Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 157 of 1999
PETITIONER:
CHANDRIKA PRASAD (D) THR. LRS. & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UMESH KUMAR VERMA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2001
BENCH:
R.P. Sethi & S.N. Phukan
JUDGMENT:
Phukan, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the order of the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Civil
Revision No.231 of 1997. The High Court allowed the application
filed under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent &
Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (for short the Act) by setting aside the
order of eviction dated 10.01.1997 passed by the Munsif 1st,
Begusarai in Title (Eviction) Suit No.15 of 1995.
The appellants-landlords filed a suit for eviction of the
respondents-tenants from the suit premises under Section 11(1)(c) of
the Act i.e. on the ground that the suit premises was reasonably and
in good faith required by the landlords for use and occupation.
The appellant No.1, since deceased was the father of the
appellant No.2. The eviction suit was filed by both the above two
appellants and during the pendency of the civil revision before the
High Court, the appellant No.1 died and the name of his wife was
substituted. The appellant No.2 has two daughters and the eldest
daughter was married to Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Singh and has no son.
The ground for eviction was that the suit premises was required for
starting a clinic for the said son-in-law of the appellant No.2, who has
been living with his father-in-law since his marriage in 1992. It was
alleged that the son-in-law was unemployed though he was a medical
graduate and registered as a Medical Practitioner. The suit was filed
against three tenants out of which two tenants agreed to vacate the
suit premises and only the defendant No.3, Umesh Chandra Verma,
who is respondent No.1 in this appeal, contested the suit after
obtaining leave to defend. The contesting respondent No.1 pleaded
that son-in-law of the appellant No.2 being a post graduate student in
Surgery was residing in the hostel and further contended that the said
son-in-law has his own house wherein he could set up the proposed
clinic. It was denied that the landlord was in bonafide need of the
suit premises. Further case of the respondent No.1 was that since
his business flourished very much the appellant asked for enhanced
rent to which he refused and, therefore, he was asked to vacate the
suit premises.
The Trial Court after scrutinising the evidence on record
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4
held that the suit premises was genuinely and bonafide required by
the landlord and accordingly ordered eviction. The High Court inter
alia held that it was only a desire of the appellant No.2 to open a
clinic in the ground floor of the suit premises for his son-in-law and,
therefore, held that the landlords did not require the suit premises
reasonably and in good faith for occupation of the son-in-law. The
High Court also came to the finding that as the premises owned by
father of the son-in-law was lying vacant and in the absence of any
positive evidence that the said building was not suitable for a clinic,
the order of eviction was not sustainable.
The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant is
that by exercising powers under proviso to sub-section (8) of Section
14 of the Act, the High Court by the impugned order reversed the
finding of the Trial Court by re-appreciating the evidence on record
which is not permissible under the law.
Section 14 is a special procedure for disposal of cases for
eviction on ground of bonafide requirement. This summary
procedure for recovery of possession of any premises is available on
the ground specified in clause (c) or clause (e) of sub-section (1) of
Section 11 of the Act. We are concerned in the case in hand with
clause (c) which is a ground for passing decree for eviction where the
building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for
his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose
benefit building is held by the landlord. Sub-section (8) of Section 14
is quoted below:
14(8). No appeal or second appeal shall lie
against an order for the recovery of possession of
any premises made in accordance with procedure
specified in this section:
Provided that on an application being made within
sixty days of the date of the order of eviction the
High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself
that an order under the section is according to law,
call for the records of the case and pass such
order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
In a revision petition filed under proviso to above sub-
section (8) of Section 14 of the Act, the High Court has to satisfy itself
as to whether the order of eviction passed under Section 14 of the
Act was in accordance with law. The scope of the revisional
jurisdiction depends on the language of the statute. Though,
revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction, it
cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal.
An identical provision contain in proviso to Section 25B of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came up for consideration of this
Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta versus Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [1999
(6) SCC 222]. The Court held that the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court under this proviso is for the purpose of
satisfying if an order made by the Controller is according to law. The
Court further held that the revisional jurisdiction exercisable under the
said proviso is not so limited as is under Section 115 CPC nor so
wide as that of an appellate court and the High Court cannot enter
into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is
inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of
facts. The court further held that the High Court, however, is obliged
to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether
it is according to law and for that limited purpose may enter into
reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or
is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
reached on the material available.
In the light of above ratio let us now examine whether by
the impugned judgment the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction
by setting aside the order of Trial Court.
The High Court has recorded a finding that there is no
pleading that the son-in-law after completing studies is sitting idle or
unemployed and has no place other than the suit premises where he
could start his clinic. This finding is contrary to the record inasmuch
as in the application for eviction it was specifically stated that the said
son-in-law, who was a registered medical practitioner was
unemployed and the suit premises was required for starting a clinic
for him. The Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the
son-in-law who has obtained MBBS degree is a registered medical
practitioner and has started his medical practice two days in a week
in one room of the part of the suit premises, which was vacated by
one of the tenants. This finding of the Trial Court was based on
evidence on record but was not noticed by the High Court.
Regarding the house belonging to the father of the son-in-law of the
appellant, the High Court recorded a finding that the said house was
lying vacant and no positive evidence was adduced to show that it
was not suitable for medical practice. Relying on the evidence of the
son-in-law, PW-2, the Trial Court has recorded a clear finding that the
said house was away from the main road and was not suitable. It has
come out from the evidence of PW-2 and one of the witnesses for the
respondent-tenant that the suit premises being situated by the side of
main road where there are many clinics of other doctors, is better
suitable place in comparison with the house of the father of the son-
in-law for starting a clinic. The High Court also did not take into
consideration this finding of the Trial Court, which is based on
evidence on record. The finding of the High Court that it is a mere
desire of the appellant to open a clinic in the suit premises is not
acceptable as the son-in-law has already started practice in one room
of the suit premises.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court not
only overlooked the findings of the Trial Court which were based on
evidence but treated the revision petition as an appeal and did not
test the order of the Trial Court on the touchstone of whether it is
according to law. The finding of the High Court is erroneous and
accordingly we hold that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in
law.
We, therefore, find merit in the present appeal and
accordingly allow it by setting aside the impugned judgment of the
High Court and restoring the judgment of the Trial Court. Cost on the
parties. However, as the respondent-tenant is residing in the suit
premises since June, 1992, to meet the ends of justice and make
alternative arrangement, we grant him time to vacate the suit
premises by 31st December, 2002 subject to filing of usual
undertaking within four weeks from today.
.J
[R. P. Sethi]
J
[S. N. Phukan]
November 07, 2001.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4
1
9