Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
KAUSHALYA DEVI & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI K.L. BANSAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/12/1968
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
HEGDE, K.S.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 838 1969 SCR (2)1048
1969 SCC (1) 59
CITATOR INFO :
E 1973 SC1311 (20,33,34)
D 1974 SC 471 (7,22,25)
R 1974 SC 994 (34,35)
RF 1975 SC2130 (2)
RF 1981 SC1401 (3)
F 1982 SC1518 (9)
RF 1987 SC1823 (8)
RF 1987 SC1986 (32)
ACT:
Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 2952, s. 13-Compromise
decree passed without regard to provisions of s. 13-If
valid.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant-plaintiffs filed a suit in February 1956, for
the eviction the respondent on the ground that the premises
were required for their own use, that the defendant already
owned a suitable house of his own, and that the respondent
had defaulted in payment of rent, after the defendant had
flied a written statement and issues had been framed a
joint application was made by them that a compromise had
been effected. The trial court decreed the suit in the
plaintiff’s favour in terms of the compromise which provided
inter alia, for the ejectment of the defendant after 31st
December 1958, and fixed the standard rent as agreed. The
defendant, however, did not vacate the premises in December
1958, and presented an application in February 1959 under s.
47 C.P.C., challenging the validity of the decree alleging
that it had been passed in contravention of the provision of
Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and contending that
the decree was, therefore, a nullity. He ’failed before the
Sub-Judge and also in appeal before the Senior Sub-Judge.
However, the High Court in revision held in his favour.
appeal to this Court,
HELD: The High Court has rightly held that the decree
was a nullity as the order passed on the basis of the
compromise did not indicate that any of the statutory
grounds mentioned in s. 13 of the Act existed. [1050 B]
Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432,
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followed.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 7,
1962 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in
Civil Revision Application No. 140-D of 1961. ’
P. Sinha, G. Bhimsena Rao and M. 1. Khowaja, for the
appellants.
I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J. This appeal by certificate granted by the
Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi is governed
by the decision of this Court in Bahadur Singh v. Munl
Subrat Dass(1).
(1) [1969] 2 S,C.R.
1041
The facts out of which the present appeal arises are
these. One Raghunath Sharma, predecessor-m-interest of
the appellants hereinafter referred to as the
plaintiff--instituted on February 7, 1956, suit No. 53
of 1956 in the Court of Subject 1st Class, Delhi, for
the eviction of his tenant, K.L. Bansal, hereinafter
referred to as the defendant. He gave three grounds for
ejectment in the plaint: (1 ) that the premises were
required bona fide by the plaintiff for occupation as
residence for himself and other members of the family,
and that he had no other, suitable accommodation to meet his
bona fide residential requirements; (2) that the
defendant already owned a house in Delhi which was suitable
for him; and (3) that the defendant had defaulted in payment
of rent.
The defendant flied a written statement denying these
allegaltions. Appropriate issues were framed on April 4,
1956. On June 5, 1956, an application was filed by the
plaintiff and the defendant that a compromise had been
effected on the following terms:
"(a) Decree for ejectment be passed in
favour of the plaintiff against the defendant,
the decree will be executable after the 31st
December, 1958, if the defendant does not give
possession till then.
(b) The standard rent of the premises
be fixed at Rs. 40/- per mensem, instead of
Rs. 50/- paid at present payable from the 1st
July, 1956, till the defendant vacates the
premises.
(c) The amount, in deposit with this
Court be paid
to the plaintiff which will be adjusted
between the
On July 6, 1956, the counsel for the parties
and the plaintiff made a statement on solemn
affirmation to the same effect, and on the
same day the Court recorded the following
order:
"In view of the statement of the
parties’ counsel and the written compromise, a
decree is passed in favour of the
plaintiff against the defendant."
The decree was drawn up accordingly.
The defendant, however, did not vacate the premises’
on December 31, 1958. On the other hand, he presented an
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application on February 16, 1959, under s. 47, C.P.C.,
challenging the validity of the decree alleging that the
same had been passed in contravention of the provisions of
s. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (XXXVIII
of 1952), (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence the
decree was a nullity. He failed
1050
before the Sub-Judge, ’and also’on appeal before the Senior
Sub-Judge, Delhi.
The High Court, on revision, held that the decree was a
nullity as the order passed on the basis of the compromise
did not indicate that any of the statutory grounds mentioned
in s. 13 of the Act existed. In Bahadur Singh’s case(1)
this Court held that the decree passed on the basis of an
award was in contravention of s. 13(1) of the Act became the
Court had passed the decree in terms of the award without
satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed.
Bachawat, J,. speaking for the Court, observed that "on the
plain wording of s. 13(1) the Court was forbidden to pass
the decree. The decree is a nullity and cannot be enforced
in execution." This Court, accordingly, declared inter alia
that "the decree in so far as it directs delivery of
possession of the premises to the landlord is a nullity and
cannot be executed."
The present case is also governed by the provisions of
s. 13(1) of the Act and, as we have said before, this appeal
must fail, in view of the judgment of this Court in Bahadur
Singh’s case(x). In the result the appeal is dismissed but
there will be no order as to costs.
R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432.
1051