Full Judgment Text
Non-reportable
2024 INSC 337
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO._________ OF 2024
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 21401 of 2022)
SHRIRAM MANOHAR BANDE …APPELLANT
VERSUS
UKTRANTI MANDAL & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Aravind Kumar, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment dated
02.05.2022 passed in Writ Petition No.1976 of 2019, whereby the
Signature Not Verified
writ petition filed by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 challenging the
Digitally signed by Dr.
Naveen Rawal
Date: 2024.04.25
14:06:01 IST
Reason:
Order dated 25.01.2019 passed by the Ld. School Tribunal
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(hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’), Amravati whereunder
termination of respondent No.1 (appellant herein) had been set
aside and directed the reinstatement with 50% back wages and
other consequential benefits came to be set aside has challenged
the same. Parties are referred to as per their rank/status in writ
court.
Facts in Brief:
4. Respondent No.1 is an educational society that runs
Respondent No.2 i.e., Vasantrao Naik High School which runs on
a grant-in-aid basis. The appellant came to be appointed as an
Assistant Teacher and was discharging his duties accordingly. The
appellant tendered his resignation from the said post on
10.10.2017. However, vide letter dated 25.10.2017, he withdrew
his resignation by posting said letter on 03.11.2017. The appellant
claimed that on 23.11.2017, he went to the school to resume his
service, which is when he was denied signing on the muster roll
by the Headmaster of Respondent No.2 and on 27.11.2017, the
appellant received a letter stating that he was relieved from his
service.
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5. Against his termination, the appellant approached the
Tribunal constituted under Section 8 of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation
Act, 1977, and Rules framed thereunder (hereinafter referred to as
MEPS Act and Rules) by filing an appeal under Section 9 of the
MEPS Act contending inter alia that the communication issued
by the respondents relieving him from service was illegal and all
connected documents therewith were fabricated and merely an
afterthought. It was also contended that he had withdrawn his
resignation, and as such respondents could not have prevented
him from joining to his duties. Appellant also contended that he
had not received any formal communication from respondents of
the acceptance of his resignation. Hence, he prayed for the order
of termination of service to be set aside.
6. Respondents in their written statement contended that the
School Committee had received the resignation letter of the
appellant and pursuant to the same Respondent No.1 –
management had passed a resolution of accepting the resignation.
It was the case of the respondents that acceptance of the
resignation was communicated to the appellant. On the contrary,
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appellant contended that the resolutions passed by the School
Committee were back-dated and it was fabricated only to show
compliance with due process.
7. The Tribunal upon perusal of the pleadings and documents
on record concluded that the appellant had indeed withdrawn his
resignation lawfully and the respondents with a mala fide intent
had fabricated the documents i.e., the resolutions of the
Committee wherein the resignation was accepted. Accordingly,
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the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 25 January 2019, set
aside the termination of the appellant, declaring it to be
unlawfully done.
8. Being aggrieved by said judgment and order of the
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Tribunal dated 25 January 2019, the Respondents approached
the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition
No.1976 of 2019 contending that Tribunal had erroneously
discarded the resolution dated 13.10.2017 passed by the School
Management. They further contended that Tribunal had
committed an error by holding that resolution was an afterthought
of the management; it was also contended that Tribunal discarded
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the vital document filed on record, leading to a mistake that needs
to be corrected in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The
Respondents also contended that appellant was granted 50% back
wages by the Tribunal without pleading or proof of his
employment during the period he was out of service. Lastly, it
was contended that Tribunal had not given a single reason for its
assessment of back wages without any pleading or proof.
9. The High Court concluded that there was material on
record to show that the resignation tendered by the appellant was
indeed accepted as per the resolution passed by Respondent No.2
and there was statutory compliance with the requirements under
the MEPS Act and Rules. The plea of the appellant that
acceptance of his resignation was never communicated to him
and thereby termination was illegal, was not accepted by the High
Court by observing that non-communication would not make the
resolution inoperative. The High Court observed that the MEPS
Act and Rules do not stipulate the resignation would come into
effect only after its acceptance is communicated to an employee.
