AZGAR BARID (D) BY LRS. vs. MAZAMBI @ PYAREMABI

CORRECTED REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2010 AZGAR BARID (D) BY LRS.        ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MAZAMBI @ PYAREMABI AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. th 1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 17 March   2009,   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at Bangalore in Regular Second Appeal No. 160 of 1995, thereby allowing the appeal filed by the respondents herein. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to filing of the present appeal are as under: 1 A suit for partition being O.S. No. 388/77 came to be filed by plaintiff Nos. 1 to 8, who are respondent Nos. 1 to 8 herein before the Prl. Munshiff at Kolar (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), for partition and separate possession of the suit th properties.   Vide judgment and decree dated 11   September 1987, the said suit came to be decreed, in part, declaring that th plaintiff No. 2 was entitled to 7/24   share and plaintiff No.3 th was entitled to 1/8  share in the suit schedule properties.  It was further held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share in suit Item Nos. 7 to 9 and 22.  Vide the said judgment and decree, the appellant herein­defendant No.1 was directed to render accounts in respect of the receipt and expenditure of the money incurred by him on the suit schedule properties for the period from the date of the suit till the date of effecting actual partition of the suit schedule properties.   It was further held that the appellant herein, who was defendant No.1, is liable to divide   the   profits   earned   from   the   properties   in   favour   of defendant Nos.2 and 3 to plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 as per their respective shares. 2 3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial   court,   the   appellant­defendant   No.1   through   L.Rs.   had filed Regular Appeal No. 60 of 1988 before the Prl. Civil Judge at Kolar (hereinafter referred to as the “First Appellate Court”). rd The said appeal was allowed by judgment and order dated 23 November   1994,   by   setting   aside   the   judgment   and   decree th dated 11  September 1987 passed by the trial court.   4. The   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   First  Appellate Court came to be challenged before the Karnataka High Court by filing Regular Second Appeal No. 160 of 1995.   The High th Court vide its judgment dated 18   March 1998, set aside the rd judgment and order dated 23   November 1994 passed by the First Appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree th dated   11   September   1987   passed   by   the   trial   court.    The th judgment passed by the High Court dated 18   March 1998 came to be challenged before this Court by filing Civil Appeal th No. 6478 of 1998.  This Court vide its order dated 17  August 2004,   found   that   the   High   Court   had   allowed   the   appeal without framing the questions of law as required under Section 3 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and set aside the th judgment dated 18   March 1998, passed by the High Court and remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal afresh in accordance with law.   5. On remand, the second appeal was heard afresh and the High Court framed the following questions of law: (1) Whether the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are entitled to share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties, particularly   when   Rehaman   Barid   through whom   plaintiffs   1   and   2   claim   partition predeceased his father ­ Mohiyuddin Pasha ­ the propositus?  (2) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in negativing the case of the plaintiffs 3 to 8 for partition and separate possession after having found   that   the   documents   Exs.P­1   to   P­7 disclose the paternity of plaintiffs 4 to 8?  4 (3) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in dismissing the suit filed by plaintiffs 3 to 8 mainly   on   the   ground   that   the   Nikhanama evidencing the marriage of plaintiff No.3 with Mohiyuddin Pasha is not produced?  (4) Whether the properties found in Mehar Deed Ex.D­1   executed   by   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   in favour   of   first   wife   Noorabi   are   liable   to   be divided among the parties to the present suit? 6. After answering the aforesaid questions of law, the High Court   vide   the   impugned   judgment,   held   that   all   the   suit schedule properties were required to be divided amongst Azgar Barid i.e. appellant­defendant No.1 and plaintiff Nos.3 to 8. The High Court also held that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were not entitled   for   any   share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties   as Rehaman Barid, husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff No.2   predeceased   the   propositus   i.e.,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha. Insofar as the shares of the parties are concerned, the High 5 Court held that the properties are liable to be divided amongst the legal heirs of Mohiyuddin Pasha in the following proportion:

7. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal is filed by the appellant­defendant No.1­Azgar Barid, through L.Rs. 8. We   have   heard   Shri   Naresh   Kaushik,   learned   counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­defendant No.1 and Shri Girish Ananthamurthy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­plaintiffs. 6 9. Shri Kaushik submitted that the trial court had decreed the suit only in favour of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3.  As such, in fact, the trial court held that plaintiff Nos. 4 to 8 were not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties of Mohiyuddin Pasha. The   said   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial   court   was   not challenged   by   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8.     The   same   was   only challenged   by   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1.     It   is therefore submitted that the second appeal at the behest of plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   was   not   at   all   tenable.     He   therefore submitted   that,   on   this   short   ground   alone,   this   appeal deserves to be allowed. 10. Shri Kaushik further submitted that though on remand by this Court, the High Court framed the questions of law, they cannot be construed to be questions of law inasmuch as all the said questions pertain to appreciation of evidence.  He therefore submitted that this appeal deserves to be allowed and the well­ reasoned   judgment  and   order   passed   by   the  First  Appellate Court deserves to be maintained. 7 11. Per contra, Shri Ananthamurthy submitted that the trial court had rightly appreciated the evidence.  However, the First Appellate   Court   had   reversed   the   same   on   the   basis   of conjectures and surmises.  The High Court has therefore rightly interfered with the same while reversing the judgment of the First Appellate Court.  He further submitted that in a partition suit, all the parties stand on a same pedestal and every party is a plaintiff as well as a defendant. 12. We will first deal with the objection of the appellant that since plaintiff Nos.4 to 8, whose claim was denied by the trial court and who had not challenged the same by way of appeal, are not entitled to relief in the second appeal.  This Court in the cases of  Bhagwan Swaroop and Others v. Mool Chand and 1 Others   and   Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Thera v. B.L. Shanker 2 , has held that in a suit for partition, the position and Others of the plaintiff and the defendant can be interchangeable.  Each party adopts the same position with the other parties.  It has 1 (1983) 2 SCC 132 2 1984 (Supp) SCC 631 8 been   further   held   that   so   long   as   the   suit   is   pending,   a defendant can ask the Court to transpose him as a plaintiff and a plaintiff can ask for being transposed as a defendant.   13. This Court in the case of  Chandramohan Ramchandra Patil and Others v. Bapu Koyappa Patil (Dead) Through 3 LRs and Others , has held thus:   “ 14.  Order 41 Rule 4 of the Code enables reversal of the decree by the court in appeal at the instance of one or some of the plaintiffs appealing and it can do so in favour of even non­appealing plaintiffs. As a necessary consequence such reversal of the decree can be against the interest of the defendants  vis­à­ vis  non­appealing plaintiffs. Order 41 Rule 4 has to be read with Order 41 Rule 33. Order 41 Rule 33 empowers the appellate court to do complete justice between the parties by passing such order or decree which ought to have been passed or made although not   all   the   parties   affected   by   the   decree   had appealed. 15.  In our opinion, therefore, the appellate court by invoking Order 41 Rule 4 read with Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code could grant relief even to the non­ appealing   plaintiffs   and   make   an   adverse   order against all the defendants and in favour of all the plaintiffs. In such a situation, it is not open to urge on   behalf   of   the   defendants   that   the   decree   of 3 (2003) 3 SCC 552 9 dismissal   of   suit   passed   by   the   trial   court   had become   final   between   the   non­appealing inter   se plaintiffs and the defendants.” 14. In that view of the matter, we find that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant with regard to plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 being not entitled to relief in the second appeal on the ground that they have not challenged the judgment and decree of   the   trial   court   before   the   First   Appellate   Court,   is   not sustainable.   As   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of (supra) ,   the   trial   court Chandramohan   Ramchandra   Patil   could grant relief even to the non­appealing plaintiffs and make an adverse order against all the defendants and in favour of all the plaintiffs.  Merely because the trial court had not granted relief in favour of plaintiff Nos.4 to 8, would not come in their way in the High Court allowing their claim. 15. That leads us to the other contention of the appellant.  It is sought to be urged by him that the High Court, in the second appeal, has framed questions of law, which are, in fact, not questions of law but questions of fact.   10 16. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board 4 : and Others “ 27.  