Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. __________OF 2025
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No._________ of
2025)
(D.NO.23536 OF 2020)
PAWAN KUMAR AGRAWAL & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal challenges the judgment and
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final order dated 30 July 2019, passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (hereinafter
referred to as, “High Court”) in Writ Appeal No. 341 of 2019,
whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
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appellants thereby affirming the order dated 13 May 2019
rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ
Petition (S) No.3620 of 2019.
4. The facts, in brief , giving rise to the present appeal
are as under:
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4.1 On 2 April 2003, the Chhattisgarh State Public
Service Commission issued Advertisement No.01/2003/Exam
inviting applications for recruitment to the post of Civil Judge,
Class-II.
4.2 The appellants submitted their applications,
participated in the examination as well as the interview.
Thereafter, while preparing the final select list, the appellants
who secured 127 and 125 marks respectively, were placed in
the supplementary select list/waiting list, despite securing
better marks than two women candidates.
4.3 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Writ Petition
No.1827 of 2004 before the High Court challenging the legality
and validity of the selection on the ground that the selection
under the reserved quota for women has been made in excess
of the quota prescribed under Rule 6-A of the Chhattisgarh
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Lower Judicial (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
1994 and Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.
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4.4 On 2 May 2012, the Division Bench of the High
Court allowed the writ petition and directed the appointment
of the appellants, subject to the fulfilment of necessary
formalities such as police verification etc., against the available
vacancies for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The High
Court further held that the seniority of the appellants will be
reckoned from the date of their appointment.
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4.5 Consequently, the appellants were appointed on 8
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July 2013 and confirmed on 4 December 2015.
4.6 Discontented by the fact that though the appellants
were appointed pursuant to the selection process held in the
year 2003, they were placed below the candidates selected in
the year 2006, 2008 and 2012, the appellants made a
representation before the Registrar General of the
Chhattisgarh High Court claiming seniority over the candidate
prior to 2006 batch on the ground that the Chhattisgarh Civil
Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 provides
that seniority of the direct recruits shall be determined on the
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basis of order of merit irrespective of the date of appointment.
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4.7 On 24 June 2016, the representation of the
appellants was rejected by the Registrar General of the High
Court stating that the order of the High Court in Writ Petition
No.1827 of 2004 clearly states that the seniority will be
determined from the date of appointment and the said order
has attained finality.
4.8 Consequently, the appellants filed an application
being MCC No.681 of 2016 in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004
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seeking clarification of the order dated 2 May 2012.
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4.9 On 28 September 2016, the Division Bench of the
High Court dismissed the aforesaid application stating that the
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order dated 2 May 2012 requires no clarification as it does
not suffer from any ambiguity.
4.10 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Writ Petition
No.3620 of 2019 before the High Court seeking quashing of the
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letter dated 24 June 2016 issued by the Registrar General of
the High Court rejecting the appellants’ claim of seniority.
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4.11 On 13 May 2019, the learned Single Judge of the
High Court rejected the writ petition of the appellants stating
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that the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 2
May 2012 in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004 had stated in
categorical terms that the seniority of the appellants would be
reckoned from the date of appointment. If the appellants were
aggrieved by the said direction, they ought to have challenged
the same at that point of time, which the appellants did not do.
Therefore, the said direction issued by the Division Bench of
the High Court has attained finality.
4.12 Discontented by the order of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court, the appellants filed Writ Appeal No.
341 of 2019.
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4.13 Vide impugned judgment and final order dated 30
July 2019, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
writ appeal stating that the Court is not in a position to deal
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with the said issue on merits since the order dated 2 May
2012 stands till date and the review petition filed against the
same also stands dismissed.
4.14 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred an
appeal to this Court by way of special leave.
4.15 It is to be noted that though candidates from the
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2006, 2008 and 2012 batch were impleaded in representative
capacity, no one has put in appearance on their behalf.
5. We have heard Shri. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, Shri B.S.
Rajesh Agrajit, learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of
Respondent No.1/State, Shri. Harsh Pathak, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2 and Shri. Apoorv
Kurup, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No.3 at length.
6. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that the
appellants, having been selected in the selection process of
2003, ought to have been granted seniority over all such
candidates who were selected in pursuance to the subsequent
selection process conducted in the years 2006, 2008 and 2012.