The High Court also ruled that conclusion arrived at by the
Tribunal regarding the documents being fabricated had no basis
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and was without any evidence to that effect and resultantly, High
Court set aside the findings of the Tribunal and found the
judgment of the Tribunal to be unsustainable and as such allowed
the writ petition as prayed for. Being aggrieved by the Order of
the High Court, appellant is before us.
Contentions of the parties:
10. We have heard Ms. Sweta Rani, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant, and Mr. Sunil Murarka, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.
10.1 It is the contention of Ms. Sweta Rani, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant that High Court committed an error in
setting aside the well-reasoned order of the Tribunal by not
appreciating the fact that only the management committee could
have taken a decision and the school committee had no power to
consider the same under the MEPS Act and Rules made
thereunder. She would further contend that High Court erred in
not considering the inconsistent plea put forward by the
management with reference to the approval of the resignation
namely in one breath it was contended that the school committee
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approved the resignation and, in another breath, it was contended
that management committee approved the resignation. It is also
contended that High Court erred in not appreciating that the
resolution dated 13.10.2017 is a manufactured document as
rightly noticed by the Tribunal. She would further elaborate her
submissions by contending that the resignation letter dated
10.10.2017 had been undisputedly withdrawn by communication
dated 25.10.2017 and non-considering of this vital aspect has
resulted in the miscarriage in the administration of justice.
10.2 Per contra, Shri Sunil Murarka, learned counsel appearing
for Respondent Nos.1 and 2 by supporting the impugned order
and praying for dismissal of the appeal has contended that
Tribunal had erred in drawing adverse inferences vis-à-vis with
reference to copies of the resolutions of the management and the
school committee as not having been filed along with written
statement, though those documents were indeed placed before the
Tribunal at the stage of recording the evidence and this fact was
taken note off by the High Court. He would contend that mandate
of Section 7 of the MEPS Act read with Rule 40 of the Rules was
fully satisfied and contrary attempt by the employee that
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resignation letter had been withdrawn would not be immune to
his benefit in the backdrop of the said resignation having already
been accepted by the management.
10.3 He further contended that written statement filed by the
respondent would clearly show that the resignation of the
appellant was firstly accepted by the management committee by
resolution dated 13.10.2017 and only thereafter by the school
committee on 14.10.2017 which was evidenced from records. He
emphasized that Paragraph 10 of the written statement makes a
mention of the resolution dated 13.10.2017, therefore, it cannot
be said that the resolution dated 13.10.2017 is an afterthought
merely because it was not annexed along with the written
statement and only produced during the course of the evidence.
He also contended that resignation was voluntary and the same
came to be accepted by the management committee and school
committee respectively which was communicated to the appellant
on 16.10.2017, and therefore appellant was estopped by his own
conduct from claiming that the resignation tendered was
withdrawn before its acceptance. Hence, he prayed for dismissal
of the appeal.
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Discussion and Analysis:
11 Against the backdrop of the aforesaid submissions, and
contentions raised by the learned counsel, we now proceed to
examine the findings of the courts below in contrast to the
relevant provisions of the MEPS Act and Rules. The appellant’s
case, in brief, is that there was non-compliance with the
provisions of the MEPS Act and Rules made thereunder which
provides for proper acceptance of a resignation. The appellant has
strenuously contended that resolution dated 13.10.2017 passed by
the management committee was a manufactured/fabricated
document. On the contrary, the respondents submit that there is
no strict rule which prescribes that resignation has to be accepted
by the management committee only, and the same should not be
considered by the school committee. It was also submitted that
the MEPS Act and Rules do not lay down any strict rules with
regard to the communication of acceptance of resignation.
12 Upon careful consideration of the factual background, the
findings of the Tribunal, and the reasoning of the High Court for
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reversing the findings of the Tribunal, we have identified two
questions for consideration before us:
I. Whether the appellant is justified in claiming that
the resolution dated 13.10.2017 is a ‘manufactured’
document by the respondent?
II. Whether there is any non-compliance with the
provisions under the MEPS Act and Rules in
acceptance of the resignation letter of the appellant?
