Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 892 of 2007
PETITIONER:
U.B. Gadhe & Ors. etc.etc
RESPONDENT:
G.M., Gujarat Ambuja Cement Pvt. Ltd
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/09/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 892 OF 2007
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Appellants call in question the judgment rendered by a
learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court allowing the
Special Civil Applications filed by the respondent (hereinafter
referred to as the ’employer’).
2. The respondent had filed the applications questioning
correctness of the award dated 31.12.2004 passed by the
Labour Court. Another set of petitions were filed by the
employer questioning correctness of the said award by which
the Labour Court had partially allowed the reference of the
concerned workmen. By the said award the workmen were
directed to be re-instated in service with continuity but
without back wages. Challenge of the workmen was to the
award insofar as it provided for no back wages and only re-
instatement.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondent is involved in providing public utility
services. In the year 1989-1990, there were certain disputes
between the management and the employees. There was an
extended strike in which a large number of employees
employed by the respondent-company participated. This
disrupted the working of the plant where the concerned
workmen were employed. The respondent-company, therefore,
initiated disciplinary action against the striking employees.
Against the workmen concerned, charge sheet came to be
issued. Since the workmen did not participate they were
proceeded ex-parte. Eventually, eight workmen were dismissed
from the service by the respondent-company by order dated
01.03.1990. The concerned workmen, therefore, raised
industrial disputes challenging their dismissal orders.
Earlier once the references were disposed of by the
Labour Court by an award dated 23.04.1999. The workmen
concerned were directed to be reinstated in service with full
back-wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement. The
employer challenged the award of the Labour Court by filing
Special Civil Application No.6055/1999. The learned Single
Judge disposed of the application on 14.5.2004 by giving
certain directions, and the proceedings were remanded back to
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the Labour Court. These directions read as follows:
"11. For the reason stated above, it is
necessary to quash and set aside the
impugned judgment and awards while giving
the following directions:-
I. The proceedings of aforesaid Reference Cases
are remanded back to the Labour Court for re-
trial.
II. When the proceedings of the aforesaid cases
are remanded back to the Labour Court, the
petitioner will be at liberty to lead additional
evidence to substantiate its action taken
against the respondents.
III. The respondents will be at liberty to lead
evidence contra.
IV. The material already adduced before the
Labour Court including the oral evidence led
on behalf of the respondents will remain as it
is.
V. The Labour Court to complete the hearing
and final declaration of the judgment and
awards on or before 30th September, 2004.
VI. That parties to the aforesaid Reference
cases will fully cooperate the Labour Court
with the hearing of the cases and no
adjournment will be sought without compelling
reasons. The common judgment and award
passed in Reference L.C.A. Nos. 139/1998,
146/1998, 162/1998, 145/1998 and
150/1998 dated 23rd April, 1999 are hereby
ordered to be quashed and set aside. The
petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute with
no order as to costs".
4. After remand, the Labour Court took up the proceedings
afresh, recorded the evidence and passed the awards on
31.12.2004.
5. Before recording the observations and conclusions of the
Labour Court in the impugned award, it would be useful to
notice the allegations made against the concerned workmen by
the employer.
6. Charges against all the workmen were identical. Twelve
different charges were leveled against them. By way of
illustration the High Court took the case of appellant No.1.
The charges read as follows:
"(1) Use of impertinent languages, insult to
superiors, indecent behaviour, insubordination
and any act which is subversive of discipline.
(2) Unlawful cessation of work or going on
illegal strike in contravention of the provisions
of law and the standing orders and
participation in a sit down strike.
(3) Inciting and/or instigating other employees
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to take part in an illegal strike, sit down strike
and action in furtherance of such strike
launched in contravention of the provision of
law.
(4) Disorderly behaviour and conduct
endangering the life or safety of any person
within the factory premises.
(5) Act of sabotage of causing damage to the
work in progress or to any property of the
management wilfully.
(6) Wilful interference with the work of another
workman or of a person authorised by the
management to work on its premises.
(7) Holding or participating in the meetings,
demonstrations and shouting of slogans inside
the factory premises or mines or residential
colony.
(8) Unauthorised absence from duty for more
than eight consecutive days.
(9) Committing a nuisance in the premises of
the factory, breach of these standing orders.
(10) Canvassing for trade union membership
and collection of union funds within the
premises except as permissible under law.
(11) Making a false, vicious or malicious
statement in public against
management/factory or officer.
(12) Instigation, incitement, abetment or
furtherance of any of the above acts.
7. Out of the said charges, charge Nos. 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 11
were held to have been proved while charge No.1 was held to
be partially proved. Other charges were not proved.
8. The question relating to legality of the departmental
proceedings was examined first. The Labour Court held that
the enquiry conducted was legal and proper, but the Labour
Court found that some of the charges were not proved. It was
held that so far as the strike is concerned it was established
that the workmen were not justified in going on strike. It was
noted that undisputedly the concerned workmen had
participated in a strike. Accordingly, the Labour Court had
held that denial of back wages for a period of 14 to 15 years
for which the concerned workmen remained out of
employment would be sufficient punishment for the
misconduct proved against them. The High Court held that
once the charges have been proved, the Labour Court ought
not to have interfered with the quantum of punishment.
Accordingly, the employer’s Special Civil Applications were
allowed and those filed by the workmen were dismissed. It
was concluded inter alia as follows:
"7.3 The above observations were made with
regard to the scope of jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, same would however, apply also to the
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powers of the Labour Court or Industrial
Tribunal while examining the conclusions
arrived at by the employer during the course of
departmental inquiry.