There   is   no   prohibition   on   entertaining   a second appeal even on a question of fact provided the   court   is   satisfied   that   the   findings   of   fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non­ consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous   approach   to   the   matter   i.e.   that   the findings of fact are found to be perverse. But the High   Court   cannot   interfere   with   the   concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that   of   the   lower   courts.   (Vide  Jagdish Singh  v.  Natthu Singh  [(1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604] ;  Karnataka Board of Wakf  v.  Anjuman­E­ Ismail Madris­Un­Niswan  [(1999) 6 SCC 343 : AIR 1999   SC   3067]   and  Dinesh   Kumar  v.  Yusuf Ali  [(2010) 12 SCC 740 : AIR 2010 SC 2679] .) 28.  If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking   into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable 4 (2010) 13 SCC 216 11 or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity   or   the   findings   are   such   that   no reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those findings,   then   the   findings   may   be   said   to   be perverse. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjecture and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non­application of mind and thus, stands vitiated. (Vide   v.  Bharatha   Matha R.   Vijaya  [(2010)  11  SCC   483   :   AIR   2010  SC Renganathan 2685] .)” 17. This Court in the case of  Illoth Valappil Ambunhi (D) By 5 , has observed thus: LRs. v. Kunhambu Karanavan

18. Recently, this  Court in  the case of   K.N. Nagarajappa 6 , to which one of us (L.N. and Others v. H. Narasimha Reddy Rao, J.) was a party, has observed thus: “ 17.  In   a   recent   judgment   of   this   court,  Narayan Sitaramji   Badwaik   (Dead)   Through   Lrs.  v.  Bisaram 2021 SCC OnLine SC 319, this court observed as follows, in the context of High Courts' jurisdiction to appreciate factual issues under Section 103 IPC: 5 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1336 6 2021 SCC OnLine SC 694 12

19. The   parties   have   claimed   through   Mohiyuddin   Pasha. According   to   the   plaintiffs,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   had   earlier married Noorbi, who died in 1944.  Out of the said wedlock, two sons   namely   Rahaman   Barid   and   Azgar   Barid­appellant (defendant No.1) were born. Rahaman Barid was married to Rahamathunnisa­plaintiff   No.1.   Out   of   the   said   wedlock, 13 Noorjahan­plaintiff   No.2   was   born.   Rahaman   Barid   died   in 1945 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964. 20. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Noorbi in 1944, Mohiyuddin Pasha married Mazambi @ Pyarembi­plaintiff No.3.   Out   of   the   said   wedlock,   five   children   namely   Syed Rahaman   Barid   @   Sabulal­plaintiff   No.4,   Shakila   Begum­ plaintiff   No.5,   Zamila   Begum­plaintiff   No.6,   Akhila   Begum­ plaintiff No.7 and Rahiman Barid @ Ikbal Pasha­plaintiff No.8, were born. 21. The   appellant­defendant   No.1   has   not   disputed   that Rahaman Barid was his brother.  However, he contended that plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   i.e.   wife   and   daughter   respectively,   of Rahaman   Barid   were   not   entitled   to   any   share   in   the   suit schedule properties inasmuch as Rahaman Barid had died in 1944 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964. 22. The appellant­defendant No.1 has specifically denied that Mazambi @ Pyarembi­plaintiff No.3 was married to Mohiyuddin 14 Pasha and that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were children of Mohiyuddin Pasha. 23. It is further contended by the appellant­defendant No.1 that Mohiyuddin Pasha had executed a Mehar Deed in favour of th his first wife Noorbi, which was registered on 30   July 1936, and as such, the said properties ceased to be the properties of Mohiyuddin Pasha. 24. The trial court, on the basis of the evidence recorded, had come to a specific finding that after the death of his first wife Noorbi, Mohiyuddin Pasha had married Mazambi @ Pyarembi­ plaintiff No.3 and plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were born out of the said wedlock.  While arriving at such a finding, the trial court has relied on oral as well as documentary evidence.  The trial court further came to a finding that from the judgment passed in an earlier suit for partition i.e. O.S. No.514/1961, it was clear that Mohiyuddin Pasha as well as the appellant herein­defendant No.1 had taken a specific stand in O.S. No.514/1961 that the said Mehar Deed was a nominal one and was never acted upon. 15 It was also contended in the said suit that the properties were never   handed   over   to   the   first   wife   Noorbi   and   that   it   was created with a view to avoid the share to the first son Rahaman Barid. 25. These findings of fact were reversed by the First Appellate Court.   The First Appellate Court held that plaintiff No.3 had failed   to   prove   that   she   was   married   to   Mohiyuddin   Pasha, since she had failed to produce any documentary evidence in support thereof.   It further held that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 had failed   to   establish   that   they   were   the   children   of   deceased Mohiyuddin Pasha. It was held that neither plaintiff No.3 nor plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   were   entitled   to   any   share   in   the   suit schedule   properties.     