Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PANCHAMAL NARAYAN SHENOY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BASTHI VENKATESHA SHENOY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/02/1970
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
SIKRI, S.M.
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
CITATION:
1971 AIR 942 1970 SCR (3) 734
1970 SCC (1) 499
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1979 SC1559 (5,10)
R 1987 SC2117 (32)
ACT:
Mysore Rent Control Act (Mys. 22 of 1961), s.
21(1)j--Reasonably and bona fide required for immediate
demolition--Whether has reference to condition of premises.
HEADNOTE:
Under s. 21 (1) (j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961
the court may on an application order the recovery of
possession of any premises in favour of the landlord, if
"the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the
landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and
such demolition is to be made for the purpose of enacting a
new building in place of the premises sought to be
demolished,". The respondent-landlord applied under s.
21(1)(j) for eviction of the tenants appellants, claiming
that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by
him for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting of
a new building, that the premises were old and were not
suitable for continued occupation. The respondent claimed
to have obtained the necessary licence and to have made all
preparations for demolishing the existing., building and
erecting new building. The appellants-tenants contested the
claim. The Rent Controller accepted the respondent
landlord’s claim and ordered eviction, which in appeal, and
further revision to the High Court was upheld. In appeal to
this Court for the appellant-tenant, it was contended that
unless the landlord was able to establish that the condition
of the building was such that it required immediate
demolition and reconstruction, no eviction of the tenant
could be ordered under s. 21 (1) (j). Rejecting this
contention and dismissing the appeal,
HELD : The requirement contemplated under clause (j) of
the proviso to sub-s. (1) is that of the landlord and it
does not have any reference to the condition of the building
as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the
landlord must satisfy the Court that he reasonably and bona
fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of
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demolishing it and such demolition is for the purpose of
erecting a new building in the place of the old one. No
doubt, whether the landlord’s requirement is reasonable and
bona fide has to be judged in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, which will include his means for
reconstruction of the building, and other steps taken by him
in that regard. [737 G, H]
In considering the reasonable and bona fide
requirements of the -landlord under this clause, the desire
of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use
after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that
may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is
not necessary that the landlord should go further and
establish under this clause that the condition of the
building is such that it requires immediate demolition. [738
D]
Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 623,
referred to.
Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Company, (1964) II M.L.J. 147,
contra observation disapproved.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1552 of
1966.
735
Appeal by-special leave from the judgment and order
dated June 8, 1966 of the Mysore High Court in C.R.P. No.
1118 of 1964.
M. C. Chagla and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
M. R. Ramamurthi, S. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, for the
respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidailyngam J. this appeal, by special leave, is
against the judgment of the Mysore High Court, dated June 8,
1966 in Civil Revision Petition No. 1118 of 1964.
The respondent land-lord filed an application, dated
July 6, 1962 under s. 21 (1) (j) of the Mysore Rent Control
Act, 1961 (Mysore Act XXII of 1961) (hereinafter called the
Act) before the Rent Controller for eviction of the tenants
(the appellants herein) on the ground that the premises were
reasonably and bonafide required by him for the immediate
purpose of demolishing and erecting of a new building.
According to the respondent the premises were old and were
(not suitable for continued occupation. The respondent had
also stated in his -application that he had obtained the
necessary licence for erecting a new building after
demolition of the existing building and that he had made all
preparations for demolition and erection of new buildings on
the site. The appellant-tenant contested the claim of the
landlord on several grounds. He pleaded that the premises
were not old and that it was quite suitable for occupation
and it does not require any re-construction or remodelling.
The allegations that the building was old and required to be
reconstructed were not bona fide and had been made by the
landlord only as a pretext for evicting the tenant. The
tenant further pleaded that the requirement of the landlord
was neither reasonable nor bona fide. In any event, the
tenant claimed that he should be entitled to be paid the
value of the improvements that had been effected by him.
