Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/09/1978
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
SHINGAL, P.N.
DESAI, D.A.
CITATION:
1979 AIR 314 1979 SCR (1) 751
1979 SCC (1) 285
ACT:
Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, as
amended by the Amending Act 29 of 1968-Section 3(d)(i) and
(ii), whether to be read conjunctively in the light of Sec.
3A, 3(gg) of the Act-Interpretation of Sections 3(d),
3(gg),3A, 5 and 6 - Whether classification as Rice Miller &
Rice Huller discriminatory offending Art.14 of the
Constitution-Whether the provisions of the Act which insist
on the rice-hullers to take licences is an unreasonable
restriction on their right to carry on the business and
violative of Articles 19 and 301 of the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
The Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act was passed
in 1958, the object and reasons of which were to preserve
and protect the indigenous and hand pounding industry of
rice growers so as to provide sufficient employment to rural
population and to ensure the modernisation of conventional
type of rice mills with a view to producing more rice of
better quality and nutritive value. Since the original Act
did not include the rice hullers, by the Amendment Act 29 of
1968, Sec. 3(d) was substituted viz. "Milling rice, with it
grammatical variation, means (i) recovering rice or any
produce thereof from paddy; (ii) polishing rice with the aid
of power". Under Section 5 read with Section 3A, the
petitioners were required to take licences for operating
their husking mills. The petitioner, therefore, assailed (a)
that the requirement of taking licences for operating their
mills amounted to complete destruction of their fundamental
rights to carry on business and (b) that the provisions of
the Act further contain unguided and uncanalised powers so
as to violate the provisions of Art. 14.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court
^
HELD: (1) An analysis of the provisions of Sections
3(d), 3A, 5, 6 and 7 indicates that the provisions contained
sufficient guidelines and do not amount to exercise of an
arbitrary power. [759B]
(2) Having regard to the setting in which Sec. 3(d) is
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placed and the dominant object of the Amending Act 29 of
1968, the intention of the Legislature was to widen the
purpose and scope of the definition of milling rice. If
Clause (i) and (ii) are read conjunctively then, it will
defeat the very purpose of the Act and would in fact become
meaningless because clause (i) which means recovering rice
or any product thereof from paddy could include products
like chura etc. which do not require polishing and yet if
the two clauses are read conjunctively chura will have to be
polished within the meaning of Section 3(d), which could not
have been contemplated by the legislature. Furthermore,
polishing rice under Section 3(gg) includes the process of
removal of bran from the kernel of rice with the aid of
power and that is what the rice hullers do. Thus on a true
interpretation of Sec. 3(d) clauses (i) and (ii) and (gg)
there can be absolutely no doubt that the section includes
the 14-549 SCI/78
752
operation carried out by the rice hullers. Though it was not
necessary for the legislature to have added Sec. 3(A), it
was done in order to put the matter beyond doubt or
controversy. [760B-D, E, 761D-E]
(3) Rice-millers and rice hullers constitute a separate
class having regard to the nature of their functions the
classification is reasonable, because (1) it to the objects,
sought to be achieved by the Act namely, the protection of
the domestic hand-pounding industry and improvement of the
quality of the rice domestic hand-pounding industry and
improvement of the quality of the rice and ensuring its easy
and quick distribution. The contention that the Act by
bringing the rice hullers and rice millers within the same
fold seems to treat unequals as equals, because rice hullers
cannot be equated with rice-millers is not correct. [762B-C]
(4) Sections 5 and 6 of the Rice Milling Industry
(Regulation) Act, 1958 do not amount to unreasonable
restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on
their trade and business. In the first place, the licensing
provisions is in public interest and is meant to carry out
the purpose of the Act. Secondly, sections 5 and 6 are
purely regulatory in character and do not amount to
unreasonable restriction. [762C-D, 763C]
Narendra Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1960]
2 SCR 375; Daruka & Co. v. Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 570;
Glass Chatons Importers & Users’ Association v. Union of
India, [1962] 1 SCR 862 referred to.
