
(3) That the State Legislature was not
competent to enact the impugned Act in sofar
as it affects sugarcane farms held by
Industrial undertakings and lands on which
sugarcane is grown; and
(4) That the Defence of India Act (LI of
1962) and the Rules made thereunder override
or render ineffective s. 28 of the impugned
Act.
In order to appreciate the points raised
before us it is necessary to notice the scheme
of the impugned Act and set out the relevant
provisions.
The preamble of the impugned Act gives broadly
the general purpose of the Act. It reads :
"Whereas, for securing the distribution of
agricultural land as best to subserve the
common good, it is expedient in the public
interest to impose a maximum limit (or
ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land
in the State of Maharashtra; to provide for
the acquisition of land held in excess of the
ceiling, and for the distribution thereof to
landless and other persons; and for
(1) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 762.
716
matters connected with the purposes aforesaid;
it is hereby enacted
The provisions of the impugned Act carry out these
objectives by imposing a ceiling on holding of land (Chapter
II) and determination, declaration and vesting of surplus
land (Chapter IV) Chapter V deals with determination and
payment of compensation. Chapter VI deals with distribution
of surplus land. Chapter VII is concerned with procedure
and appeal, and in Chapter VIII various miscellaneous
provisions are made. We may notice s. 21, s. 27 and s. 28
in detail. Under s. 21 the Collector makes a declaration
stating therein his decision, inter alia, on the area,
description and full particulars of the land which is
delimited as surplus land. Under sub-s. (2) the Collector
notifies this area, and under sub-s. (4) after a lapse of a
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certain time the Collector takes possession of the land
which is delimited as surplus. The effect of thus -taking
possession, in brief, is that "the surplus land shall be
deemed to be acquired ’by the State Government for the
purposes of the Act and shall accordingly vest in the State
Government." Section 27 directs distribution of surplus land
in the order of priority set out in sub-ss. (2), (3), (4)
and (5). For instance, sub-s. (2) gives priority to a
tenant who was rendered landless because the person to whom
the surplus land belonged had resumed land from his tenant
for personal cultivation under any tenancy law. Sub-s. (5)
provides :
"(5) Thereafter all surplus land (including
surplus land which has not been granted under
sub-section (2) or (3) or (4) shall be offered
in the following order of priority, that is to
say,-
(i) a person from whom any land has been
resumed by his landlord for personal
cultivation under any tenancy law and who in
consequence thereof has been rendered
landless, provided that such person is a resi-
dent of the village in which the surplus land
for distribution is situate, or within five
miles thereof;
(i-a) serving members of the armed forces, and
ex-servicemen-
(i-b) a joint farming society or a farming
society, the members of which answer to any of
the following descriptions, namely :-
(i) serving members of the armed forces,
(ii) ex-servicemen,
(iii) agricultural labourers,
(iv) landless persons, or
(v) small holders;
717
Provided that the majority of members of such
society are serving members of the armed
forces or ex-servicemen;
(ii) a joint farming society, the members of
which answer to the one or more of the
following descriptions, namely :-
agricultural labourer or
landless person or
small holder;
(iii) a farming society, the members of which
answer to the one or more of the following
descriptions, namely
agricultural labourer or
landless person or
small holder-,".
Section 28 which is the subject matter of
special attack provides
"28(1) Where any land held by an industrial
undertaking is acquired by, and vests in, the
State Government under section 21, such land
being land which was being used for the
purpose of producing or providing raw material
for the manufacture or production of any
goods, articles or commodities by the
undertaking, the State Government shall take
particular care to ensure that the acquisition
of the land does not affect adversely the
production and supply of raw material from the
land to the undertaking.
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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
section 27, but subject to any rules made in
this behalf, for the purpose of so ensuring
the continuance of the supply of such raw
material to the undertaking, and generally for
the full and efficient use of the land for
agriculture and its efficient management, the
State Government-
(a) may, if it is in the opinion of that
Government necessary for ’the purpose
aforesaid (such opinion being formed after
considering the representation of persons
interested therein) maintain the integrity of
the area so acquired, in one or more compact
blocks; and
(b) may, subject to such terms and
conditions (including in particular,
conditions which are calculated to ensure the
full and continuous supply of raw material to
the undertaking, at a fair price), grant the
land,
718
or any part thereof, to a joint farming
society (or a member thereof) consisting as
far as possible, of-
(i) persons who had previously leased such
land to the undertaking,
(ii) agricultural labour (if any) employed by
the undertaking on such land,
(iii) technical or other staff engaged by the
undertaking on such land, or in relation to
the production of any raw material,
(iv) adjoining landholders who are small
holders,
(v) landless persons
Provided that, the State Government may-
(a) for such period as is necessary for the setting up of
joint farming societies as aforesaid, being not more than
three years in the first instance (extensible to a further
period not exceeding two years) from the date of taking
possession of the land, direct that the land acquired, or
any part thereof, shall be cultivated by one or more farms
run or managed by the State, or by one or more corporations
(including a company) owned or controlled by the State;
(b) grant to the landlord so much of the surplus land
leased by him to the undertaking, which together with any
other land held by him does not exceed the ceiling area (but
if the landlord be a public trust and and-major portion of
the income from the land is being appropriated for purposes
of education or medical relief, grant the entire land to the
public trust) on condition that the landlord, or as the case
may be, the public trust lease the land to a farm or
corporation described in clause (a) aforesaid, and
thereafter, in the case of a landlord (not ’being a public
trust) that he becomes a member of the joint farming
society, and in the case of a public trust, that it lease
the land to a joint farming society.