He submits that, in any case, the appellants were entitled to
seniority over the candidates who were appointed after the
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order of the Division Bench of the High court dated 2 May
2012. It is, therefore, submitted that the appellants ought to
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have at least been placed above the batch appointed on 10
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July 2012.
7. Per contra , learned counsel for the State submits
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that the order of the High Court dated 2 May 2012 is clear.
As per the said order, the seniority of the appellants was to be
reckoned from the date of their appointment. It is submitted
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that though the order of the High Court was passed on 2 May
2012, the same was challenged before this Court by way of
Special Leave Petition (“SLP” for short) being SLP(C) No. 21673
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of 2012 and after the said SLP was rejected on 30 November
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2012, the appellants were appointed on 8 July 2013. It is
submitted that, in the meantime, the 2012 batch came to be
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appointed on 10 July 2012. It is thus submitted that since it
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is clear from the order of the High Court dated 2 May 2012
that the appellants’ seniority was to be reckoned from the date
of their appointment, their seniority has rightly been
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considered from the date of their appointment i.e. from 8 July
2013. The said order having attained finality, it is now not
open for the appellants to say that they ought to have been
granted seniority with retrospective effect.
8. At the outset, we do not propose to go into the merits
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and demerits of the order passed by the Division Bench of the
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High Court dated 2 May 2012, inasmuch as it has attained
finality in view of the dismissal of the SLP by this Court vide
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order dated 30 November 2012. We would only consider as
to from which date the appellants could be entitled to seniority
in the cadre of Civil Judge (Junior Division).
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9. Undisputedly, in the order dated 2 May 2012, the
Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed as
under:
“16. Thus, in the totality of the facts
and circumstances of the case,
we deem it appropriate to direct
respondent No.1 to appoint the
petitioners, subject to
fulfillment of necessary
formalities like police
verification etc. against the
available vacancies for the post
of Civil Judge (Junior Division).
The seniority of the
petitioners will, however, be
reckoned from the date of
their appointment .”
[Emphasis supplied]
10. It can thus be seen that the seniority of the
appellants was to be reckoned from the date of their
appointment. As such, we do not find merit in the claim of the
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appellants with regard to the grant of seniority vis-à-vis those
candidates who were appointed prior to the date of the order
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of the High Court i.e. 2 May 2012.
11. The only question that will have to be considered is.
as to whether the appellants would be entitled to seniority over
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the batch of Judicial Officers who were appointed on 10 July
2012.
12. It is clear from the record that the writ petition filed
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by the appellants was decided on 2 May 2012. As such, the
State ought to have appointed the appellants within a
reasonable time. Though the State had challenged the said
order in an SLP before this Court, the order of the High Court
was never stayed by this Court. Ultimately, the SLP came to
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be dismissed on 30 November 2012. Even thereafter, for a
period of around 8 months, no action was taken by the State
in issuing an order of appointment to the appellants.
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13. Undisputedly, the 2012 batch was appointed on 10
July 2012 i.e., after a period of more than 2 months from the
date of the order of the High Court. As already pointed out by
us hereinabove, no one has appeared for the candidate from
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the 2012 batch of the Judicial Officers who was impleaded in
the present case.
14. We are of the considered opinion that the right to be
appointed accrued to the appellants on the date of the order of
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the High Court i.e. on 2 May 2012. The period between the
date of the order of the High Court and the appointment of the
batch of 2012 is more than 2 months. During the said period,
the respondent-State could very well have fulfilled the
necessary formalities like police verification, etc., and issued
an order of appointment to the appellants.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
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delay in giving effect to the order of the High Court dated 2
May 2012 by the State Government should not be permitted to
act to the prejudice of the appellants. In this respect, we may
gainfully refer to the order passed by this Court in the case of
Pilla Sitaram Patrudu and others v. Union of India and
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others .
16. We are, therefore, inclined to partly allow the
present appeal. Accordingly, we pass the following order:
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(1996) 8 SCC 637
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(i) The appeal is partly allowed.
(ii) It is directed that in the seniority list, the
appellants be shown senior to the Judicial
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Officers who were appointed on 10 July 2012.
17. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there
shall be no order as to costs.
..............................J
(B.R. GAVAI)
…..………...............................J
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 23, 2025
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