Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SHIVAJI UNIVERSITY THROUGH DIRECTOR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BHARTI VIDYAPEETH THROUGH JOINT SECRETARY & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/03/1999
BENCH:
S.P. Bharucha, R.C. Lahoti.
JUDGMENT:
Bharucha. J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
The order under challenge was passed by a Division
Bench of the High Court of Bombay.
The first respondent educational institution was
granted permission by the appellant universe, subject to the
approval of the third respondent, the Medical Council of
India, to start a law college at Sangli to provide only
morning classes for a three year course. The permission of
the third respondent not having been received, the college
was not
commenced during the academic year 1994-95. The same
thing happened in respect of the academic year 1995-96.
On 13th June, 1995 the second respondent, the State of
Maharashtra. passed a resolution on the subject
ofpemiission for new law colleges on permanent unaided basis
in Districts of the State where not a single law college
existed. It noted that this Court was yet to hear and
dispose of an appeal in respect of grant-in-aid to private
law colleges in the State. (That decision was rendered on
16th August, 1995. in State of Maharashtra vs. Manubhai
Pragaii Vashi & Ors.. 1995(5) SCC 730). The resolution
stated that till such time that appeal was disposed of, if
applications and proposals were received to open law
colleges in Districts where not a single law college
existed, they would be considered. On 25th September, 1995
the first respondent made an application to the appellant
for permission lo start the said law college for the
academic year 1996-97. On 28th September. 1995 such
permission was declined on the ground that a law college
already existed at Sangli.
On 20th August, 1996 the third respondent communicated
to the first respondent its permission to start the said law
college "for teaching three year course for the three years
with morning classes only from 1996-97". On 19th October.
1996 the Director of the appellant wrote to the 2nd
respondent staring that the first respondent had sent a
proposal for starting the said law college in year 1995-96
and the appellant’s Board had recommended the said proposal
to the 2nd respondent, but it had not been given provisional
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sanction. The letter stated that the approval of the third
respondent (referred to above) was
considered valid for the year 1997-98 and it was.
therefore, requested that orders be passed to start the said
law college from June, 1997. On 30th October, 1996 the
first respondent applied to the appellant for permission to
start the said law college for the academic year 1997-98.
On 22nd November, 1996 a draft Perspective Plan was prepared
by the appellant under the provisions of Section 82 of the
Maharashtra Universities Act 1994. The application of the
first respondent dated 30th October. 1996 was rejected on
24th December. 1996. The reason for the rejection was that
the location of the said law college was outside the draft
Perspective Plan and one law college already existed in
Sangli. On 3rd February and I" March. 1997 the appellant
wrote to the 2nd respondent requesting that its letter dated
19th October. 1996 be treated as cancelled. It stated that
it had not recommended the proposal of the first respondent
to start the said law college for the year 1997-98.
In April, 1997 the first respondent filed the writ
petition upon which the judgment and order under challenge
was passed. By an interim order the first respondent was
permitted to start the said law college. In the judgment
and order under challenge, the High Court found that the
figures of population and the grant of permission to law
colleges at smaller places in the area of operation of the
appellant as also the Perspective Plan justified the opening
of a morning law college at Sangli having regard to Sangli’s
population. The appellant had, for the earlier years,
recommended the proposal to open the said law college.
There was a need for opening a post-graduate Department of
Law in the appellant-University, as appeared from certain
guidelines and the Perspective Plan. The reasons given in
the letters dates 2th December. 1995 and 24th December.
1996
rejecting the first respondent’s proposal showed
non-application of mind and arbitrariness. The affidavit of
the second respondent did not disclose any policy decision
which would go against the grant of the permission. The
appellant was bound by the contents of its letter dated 19th
October. 1996, which had neither been recalled nor
cancelled. Assuniing that the resolution dated 13th June.