(3) The State Government may provide that,-
(a) for the breach of any term or condition
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2),
or
(b) if the landlord to whom the land is
granted fails to lease the land to the farm or
corporation or to become a member of a joint
farming society; or
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(c) if it considers after such inquiry as it
thinks fit, that the production and supply of
raw material to
719
the undertaking is not maintained at the level
or in the manner which, with proper and
efficient management it ought to be
maintained, or
(d)for any other reason it is undesirable in
the interest of the full and efficient
cultivation of the land, that the joint
farming society should continue to cultivate
the land,
the grant shall, after giving three months’
notice of termination thereof and after giving
the other party reasonable opportunity of
showing cause, be terminated, and the land
resumed. Thereafter, the State Government may
make such other arrangements as it thinks fit
for the proper cultivation of the land and
maintenance of the production and supply of
raw material to the undertaking."
Regarding the first point raised by the learned counsel for
the appellant, it seems to us that the High Court was right
in holding that Art. 31B does protect the impugned Act from
challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights.
There is no doubt that Art. 31B should be interpreted
strictly. But even interpreting it strictly, the only
requirement which is laid down by Art. 3 1 B is that the Act
should be specified in the Ninth Schedule. Now the question
arises whether the impugned Act has been specified in the
Ninth Schedule or not. It is true that what is mentioned in
entry 34 of the Ninth Schedule is "The Maharashtra Agricul-
tural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act
XXVII of 1961)" which may be referred to as the Principal
Act, and no mention is made of the Amending Act, namely,
Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962. Ordinarily if an Act is
referred to by its title, it is intended to refer to that
Act with all the amendments made in it upto the date of
reference. For instance, the Constitution refers to the
General Clauses Act, 1897, in Art. 367. This Article
provides that "unless the context otherwise requires, the
General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations
and modifications that may be made therein under Article
372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it
applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature
of the Dominion of India." If the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant is accepted it would mean that for
the purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution the
General Clauses Act, as origiually enacted in 1897, would
alone be taken into consideration. :We can hardly imagine
that this was the intention of the Constitution makers.
Further, when one refers to the Code of Civil Procedure or
the Criminal Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code one
ordinarily means to refer to them as amended up to date.
There is no reason why this ordinary manner of referring to
Acts
720
should not be borne in mind while interpreting the Ninth
Schedule.
It is true that some amending Acts are mentioned in the
Ninth Schedule apart from the principal Acts. For example,
the Madras Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948) is mentioned in item 9,
while the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
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Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1950 (Madras Act 1 of 1950) is
mentioned in item 10. Further item 20 specifically mentions
the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948
(West Bengal Act XXI of 1948), as amended by West Bengal Act
XXIX of 1951. But then there are many other Acts which had
been amended before they were inserted in the Ninth
Schedule, and we can hardly imagine that Parliament intended
only to protect the Acts a,% originally passed and not the
amendments made up to the date of their incorporation in-to
the Ninth Schedule. The reason for this express insertion
of certain amending Acts seems to be that some States, out
of abundant caution, recommended that their amending Acts be
specifically inserted in the Ninth Schedule. It is true
that for some purposes an amending Act retains its
individuality, a-, observed by Jagannadhadas, J., in Shri
Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd.(2) :
"In the present case what we are concerned
with is not the meaning of any particular
phrase or provision of the Act after the
amendment but the effect of the amending
provisions in their relation to and effect on
other statutory provisions outside the Act.
For such a purpose the amendment cannot
obviously be treated as having been part of
the original Act itself so as to enable the
doctrine to be called in aid that a later Act
overrides an earlier Act."
These observations, however, do not lead to the conclusion
that when an Act is referred to by its title it is not
intended to include the amendments made in it.
Accordingly we must overrule the first submission made by
the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that Art. 31B
protects the impugned Act including the amendments made in
it upto ’the date of its incorporation into the Ninth
Schedule. The impugned Act cannot, therefore, be challenged
on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. We, accordingly agree with the High Court
that s. 28 which was originally’ held by the High Court to
violate Art. 14 of the Constitution is now protected under
Art. 31B from attack on the ground that it infringes Art.
14.
(1) (19561 S. C. R. 603, 614.
