Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1321
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
INHERENT JURISDICTION
SUO MOTO CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 3 OF 2025
IN RE: N. PEDDI RAJU AND OTHERS
.... ALLEGED CONTEMNORS
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, CJI.
1. When the Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 613 of 2025 was
listed before us, upon perusal of the pleadings, we noticed that
scurrilous and scandalous allegations had been made against a
sitting Judge of the High Court of Telangana.
2. When we expressed our displeasure with the language used
in the said petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought
liberty to withdraw the transfer petition. However, vide our order
dated 29.07.2025, we refused to permit the petitioner to withdraw
the said petition.
3. Though, we dismissed the petition vide our order dated
Signature Not Verified
29.07.2025, we observed that we cannot permit the petitioner and
Digitally signed by
POOJA SHARMA
Date: 2025.11.15
12:55:24 IST
Reason:
1
the lawyers connected with the transfer petition to go scot-free.
We had, therefore, issued notice to Mr. N. Peddi Raju, the
1
petitioner , Mr. Ritesh Patil, learned Advocate on Record for the
2
petitioner and Mr. Nitin Meshram, learned Counsel who has
3
drawn the transfer petition , to show cause as to why an action for
committing Contempt of the Court should not be initiated against
them. The notice was made returnable on 11.08.2025.
4. When the matter was listed on 11.08.2025, we had heard
Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel for the alleged contemnor
no.1, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the alleged
contemnor no.2 and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel
for the alleged contemnor no.3.
5. On the said date, an affidavit of apology was tendered before
this Court. We were, however, of the considered view that since the
scandalous allegations were made against the learned Judge of the
High Court, it would be more appropriate for the alleged
contemnors to tender an apology first to the learned Judge.
1
Hereinafter referred to as, “alleged contemnor no.1”.
2
Hereinafter referred to as, “alleged contemnor no.2”.
3
Hereinafter referred to as, “alleged contemnor no.3”.
2
At that stage, the learned senior counsel/counsel appearing for
the alleged contemnors sought liberty from this Court to approach
the High Court to tender their unconditional apology.
6. We, therefore, permitted the alleged contemnors to tender
their unconditional apology before the learned Judge of the High
Court.
7. Since the Criminal Petition No. 4162 of 2020 was already
disposed of, we had directed the Registrar General of the High
Court to reopen the matter. We, however, clarified that the matter
will be reopened only for the limited purpose of tendering an
unconditional apology by the alleged contemnors before the
learned Judge of the High Court, who had passed the final order
in the said criminal petition.
8. Accordingly, the matter was reopened before the High Court,
and the learned Single Judge of the High Court has passed an
order dated 22.08.2025.
9. In her order dated 22.08.2025, the learned Judge has
observed thus:
“ 11. A trend of vilifying Judges has emerged in
recent times. Disgruntled lawyers and litigants often
demand release, recusal and transfer of matters on
3
the pretext of oblique motives attributed to the
Judge. Such reckless allegations derail the course of
justice by creating an environment of intimidation
which is not conducive to the effective administration
of justice. Personal attacks on Judges breach the
safety-net of impartial decision-making and is
antithetical to independent Judges. Targetting of
Judges makes for Skeptical and unsure Judges.
12. The attackers also forget that while - casting
and circulating – aspersions in print or on social
media can be done by the flick of a key, the concerned
Judge does not have a platform to present his/her
side of the story. One-sided mud-slinging, more
often than not, swings right back to besmirch the
attacker. The ‘Majesty’ of a Court is an inalienable
part of the respect associated with upholding of the
Rule of Law. Attacks on Judges irrevocably dent the
dignity of Courts as impartial arbiters of justice and
affects public trust and confidence in the judiciary.
Advocates, as equal participants in the quest for
justice, have a greater responsibility in ensuring that
the Court is not brought to disrepute.
13. As an end-note, Judgeship is never about the
power of the Chair but is always about the
responsibility of disseminating justice with
conscience, commitment and compassion. The
common man should repose full faith and confidence
on the Courts. Fortunately, notwithstanding the
occasional stresses and strains, Courts continue to
be the proud flag-bearers of justice.
14. I accept the apology tendered by the three
alleged Contemnors. Let the matter be placed before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as directed in the
judgment dated 11.08.2025.”
10. It can thus be seen that the learned Judge has shown the
magnanimity of accepting the apology tendered by the alleged
4
contemnors.
11. In the recent past, we have noticed a growing trend of lawyers
making scurrilous and scandalous allegations against the
Judge(s), in the pleadings, when they do not get favourable orders.