Answer: Both the questions are in the negative for following
reasons:
RE: Issue No.1
13 It would be necessary for us to examine the issue of
whether the resolution dated 13.10.2017 is a
manufactured/fabricated document as claimed by the appellant, as
the Tribunal had set aside the termination order on the basis that
resolution dated 13.10.2017 was an afterthought and was created
by the respondents only to show compliance with the provisions
of MEPS Act and Rules. The Tribunal’s conclusion for holding
the resolutions to be fabricated document was based on the
pleadings of the respondents in the written statement filed before
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the Tribunal, wherein at Paragraph 6 of the written statement, the
respondent had stated that the school committee decided on the
resignation which was thereafter approved by the management
and it had failed to place on record the resolution along with its
written statement. However, it is to be noted that the Tribunal had
completely overlooked and ignored the additional information in
Paragraph 10 namely in the subsequent part of the written
statement, whereunder the detailed steps taken by the respondents
after receiving the resignation letter have been enumerated. It
would be apposite to reproduce the relevant paragraph of the
written statement of the respondents.
“10. Additional information: - The appellant is trying
to take undue advantage of communications made by the
respondent no.2. It is submitted that as soon as the
appellant tended his resignation before the respondent no.2,
it was placed before the executive committee of the society,
in turn the society has resolved to accept the resignation
and in the same it was decided that the same resolution is to
be passed in school committee. Accordingly, the directions
of the management were compiled by passing a resolution
in the school committee. It is obvious that acceptance of
resignation firstly was made by the management and the
said decision is accepted by the school committee later on.
Therefore, nothing is wrong in it.”
14 A bare perusal of the pleadings in Paragraph 10 of the
written statement would make it abundantly clear that the school
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committee upon receipt of the resignation letter had placed it
before the executive committee, which in turn had resolved by
resolution dated 13.10.2017 to accept the resignation and in the
same resolution it was also resolved to be passed by the school
committee, and accordingly the school committee had passed the
resolution dated 14.10.2017. This plea received in the written
statement reflects that respondents had specifically pleaded that
the management committee was the first one to accept the
resolution and only thereafter the school committee had passed its
resolution dated 14.10.2017. Further, it is important to note that
the document in question was placed before the Tribunal at the
stage of evidence, which is an admitted fact. Hence, it was wholly
erroneous for the Tribunal to conclude that merely because the
document and records were in possession of the management,
they would have prepared or fabricated such record. The
circumstances analyzed by the Tribunal for arriving at this
finding and the reasons arrived thereunder is in complete
ignorance of plea raised in Paragraph 10 of the respondent's
written statement and hence it is an apparent error on the face of
record. The High Court has thus rightly appreciated the pleadings
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and documents on record to conclude that Tribunal committed an
error by holding that documents were manufactured without any
appropriate reasons or sufficient evidence to the said effect, more
so when there was an explicit mention of the resolution passed by
the management in Paragraph 10 of the written statement.
Accordingly, Issue No.1 is decided against the appellant, thereby
holding that the resolution dated 13.10.2017 is not a
‘manufactured’ document and upholding the findings of the High
Court on this aspect.
RE: Issue No.2
15. The resolution dated 13.10.2017 having been accepted as
a valid document to determine the case at hand, it is now
necessary to see whether there has been any non-compliance with
the provisions of the MEPS Act and Rules while accepting the
resignation of the appellant and thereby terminating his services.
One of the main grounds for challenging the impugned judgment
by the appellant was that only management could have accepted
the resignation and taken a decision on the resignation letter dated
10.10.2017, and the school committee lacked the power to
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consider the same, and hence it was in violation of the provisions
of the MEPS Act and Rules. It would be pertinent to note that
High Court has rightly rejected said contention by discussing in
detail the functions to be performed by the school committee as
laid out under Schedule ‘A’ to the MEPS Act and Rules. The
functions to be performed by the school committee are as
prescribed under Clause 3, which include the appointment of
employees, other than head of the school. It is worthy to note,
that appellant himself had addressed his resignation letter to the
school committee, however, the school committee placed it
before the management, upon which the management committee
passed a resolution dated 13.10.2017, accepting the resignation. It
is only after the acceptance of the resignation by the
management, the school committee on 14.10.2017 passed the
resolution accepting the resignation letter. It is equally important
to note that School Committee consists of four representatives of
the management, including the President of the Governing Body
and one member from amongst permanent teachers, with the head
of the school being ex-officio secretary of the committee.