721
Coming to the second point, the learned counsel merely men-
tions the point. He says that there was no majority for any
particular ratio as five Judges held the Seventeenth
Amendment to be ,Void because it contravened Art. 13 (2),
but by applying the doctrine of "prospective overruling"
they declared that their decision would not affect ’the
validity of the Seventeenth Amendment. Hidayatullah, J., as
he then was, on the other hand did not apply the doctrine of
"prospective overruling", but held S. 3 (2) of the
Seventeenth Amendment to be bad. The other five Judges held
that the Seventeenth Amendment was a valid amendment of the
Constitution. We are, however, bound by the result arrived
at by this Court in that decision and the result that the
Seventeenth Amendment is valid is binding on us. We may
mention that Mr. Mani, appearing for one of the interveners,
also raised this point but ultimately asked for permission
to be allowed to withdraw the point.
Coming to the third point, the learned counsel for the
appellant contends that S. 28 is a law with respect to entry
52 of List 1, and therefore beyond the competence of the
State Legislature. The entry reads thus :
"52. Industries, the control of which by the Union is
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declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest."
He points out that one of the industries specified in the
Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951 (LXV of 1951) is "sugar". He says that the whole
object of S. 28 of the impugned Act with regard to lands
held by industrial undertakings who were producing sugarcane
was to ensure the production of sugarcane and its supply to
the sugar factories and this object falls squarely within
entry 52, List 1. In the alternative he urges that the State
Legislature had no authority to legislate adversely on
matters falling within item 52. There is no doubt that the
impugned Act, apart from S. 28, is a law with respect to
entry 18 of List 11 and entry 42 of List III. These entries
read as follows :
"Entry 18, List 11
Land, that is to say, rights in or over land,
land tenures including the relation of
landlord and tenant, and the collection of
rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural
land, land improvement and agricultural loans;
colonization.
Entry 42, List III
Acquisition and Requisition of property."
It is not seriously disputed that apart from
s. 28 the rest of impugned Act is a law with
respect to entry 18, List.I and II entry 42
List 111.
722
It is not necessary to consider whether S. 28 can be
sustained -on the ground that it is an ancillary or
subsidiary matter to the law made under entry 18 List II and
entry 42, List In, for, in our -opinion, s. 28 falls within
entry 35 list II, which reads :
"Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession
of the State."
It will be noticed that s. 28 only deals with lands which
have vested in the State. There cannot be any doubt that
the State Legislature is competent to enact provisions
regarding the production and supply of raw materials from
land which has vested in ,the State and for the full and
efficient use of such land and its ,efficient management.
Coming now to the last point, the learned counsel for the
,appellants urges that by virtue of Art. 251 of the
Constitution s. 28 can no longer be effective as it is
repugnant to the Defence -of India Act and the Rules made
thereunder. He says that under S. 3 (2) (26) of the Defence
of India Act, 1962, the Central Government is enabled to
make orders providing for "the control of agriculture
(including the cultivation of agricultural land and ,crops
to be raised therein) for the purpose of increasing the pro-
duction and supply of foodgrains and other essential
agricultural products." By notification dated October 30,
1963, the Government of Maharashtra made an order whereby it
"reserved each of the areas specified in column (3) of the
Schedule hereto annexed for the factory respectively
specified against it in column (2) thereof", and made other
provisions regarding the purchase and -export of sugarcane.
In the Schedule the following areas were made reserved areas
for the appellant, the Godavari Sugar Mills -Limited :
"Areas comprised within the limits of the
following talukas.
(i) Kopergaon of Ahmednagar District.
(ii) Shrirampur of Ahmedabad District."
This order was made by the Government of Maharashtra in the
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exercise of its powers under r. 125-B of the Defence of
India Rules.
The learned counsel is right that to the extent valid orders
made under the Defence of India Rules conflict with the
provisions in s. 28, the orders would override s. 28 of the
impugned Act. But it has not been shown to us on the
material available here how the order dated October 30,
1963, is in conflict with s. 28. The order ’first reserves
certain areas for the factories mentioned in the Schedule,
and then prohibits the working of certain power crushers and
:also prohibits the export of sugarcane from the reserved
areas
723
except in accordance with a permit issued by the Collector
of the District. It further prohibits the purchase of
sugarcane for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or
jaggery by a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to
a grower or body of growers of sugarcane except under and in
accordance with a permit issued by. the Collector. Section
28, inter alia, is concerned with ensuring the supply of
sugarcane to the factories and ensuring that the-persons to
whom the land is granted also supply it at fair price. It
seems to us that the provisions of S. 28 can stand together
with the order dated October 30, 1963. In our opinion there
is no force in the point raised by the learned counsel.
In the result Civil Appeal No. 694 0 19 7 is dismissed. The
other appeals (Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966) are
allowed, judgment of the High Court, insofar as it declared
s. 28 void, set aside and the petitions out of which these
appeals arose dismissed. There will be no order as to costs
in all the appeals.
V.P.S.
C.A. No. 694 of 1967 dismissed
other appeals allowed.
724