(5) In view of the language of section 6 with which the
rice hullers are concerned, the question of uncanalised
powers being conferred on the licensing authority does not
arise. Under Section 6(3) once an application is received by
the licensing officer he shall grant a licence or such
condition as he may impose. The statute does not have any
discretion in the licensing officer to grant or to refuse to
grant licence. He has a mandatory duty to perform, and,
therefore, there is no question of the licensing officer
having been conferred or uncanalised powers under the Act.
[763D-E]
(6) Sub-section (4) of Sec. 5 columns as many as six
guidelines for the grant of permit. The power is to be
exercised by such a high authority as the Central Govt.
Furthermore under S. 12 an appeal lies against a decision of
the licensing officer under Sec. 6 or Sec. 7 to an appellate
officer nominated by the Central Government. [763F-G]
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JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 1135-1155,
1544-1758, 1759-1949, 1952-1991, 1993-2199, 2216-2220, 2274-
2325 of 1977, 592-607, 849-862 and 1898-1908/78 and 1577-
1605/78.
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 955 and 966/77.
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 1222/77 and 4-176 and 2359/78
753
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 967, 1128/77, 314-591, 901-950,
1870-1887,2240-2294, 2367, 2390/78, 3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/
77, 177-313, 871-900, 2319, 2358 & 2326-2430/77, 1807-1869,
1239-1312, 1584-1592, 1737-1749, 2296-2311, 2312-2318, 2392-
2472, 2937-2951, 3380-3464/78,- 609-821, 979-1237, 1543-
1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936/78, 2986-2998/78, 2953-2968/78 &
2472A-2472B of 1978.
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 823,3514-3574,824-826,975, 1617-
1627, 1628-1725, 1915-1942/78, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576, 1313-
1542, 2112-2203, 3131-3340, 1760-1806/78, 2231-2234, 2235-
2236, 2237-2238, 2475, 2476, 2975-2985 of 1978, 3465. 3466-
3513/78, 3622-3641/78,3766, 3801 & 3786-3788/78
A. K. Ganguli for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1135-
1155, 1544-1758, 2274-2325 & 966/77, 3622-3641/78, 1898-
1908/78, 967-1128/77, 314-591, 901-950, 2240-2294, 2367-
2398, 3063-3081/78.
N. R. Choudhury for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2216-
2220, 592-607, 312-318, 2472A, 2472B/78, 849-862/78, 1239-
1312. 1584-1592, 1737-1759, 1870-1887, 2296-2318, 2392-2472,
2937- 2951, 3380-3464/78.
A. K. Sen (In W.P. 1759-1949), D. P. Mukherjee (in all
W.Ps.), R. P. Roy and A. K. Ganguli (In 1759-1949) for the
Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1759-1949 and 955/77.
Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.
1952- 1991/77, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, 3131-3340/ 78
M. M. Kshatriya for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1993-
2199/77.
S. S. Ray (In 1597-1606 and 1760-1806) Dr. Debi Pal (In
1759, 2125-2128/78).
S. R. Agarwal, A. T. Patra, Praveen Kumar (In all Writ
Petitions except 2125-2128) for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.
1597-1606/78. 1760-1806 and Applicant/Intervener in W.P.
Nos. 1759-1949/77 and in W.P. Nos. 1222/77 and 2125-2128/78.
Y. S. Chitle (In 1223-1526, 1222) and Prodyot Kumar
Chakravarty, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.1222/77 and
4/78,1223-1526, 5-176,177-313,871-900,2319-2358.
754
P.K. Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 2359/78.
P. K. Gupta for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2326-
2430/77 and 1807-1869 of 1978
D. P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 609-
821, 979-1237, 1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936,
2953-2968, 2986-29998/78.
Majumdar and Mrs . Laxmi Arvind for the Petitioners in
W.P. Nos. 823, 3514-3574, 824, 826, 975, 1617-1627, 1628-
1723, 1915-1942, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576/78 and 3766/78.