Insofar   as   plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   are concerned, the First Appellate Court held that since they were claiming through Rahaman Barid, who died in 1945 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964, they are also not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties. 16 26. While holding that the finding of the First Appellate Court that  Mazambi  @  Pyarembi­plaintiff  No.3  was not  married to Mohiyuddin Pasha was erroneous in law, the High Court has mainly relied on the oral as well as the documentary evidence. 27. Syed Ahmed Ali­PW­1, who was aged 75 years at the time of   giving   evidence,   was   the   brother   of   Noorbi,   first   wife   of Mohiyuddin Pasha.   As such, he was a maternal uncle of the appellant   herein­defendant   No.1.   He   has   clearly   and emphatically deposed that Mohiyuddin Pasha had two wives i.e. Noorbi and Mazambi @ Pyarembi.  He has further deposed that after the death of his sister Noorbi, Mohiyuddin Pashaa took Mazambi   @   Pyarembi   as   his   second   wife.     He   has   also specifically   deposed   that   he   has   attended   the   marriage   of Mazambi   @   Pyarembi­plaintiff   No.3   with   Mohiyuddin   Pasha. The   High   Court   found   that   in   spite   of   searching   cross­ examination, nothing came on record to discard the evidence of PW­1.   It was further found that the evidence of PW­1 was supported by Nabi Sab­PW­2, who was also an independent 17 witness.     Appenna­PW­3,   who   was   also   an   independent witness, supported the case of the plaintiffs. 28. The High Court found that the voluminous documents of evidence including the birth certificates of plaintiff Nos.4 to 8, the   transfer   certificates   issued   by   the   Government   Higher Primary   School,   Thadigol   and   Higher   Primary   Boys   School, Thadigol, established that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were the children born to Mohiyuddin Pasha through Mazambi @ Pyarembi.  We are of the view that, the High Court rightly interfered with the findings as recorded by the First Appellate Court, inasmuch as the   First   Appellate   Court   was   not   justified   in   reversing   the findings of the trial court in that regard which were based on proper appreciation of evidence.   We are of the view that the First Appellate Court had failed in appreciating the evidence in correct perspective.  The High Court was justified in reversing the same. 29. Similarly, the High Court found that the Mehar Deed in favour of deceased Noorbi, first wife of Mohiyuddin Pasha, was 18 a nominal one and was not acted upon and the reversal of the findings of the trial court by the First Appellate Court in that regard, was erroneous.  It will be relevant to note that the trial court, on the basis of the proceedings in the earlier suit for partition i.e. O.S. No.514/1961, had found that in the said suit for partition, deceased Mohiyuddin Pasha was defendant No.1, whereas   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1   was   defendant No.2.  In the said suit, the case pleaded by them was that the first son of Noorbi and Mohiyuddin Pasha, namely Rahaman Barid, was demanding separate share in the properties and was residing separately.  It was therefore contended by them in their respective written statements that to avoid any share in the suit schedule properties, deceased Mohiyuddin Pasha had created the Mehar Deed in favour of his first wife Noorbi.   The High Court found that in view of the findings arrived in the said O.S. No.514/1961,   which   were   based   on   the   admission   of Mohiyuddin   Pasha   and   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1 herein, it was not open for the appellant herein­defendant No.1 again   to   contend   that   the   properties   belonged   to   Noorbi 19 exclusively as they were given to her in Mehar.  The High Court further found that the appellant herein­defendant No.1 himself had produced the judgment in O.S. No.514/1961 at Ex.D­16 and relied upon the same for opposing the present suit for partition.   30. It could thus clearly be seen that in the present case, the First Appellate Court had reversed the findings recorded by the trial   court   which   were   based   upon   correct   appreciation   of evidence.  The High Court has given sound and cogent reasons as   to   why   an   interference   with   the   findings   of   the   First Appellate   Court   was   required.   We   also   find   that   the   First Appellate   Court   has   failed   to   take   into   consideration   the voluminous oral as well as documentary evidence, on the basis of which the trial court had recorded its findings.  The findings as   recorded   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   are   based   on conjectures and surmises.  As such, we are of the considered view that the perverse approach of the First Appellate Court in arriving at the findings would give rise to a substantial question 20 of law, thereby justifying the High Court to interfere with the same.   31. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this appeal.  Hence, this appeal is dismissed. 32. No order as to cost.   Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms. ….……..….......................J.                                                        [L. NAGESWARA RAO]     ………….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 21, 2022. 