Nagarajan vs. The State Of Tamil Nadu

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 703
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1390 OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 8401/2022]

NAGARAJAN & ANR. … APPELLANT(S)
VS.
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2054 OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 2217 OF 2022]

NARESH CHANDRA @ NARESH BABU … APPELLANT(S)
VS.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

T HE A PPEALS
1. The two criminal appeals before us, arising from different incidents
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2025.05.15
17:30:29 IST
Reason:
of crime, question the correctness of two decisions of the respective
High Courts involving the same question of law. We, therefore,

propose to decide the said two appeals by this common judgment
and order.
2. In the lead appeal, the appellants - Nagarajan and Selvaraj - have
1
assailed the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras
th 2
dated 04 June, 2019 dismissing the criminal revision filed by them
on the grounds assigned therein.
3. In the connected appeal, the appellant - Naresh Chandra - has
3
assailed the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
th 4
dated 04 July, 2019. The criminal revision filed by the appellant
was dismissed thereby on similar grounds.
F ACTUAL M ATRIX
4. The case of the prosecution in the lead appeal is that a sample of
th
curd was taken from the shop of the appellants on 26 June, 2001 at
about 14:30 hours and sent for analysis. The analysis revealed that
the standard, prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration
5
Act, 1954 and the relevant rules, was not fulfilled. A complaint came
to be registered followed by trial. Upon perusal of the evidence, vide
th
judgment and order dated 18 June, 2006, the Trial Court convicted
Nagarajan and Selvaraj under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) r/w
Section 2(ia)(a)(m) of the PoFA Act and sentenced them to undergo
simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months each and to pay a fine of Rs.

1
Madras High Court
2
CRLRC (MD) No. 111/2010
3
Allahabad High Court
4
CRLR No. 1660/1998
5
PoFA Act
2


3000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 (two)
months each.
6
5. Aggrieved, Nagarajan and Selvaraj filed an appeal before the
concerned Appellate Court, which confirmed the conviction and the
th
sentence of the Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 18
December, 2009.
6. Still aggrieved, Nagarajan and Selvaraj invoked the revisional
jurisdiction of the Madras High Court unsuccessfully.
7. The case of the prosecution in the connected appeal is that at about
th
10:45 hours on 20 March, 1985, in the area of Karkala Bazaar, the
concerned Food Inspector found Naresh Chandra selling spice, chilli
powder, flour, cooking oil, salt and other stuff. Upon suspicion, the
Food Inspector presented Form VI to Naresh Chandra who refused to
accept and sign it. The Food Inspector then called on witnesses
present there; however, no one agreed to take part except one
Radhey Lal (PW2). Thereupon, an attempt was made by the Food
Inspector to take a sample on his own. Naresh Chandra intimidated
the Food Inspector and refused to allow him to take a sample. The
complaint lodged by the Food Inspector eventually led to a trial. The
th
Trial Court vide order dated 25 August, 1987 convicted Naresh
Chandra u/s Section 7/10(1) r/w Section 16(1)(c)(d) of the PoFA Act
and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 (six)

6
CA No. 183 of 2004
3


months and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to undergo simple
imprisonment for 2 (two) more months.
7
8. The conviction and sentence had been carried in appeal by Naresh
Chandra whereupon, the Appellate Court upheld the same and
th
dismissed the appeal vide order dated 16 November, 1988.
9. The appellate judgment and order having been subjected to challenge
before the Allahabad High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, vide the
impugned judgment, the court refused to interfere and dismissed the
revision.
ONTENTIONS
C
10. Mollification of sentence is sought on behalf of the two sets of
appellants by learned counsel appearing on their behalf on the
common following grounds:
a. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act effectively denies the benefit
of probation for first-time offenders, thereby violating Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
b. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act violates Article 21 of the
Constitution as denial of probation impacts the liberty of
individuals without due consideration of their circumstances
8
considering that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is to
rehabilitate offenders and reduce the burden on the prison
system.