Therefore, it is evident that management was indeed involved in
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the process of considering and accepting the resignation letter.
Appellant has failed to convince this Court that there was any
error in the findings of the High Court on this ground.
16. It would be apposite for us to look into the provisions
under the MEPS Act and Rules which enumerate the procedure
for resignation by an employee of a private school. The relevant
provisions i.e., Section 7 of the MEPS Act which is reproduced
below for reference:
“7. Procedure for resignation by employees of private
schools: If any employee intends to resign from his post in
any private school, at any time after the appointed date, he
shall draw up a letter of resignation in duplicate and sign
both copies of that letter and put the date thereon. He may
then forward one copy to the Management by registered
post and keep the other copy with him.”
A bare perusal of Section 7 of the MEPS Act, the three-fold
requirements while tendering a resignation are stipulated for the
employee's advantage. It addresses the prescribed protocol for
submitting a letter of resignation. The purpose of this provision is
to protect employees from unethical practices, such as
management calling them in, pressurising or coercing them, or
offering them any form of inducement or incentive to sign blank
documents that may be used to draft resignation letters at a later
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date or to terminate employees through deceptive means.
Therefore, it is imperative that an employee strictly adhere to the
favour of Section 7 it while submitting their resignation. The
employee forfeits the protections stipulated therein if he fails to
adhere to the prescribed procedure or acknowledge executing a
typewritten or printed letter of resignation and subsequently
admits to personally delivering or tendering the resignation to
management or doing so through a third party. Section 7 of the
MEPS Act is not applicable in such circumstance, and the
employee cannot invoke its protection to proclaim an unlawful
and involuntary resignation in violation of the provision. In the
present case, it is an admitted position that the employee
voluntarily tendered his resignation. Hence, we need not delve
into this aspect in depth.
17. The relevant Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules, also needs to be
considered, and is reproduced below:
RULE 40 OF THE MAHARASHTRA EMPLOYEES OF
PRIVATE SCHOOLS (CONDITIONS OF SERVICE)
RULES, 1981
40. Resignation.-
(1) A permanent employee may leave service after giving three
calendar months’ notice and a non-permanent employee may
leave service after giving one calendar month’s notice. The
Management may, however, allow an employee to leave service
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earlier on payment of pay (excluding allowances) for three
months, or as the case may be, one month in lieu of notice by the
employee. The amount in lieu of notice shall be restricted to the
pay for the period by which the notice period falls short.
(2) If any Management allows an employee to leave service
earlier either without due notice or without making payment of
pay in lieu of notice as specified in sub-rule (1), a proportionate
amount of pay in lieu of notice shall be deducted from the grant
due to the school concerned.
(3) An employee entitled to vacation shall not give notice of
resignation during the vacation or so as to cover any part of the
vacation. The notice of resignation shall not be given within a
month after the beginning of the first term of the year.
18. It is important to note that in Section 7 of MEPS Act, the
three-fold requirement to be fulfilled while tendering a
resignation is to protect the interest of the employee, whereas
Rule 40 of the Rules was introduced to safeguard the interests of
the Management, i.e., to enable the management to make
necessary arrangements to replace the existing employee. The
first part of Rule 40 (1) imposes a condition only upon the
employee while tendering a resignation, i.e., notice to the
Management. A permanent employee is required to give three-
calendar months’ notice, whereas a non-permanent employee has
to give a month’s notice. However, the second part of Rule 40 (1)
permits the Management to relieve an employee from his service
before the duration of the notice period by paying the employee
for the remaining duration of the notice period. On a holistic
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reading of Rule 40, it can be concluded that Management is given
the authority to accept the resignation tendered prior to the
completion of the notice period and terminate the services of the
employee with payment in lieu of the remaining period. Further,
it is observed that Rule 40 has not prescribed any requirement or
obligation to be fulfilled by the management relating to
communication of acceptance of resignation to the employee, nor
the Rule would indicate that acceptance of resignation and
consequent termination of services of the employee would be
improper if such acceptance of resignation is not communicated
to the employee. In light of the intent and interpretation of the
relevant Section 7 of MEPS and Rule 40 of the Rules, we
conclude that the High Court was right in holding that mere non-
communication of acceptance of resignation to the employee
would not render the termination invalid. We answer the Issue in
the negative, thereby upholding the findings of the High Court.