Such a practice has to be strongly deprecated.
12. As early as in 1954, the Constitution Bench of this Court in
the case of M.Y. Shareef and Another vs. Hon’ble Judges of the
4
High Court of Nagpur and Others has observed thus:
“13. The fact however remains, as found by the High
Court, that there was at the time these events
happened considerable misconception amongst a
section of the Nagpur Bar about advocates'
responsibilities in matters of signing transfer
applications containing allegations of this character.
It cannot be denied that a section of the Bar is under
an erroneous impression that when a counsel is
acting in the interests of his client, or in accordance
with his instructions he is discharging his legitimate
duty to his client even when he signs an application
or a pleading which contains matter scandalizing the
Court. They think that when there is conflict between
their obligations to the Court and their duty to the
client, the latter prevails. This misconception has to
be rooted out by a clear and emphatic
pronouncement, and we think it should be widely
made known that counsel who sign applications or
pleadings containing matter scandalizing the Court
without reasonably satisfying themselves about the
prima facie existence of adequate grounds there for,
4
(1954) 2 SCC 444
5
with a view to prevent or delay the course of justice,
are themselves guilty of contempt of Court, and that
it is no duty of a counsel to his client to take any
interest in such applications; on the other hand, his
duty is to advise his client for refraining from making
allegations of this nature in such applications. Once
the fact is recognized as was done by the High Court
here, that the members of the Bar have not fully
realized the implications of their signing such
applications and are firmly under the belief that their
conduct in doing so is in accordance with
professional ethics, it has to be held that the act of
the two appellants in this case was done under a
mistaken view of their rights and duties, and in such
cases even a qualified apology may well be considered
by a Court. In borderline cases where a question of
principle about the rights of counsel and their duties
has to be settled, an alternative plea of apology merits
consideration; for it is possible for a judge who hears
the case to hold that there is no contempt in which
case a defence of unqualified apology is meaningless,
because that would amount to the admission of the
commission of an offence.”
13. It cannot be disputed that lawyers, as officers of the Court,
possess a duty to the Court.
14. A reference in this respect can be made to the following
observations made by this Court In the matter of T.V.
Choudhary, A Member of the Indian Administrative Service
5
(Under Suspension) , where the classic case of Rondel vs.
5 (1987) 3 SCC 258.
6
6
Worsley was referred to :
“ 9. We wish we could have rested content with
concluding the judgment with the operative portion of
our conclusions on the merits of the case but we find
with a sense of anguish and heaviness of heart that
we have to express our disapproval of the manner in
which the arguments were advanced before us on
behalf of the applicant T.V. Choudhary. Not only were
the arguments advanced with undue vehemence and
unwarranted passion, reflecting identification of
interests beyond established conventions but were of
degrees not usual of enlightened senior counsel to
adopt. The majesty of law and the dignity of courts
cannot be maintained unless there is mutual respect
between the Bench and the Bar and the counsel act
in full realisation of their duty to the court alongside
their duty to their clients and have the grace to
reconcile themselves when their pleas and arguments
do not find acceptance with the court. It is needless
for us to say that neither rhetoric nor tempestuous
arguments can constitute the sine qua non for
persuasive arguments.
10. By virtue of the pre-eminence which senior
counsel enjoy in the profession, they not only carry
greater responsibilities but they also act as a model to
the junior members of the profession. A senior
counsel more or less occupies a position akin to a
Queen's counsel in England next after the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General. It is an honour and
privilege conferred on advocates of standing and
experience by the Chief Justice and the Judges of this
Court. They thus become leading counsel and take
precedence on all counsel not having that rank. A
senior counsel though he cannot draw up pleadings
of the party, can nevertheless be engaged “to settle”
6
(1967) 3 All ER 993, 998
7
i.e. to put the pleadings into “proper and satisfactory
form” and hence a senior counsel settling pleadings
has a more onerous responsibility as otherwise the
blame for improper pleadings will be laid at his doors.
11. Lord Reid in Rondel v. Worsley [(1967) 3 All ER
993, 998] has succinctly set out the conflicting nature
of the duties a counsel has to perform in his own
inimitable manner as follows:
“Every counsel has a duty to his client
fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every
argument, and ask every question, however
distasteful, which he thinks will help his
client's case. As an officer of the court
concerned in the administration of justice, he
has an overriding duty to the court, to the
standards of his profession, and to the
public, which may and often does lead to a
conflict with his client's wishes or with what
the client thinks are his personal interests.