Amlan Ghosh and Ravinder Bahl for the Petitioners in
W.P. Nos.2231-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475 & 2476, 2975-
2985/78, 3744-3768, 3801 and 3840/78.
Rathin Das for the Petitioner in W.P. 3465/78.
J. M. Khanna for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 3466-
3513/78.
S. K. Bisaria, for the Petitioners in W.Ps. 3786-
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3788/78.
S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl. (In W.P. 1135, 1759, 1943, and
2216/77 ) R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for
Respondents in W.Ps. 1898-1908, 177-313, 1584-1592,1313-
1542/78 and for Respondents No. 1 in Rest of the W.P.
excepting in W.P. Nos. 1222 and 2359/ 78.
A P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for other
appearing respondents in all W.P. Nos. excepting 2359/78.
Somnath Chatterjee (In W.P. 2359), S. S. Reyin (In
2216), Samir Kumar Ghosh (In 2359 and 2216), Shib Kumar
Shahu and P. Keshava Pillai, for Respondent No. 5 in W.P.
2359/78 and Applicant intervener in 1759/77, 1949/77 and
2216.
P. Chatterjee (In W.P. 955), D. Mookerjee (In 1759) and
Sukumar Ghosh for the applicant/Intervener in W.P. Nos.
1759-1949 and 955/77.
ORDER
We discharge the rule in all of these Writ Petitions
and dismiss the same with costs in one set. We vacate the
Stay orders in all the Petitions. We will give our reasons
for this Order later.
755
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.-A large batch of writ petitions has been
filed in this Court challenging the constitutional validity
of the Rice-Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 as
amended in 1968, on the ground that some of the provisions
of the aforesaid Act are clearly violative of Articles 14 19
and 301 of the Constitution of India. Serious objection
appears to have been taken to those provisions of the Act
which require the petitioners who are owners of Rice Husking
Mills or Rice Hullers to take out a licence for husking
rice.
We propose to take up the writ petitions of Bijoy Kumar
Majhi & Ors. (Writ Petitions No. 1759-1949 of 1977). The
main contention of the petitioners has been that there are
as many as 18,000 husking mills owned and operated by
various persons in the State of West Bengal and each mill
employs 4 or 5 persons. The provisions of the Act which
require the petitioners to take licences for operating the
mills amount to a complete destruction of the fundamental
right of the petitioners to carry on business and the
provisions further contain unguided and uncanalised powers
so as to violate the provisions of Article 14. In all the
other writ petitions the arguments put forward by the
petitioners in the aforesaid petitions have been completely
adopted.
Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 of 1977 have been filed
by Chandra Kanta Saha & Ors. where the petitioners have
merely challenged the validity of Ordinance No. 14 of 1977
dated 9-8-1977 which has repealed portions of Rice Milling
Industry (Regulation) West Bengal Second Amendment Act of
1974 and deleted section 6A of that Act.
In order to appreciate the contentions raised by
counsel for the parties, it may be necessary to give a brief
history of the legislation on the subject. It appears that
as far back as 1958 Parliament after a declaration as
required by the Constitution passed the Rice Milling
Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as
the 1958 Act). The Act was passed on 18th May, 1958. It
would appear from the object and reasons of the Act that the
main purpose for passing the Act was to preserve and protect
the indigenous and hand- pounding industry of rice growers
so as to provide sufficient employment to rural population.
The other object was to ensure the modernisation of
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conventional type of rice mills with a view to producing
more rice of better quality and nutritive value. Section 2
of the Act contains a declaration which may be extracted
thus:
"Declaration as to expediency of control by the Union:
It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the
public
756
interest that the Union should take under its control
the rice milling industry."
This declaration was obviously made as required by Entry 52
List I Schedule VII of the Constitution. In other words,
Parliament declared that it was in public interest to
regulate the working of the Rice Milling Industry and
accordingly it purported to legislate under the power
contained in Schedule VII List I Entry 52 read with Entry 24
of List II. In these circumstances, there cannot be any
question of the incompetency of Parliament to legislate on
the subject matter of the Act nor was any such question
raised before us.