21 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2010 AZGAR BARID (D) BY LRS. AND OTHERS     ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MAZAMBI @ PYAREMABI AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. th 1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 17 March   2009,   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at Bangalore in Regular Second Appeal No. 160 of 1995, thereby allowing the appeal filed by the respondents herein. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to filing of the present appeal are as under: 1 A suit for partition being O.S. No. 388/77 came to be filed by plaintiff Nos. 1 to 8, who are respondent Nos. 1 to 8 herein before the Prl. Munshiff at Kolar (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), for partition and separate possession of the suit th properties.   Vide judgment and decree dated 11   September 1987, the said suit came to be decreed, in part, declaring that th plaintiff No. 2 was entitled to 7/24   share and plaintiff No.3 th was entitled to 1/8  share in the suit schedule properties.  It was further held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share in suit Item Nos. 7 to 9 and 22.  Vide the said judgment and decree, the appellant herein­defendant No.1 was directed to render accounts in respect of the receipt and expenditure of the money incurred by him on the suit schedule properties for the period from the date of the suit till the date of effecting actual partition of the suit schedule properties.   It was further held that the appellant herein, who was defendant No.1, is liable to divide   the   profits   earned   from   the   properties   in   favour   of defendant Nos.2 and 3 to plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 as per their respective shares. 2 3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial   court,   the   appellant­defendant   No.1   through   L.Rs.   had filed Regular Appeal No. 60 of 1988 before the Prl. Civil Judge at Kolar (hereinafter referred to as the “First Appellate Court”). rd The said appeal was allowed by judgment and order dated 23 November   1994,   by   setting   aside   the   judgment   and   decree th dated 11  September 1987 passed by the trial court.   4. The   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   First  Appellate Court came to be challenged before the Karnataka High Court by filing Regular Second Appeal No. 160 of 1995.   The High th Court vide its judgment dated 18   March 1998, set aside the rd judgment and order dated 23   November 1994 passed by the First Appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree th dated   11   September   1987   passed   by   the   trial   court.    The th judgment passed by the High Court dated 18   March 1998 came to be challenged before this Court by filing Civil Appeal th No. 6478 of 1998.  This Court vide its order dated 17  August 2004,   found   that   the   High   Court   had   allowed   the   appeal without framing the questions of law as required under Section 3 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and set aside the th judgment dated 18   March 1998, passed by the High Court and remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal afresh in accordance with law.   5. On remand, the second appeal was heard afresh and the High Court framed the following questions of law: (1) Whether the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are entitled to share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties, particularly   when   Rehaman   Barid   through whom   plaintiffs   1   and   2   claim   partition predeceased his father ­ Mohiyuddin Pasha ­ the propositus?  (2) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in negativing the case of the plaintiffs 3 to 8 for partition and separate possession after having found   that   the   documents   Exs.P­1   to   P­7 disclose the paternity of plaintiffs 4 to 8?  4 (3) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in dismissing the suit filed by plaintiffs 3 to 8 mainly   on   the   ground   that   the   Nikhanama evidencing the marriage of plaintiff No.3 with Mohiyuddin Pasha is not produced?  (4) Whether the properties found in Mehar Deed Ex.D­1   executed   by   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   in favour   of   first   wife   Noorabi   are   liable   to   be divided among the parties to the present suit? 6. After answering the aforesaid questions of law, the High Court   vide   the   impugned   judgment,   held   that   all   the   suit schedule properties were required to be divided amongst Azgar Barid i.e. appellant­defendant No.1 and plaintiff Nos.3 to 8. The High Court also held that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were not entitled   for   any   share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties   as Rehaman Barid, husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff No.2   predeceased   the   propositus   i.e.,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha. Insofar as the shares of the parties are concerned, the High 5 Court held that the properties are liable to be divided amongst the legal heirs of Mohiyuddin Pasha in the following proportion:

7. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal is filed by the appellant­defendant No.1­Azgar Barid, through L.Rs. 8. We   have   heard   Shri   Naresh   Kaushik,   learned   counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­defendant No.1 and Shri Girish Ananthamurthy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­plaintiffs. 6 9. Shri Kaushik submitted that the trial court had decreed the suit only in favour of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3.  As such, in fact, the trial court held that plaintiff Nos. 4 to 8 were not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties of Mohiyuddin Pasha. The   said   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial   court   was   not challenged   by   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8.     The   same   was   only challenged   by   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1.     It   is therefore submitted that the second appeal at the behest of plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   was   not   at   all   tenable.     He   therefore submitted   that,   on   this   short   ground   alone,   this   appeal deserves to be allowed. 10. Shri Kaushik further submitted that though on remand by this Court, the High Court framed the questions of law, they cannot be construed to be questions of law inasmuch as all the said questions pertain to appreciation of evidence.  He therefore submitted that this appeal deserves to be allowed and the well­ reasoned   judgment  and   order   passed   by   the  First  Appellate Court deserves to be maintained. 7 11. Per contra, Shri Ananthamurthy submitted that the trial court had rightly appreciated the evidence.  However, the First Appellate   Court   had   reversed   the   same   on   the   basis   of conjectures and surmises.  The High Court has therefore rightly interfered with the same while reversing the judgment of the First Appellate Court.  He further submitted that in a partition suit, all the parties stand on a same pedestal and every party is a plaintiff as well as a defendant. 12. We will first deal with the objection of the appellant that since plaintiff Nos.4 to 8, whose claim was denied by the trial court and who had not challenged the same by way of appeal, are not entitled to relief in the second appeal.  This Court in the cases of  Bhagwan Swaroop and Others v. Mool Chand and 1 Others   and   Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Thera v. B.L. Shanker 2 , has held that in a suit for partition, the position and Others of the plaintiff and the defendant can be interchangeable.  Each party adopts the same position with the other parties.  It has 1 (1983) 2 SCC 132 2 1984 (Supp) SCC 631 8 been   further   held   that   so   long   as   the   suit   is   pending,   a defendant can ask the Court to transpose him as a plaintiff and a plaintiff can ask for being transposed as a defendant.   13. This Court in the case of  Chandramohan Ramchandra Patil and Others v. Bapu Koyappa Patil (Dead) Through 3 LRs and Others , has held thus:   “ 14.  Order 41 Rule 4 of the Code enables reversal of the decree by the court in appeal at the instance of one or some of the plaintiffs appealing and it can do so in favour of even non­appealing plaintiffs. As a necessary consequence such reversal of the decree can be against the interest of the defendants  vis­à­ vis  non­appealing plaintiffs. Order 41 Rule 4 has to be read with Order 41 Rule 33. Order 41 Rule 33 empowers the appellate court to do complete justice between the parties by passing such order or decree which ought to have been passed or made although not   all   the   parties   affected   by   the   decree   had appealed. 15.  In our opinion, therefore, the appellate court by invoking Order 41 Rule 4 read with Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code could grant relief even to the non­ appealing   plaintiffs   and   make   an   adverse   order against all the defendants and in favour of all the plaintiffs. In such a situation, it is not open to urge on   behalf   of   the   defendants   that   the   decree   of 3 (2003) 3 SCC 552 9 dismissal   of   suit   passed   by   the   trial   court   had become   final   between   the   non­appealing inter   se plaintiffs and the defendants.” 14. In that view of the matter, we find that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant with regard to plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 being not entitled to relief in the second appeal on the ground that they have not challenged the judgment and decree of   the   trial   court   before   the   First   Appellate   Court,   is   not sustainable.   As   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of (supra) ,   the   trial   court Chandramohan   Ramchandra   Patil   could grant relief even to the non­appealing plaintiffs and make an adverse order against all the defendants and in favour of all the plaintiffs.  Merely because the trial court had not granted relief in favour of plaintiff Nos.4 to 8, would not come in their way in the High Court allowing their claim. 15. That leads us to the other contention of the appellant.  It is sought to be urged by him that the High Court, in the second appeal, has framed questions of law, which are, in fact, not questions of law but questions of fact.   10 16. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board 4 : and Others “ 27.  