Counsel must not mislead the court, he must
not lend himself to casting aspersions on the
other party or witnesses for which there is no
sufficient basis in the information in his
possession, he must not withhold authorities
or documents which may tell against his
clients but which the law or the standards of
his profession require him to produce. By so
acting he may well incur the displeasure or
worse of his client so that if the case is lost,
his client would or might seek legal redress if
that were open to him.”
12. Again as Lord Denning, M.R. in Rondel v. W
[(1966) 3 All ER 657, 665] would say:
“He (the counsel) has time and again to
choose between his duty to his client and his
duty to the court. This is a conflict often
8
difficult to resolve; and he should not be
under pressure to decide it wrongly.... [W]hen
a barrister (or an advocate) puts his first duty
to the court, he has nothing to fear. (words in
brackets added).”
In the words of Lord Denning:
“It is a mistake to suppose that he is the
mouthpiece of his client to say what he
wants:…He must disregard the most specific
instructions of his client, if they conflict with
his duty to the court. The code which
requires a barrister to do all this is not a code
of law. It is a code of honour. If he breaks it,
he is offending against the rules of the
profession and is subject to its discipline....”
13. We are constrained to give expression to our
views with a feeling of remorse to remind the counsel
of that sense of detachment and non-identification
they are expected to maintain with the causes
espoused by them and not with a view to belittle the
profession or cast aspersions on counsel.”
15. The lawyers before subscribing their autographs to a
pleading making scurrilous and scandalous allegations against a
Judge ought to think about the serious repercussions of the same.
16. Be that as it may, recently in the case of N. Eswaranathan
7
v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police ,
rd
by an order dated 23 July 2025, a three Judge Bench of this
7
Miscellaneous Application No. 1264 of 2025 in SLP (Crl.) No. 6029 of 2025
9
Court, to which two of us (The Chief Justice of India and
Mr. Justice K.V. Chandran) were a party, decided a reference with
regard to the difference of opinion between two learned Judges of
this Court over the issue of the sentence to be imposed on two
lawyers of this Court. In the said order, we observed that the
majesty of law lies not in punishing someone, but in forgiving
someone who acknowledges their mistake. We, therefore, agreed
with the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court who had
accepted the unconditional apology made by the lawyers therein.
17. Since the learned Judge of the High Court against whom
scandalous and scurrilous allegations were made, has accepted
the unconditional apology tendered by the alleged contemnors, we
are also inclined to accept the unconditional apology tendered by
them. However, we put a note of caution that the lawyers who are
expected to act as officers of Court, should be careful while
subscribing their signatures on the pleadings which are in the
nature of making scandalous and scurrilous allegations against
the Judges of the Court.
10
18. With the aforesaid observations, the apology tendered by the
alleged contemnors is accepted.
19. The Contempt Proceedings are closed.
……………………………….CJI
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………………….J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 10, 2025.
11
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
INHERENT JURISDICTION
SUO MOTO CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 3 OF 2025
IN RE: N. PEDDI RAJU AND OTHERS
.... ALLEGED CONTEMNORS
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, CJI.
1. When the Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 613 of 2025 was
listed before us, upon perusal of the pleadings, we noticed that
scurrilous and scandalous allegations had been made against a
sitting Judge of the High Court of Telangana.
2. When we expressed our displeasure with the language used
in the said petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought
liberty to withdraw the transfer petition. However, vide our order
dated 29.07.2025, we refused to permit the petitioner to withdraw
the said petition.
3. Though, we dismissed the petition vide our order dated
Signature Not Verified
29.07.2025, we observed that we cannot permit the petitioner and
Digitally signed by
POOJA SHARMA
Date: 2025.11.15
12:55:24 IST
Reason:
1
the lawyers connected with the transfer petition to go scot-free.
We had, therefore, issued notice to Mr. N. Peddi Raju, the
1
petitioner , Mr. Ritesh Patil, learned Advocate on Record for the
2
petitioner and Mr. Nitin Meshram, learned Counsel who has
3
drawn the transfer petition , to show cause as to why an action for
committing Contempt of the Court should not be initiated against
them. The notice was made returnable on 11.08.2025.
4. When the matter was listed on 11.08.2025, we had heard
Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel for the alleged contemnor
no.1, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the alleged
contemnor no.2 and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel
for the alleged contemnor no.3.
5. On the said date, an affidavit of apology was tendered before
this Court. We were, however, of the considered view that since the
scandalous allegations were made against the learned Judge of the
High Court, it would be more appropriate for the alleged
contemnors to tender an apology first to the learned Judge.