The Act of 1958 before its amendment did not include
the rice hullers and was completely innocuous so far the
writ petitioners are concerned. It was after the amendment
of 1968 that the rice hullers or the owners of the rice
husking mills have come forward to this Court with the
grievance that the Act is constitutionally invalid. The rice
millers have not filed any petition assailing any provisions
of the Act of 1968. Section 3(a) of the Act of 1958 defines
a ’defunct rice mill, and section 3(b) defines an "existing
rice mill". The present Section 3(d) was substituted by the
Amendment Act 29 of 1968 and reads as follows:-
"Milling rice" with its grammatical variation, means-
(i) recovering rice or any produce thereof from
paddy.
(ii) polishing rice,
with the aid of power".
The question is whether this definition applies to the
petitioners and takes within its fold not only the rice
millers but also the rice hullers. Section 3(A) which may be
extracted is a provision which applies expressly to rice
hullers attached to or maintained by any flour, oil, dal or
other mills or pumping sets as they apply to rice mills
mutatis mutandis:
"3A-The provisions of this Act shall apply to rice
hullers attached to, or maintained with, any flour, oil
dal or other mill, or pumping set as they apply to rice
mills subject to the modification that any reference to
the commencement of this Act in those provisions shall,
in their application to such rice-hullers, be construed
as a reference to the commencement of the Rice-Milling
Industry (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1968"-
Section 5 requires permits to be taken for a new or
defunct rice mill and sub-sections (4) and (5) which run
thus:
757
"(4) Before granting any permit under sub-section
(3) the Central Government shall cause a full and
complete investigation to be made in the prescribed
manner in respect of the application and shall have due
regard to-
(a) the number of rice mills operating in the
locality;
(b) the availability of paddy in the locality;
(c) the availability of power and water supply
for the rice mill in respect of which a
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permit is applied for;
(d) whether the rice mill in respect of which a
permit is applied for will be of the huller
type, sheller type or combined sheller-huller
type;
(e) whether the functioning of the rice mill in
respect of which a permit is applied for
would cause substantial unemployment in the
locality;
(f) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(5) (a) In granting a permit under this section
(whether for the establishment of a new rice mill or
for re-commencing rice-milling operation in a defunct
rice mill), the Central Government shall give
preference-
(i) to a Government company or a corporation
owned or controlled by the Government over
every other applicant;
(ii) to a farmers’ co-operative society over every
other applicant, not being a Government
Company or a corporation owned or controlled
by the Government,
Notwithstanding that such other
applicant has applied for the grant of a
permit for re-commencing rice-milling
operation in a defunct rice mill.
(b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a)
in granting a permit under this section, the
Central Government shall give preference to a
defunct rice mill over a new rice mill".
lay down the various factors and conditions which the
licensing authority has to consider before granting permit.
Sub-section (6) provides that a permit shall be valid for
the periods specified therein or for such period as the
Central Government may extend. The relevant portion of
section 6 runs thus:-
758
"6(1) Any owner of an existing rice mill or of a
rice mill in respect of which a permit granted under
section 5 is effective may make an application to the
licensing officer for the grant of a licence for
carrying on rice-milling operation in the rice mill.
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall
be made in the prescribed form and shall contain the
particulars regarding the location of the rice mill,
the size and type thereof and such other particulars as
may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of any such application for the
grant of licence, the licensing officer shall grant the
licence on such conditions including such conditions as
to improvements to existing machinery, replacement of
existing machinery and use of improved methods of rice-
milling as may be necessary to eliminate waste, obtain
maximum production and improve quality and conditions
relating to the polishing of rice, on payment of such
fees and on the deposit of such sum, if any, as
security for the due performance of the conditions as
may be prescribed".