7
Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 1987
8
Probation Act
4


c. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act contradicts the reformative
justice approach enshrined in Section 360 of the Criminal
9
Procedure Code, 1973 which encourages rehabilitation of
offenders.
10
d. That the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 , which
repealed the PoFA Act, does not include a provision equivalent
to Section 20AA evincing the legislative intent to move towards
a reformatory framework.
11. However, learned counsel for the respondent in the lead appeal -
State of Tamil Nadu - has placed great reliance on the express words
in Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, prescribing a categorical and
complete exclusion of the applicability of the Probation Act and
Section 360 of the Cr. PC. Therefore, according to the State, the
legislative intent is clear that food adulteration is a crime against
public health and the perpetrators of such crimes must face
consequences for their acts of crimes. Furthermore, emphasis was
laid on incorporation of Section 20AA in the PoFA Act by way of
amendment and reliance was placed on the Statement of Object and
Reasons for such amendment highlighting the growing concern over
the prevalence of food adulteration and the inadequacy of existing
provincial laws to address the issue uniformly.
12. The State of Uttar Pradesh has not pressed any arguments before us.

9
Cr. PC
10
FSS Act
5


T HE L EGISLATIVE F RAMEWORK
13. Section 20AA was introduced in the PoFA Act though an amendment
in 1976. It reads thus:
20AA. Application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and
section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.— Nothing
contained in the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or
section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall
apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless that
person is under eighteen years of age.

14. The PoFA Act was repealed by the FSS Act. We may also refer to
Section 97 of the FSS Act, which deals with ‘repeal and savings’. The
proviso to Section 97 specifically saves certain aspects of the PoFA
Act. The relevant part is reproduced below:
97. Repeal and savings.–
…
Provided that such repeal shall not affect:—
(i) the previous operations of the enactment and Orders under
repeal or anything duly done or suffered there under; or
(ii) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under any of the enactment or Orders under repeal;
or
(iii) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of
any offences committed against the enactment and Orders
under repeal; or
(iv) any investigation or remedy in respect of any such penalty,
forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal
proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or
enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may
be imposed, as if this Act had not been passed.
…
15. The appellants have largely based their arguments on the basis of

Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which is as follows:
20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.— (1) No
person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law
in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an
offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might
have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offence.

6


16. Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966, which was ratified by India in 1979, includes a provision
similar to Article 20(1) of the Constitution. It says:
Article 15. 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed.
If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made
by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall
benefit thereby.

11
17. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 notes the effect of a
repeal of any enactment:
6. Effect of repeal.— Where this Act, or any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any
enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
different intention appears, the repeal shall not—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the
repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued
or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect
of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of
any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and
any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the
repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.

18. Section 26 of the GC Act positing a situation of an offence being
punishable under two or more enactments, ordains that the offender
shall be liable to punishment only under one of those enactments and
not under both [quite falling in line with Article 20(2) of the
Constitution]. It reads thus:

11
GC Act, hereafter
7


26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more
enactments.— Where an act or omission constitutes an offence
under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to
be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments,
but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence

19. The relevant part of Section 16 of the PoFA Act stipulating penalties
reads as follows:
16. Penalties.— (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A) if
any person—
(a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf,
imports into India or manufacturers for sale or stores, sells or
distributes any article of food—
(i) which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-
clause (m) of clause (ia) of section 2 or misbranded
within the meaning of clause (ix) of that section or the
sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this
Act or any rule made thereunder or by an order of the
Food (Health) Authority;
(ii) Other than an article of food referred to in sub-
clause (I), in contravention of any of the provision of
this Act or of any rule made thereunder, or
…
(c) prevents a food inspector from taking a sample as
authorised by this Act; or
(d) prevents a food inspector from exercising any other power
conferred on him by or under this Act;
…
he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under
the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend
to three years, and with fine which shall not be less than one
thousand rupees:
…

UESTIONS
Q
20. Special Leave Petitions having been presented before this Court by
the two sets of appellants, separate coordinate Benches issued
notice, limited to the question of sentence.
21. Based on the rival contentions, two short but interesting inter-
connected questions of law arise for decision in the present appeals:
8


(i) whether the benefit of the provisions of the Probation Act can be
granted to the respective appellants? (ii) should the answer to the
above question be in the negative, can the reduced sentence that the
FSS Act envisages be imposed on the appellants instead?
NALYSIS
A
22. We now proceed with our analysis. The task ought to commence with
a study of judicial precedents.
P RECEDENTS

23. The parties before us have referred to a catena of decisions of this
Court in support of their contentions. A study of such decisions along
with a few other decisions would provide guidance for the ultimate
disposal of these appeals.