There   is   no   prohibition   on   entertaining   a second appeal even on a question of fact provided the   court   is   satisfied   that   the   findings   of   fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non­ consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous   approach   to   the   matter   i.e.   that   the findings of fact are found to be perverse. But the High   Court   cannot   interfere   with   the   concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that   of   the   lower   courts.   (Vide  Jagdish Singh  v.  Natthu Singh  [(1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604] ;  Karnataka Board of Wakf  v.  Anjuman­E­ Ismail Madris­Un­Niswan  [(1999) 6 SCC 343 : AIR 1999   SC   3067]   and  Dinesh   Kumar  v.  Yusuf Ali  [(2010) 12 SCC 740 : AIR 2010 SC 2679] .) 28.  If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking   into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable 4 (2010) 13 SCC 216 11 or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity   or   the   findings   are   such   that   no reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those findings,   then   the   findings   may   be   said   to   be perverse. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjecture and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non­application of mind and thus, stands vitiated. (Vide   v.  Bharatha   Matha R.   Vijaya  [(2010)  11  SCC   483   :   AIR   2010  SC Renganathan 2685] .)” 17. This Court in the case of  Illoth Valappil Ambunhi (D) By 5 , has observed thus: LRs. v. Kunhambu Karanavan

18. Recently, this  Court in  the case of   K.N. Nagarajappa 6 , to which one of us (L.N. and Others v. H. Narasimha Reddy Rao, J.) was a party, has observed thus: “ 17.  In   a   recent   judgment   of   this   court,  Narayan Sitaramji   Badwaik   (Dead)   Through   Lrs.  v.  Bisaram 2021 SCC OnLine SC 319, this court observed as follows, in the context of High Courts' jurisdiction to appreciate factual issues under Section 103 IPC: 5 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1336 6 2021 SCC OnLine SC 694 12

19. The   parties   have   claimed   through   Mohiyuddin   Pasha. According   to   the   plaintiffs,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   had   earlier married Noorbi, who died in 1944.  Out of the said wedlock, two sons   namely   Rahaman   Barid   and   Azgar   Barid­appellant (defendant No.1) were born. Rahaman Barid was married to Rahamathunnisa­plaintiff   No.1.   Out   of   the   said   wedlock, 13 Noorjahan­plaintiff   No.2   was   born.   Rahaman   Barid   died   in 1945 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964. 20. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Noorbi in 1944, Mohiyuddin Pasha married Mazambi @ Pyarembi­plaintiff No.3.   Out   of   the   said   wedlock,   five   children   namely   Syed Rahaman   Barid   @   Sabulal­plaintiff   No.4,   Shakila   Begum­ plaintiff   No.5,   Zamila   Begum­plaintiff   No.6,   Akhila   Begum­ plaintiff No.7 and Rahiman Barid @ Ikbal Pasha­plaintiff No.8, were born. 21. The   appellant­defendant   No.1   has   not   disputed   that Rahaman Barid was his brother.  However, he contended that plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   i.e.   wife   and   daughter   respectively,   of Rahaman   Barid   were   not   entitled   to   any   share   in   the   suit schedule properties inasmuch as Rahaman Barid had died in 1944 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964. 22. The appellant­defendant No.1 has specifically denied that Mazambi @ Pyarembi­plaintiff No.3 was married to Mohiyuddin 14 Pasha and that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were children of Mohiyuddin Pasha. 23. It is further contended by the appellant­defendant No.1 that Mohiyuddin Pasha had executed a Mehar Deed in favour of th his first wife Noorbi, which was registered on 30   July 1936, and as such, the said properties ceased to be the properties of Mohiyuddin Pasha. 24. The trial court, on the basis of the evidence recorded, had come to a specific finding that after the death of his first wife Noorbi, Mohiyuddin Pasha had married Mazambi @ Pyarembi­ plaintiff No.3 and plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were born out of the said wedlock.  While arriving at such a finding, the trial court has relied on oral as well as documentary evidence.  The trial court further came to a finding that from the judgment passed in an earlier suit for partition i.e. O.S. No.514/1961, it was clear that Mohiyuddin Pasha as well as the appellant herein­defendant No.1 had taken a specific stand in O.S. No.514/1961 that the said Mehar Deed was a nominal one and was never acted upon. 15 It was also contended in the said suit that the properties were never   handed   over   to   the   first   wife   Noorbi   and   that   it   was created with a view to avoid the share to the first son Rahaman Barid. 25. These findings of fact were reversed by the First Appellate Court.   The First Appellate Court held that plaintiff No.3 had failed   to   prove   that   she   was   married   to   Mohiyuddin   Pasha, since she had failed to produce any documentary evidence in support thereof.   It further held that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 had failed   to   establish   that   they   were   the   children   of   deceased Mohiyuddin Pasha. It was held that neither plaintiff No.3 nor plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   were   entitled   to   any   share   in   the   suit schedule   properties.     