This section therefore requires every owner of an
existing rice mill to make an application for obtaining a
licence. The application is to be made to a licensing
officer. It may be pertinent to note here that once an
application is filed by an owner of a rice-mill the
licensing officer has no discretion in the matter but has a
mandatory duty to grant a licence as will appear from the
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word "shall" which follows licensing officer. Sub-section
(4) again lays down the period of licence etc. Section 7
provides the ground on which the licensing officer can
revoke or suspend the licence after giving the licencee an
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to
be taken. This section runs thus:-
"7(1) If the licensing officer is satisfied,
either on a reference made to him in this behalf or
otherwise, that,-
(a) a licence granted under section 6 has been
obtained by misrepresentation as to an essential fact,
or
(b) the holder of licence has, without reasonable
cause, failed to comply with the conditions subject to
which the licence has been granted or has contravened
any of the pro visions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder.
then without prejudice to any other penalty to
which the holder of licence may be liable under this
Act, the licensing
759
officer may, after giving the holder of the licence an
opportunity of showing cause, revoke or suspend the
licence or forfeit the sum, if any, or any portion
thereof deposited as security for the due performance
of the conditions subject to which the licence has been
granted".
Thus the provisions contain sufficient guidelines and do not
amount to exercise of an arbitrary power.
As the Amending Act 29 of 1968 had made vital and
substantial changes in the Act of 1958 by bringing the rice
hullers also within the domain of the Act. We might like to
consider some of the amended provisions whose constitutional
validity has been challenged on various grounds. To begin
with, the relevant part of the object and reasons of the
Amending Act runs thus:-
"First, several difficulties have been experienced
with regard to the control over small hullers. These
hullers are scattered all over the country-side far
away from important markets and, in many cases, are run
along with other power driven plants like flour, oil
and dal mills or pumping sets etc. without obtaining
requisite permits or licences under the Act. These
hullers sometimes operate clandestinely at night making
it difficult to check their activities. it is,
therefore, proposed to make it clear that the
attachment of hullers with other power-driven units
mentioned above would amount to establishment of rice-
mill and to tighten at the same time the penal
provisions in respect of running of unlicensed hullers.
Secondly, it is possible under the Act for existing or
new rice mills to stop rice-milling operations for a
considerable period and thereby affect the supply
position. It is, therefore, proposed to provide that if
any mill ceases to operate for a continuous period of
exceeding one year, it would become a defunct rice-mill
and would require a fresh permit for recommencing rice-
milling operations ........... Moreover, removal of
bran popularly known as polishing of rice after its
recovery from paddy is also pro- posed to be covered by
the term ’milling rice’ which at present covers
recovery of rice from paddy. This will check
unauthorised milling which is done in the name of
polishing of rice".
It would thus appear that the rice hullers were practically
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performing the same functions as rice millers but without
any control having been exercised on them, as a result of
which the poor rice growers were
760
exploited and the hand-pounding industry suffered. Sometimes
the supply position of the rice also suffered.
Coming now to the merits of the amendments of 1968. it
was argued in the first place that the introduction of
section 3A unmistakably shows that the definition in section
3(d) & (gg) did not include the rice hullers. It was also
argued that clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(d) must be
read conjunctively and not disjunctively are however unable
to agree with these arguments. Having regard to the setting
in which section 3(d) is placed and the dominant object of
the Amendment Act the intention of the Legislature was to
Widen the purport and scope of the definition of milling
rice. If clauses (i) and(ii) are read conjunctively then it
will defeat the very purpose of the Act and would in fact
become meaningless because clause (i) which means recovering
rice or any product thereof from paddy would include
products like chura etc. which do not require polishing and
yet if we have to read the two clauses conjunctively chura
will have to be polished to fall within the meaning of
section 3(d) which, in our opinion, could not have been
contemplated by the Legislature. Furthermore the definition
of polishing in section 3(gg) runs thus:-
" ’polishing’ in relation to rice means the
removal of bran from the kernel of rice.
Polishishing rice therefore includes the process of removal
of bran from the kernel of rice with the aid of power in
what the rice hullers do. In this connection, we might
mention that the process of removing husk from the rice as
defined in Encyclopaedia Britannica Col. 19 Page 284 which
is as follows:-
"Preparation of rice: The kernel of rice as it
leaves the thresher is enclosed by the hull or husk,
and is known as paddy or rough rice. Rough rice is used
for seed and feed and livestock, but most of it is
milled for human consumption. Rice is a good energy
food, and is consumed in vast quantities in the orient.