12
(1973) 2 SCC 65
9

13
under the PoFA Act in Jai Narain v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi ,
while upholding the view expressed in Ishar Das (supra), held that
the conduct of the appellant therein being anti-social did not merit
the application of the Probation Act.
26. Yet again, in the case of Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo
14
Ramchandra Dange , this Court, through Hon’ble V.R. Krishna

13
(1972) 2 SCC 637
14
(1974) 1 SCC 167
10


Iyer, J., upheld the view in Ishar Das (supra) and observed that the
offence under the PoFA Act is an economic offence and would
therefore, not be easily susceptible to the probationary process. We
quote His Lordship hereunder:
“ 28. The kindly application of the probation principles is negatived
by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of moral
proselyti-sation. No chances can be taken by society with a man
whose anti-social operations, disguised as a respectable trade,
imperil numerous innocents. He is a security risk. Secondly, these
economic offences committed by white-collar criminals are unlikely
to be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process. Neither casual
provocation nor motive against particular persons but planned profit-
making from numbers of consumers furnishes the incentive — not
easily humanised by the therapeutic probationary measure. It is not
without significance that the recent report (47th report) of the Law
Commission of India has recommended the exclusion of the Act to
social and economic offences by suitable amendments. It observed:
‘We appreciate that the suggested amendment would be in
apparent conflict with current trends in sentencing. But
ultimately, the justification of all sentencing is the protection
of society. There are occasions when an offender is so anti-
social that his immediate and sometimes prolonged
confinement is the best assurance of society's protection. The
consideration of rehabilitation has to give way, because of the
paramount need for the protection of society. We are,
therefore, recommending suitable amendment in all the Acts,
to exclude probation in the above cases’.”

27. Shortly after the amendment in 1976, this Court speaking through
Hon’ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in Prem Ballab
15
v. State (Delhi Admn.) , while deciding on a similar issue arising
from the unamended statute, observed that:
“ 7. …The imperatives of social defence must discourage the
applicability of the probation principle. No chances can be taken by
society with a man whose anti-social activities, in the guise of a
respectable trade, jeopardise the health and well-being of numerous
innocent consumers. The adulterator is a social risk. It might be
dangerous to leave him free to carry on his nefarious activities by
applying the probation principle to him. Moreover, it must be
remembered that adulteration is an economic offence prompted by

15
(1977) 1 SCC 173
11

16
Henry Ah Hoe , was called upon to decide various issues including
the issue whether a convict is entitled to the mollified sentence on
account of the fact that the new Central enactment provided for a
lesser punishment for the same offence as compared with an older
State enactment under which the appellant was convicted. Hon’ble
A.P. Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench ruled
that:
“ 11. It was not long before Parliament stepped in to meet the
growing menace of the anti-social offence of adulteration of articles
of food meant for human consumption which was a threat to the
national well-being and it was felt that such offences must be
ruthlessly dealt with. It was also felt that there should be a summary
trial of these offences. The Prevention of Food Adulteration
(Amendment) Act, 1976 was accordingly brought into force with
effect from April 1, 1976. It not only created new offences but also
enhanced the punishment provided. But at the same time it also
provided for graded punishment for various types of offences.
Incidentally, it mollified the rigour of the law by providing for a
reduced punishment for an offence punishable under Section
16(1)( a ). We are however not concerned with other types of offences
except the one punishable under Section 16(1)( a ) and for this the

16
(1983) 1 SCC 177
12


maximum punishment provided was for a term of three years instead
of six years…
…
22. It is only retroactive criminal legislation that is prohibited under
Article 20(1). The prohibition contained in Article 20(1) is that no
person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law
in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an
offence prohibits nor shall he be subjected to a penalty greater than
that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the
time of the commission of the offence. It is quite clear that insofar as
the Central Amendment Act creates new offences or enhances
punishment for a particular type of offence no person can be
convicted by such ex post facto law nor can the enhanced punishment
prescribed by the amendment be applicable. But insofar as the
Central Amendment Act reduces the punishment for an offence
punishable under Section 16(1)( a ) of the Act, there is no reason why
the accused should not have the benefit of such reduced punishment.
The rule of beneficial construction requires that even ex post facto
law of such a type should be applied to mitigate the rigour of the law.
The principle is based both on sound reason and common sense.
23. To illustrate, if Parliament were to reenact Section 302 of the
Penal Code, 1860 and provide that the punishment for an offence of
murder shall be sentence for imprisonment for life instead of the
present sentence of death or imprisonment for life, then it cannot be
that the courts would still award a sentence of death even in pending
cases.
…
25. It is settled both on authority and principle that when a later
statute again describes an offence created by an earlier statute and
imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier
statute is repealed by implication…The rule is however subject to the
limitation contained in Article 20(1) against ex post facto law
providing for a greater punishment and has also no application where
the offence described in the later Act is not the same as in the earlier
Act i.e. when the essential ingredients of the two offences are
different.
26. In the premises, the Central Amendment Act having dealt with
the same offence as the one punishable under Section 16(1)( a ) and
provided for a reduced punishment, the accused must have the
benefit of the reduced punishment. We wish to make it clear that
anything that we have said shall not be construed as giving to the
Central Amendment Act a retrospective operation insofar as it
creates new offences or provides for an enhanced punishment.”
(emphasis supplied)