1
Hereinafter referred to as, “alleged contemnor no.1”.
2
Hereinafter referred to as, “alleged contemnor no.2”.
3
Hereinafter referred to as, “alleged contemnor no.3”.
2
At that stage, the learned senior counsel/counsel appearing for
the alleged contemnors sought liberty from this Court to approach
the High Court to tender their unconditional apology.
6. We, therefore, permitted the alleged contemnors to tender
their unconditional apology before the learned Judge of the High
Court.
7. Since the Criminal Petition No. 4162 of 2020 was already
disposed of, we had directed the Registrar General of the High
Court to reopen the matter. We, however, clarified that the matter
will be reopened only for the limited purpose of tendering an
unconditional apology by the alleged contemnors before the
learned Judge of the High Court, who had passed the final order
in the said criminal petition.
8. Accordingly, the matter was reopened before the High Court,
and the learned Single Judge of the High Court has passed an
order dated 22.08.2025.
9. In her order dated 22.08.2025, the learned Judge has
observed thus:
“ 11. A trend of vilifying Judges has emerged in
recent times. Disgruntled lawyers and litigants often
demand release, recusal and transfer of matters on
3
the pretext of oblique motives attributed to the
Judge. Such reckless allegations derail the course of
justice by creating an environment of intimidation
which is not conducive to the effective administration
of justice. Personal attacks on Judges breach the
safety-net of impartial decision-making and is
antithetical to independent Judges. Targetting of
Judges makes for Skeptical and unsure Judges.
12. The attackers also forget that while - casting
and circulating – aspersions in print or on social
media can be done by the flick of a key, the concerned
Judge does not have a platform to present his/her
side of the story. One-sided mud-slinging, more
often than not, swings right back to besmirch the
attacker. The ‘Majesty’ of a Court is an inalienable
part of the respect associated with upholding of the
Rule of Law. Attacks on Judges irrevocably dent the
dignity of Courts as impartial arbiters of justice and
affects public trust and confidence in the judiciary.
Advocates, as equal participants in the quest for
justice, have a greater responsibility in ensuring that
the Court is not brought to disrepute.
13. As an end-note, Judgeship is never about the
power of the Chair but is always about the
responsibility of disseminating justice with
conscience, commitment and compassion. The
common man should repose full faith and confidence
on the Courts. Fortunately, notwithstanding the
occasional stresses and strains, Courts continue to
be the proud flag-bearers of justice.
14. I accept the apology tendered by the three
alleged Contemnors. Let the matter be placed before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as directed in the
judgment dated 11.08.2025.”
10. It can thus be seen that the learned Judge has shown the
magnanimity of accepting the apology tendered by the alleged
4
contemnors.
11. In the recent past, we have noticed a growing trend of lawyers
making scurrilous and scandalous allegations against the
Judge(s), in the pleadings, when they do not get favourable orders.
Such a practice has to be strongly deprecated.
12. As early as in 1954, the Constitution Bench of this Court in
the case of M.Y. Shareef and Another vs. Hon’ble Judges of the
4
High Court of Nagpur and Others has observed thus:
“13. The fact however remains, as found by the High
Court, that there was at the time these events
happened considerable misconception amongst a
section of the Nagpur Bar about advocates'
responsibilities in matters of signing transfer
applications containing allegations of this character.
It cannot be denied that a section of the Bar is under
an erroneous impression that when a counsel is
acting in the interests of his client, or in accordance
with his instructions he is discharging his legitimate
duty to his client even when he signs an application
or a pleading which contains matter scandalizing the
Court. They think that when there is conflict between
their obligations to the Court and their duty to the
client, the latter prevails. This misconception has to
be rooted out by a clear and emphatic
pronouncement, and we think it should be widely
made known that counsel who sign applications or
pleadings containing matter scandalizing the Court
without reasonably satisfying themselves about the
prima facie existence of adequate grounds there for,
4
(1954) 2 SCC 444
5
with a view to prevent or delay the course of justice,
are themselves guilty of contempt of Court, and that
it is no duty of a counsel to his client to take any
interest in such applications; on the other hand, his
duty is to advise his client for refraining from making
allegations of this nature in such applications. Once
the fact is recognized as was done by the High Court
here, that the members of the Bar have not fully
realized the implications of their signing such
applications and are firmly under the belief that their
conduct in doing so is in accordance with
professional ethics, it has to be held that the act of
the two appellants in this case was done under a
mistaken view of their rights and duties, and in such
cases even a qualified apology may well be considered
by a Court. In borderline cases where a question of
principle about the rights of counsel and their duties
has to be settled, an alternative plea of apology merits
consideration; for it is possible for a judge who hears
the case to hold that there is no contempt in which
case a defence of unqualified apology is meaningless,
because that would amount to the admission of the
commission of an offence.”
