Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DIRECTOR GENERAL, TELECOMMUNICATION & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
T.N. PEETHAMBARAM
DATE OF JUDGMENT19/09/1986
BENCH:
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
BENCH:
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 162 1986 SCR (3) 828
1986 SCC (4) 348 JT 1986 496
1986 SCALE (2)471
ACT:
Telegraph Engineering Service (Group ’B’) Recruitment
Rules 1981-Rule 2 in Appendix III-"minimum" pass mark-What
it means.
HEADNOTE:
Rule 2 in Appendix III of the Telegraph Engineering
Service (Group ’B’) Recruitment Rules 1981 was interpreted
by the appellant Department as requiring the candidates to
secure 50% minimum pass marks for the general candidates and
45% minimum pass marks for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes in ’each’ of the four subjects or items.
On a challenge made by the respondent to this
interpretation by the Department, the Administrative
Tribunal took the view that the requirement as regards
securing minimum pass marks in the examination by the
candidates concerned is referable to ’aggregate’ and not to
’each’ of the four subjects or items of the examination.
Allowing the appeal of the Department, this Court,
^
HELD: 1. The ’Rule’ does not employ the expression
’aggregate’. Injection of the word ’aggregate’ in the Rule
in the disguise of interpretation would be self defeating
and lead to absurd results and accordingly would be contrary
to well established canons of construction, not to speak of
a common-sense-oriented approach. [830E-F]
2. The interpretation propounded by the Tribunal would
result in havoc and have a catastrophic consequencs. [830D]
3. Since the Rule does not specify a different passing
standard for ’each’ subject, the prescribed minimum passing
standard must be the yardstick to apply to each of the
subjects or items. Minimum must mean the minimum in ’each’,
as much as, minimum in ’aggregate’. [830F-G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3141 of
1986
829
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.3.1986 of the
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Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras in Transferred
Application No. 479 of 1986.
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, P.
Parmeshwaran and R.P. Srivastava for the Appellants.
Harish N. Salve, Rajiv K. Garg, N.D. Garg and Mr. N.
Safaya for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
THAKKAR, J. ’Fails’ in one subject, but ’passes’ the
examination. It is not a tounge-in-the-check remark, for,
passing an examination does not mean passing or securing the
minimum passing marks in each subject or item of examination
provided the candidate secures the minimum passing marks in
aggregate, and he is entitled to be declared as having
passed the examination according to the Central
Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal hereafter), Hyderabad,
which has upheld the aforesaid proposition canvassed by the
respondent. The validity of this view is in focus before
this Court in the present appeal by Special Leave.
Rule 2 in Appendix III of the Telegraph Engineering
Service (Group ’B’) Recruitment Rules, 1981, for limited
Departmental Qualifying Examination, in the context of which
the controversy has arisen. reads thus:-
"2. Limited Departmental Competitive Examination:
(i)(a) Advanced Technical paper- . . . 100 marks
General
(b) Advanced Technical Paper- . . . 100 marks
Special.
(c) General Knowledge and . . . 50 marks
Current Affairs
(d) Assessment of . . . 75 marks
Confidential Reports
(ii) (a) The minimum pass marks in the examination
shall be 50% for general candidates and 45% for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe candidates."
830
This rule was interpreted by the concerned Department
as requiring the candidates to secure 50% minimum pass marks
for the general candidates and 45% minimum pass marks for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in "each" of the four
subjects or items. The Tribunal has taken the view that the
Department was wrong in so interpreting the Rule and has
formed the opinion that on a true interpretation, the rule
requirement as regards securing minimum pass marks in the
examination by the candidates concerned is referable to
"aggregate" marks and not to each of the four subjects or
items of the examination. It has been overlooked by the
Tribunal that the ’Rule’ does not employ the expression
’aggregate’, and that it is impossible to inject the said
word in the rule in the disguise of interpretation, as it
would lead to absurd results. An illustration will make the
’obvious’ point ’more obvious’. The illustration might be
viewed in the scenario of a medical degree examination. Can
one who secures zero, say in surgery, but secures high marks
in the other papers, so that the minimum aggregate standard
is attained, be declared to have passed the examination?
Such an interpretation would result in havoc and have
catastrophic consequences. Examining the examination rule in
the present context, the nihilist result is equally
conspicuous. Say, a candidate secures zero in the first
paper of ’Advanced Technology (general), or second paper of
Advanced Technology (Special), but secures full marks in the
rest of the subjects (or items). He would be securing (0 +
100 + 50 + 75) or (100 + 0 + 50 + 75) (= 225 i.e. 56.25%)
minimum passing marks and would be entitled to be declared
as having passed and having become entitled to the
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outflowing preferential treatment. Similar would be the
outcome also in a case where a candidate’s Confidential
Record is bad and he earns no points in that item. Such an
interpretation would thus be self-defeating and lead to
absurd results, and accordingly, would be contrary to well-
established canons of construction, not to speak of a
common-sense-oriented approach. Since the rule does not
specify a different passing standard for ’each’ subject, the
prescribed minimum passing standard must be the yardstick to
apply to each of the subjects or items. Minimum must mean
minimum in each, as much as, minimum in aggregate. The
Tribunal should not have therefore upset the decision of the
concerned Department and imposed on the department the
mistaken interpretation propounded by it. In the result, the
decision of the Tribunal must be reversed.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed accordingly. There
will be no order as to costs.
A.P.J. Appeal allowed.
831