29. T. Barai (supra) is no doubt a leading decision on the aspect of the
principle of beneficial interpretation of penal statutes for the purposes
of sentencing. However, we are not convinced that the same is wholly
13


applicable in the instant case as (i) the dispute therein was between
a Central enactment and a State enactment pertaining to the same
offence, (ii) the case concerned punishment to be provided and was
not a decision related to release of an offender on probation and (iii)
in that case, there existed no such provision similar to either Section
20AA of the PoFA Act or even Section 97 of the FSS Act and obviously,
was not a case dealing with repeal.
30. Shortly after the decision in T Barai (supra), this Court in the case
17
of Babu Ram v. State of Haryana , in no uncertain terms held that
the special provision made in the form of Section 20AA of the PoFA
Act, would override the provisions of the Probation Act.
“ 2. The appellant was convicted under Section 16(1)( a )(i) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The facts are not in dispute. The
respondent has been sentenced to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Rs 1000. Notice was issued confined to the
question of sentence. The learned counsel argues that this is a fit
case where the appellant should be admitted to probation. On the
other hand, Mr Mahajan for the respondent points out the provision
in Section 20AA in support of his submission that the Special Act
excludes application of the Probation of Offenders Act. We are
inclined to agree with him that the special provision made in the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act overrides the provision of the
Probation of Offenders Act and therefore the appellant will not be
entitled to the benefit thereof…”
(emphasis supplied)

18
31. In the case of Nemi Chand v. State of Rajasthan , this Court
applying the decision in T. Barai (supra) modified the sentence of six
months’ imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 50,000 for an
offence committed under Sections 7/16 of the PoFA Act.

17
1987 Supp SCC 12
18
(2018) 17 SCC 448
14


32. Recently, a co-ordinate bench of this Court in A.K. Sarkar & Co. v.
19
State of W.B. , placing reliance on T Barai (supra) held that:
“ 10. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was repealed by
the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 where
Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs 3,00,000 for
misbranded food. There is no provision for imprisonment…
…
15. Considering all aspects, more particularly the nature of offence,
though we uphold the findings of the courts below regarding the
offence, but we hereby convert the sentence of Appellant 2 from
three months of simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs 1000 to a
fine of Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only). The sentence of
Appellant 1 which is for a fine of Rs 2000 is upheld. The amount shall
be deposited with the court concerned within a period of three weeks
from today. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed.”

33. Two more decisions have been cited before us, which we believe are
inapplicable to the present lis . The reasons are assigned below:
20
a. In Paramjit Singh v. Municipal Corpn. , the Court held that
since the offence pertained to November 1968 at which point
of time the Courts had the power to release the offender on
probation, the same should be done as the facts did not
necessitate the passing of a sentence of imprisonment upon the
appellant therein. This case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable
from the present matter.
21
b. The decision in Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corpn. is also
not applicable to the facts at hand as that was a case of
commutation of sentence under Section 433(d), Cr. PC.

19
(2024) 10 SCC 727
20
(1982) 3 SCC 317
21
(2000) 9 SCC 151
15


34. At this stage, we would also like to highlight a few other decisions of
this Court that would seem to be applicable for resolution of the
controversy.
22
35. In the case of Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab , Hon’ble K. Subba
Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the majority in a 3-
Judge Bench decision held that:
“ 6. …Every ex post facto law is necessarily retrospective. Under
Article 20 of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted of any
offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of that act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the
law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. But an ex
post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does
not fall within the said prohibition. If a particular law makes a
provision to that effect, though retrospective in operation, it will be
valid. The question whether such a law is retrospective and, if so, to
what extent depends upon the interpretation of a particular statute,
having regard to the well-settled rules of construction. Maxwell in his
book On Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., at pp. 274-75,
summarizes the relevant rule of construction thus:

‘The tendency of, modern decisions, upon the whole, is to
narrow materially the difference between what is called a strict
and a beneficial construction. All statutes are now construed
with a more attentive regard to the language, and criminal
statutes with a more rational regard to the aim and intention
of the legislature, then formerly. It is unquestionably right that
the distinction should not be altogether erased from the
judicial mind, for it is required by the spirit of our free
institutions that the interpretation of all statutes should be
favourable to personal liberty, and this tendency is still evinced
in a certain reluctance to supply the defects of language, or to
eke out the meaning of an obscure passage by strained or
doubtful influences. The effect of the rule of strict construction
might almost be summed up in the remark that, where an
equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable
doubt of its meaning which the canons of interpretation fail to
solve, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject
and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself.
But it yields to the paramount rule that every statute is to be
expounded according to its expressed or manifest intention
and that all cases within the mischiefs aimed at are, if the

22
1964 SCC OnLine SC 40
16


language permits, to be held to fall within its remedial
influence.’
7. Let us now proceed to consider the question raised in the present
case. This is not a case where an act, which was not an offence before
the Act, is made an offence under the Act; nor this is a case where
under the Act a punishment higher than that obtaining for an offence
before the Act is imposed. This is an instance where neither the
ingredients of the offence nor the limits of the sentence are
disturbed, but a provision is made to help the reformation of an
accused through the agency of the court. Even so the statute affects
an offence committed before it was extended to the area in question.
It is, therefore, a post facto law and has retrospective operation. In
considering the scope of such a provision we must adopt the rule of
beneficial construction as enunciated by the modern trend of judicial
opinion without doing violence to the provisions of the relevant
section. … As the Act does not change the quantum of the sentence,
but only introduces a provision to reform the offender, there is no
reason why the legislature should have prohibited the exercise of
such a power, even if the case was pending against the accused at
one stage or other in the hierarchy of tribunals…”

23
36. In Basheer v. State of Kerala , a batch of appeals was heard on
the point of the constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 41(1)
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment)
Act, 2001. The unamended statute made no distinction between “any
quantity” and “small quantity”. In all the appeals before the Court,
the accused were convicted by the trial courts and had filed appeals
before the respective High Courts. Further, their appeals were
nd
pending before the High Courts on 2 October, 2001, when the
amending Act came into force. The accused were found guilty of
offences and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 10 years
and a fine of Rs one lakh each, which was the minimum punishment
prescribed under the unamended statute. The new Act, however,
provided for graded punishment on the basis of the quantity of drugs

23
(2004) 3 SCC 609
17


in the possession of the accused. This Court ruled that the concerned
rule of beneficial construction of a penal statute is limited to the
reduction of any sentence and the conviction remains under the old
Act. The amendment had in effect created a new set of offences, and
therefore, the benefit of graded punishment would not be available
to the appellants therein. Relevant passages read thus:

18

24
Biswas , Y.V. Chandrachud, J (as His Lordship then was) arising
from a conviction under the Customs Act, 1962 succinctly delineated
the purpose, purport and object of the Probation Act in the following
words:
“ 11. The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure and its
object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of
incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jail term
should normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt but the
sentence which the society passes on convicts is relentless. The
ignominy commonly associated with a jail term and the social stigma
which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the
disease and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger of
being frustrated. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be
deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of
the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays

24
(1974) 4 SCC 222
19


into the path of crime ought, in the interest of society, be treated as
being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal
tendencies and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced
by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders Act
recognises the importance of environmental influence in the
commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender
can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social
defiance and recklessness which comes to a convict who, after a jail
term, is apt to think that he has no more to lose or fear may breed a
litter of crime. The object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to nip
that attitude in the bud. Winifred A. Elkin describes probation as a
system which provides a means of re-education without the necessity
of breaking up the offender's normal life and removing him from the
natural surroundings of his home [ English Juvenile Courts, (1938)
p. 162] . Edwin H. Sutherland raises it to a status convicted offender.
[ Principles of Criminology 4th Edn. (1947) p. 383]
…
13. There is no foundation for the fear that offenders released on
probation may hold the society to ransom and the society may
therefore look upon the release of offenders on probation as the
triumph of criminals over the weaknesses of law. An offender
released on probation is convicted but not forthwith sentenced in the
sense of penal laws. Under the disposition made by the Court the
sentence is suspended during the period of probation. Section 4(1)
of the Act provides that instead of sentencing the offender ‘at once’,
the Court may direct his release on his entering into a bond to
‘receive sentence when called upon’ during the probationary period
and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
Thus it is only in a limited, though a socially significant, sense that
the Act constitutes an exception to the broad and general principle
of criminal law embodied, for example, in Sections 245(2), 258(2),
306(2) and Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that a
sentence shall follow on a conviction.”