The Rent Controller, by his order dated January 22,
1964 accepted the claim of the respondent and ordered
eviction of the appellant granting the tenant one month’s
time for delivering vacant possession. Though the
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Consulting Engineer who gave evidence as P.W. 2 on behalf of
the respondent had stated that the building was over 60
years old but nevertheless it could go co for about 15 years
more, the Rent Controller actually found that the building
was more than 50 years old and that it was an old-fashioned
one. He further found that when the landlord desired to
pull it down and put up a modern building thereon, it could
not under the circumstances, be- said that his claim was not
bona fide or reasonable
736
and that the intention of the landlord in pulling down the
building and erecting a new one to get a better return was
certainly understandable. The Rent Controller further found
that the landlord had proved that he had sufficient means to
construct the building and that he had also obtained the
necessary sanction from the Municipality concerned for
reconstruction of the building. In view of all these
circumstances, the Rent Controller found that the
requirement of the landlord was quite reasonable and bona
fide. Regarding the claim of the tenant for payment of
improvements before eviction is ordered, the Rent Controller
found that such a claim, even if established, could not
stand in the way of the landlord getting possession of the
premises. Ultimately the application filed by the landlord
was allowed.
The findings recorded by the Rent Controller were
confirmed by the learned District Judge, by his judgment
dated October 19, 1964 in A.S. No. 43 of 1964 taken before
him by the tenant.
The revision filed by the appellant before the High
Court was rejected by order dated June 8, 1966.
Mr. Chagla, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, contended that the interpretation placed by all
the Courts on s. 21 (j) of the Act was erroneous. According
to the learned counsel, unless the landlord was able to
establish that the condition of the building was such that
it required immediate demolition and re-construction, no
eviction of the tenant could be ordered under s. 21 (1) (j)
of the Act. On the findings of the Courts, based upon the
evidence of the Engineer, that though the building was old
it could continue to exist for another 15 years, it should
have been held that the conditions mentioned in s. 21 (I)
(j) were not attracted to justify an order of eviction of
the tenant.
Mr. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the respondent,
pointed out that in order to attract s. 21 (I) (j) it was
not necessary that the landlord should establish that the
condition of the building was such that it required to be
demolished immediately. On the other hand, the sub-section
made it clear that the requirement contemplated was that of
the landlord and once his requirement had been held by all
the Courts to be reasonable and bona fide, the order passed
for eviction of the tenant was fully justified.
Having due regard to the scheme of the Act, we are
satisfied that the interpretation placed upon S. 21(1)(j) by
the High Court is correct.
Section 21 (1), while placing a general embargo against
a landlord from evicting a tenant, recognises, in its.
proviso the circumstances under which a landlord could seek
recovery of
737
possession of a premises. The ground upon which the
landlord asked for eviction, in the present case, was based
on s. 21 (1) (j). The material provision is as follows :
"21. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the
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contrary contained in any other law or
contract no order or decree for the recovery
of possession of any premises shall be made by
any court or other authority in favour of the
landlord against the tenant:
Provided that the court may on an application
made to it, make an order for the recovery of
possession of a premises on one or more of the
following grounds only, namely:-
..............................
(j) that the premises are reasonably and
bona fide required by the landlord for the
immediate purpose of demolishing them and such
demolition is to be made for the purpose of
erecting a new building in place of the
premises sought to be demolished;
................................
According to Mr. Chagla, the words ’reasonably and bona fide
required’, occurring in this clause, must be interpreted to
have reference to the condition of the building, the
demolition of which is sought to be made and those words
have no reference to any intention entertained by the
landlord. The mere fact that a landlord may bona fide and
reasonably entertain an idea of demolishing the building and
reconstructing the same with a view to putting the property
to a more profitable use after construction, will not
satisfy the requirements of the said clause. That is,
according to the learned counsel, the condition of the
building must be such that it is immediately necessary to
demolish it, in which case alone eviction under cl. (j)
could be ordered.
We are not inclined to accept this construction sought
to be placed by the appellant on the clause in question.
The proviso to s. 21 (1) enumerates the various
circumstances under which a landlord may seek to recover
possession of the property from his tenant. The requirement
contemplated under clause (j) of the proviso to sub-s. ( 1 )
is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference
to the condition of the building as such. What-is necessary
under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the
Court that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises
for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and the
demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in
the place of the old one. No doubt, as to whether the
landlord’s requirement is reason-
738
able and bona fide has to be judged by the surrounding
circumstances, which will include his means for
reconstruction of the. building, and other steps taken by
him in that regard.