1995 was valid, after the decision in Manubhai Pragaji
Vashi’s case (ibid) there was nothing to suggest that a
policy decision had been taken not to permit an additional
college even where there was a need for it and the appellant
and third respondent had approved the law college. Upon
this basis, the High Court passed the following order:
"i) The rejection of the petitioner’s proposal under
letter dated 28th December. 1995 sent by the Deputy
Registrar and its communication dated 15th January; 1996 is
hereby quashed and set aside.
ii) The rejection of the petitioner’s proposal under
letter dated 24th December. 1996 and its communication on
3rd January, 1997 by the Deputy Registrar of the University
is hereby quashed and set aside.
iii) In view of the approval accorded by the Bar
Council of India under its letter dated 20th August. 1996
and the letter dated 19th October. 1996 issued by the Board
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of College and University Development, the petitioner’s
application for opening of a morning Law College, at Sangli
shall be deemed to have been approved by the Shivaji
University under sub-section(4) of Section 82 of the
Maharashtra Universities Act. 1994 from the academic year
1997- 98 onwards for a Three Year Degree Law Course.
iv) In view of the aforesaid the petitioner’s
application for permission to open a morning Law College at
Sangli shall be deemed to have been granted by the State
Government and permission shall be deemed to have been
granted to open the said Law College under sub-section (5)
of Section 82 of the Maharashtra Universities Act. 1994
from the academic year 1997-98 onwards for a Three Year
Degree Law Course.
v) in view of the ad interim order passed by this
Court on 19th June. 1997 and the order dated 17th July.
1998 passed in C.A. No. 5647 of 1998. we hereby direct
that provisional affiliation be deemed to have been granted
to the petitioner’s college for the Academic Year 1997-98
and 1998-99 in accordance with the provision of Section 83
of the Maharashtra Universities Act. 1994.
vi) We. however, direct that for obtaining
affiliation for the academic year 1999-2000 the petitioner
will be required to make the requisite application and
follow the procedure laid down under the Maharashtra
Universities Act, 1994.
vii) With a view to obviating any hardships to the
students who have been admitted during the Academic Year
1997-98 and 1998-99 under the orders passed by this Court on
the 19th June, 1997 and 17th July, 1998 we direct the second
respondent University to permit such students to appear for
the requisite examinations and further to declare the
results of the students who so appear. It is our
unfortunate experience that despite the orders of this Court
students or their parents are required to approach the court
for (a) permission to appear in the examination, (b) for
direction to declare their results and (c) permission to
admit them in the next year. We wish to obviate such
injustice to the students in particular."
It is difficult to hold that the Government Resolution
dated 13th June. 1995 lays down, as a matter of policy,
that where there is a single law college in a District of
the State no other law college therein will be permitted.
In the first place; the resolution was to operate only till
such time as this Court rendered its decision in Manubhai
Pragaji Vashi’s case (ibid) and it provided that in that
interregnum applications and proposals for the commencement
of law colleges would be considered if received from
Districts where no law college existed. In the second
place, and assuming that that is the policy, this is clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable. Account has not to be taken of
whether or not a law college exists in a District. What is
relevant and what should be taken into consideration is the
population which the existing law college serves and
whether, therefore, there is need for an additional college.
The refusal by the appellant to grant to the first
respondent permission to start the said college based upon
the same reason is. therefore, also arbitrary and
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unreasonable. The draft Perspective Plan is also to, more
or less, the effect and the refusal based thereon is,
therefore, also arbitraiy and unreasonable.
To this extent, we are in agreement with the High
Court and need not dilate further.
Where we differ is with the order that the High Court
has passed, particularly in clause (iii) thereof, quoted
above. In our view, it is a University which must decide
whether or not it can support the proposal for the
commencement of a new college. If in a given case the
University has gone wrong in declining such permission by
relying upon ground which is arbitrary or unreasonable or
otherwise defective, the court should set aside such refusal
and return the matter to the University for re-consideration
in the light of its judgment.
In the instant case. we are in no doubt that the
appellant was in error in refusing to accord permission to
the first respondent to start the said law college only
because a law college already existed at Sangli. That
decision must, therefore, be set aside and the matter must
go back to the appellant to consider the issue afresh. In
doing so it must take into consideration what the population
of Sangli District is, what population the existing law
college serves and whether the said law college is, in
this light, required. Having regard to the lapse of time,
the appellant must do so within eight weeks.
Having regard to the fact that the said law college
has admitted students for the academic year 1998-99 pursuant
to the High Courts interim order, whether that term comes to
an end in the summer of 1999 or the winter of 1999. it is
proper to permit the term to be completed and the students
to take the examinations. For the purposes of following
academic years, the decision to be rendered by the appellant
as aforestated shall govern.
We do not consider it necessary to go into any other
aspect for the purposes of this appeal.
Order on the appeal accordingly. No order as to
costs.