38. We preface our observations that this Court has consistently held that
the safety of citizens is paramount. The safety of consumers was the
goal of the PoFA Act as safety standards of food is essential for the
health and well-being of its citizens. The PoFA Act, now repealed by
the FSS Act, was instrumental in preventing adulterated food in the
market by creating a framework wherein adulterated food could not
be sold as they would endanger the lives of consumers. Food, as we
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all know, is essential for life and no leeway must be given in such
circumstances.
A PPLICATION O F T HE P ROBATION O F O FFENDERS A CT
39. A canonical rule of statutory interpretation, i.e, the rule of literal
construction, is that the words of a statute should be read as it is and
should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense. A reference
to the rule of beneficial construction of a statute or any other rule of
statutory interpretation may be resorted to only if the literal rule fails
to provide suitable guidance or results in absurdity.
40. There can be no quarrel that Section 20AA, introduced by way of
amendment, is too clear admitting of no absurdity and seals this
question of law against the appellants. Nothing in these decisions
have shown us that the rule of beneficial construction can also be
extended to the release of offenders on probation, especially
considering the express provision present in Section 20AA of the PoFA
Act.
41. This Court has often lamented the lack of sentencing guidelines in
this country, which we echo. That being said, we are of the firm
opinion that there exists a fundamental difference between reduction
or mollification of a sentence and releasing an offender on probation.
The probationary process envisages that first time offenders who are
capable of reformation can be provided a benefit such that they can
continue to a be a part of society as capable and law-abiding citizens
21


in the future. The thrust of penology in the past few decades has been
focused on the reformation of an individual. “Every saint has a past,
and every sinner has a future”. While there is no quarrel with the
probationary process, we ought to remain subservient to the wisdom
of the legislature in applying the benefit of probation. This Court
cannot offend the express provisions present in any legislative
instrument merely to provide a benefit to an offender, not envisaged
under the law. Section 20AA of the PoFA Act read with Section 97 of
the FSS Act makes it clear that the benefit under the Probation Act
cannot be made applicable to an offence committed between 1976
(when Section 20AA was introduced) up to the repeal of the statute
in 2006 by the FSS Act in line with the decision rendered in Babu
Ram (supra).
42. Therefore, the first question is decided against the appellants.
OLLIFICATION F UNISHMENT
M O P
43. While deliberating on the second question, we have also considered
the claim that the sentence should at least be reduced as per the FSS
Act. Several decisions have been cited before us to contend that
mollification of a punishment on the ground that the new enactment
provides for a lesser punishment is permissible. We are, however, in
respectful disagreement with such proposition insofar as the instant
case is concerned. A ‘repeals and savings’ clause in any statute is not
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mere surplusage that the Courts may ignore in the interpretation of
the law. When a ‘repeal and savings’ clause specifically protects a
penalty provided for in the old enactment, the intention of the
legislature is clear. This Court, in its enthusiasm, cannot and should
not provide a benefit to the accused that is not permitted in law.
Mollification must only be provided in cases where a provision in
relation to ‘repeal and savings’ is either not present or where the
‘repeal and savings’ clause envisages such a possibility. This is in line
with the decision rendered in Basheer (supra). Therefore, the second
question too is decided against the appellants.
44. At this stage, a plea to our conscience has been made that despite
the order issuing notice being limited to sentence, to look at the
grounds for conviction and to provide some relief in the lead appeal.
Considering the age of the appellants and the fact that the offences
took place in 2001 and 1985, we consider it appropriate to look into
the record to see whether we may interfere with the conviction
recorded against these appellants.
45. In the lead appeal, the cause for the offence is that the appellants
were selling curd that was found to have a fat content lower than the
standard prescribed for buffalo milk, leading to its classification as
adulterated. The record before us suggests that the Food Inspector
took 12 samples of curd, mixed them in a vessel and out of that
mixture took a sample and sent it for analysis. The Food Inspector
had not marked whether the milk was buffalo milk or cow milk, and
23

25
(2006) 13 SCC 290
24

25

26


case of Naresh Chandra, the sentence of imprisonment is converted
to that of fine of Rs.20,000/.
51. All three appellants are given time till end of June, 2025 to pay the
fine, failing which this order shall stand revoked and they shall expose
themselves to be taken in custody for serving the prison term of six
months, minus set-off for any period they were in custody earlier.



………………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



………………………………J.
(MANMOHAN)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 15, 2025.
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