In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement
of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the
landlord to put the property to a more profitable use -after
demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be
taken into account in favour of the landlord. In our
opinion, it is not necessary that the landlord should go
further and establish under this clause that the condition
of the building is such that it requires immediate
demolition. That the condition of the property may be such
which requires immediate demolition is emphasized in cl. (k)
of the proviso. When such a specific provision has been
made in cl. (k), the condition of the building cannot come
into the picture nor could it have been dealt with again in
cl. (i). So the requirement under cl. (j) is that of the
landlord and cannot have any reference to the building.
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This Court, in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal (1) in
interpreting no doubt a slightly differently worded
provision in s. 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Patiala and East Punjab
States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 B.K. (8
of 2006 BK) held that one of the circumstances which could
be taken into account in considering the requirements of the
landlord with reference to the existing building is ’the
possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after
construction’. In the case ’before us all the Courts have
concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is
reasonable and bona fide and that he had obtained the
necessary sanction from the municipality concerned and that
the landlord had also the means for reconstruction of the
building. If the landlord does not commence demolition of
the premises within the period specified in the order of the
Court, the tenant is given a right under s. 26(1) to issue a
notice to the landlord -of -his intention to occupy the pre-
mises from which he had been evicted and also to apply to
the Court for relief if the landlord does not comply with
his request. Again under s. 27, the tenant has got a right
to occupy the new building on its completion provided he
satisfies the requirements contained in that section. Under
s. 2 8 (I), the landlord is bound to intimate the tenant
from whom he had received a notice under s. 27 the date on
which the erection of the new building will be completed
from which date the tenant will be entitled to occupy the
same.
Mr. Chagla has referred us to a decision of the Madras
High Court in Mehsin Bhai v. Hate & Company (2). The
section which came up for consideration before the Madras
High Court was s. 14(3) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act XVIII of 1960) which was as
follows:
(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 623.
(2) [1964] 2 , M.L.J. 147.
739
14(1)(b) that the building is bona fide
required by the landlord for the immediate
purpose of demolishing it and such demolition
is to be made for the purpose of erecting a
new building on the site of the building
sought to be demolished, pass an order
directing the tenant to deliver possession of
the building to the landlord before a
specified date."
That clause is substantially similar to s. 21(1)(j) of the
Act.In the Madras case it is seen that the building from
which the tenant was sought to be evicted was in good
condition and there was no danger of its failing for another
20 years though the building was old. Under those
circumstances when the landlord applied under s. 14(1) (h)
of the Madras Act for eviction on the ground that he wished
to demolish the building for the purpose of erecting a new
building thereon, the High Court affirmed the decision of
the Subordinate Court declining relief to the landlord,
Though the learned Judge states that landlords May bona fide
require such buildings, particularly old buildings in their
own interest for demolition and reconstruction, he holds
that it is equally possible that the mere fact that a
building is old may be taken advantage of by a landlord to
put forth such pretext, his real object being ulterior and
not bona fide -,for the purpose of reconstruction.
We have no hesitation in agreeing with the- learned
Judge’s observation that the landlord must prove the
reasonableness and bona fide nature of his requirement.
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But, if the learned Judge intended to Iay down a proposition
of law that under s. 14 ( I ) (b) of the- Madras Act,
similar to s. 21 ( 1) (j) of the Act a landlord cannot
recover possession of the property for the purpose of re-
construction so as to put the property to a more profitable
use, we are of the view that the decision of the Madras High
Court must be considered to be erroneous. There is
absolutely no justification for putting such a narrow
interpretation on the clause in question.
Mr. Chagla further urged that before his client is
evicted his, claim for compensation should have been
considered by the Rent Controller. It is enough to say
that, as pointed out by the High Court, that claim does not
arise for consideration in these proceedings. We may also
state that a further contention regarding them validity of
the notice to quit issued by the landlord which was taken
before the High Court -and held against the appellant, has
not been canvassed before us.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs. The petitioner/appellant undertaken to vacate the
premises within a month from today.
Y.P.
Appeal dismissed.
740