7.5 I do not find that Labour Court
considered the evidence on record to come to
the above conclusions. The power of the
Labour Court to interfere with the findings
arrived at by the employer are extremely
narrow. If there is some evidence on record to
permit the employee to draw such conclusions,
it is not for the Labour Court to decide the
sufficiency of such evidence and unless the
conclusions are based on no evidence and,
therefore, perverse, Labour Court could not
have interfered with the same.
7.7. The Labour Court also proceeded to
consider the question of quantum of
punishment on the basis that the charge of
going on illegal strike was proved against the
workmen. The Labour Court ultimately found
that for the proved misconduct, punishment of
withholding of the back wages for a period of
14 to 15 years would be sufficient punishment.
The Labour Court found that order of
dismissal cannot be sustained."
9. It was concluded that since the Labour Court had held
that the workmen had proceeded on illegal strike and they
were leading participants in such a strike, the Labour Court
ought not to have interfered with the quantum of punishment,
specially when it was established that the employer is a public
utility service and the strike prolonged for a period of five
months.
10. The stand of learned counsel for the workmen was that
before the Conciliation Officer the employer had agreed to re-
instate the workmen and to take a sympathetic view.
11. The main plank of the appellants’ arguments was that
the parameters of Section 11-A of the Act had not been
considered by the High Court.
12. After the amendment of Section 11-A, the Labour Court
or the Tribunal, as the case may be, had ample power to
decide the question relating to quantum of punishment.
Decisions relied upon by the High Court either related to a
stage where amendment to Section 11-A was not there or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short
the ’Constitution’). The situation is different in cases in which
Section 11-A of the Act can apply.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
primary stand of the respondent before the High Court was
alleged agreement to consider the cases sympathetically. That
aspect was considered by the High Court in proper
perspective, considering the fact that after the arrangement
was agreed to, the employer appointed a Committee to
examine the matter that no sympathy was required to be
shown. The High Court’s approach is clearly correct in view of
the serious nature of the allegations against the appellants.
14. When the Labour Court found that the workmen had
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proceeded on illegal strike and that they were leading
participants in such a strike, the Labour Court ought not to
have interfered with the quantum of punishment especially
when it was established that the employer is a Public Utility
service and that the strike prolonged for a period of four to five
months. Even in the absence of any further proof of
involvement of the workmen for other misconduct of unruly
behaviour, abusing superiors officers, preventing officers from
entering the premises, preventing co-workers from resuming
duties and threatening the family members of the workmen
and collecting union subscription illegally, it is doubtful
whether the Labour Court could have reduced the
punishment and substituted the order of dismissal of lesser
punishment. As noted earlier, this Court in Mill Manager,
Model Mills Nagpur Ltd. v. Dharam Das, Etc. (AIR 1958 SC
311) had upheld the action of the employer in dismissing the
employees who were found to have gone on illegal strike.
15. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned
counsel for the workmen that before the Conciliation Officer,
the employer had agreed to reinstate the workmen concerned
as also the contention that having agreed to take a
sympathetic review of the situation, the employer failed to do
so and that therefore, the order is rendered illegal.
16. In the agreement, the following terms were provided:
"(1) The case of eight disputed workmen will be
reviewed sympathetically within a period of
one month.
(2) The workmen will give undertaking as
decided.
(3) The management has proposed the
principle of "No work no pay" as against which
the demand has been raised by the union
which will be decided jointly by Shri
Sureshbhai and Managing Director.
(4) If the company finds that the workman
has committed any misconduct or has done
something wrong after taking him in service it
will be open for the management to take steps
in accordance with law. "
17. The High Court, as noted above, has not considered the
case in the background of Section 11-A of the Act. Under
Section 11-A, wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal
in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances
of the case, whereas in the writ jurisdiction it is extremely
limited.
18. It is not necessary to go into in detail regarding the power
exercisable under Section 11-A of the Act. The power under
said Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the
Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, is
expected to interfere with the decision of a management under
Section 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that
punishment imposed by the management is wholly and
shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the
workman concerned. To support its conclusion, the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give
reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be
exercised judiciously and mere use of the words
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’disproportionate’ or ’grossly disproportionate’ by itself will not
be sufficient.
19. In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this,
perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency
towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning
and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen
to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and
should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction
of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy,
generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain
the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the
conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal
findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled
and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of
mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the
legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually
irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its
dignity, authority, predictability and respectability. [See:
Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr.
[1994 (1) SCALE 631)].
20. Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power
to reduce the quantum of punishment, it has to be done
within the parameters of law. Possession of power is itself not
sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance with law.
21. These aspects were highlighted in Life Insurance
Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani (AIR 2006 SC 615).
22. Power and discretion conferred under the Section
needless to say have to be exercised judicially and judiciously.
The Court exercising such power and finding the misconduct
to have been proved has to first advert to the question of
necessity or desirability to interfere with the punishment
imposed and if the employer does not justify the same on the
circumstances, thereafter to consider the relief that can be
granted. There must be compelling reason to vary the
punishment and it should not be done in a casual manner.
23. We would have asked the High Court to consider that
aspect. But considering the long passage of time, it would not
be proper to do so since the employer seems to be a public
utility service and the workmens’ continued utility to the
employer is gravely doubtful in view of their conduct. After
such a long period, it would not be in the interest of parties to
direct the High Court to consider parameters of Section 11-A
of the Act. Therefore, we have considered the matter, taking
into account the background facts. The proved misconduct is
definitely serious. The respondent has, as a matter of good
gesture, offered to pay each of the appellant rupees one lakh,
in view of the fact that they have received payment upto
December, 2004.
24. Taking into account all relevant aspects, the offer of
respondent appears to be fair and reasonable. Let the payment
be made within eight weeks from today.
25. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to
costs.