Insofar   as   plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   are concerned, the First Appellate Court held that since they were claiming through Rahaman Barid, who died in 1945 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964, they are also not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties. 16 26. While holding that the finding of the First Appellate Court that  Mazambi  @  Pyarembi­plaintiff  No.3  was not  married to Mohiyuddin Pasha was erroneous in law, the High Court has mainly relied on the oral as well as the documentary evidence. 27. Syed Ahmed Ali­PW­1, who was aged 75 years at the time of   giving   evidence,   was   the   brother   of   Noorbi,   first   wife   of Mohiyuddin Pasha.   As such, he was a maternal uncle of the appellant   herein­defendant   No.1.   He   has   clearly   and emphatically deposed that Mohiyuddin Pasha had two wives i.e. Noorbi and Mazambi @ Pyarembi.  He has further deposed that after the death of his sister Noorbi, Mohiyuddin Pashaa took Mazambi   @   Pyarembi   as   his   second   wife.     He   has   also specifically   deposed   that   he   has   attended   the   marriage   of Mazambi   @   Pyarembi­plaintiff   No.3   with   Mohiyuddin   Pasha. The   High   Court   found   that   in   spite   of   searching   cross­ examination, nothing came on record to discard the evidence of PW­1.   It was further found that the evidence of PW­1 was supported by Nabi Sab­PW­2, who was also an independent 17 witness.     Appenna­PW­3,   who   was   also   an   independent witness, supported the case of the plaintiffs. 28. The High Court found that the voluminous documents of evidence including the birth certificates of plaintiff Nos.4 to 8, the   transfer   certificates   issued   by   the   Government   Higher Primary   School,   Thadigol   and   Higher   Primary   Boys   School, Thadigol, established that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were the children born to Mohiyuddin Pasha through Mazambi @ Pyarembi.  We are of the view that, the High Court rightly interfered with the findings as recorded by the First Appellate Court, inasmuch as the   First   Appellate   Court   was   not   justified   in   reversing   the findings of the trial court in that regard which were based on proper appreciation of evidence.   We are of the view that the First Appellate Court had failed in appreciating the evidence in correct perspective.  The High Court was justified in reversing the same. 29. Similarly, the High Court found that the Mehar Deed in favour of deceased Noorbi, first wife of Mohiyuddin Pasha, was 18 a nominal one and was not acted upon and the reversal of the findings of the trial court by the First Appellate Court in that regard, was erroneous.  It will be relevant to note that the trial court, on the basis of the proceedings in the earlier suit for partition i.e. O.S. No.514/1961, had found that in the said suit for partition, deceased Mohiyuddin Pasha was defendant No.1, whereas   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1   was   defendant No.2.  In the said suit, the case pleaded by them was that the first son of Noorbi and Mohiyuddin Pasha, namely Rahaman Barid, was demanding separate share in the properties and was residing separately.  It was therefore contended by them in their respective written statements that to avoid any share in the suit schedule properties, deceased Mohiyuddin Pasha had created the Mehar Deed in favour of his first wife Noorbi.   The High Court found that in view of the findings arrived in the said O.S. No.514/1961,   which   were   based   on   the   admission   of Mohiyuddin   Pasha   and   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1 herein, it was not open for the appellant herein­defendant No.1 again   to   contend   that   the   properties   belonged   to   Noorbi 19 exclusively as they were given to her in Mehar.  The High Court further found that the appellant herein­defendant No.1 himself had produced the judgment in O.S. No.514/1961 at Ex.D­16 and relied upon the same for opposing the present suit for partition.   30. It could thus clearly be seen that in the present case, the First Appellate Court had reversed the findings recorded by the trial   court   which   were   based   upon   correct   appreciation   of evidence.  The High Court has given sound and cogent reasons as   to   why   an   interference   with   the   findings   of   the   First Appellate   Court   was   required.   We   also   find   that   the   First Appellate   Court   has   failed   to   take   into   consideration   the voluminous oral as well as documentary evidence, on the basis of which the trial court had recorded its findings.  The findings as   recorded   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   are   based   on conjectures and surmises.  As such, we are of the considered view that the perverse approach of the First Appellate Court in arriving at the findings would give rise to a substantial question 20 of law, thereby justifying the High Court to interfere with the same.   31. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this appeal.  Hence, this appeal is dismissed. 32. No order as to cost.   Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms. ….……..….......................J.                                                        [L. NAGESWARA RAO]     ………….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 21, 2022. 21