Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
KRISHNAKANT RAGHUNATH BIBHAVNEKAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/02/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, SUJATA V. MANOHAR
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
Leave granted.
We have heard counsel on both sides.
The appellant while working as compositor in the
Government of India Printing Press, was charged for offences
punishable, inter alia, under Section 409 of IPC. Pending
trial, he was kept under suspension and was paid subsistence
allowance. After his acquittal, the appellant was
reinstated but the respondents did not grant the
consequential benefits to him. Consequently, the appellant
approached the Administrative Tribunal, The Tribunal by the
impugned order dated 27th April, 1995 in OA No. 40/92,
dismissed the application. Thus, this appeal by special
leave.
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant,
contends that under Rule 72(3) of the Maharashtra civil
services (Joining Time, foreign Services, and Payment during
Suspension, dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1991 (for short,
the ’Rules’) the Rules cannot be applied to the appellant
nor would the respondents be justified in treating the
period of suspension of appellant, as the period of
suspension, as not being warranted under the Rules. We find
no force in the contention. It is true that when a
Government servant is acquitted of offences, he would be
entitled to reinstatement. But the question is: whether he
would be entitled to all consequential benefits including
the pensionary benefits treating the suspension period as
duty period, as contended by Shri Ranjit Kumar? The object
of sanction of law behind prosecution is to put an end to
crime against the society and laws thereby intends to
restore social order and stability. The purpose of
prosecution of a public servant is to maintain discipline in
service, integrity, honesty and truthful conduct in
performance of public duty or for modulation of his conduct
to further the efficiency in public service. The
Constitution has given full faith and credit to public acts,
conduct of a public servant has to be an open book: corrupt
would be known to everyone. The reputation would gain
notoriety. Though legal evidence may be insufficient to
bring home the guilt beyond doubt or fool proof. The act of
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reinstatement sends ripples among the people in the
office/locality and sows wrong signals for degeneration of
morality, integrity and rightful conduct and efficient
performance of public duty. The constitutional animation of
public faith and credit given to public acts, would be
undermined. Every act or the conduct of a public servant
should be to effectuate the public purpose and
constitutional objective. Public servant renders himself
accountable to the public. The very cause for suspension of
the petitioner and taking punitive action against him was
his conduct that led to the prosecution of him for the
offences under the Indian Penal Code. If the conduct alleged
is the foundation for prosecution, though it may end in
acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence,
the question emerges: whether the Government servant
prosecuted for commission of defalcation of public funds and
fabrication f the records, though culminated into acquittal,
is entitled to be reinstated with consequential benefits? In
our considered view, this grant of consequential benefits
with all back wages etc. cannot be as a matter of course. We
think that it would deleterious to the maintenance of the
discipline if a person suspended on valid considerations is
given full back wages as a matter of course, on his
acuittal, Two courses are open to the disciplinary
authority, viz., it may enquire into misconduct unless, the
self-same conduct was subject of charge and on trial the
acquittal was recorded on a positive finding that the
accused did not commit the offence at all; but acquittal is
not on benefit of doubt given. Appropriate action may be
taken thereon. Even otherwise, the authority may, on
reinstatement after following the principle of natural
justice, pass appropriate order including treating
suspension period as period of not on duty , ( and on
payment of subsistence allowance etc.) Rules 72(3), 72 (5)
and 72 (7) of the Rules give a discretion to the
disciplinary authority. Rule 72 also applies, as the action
was taken after the acquittal by which date rule was in
force. Therefore, when the suspension period was treated to
be a suspension pending the trial and even after acquittal ,
he was reinstated into service he would not be entitled to
the consequential, he was reinstated into service, he would
not be entitled to the consequential benefits, As a
consequence, he would not be entitled to the benefits of
nine increments as stated in para 6 of the additional
affidavit. He is also not entitled to be treated as on duty
from the date of suspension till the date of the acquittal
for purpose of computation of pensionary benefits etc . The
appellant is also not entitled to any other consequential
benefits as enumerated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
additional affidavit.
Under these circumstances, we do not think that the
Tribunal has committed any error.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the
circumstances of this case, without costs.