In the western hemisphere, however, rice is not the
staple cereal food, except in certain Caribbean and
South Pacific Islands. A diet limited largely to well
milled rice renders eastern people on a restricted diet
liable to beriberi, a deficiency disease caused by a
shortage of essential thiamin (Vitamin B1) and
minerals. This disease, however, can be avoided by
adding legumes, fish, fruits and vegetables to the
diet. Rough rice that is preboiled and dried prior to
milling retains more thiamin and minerals than
untreated rice. and hence is less apt to cause
beriberi. It
761
appears that in preboiling the thiamin, which is
largely in the germ and bran layers of the kernel,
diffuses into and is fixed in the starchy endosperm.
Most of the rice is milled in or near the areas in
which it is produced. In modern mills, special machines
are used for removing the hull from the kernel, for
removing the bran layers by attrition, for polishing,
for coating and for grading The object in milling is to
remove the hull and the bran layers of the kernel with
as little breakage as possible for the most valuable
product is the whole kernel. Milled rice often is
coated with glucose and talc, or with vegetable oils,
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to improve its appearance. The by-products, bran and
polish, are used as feed for livestock, the broken rice
for brewing, distilling, and the manufacturing; of
starch and rice flour. The hulls are used for fuel or
packing, and the straw is used for feed, for bedding
livestock, for thatching roofs, and for mats, garments,
packing and broom straws".
Thus, on a true interpretation of section 3(d) clauses (i)
and (ii) and (gg) there can be absolutely no doubt that the
section includes the operation carried out by the rice
hullers. In view of this interpretation it was not necessary
for the Legislature to have added section 3(A) but this was
done in order to put the matter beyond doubt or Controversy.
Counsel for the petitioners assailed these provisions
of the Act on three grounds, viz., (1) that the Act by
bringing the rice hullers and rice millers within the same
fold seems to treat unequals as equals, because rice hullers
cannot be equated with rice millers, (2) that sections 5 and
6 contained uncanalised and unguided powers so as to be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and
(3) that the provisions compelling the petitioners to take
licences is too harsh in nature and is an unreasonable
restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on
their business.
So far as the first contention is concerned, it is
absolutely without any substance. Having regard to the
process in which the rice is milled or dehusked by machine
there is not much of a difference between a rice miller and
a rice huller. Both resort to machines driven by power to
effectuate the result. In fact, a husking mill with one
huller not only dehusks paddy but simultaneously polishes it
by suitable adjustment of the blade, a function which is
almost similar to that performed by the rice millers. Having
regard to the object contained in the statement and reasons
mentioned above it cannot be said that there is any
discrimination between the rice millers and the rice hullers
762
both of whom are obliged to take licences before conducting
their business. The whole idea is that the indigenous hand
pounding industry may not be wiped out by allowing rice
huller to take all the licences of de-husking so as to
render the hand-pounding industry completely nugatory. Thus,
in our opinion, in the first place, rice millers and rice
hullers constitute a separate class and secondly, having
regard to the nature of their functions the classification
is reasonable, because (1) it is founded upon intelligible
differentia, (2) the defferentia has rational relation to
the objects sought to be achieved by the Act, namely, the
protection of the domestic hand pounding industry and
improvement of the quality of the rice and ensuring its easy
and quick distribution. The first contention raised by the
writ petitioners is, therefore overruled.