19. In fact, there is no ground before us, which was not
already dealt with by the High Court in its reasoning and finding,
however, we have gone into the facts in detail and reviewed the
judgments of the courts below in quite detail only to satisfy our
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conscience that no injustice has been meted out to appellant. We
now proceed to detail out the specific findings of the High Court
which dealt with all grounds raised by the appellant, which have
been reagitated before us.
20. It is to be noted that appellant was undergoing certain
marital disputes and has admitted to this effect that owing to his
difficulties in performing his duties, he tendered his resignation
on 10.10.2017. Before the Tribunal, appellant tried to take a stand
that he was pressurized into tendering his resignation, however,
the Tribunal specifically observed that the appellant never took
this stand in his resignation letter, and this plea was raised for the
first time before the Education Officer vide letter dated
13.12.2017. Appellant did not take this plea in any of the earlier
communications, and accordingly, Tribunal observed that
resignation was voluntary, and the submissions of pressurization
were vague. Appellant also stated that he had filed a leave
application on 10.10.2017, the same date as his resignation letter,
seeking leave from 01.11.2017 to 30.11.2017. However, the
Tribunal had brushed aside said contention of the appellant on the
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ground that he never submitted any proof to show his bona fides
of having communicated the leave application, and Tribunal held
that Appellant had acted upon his resignation till his subsequent
communication. These observations of the Tribunal would go to
show the conduct of the appellant, and the attempts made by the
appellant to undo the voluntary decision to resign only post
acceptance of his resignation letter. Appellant himself has
admitted that he sought withdrawal of his resignation letter on
03.11.2017 only upon realizing his mistake. Tribunal and the
High Court have confirmed the fact that resignation was
voluntarily tendered by the appellant. The appellant has also
strenuously submitted that the acceptance of the resignation was
not communicated to him, and he submitted his letter seeking
withdrawal of resignation before the communication of
acceptance of the resignation. Hence, he contended that the
termination was invalid.
21. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to point out that as
per service jurisprudence, the employment is terminated from the
date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the
appropriate authority. The appellant, in this case, tendered his
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resignation letter on 10.10.2017 and this resignation letter came
be accepted on 14.10.2017, hence the date of termination of the
services of the appellant for the purpose of adjudication would be
14.10.2017.
22. This Court in North Zone Cultural Centre and another
vs. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar reported in (2003) 5 SCC 455 has
held that resignation would be effective on its acceptance, even if
the acceptance is not communicated as long as rules or guidelines
governing the resignation do not mandate such acceptance of
resignation is to be communicated. In the North Zone (supra)
case, the employee who was a temporary Accountant tendered his
resignation from the post held by him on 18.11.1988. With effect
from the said date, the resignation was accepted by the Director
on the very same day with the endorsement "Accepted, hand over
charge". The employee vide Telegram on 21.11.1988 withdrew
his resignation stating that the same was obtained by pressure. He
was communicated vide letter dated 18.11.1988 regarding
acceptance of his resignation. The High Court allowed the writ
petition on two grounds; (i) the acceptance of resignation was not
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communicated till the withdrawal and (ii) the employee was
permitted to attend the duty even after acceptance of resignation.
Setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court held that
non-communication of the acceptance does not make the
resignation inoperative provided, there is, in fact, an acceptance
before the withdrawal. It is also held that it is not open to the
public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by
the appropriate authority
23. As noticed by us above, Section 7 of the MEPS Act and
Rule 40 of the Rules does not impose any guidelines for
acceptance of the resignation upon the management. Hence, the
position of law laid down by this Court in North Zone (supra)
squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the
contention raised by the appellant about withdrawal of
resignation before communication of its acceptance does not hold
water.
24. We find no infirmity with the impugned judgment and it
does not merit any interference. In light of both the points
formulated having been answered in the negative, we affirm the
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findings of the High Court and consequently dismiss the present
appeal with no order as to costs.
…...........….………………….J.
(Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha)
…...........….………………….J.
(Aravind Kumar)
New Delhi,
April 25, 2024
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