It was next contended that the provisions of the Act
which insist on the rice hullers to take licences is an
unreasonable restriction on their right to carry on the
business. In the first place, the licensing provision is in
public interest and is meant to carry out the purpose of the
Act. Secondly, sections 5 and 6 are purely regulatory in
character and do not amount to unreasonable restriction. It
has been held by this Court that canalization of export
through selected licences causing elimination of other
traders amounts to a reasonable restriction. In this
connection, in the case of Narendra Kumar and ors. v. Union
of India & ors.(1) this Court observed as follows:-
"The first evil sought to be remedied by the law
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being thus the rise in price.. The essential subsidiary
step therefore was to introduce a system of permits so
that the persons acquiring copper could be known. A
system of permits would also be of great help in
ensuring that the raw material would go to those
industries where it was needled most and distributed in
such quantities to several industries in different
parts of the country as would procure the greatest
benefit to the general Public".
To the same effect is the decision of this Court in the
case of Daruka & Co. v. Union of India(2) where Ray, C.J.
speaking for the Court observed as follows:-
"This Court in Glass Chatons. case (1962) 1
S.C.R. 862 held that if the scheme of canalization of
imports is in the interest of the general public the
refusal of licence to out-
763
siders would also be in the interest of the general
public. The canalisation of import was held to be per
se not an unreason able restriction in the interest of
the general public.
Policies of imports or exports are fashioned not
only with reference to internal or international trade
but also on monetary policy, the development of
agriculture and industries and even on the political
policies. If the Government decides an economic policy
that import or export should be by a selected channel
or through selected agencies the court would proceed on
the assumption that the decision is in the interest of
the general public unless the contrary is shown".
For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to hold that
sections 5 and 6 amount to unreasonable restrictions on the
right of the petitioners to carry on their trade and
business.
It was next argued that sections 5 and 6 contain
unguided and uncanalised power and suffer from the vice of
excessive delegation or powers. In the first place, in view
of the language of section 6 with which the existing rice
hullers are concerned, the question of uncanalised powers
being conferred on the licensing authority does not arise.
It would be seen that under section 6(3) once an application
is received by the licensing officer he shall grant a
licence on such conditions as he may impose. The statute
does not leave any discretion in the licensing officer to
grant or to refuse to grant a licence. He has a mandatory
duty to perform, and, therefore, there is no question of the
licensing officer having been conferred unrestricted or
uncanalised powers under the Act. It was, however, submitted
that although the grant of licence is mandatory under sub-
section (3) of section 6 yet this can be granted only if a
permit has been granted under section 5 sub-section (6).
There is no pleading before this Court that any of the
petitioners was not granted permits at all. Even so, as
indicated above, sub-section (4) of section 5 contains as
many as six guidelines for the grant of permit. The power is
to be exercised by such a high authority as the Central
Government. Furthermore, under section 12 an appeal lies
against a decision of the licensing officer under section 6
or section 7 to an appellate officer nominated by the
Central Government.
For the reasons, given above Writ Petitions No. 1135 to
1155 and 1759 to 1949 of 1977 are dismissed, but in the
circumstances with costs, one set.
764
For the reasons given in Writ Petitions No. 1135 to
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1155 and 1759 to 1949 of 1977, Writ Petitions No. 1544-1758,
1952-1991, 1993-2199, 2216-2220, 2274-2325 of 1977, 592-607,
849-862, 1898 1908/78, 1597-1606/78, 955-956/77, 1222/77, 4-
176 & 2359/78, 967-1128/77, 314-591, 901-950, 1870-1887,
2240-2294, 2367-2390, 3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/77, 177-313,
871-900 2319-2358/78, 2326-2430/77,1807-1869 1239-1312,1584-
1592, 1737-1759, 2296-2311, 2312-2318, 2392-2472, 2937-2951,
3380-3464, 609-821, 979-1237,1543-1583,1956-2111, 2810-2936,
2986-2998,2953-2968/78, 2472A-2472B/78, 823, 3514-3574, 824-
826, 975, 1617-1627, 1628 1725, 1915-1942/78, 2366, 2610,
3088, 3576, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, 3131-3340, 1760-1806/78,
2231-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475, 2476, 2975-2985/78,
3465, 3466-3513/78, 3622-3641/78, 3766,3801 & 3786-3788/78
are dismissed but without any order as to costs. These are
the reasons for our orders pronounced on 5-5-1978.
S.R. Petitions dismissed.
765