13. It cannot be disputed that lawyers, as officers of the Court,
possess a duty to the Court.
14. A reference in this respect can be made to the following
observations made by this Court In the matter of T.V.
Choudhary, A Member of the Indian Administrative Service
5
(Under Suspension) , where the classic case of Rondel vs.
5 (1987) 3 SCC 258.
6
6
Worsley was referred to :
“ 9. We wish we could have rested content with
concluding the judgment with the operative portion of
our conclusions on the merits of the case but we find
with a sense of anguish and heaviness of heart that
we have to express our disapproval of the manner in
which the arguments were advanced before us on
behalf of the applicant T.V. Choudhary. Not only were
the arguments advanced with undue vehemence and
unwarranted passion, reflecting identification of
interests beyond established conventions but were of
degrees not usual of enlightened senior counsel to
adopt. The majesty of law and the dignity of courts
cannot be maintained unless there is mutual respect
between the Bench and the Bar and the counsel act
in full realisation of their duty to the court alongside
their duty to their clients and have the grace to
reconcile themselves when their pleas and arguments
do not find acceptance with the court. It is needless
for us to say that neither rhetoric nor tempestuous
arguments can constitute the sine qua non for
persuasive arguments.
10. By virtue of the pre-eminence which senior
counsel enjoy in the profession, they not only carry
greater responsibilities but they also act as a model to
the junior members of the profession. A senior
counsel more or less occupies a position akin to a
Queen's counsel in England next after the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General. It is an honour and
privilege conferred on advocates of standing and
experience by the Chief Justice and the Judges of this
Court. They thus become leading counsel and take
precedence on all counsel not having that rank. A
senior counsel though he cannot draw up pleadings
of the party, can nevertheless be engaged “to settle”
6
(1967) 3 All ER 993, 998
7
i.e. to put the pleadings into “proper and satisfactory
form” and hence a senior counsel settling pleadings
has a more onerous responsibility as otherwise the
blame for improper pleadings will be laid at his doors.
11. Lord Reid in Rondel v. Worsley [(1967) 3 All ER
993, 998] has succinctly set out the conflicting nature
of the duties a counsel has to perform in his own
inimitable manner as follows:
“Every counsel has a duty to his client
fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every
argument, and ask every question, however
distasteful, which he thinks will help his
client's case. As an officer of the court
concerned in the administration of justice, he
has an overriding duty to the court, to the
standards of his profession, and to the
public, which may and often does lead to a
conflict with his client's wishes or with what
the client thinks are his personal interests.
Counsel must not mislead the court, he must
not lend himself to casting aspersions on the
other party or witnesses for which there is no
sufficient basis in the information in his
possession, he must not withhold authorities
or documents which may tell against his
clients but which the law or the standards of
his profession require him to produce. By so
acting he may well incur the displeasure or
worse of his client so that if the case is lost,
his client would or might seek legal redress if
that were open to him.”
12. Again as Lord Denning, M.R. in Rondel v. W
[(1966) 3 All ER 657, 665] would say:
“He (the counsel) has time and again to
choose between his duty to his client and his
duty to the court. This is a conflict often
8
difficult to resolve; and he should not be
under pressure to decide it wrongly.... [W]hen
a barrister (or an advocate) puts his first duty
to the court, he has nothing to fear. (words in
brackets added).”
In the words of Lord Denning:
“It is a mistake to suppose that he is the
mouthpiece of his client to say what he
wants:…He must disregard the most specific
instructions of his client, if they conflict with
his duty to the court. The code which
requires a barrister to do all this is not a code
of law. It is a code of honour. If he breaks it,
he is offending against the rules of the
profession and is subject to its discipline....”
13. We are constrained to give expression to our
views with a feeling of remorse to remind the counsel
of that sense of detachment and non-identification
they are expected to maintain with the causes
espoused by them and not with a view to belittle the
profession or cast aspersions on counsel.”
15. The lawyers before subscribing their autographs to a
pleading making scurrilous and scandalous allegations against a
Judge ought to think about the serious repercussions of the same.
16. Be that as it may, recently in the case of N. Eswaranathan
7
v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police ,
rd
by an order dated 23 July 2025, a three Judge Bench of this
7
Miscellaneous Application No. 1264 of 2025 in SLP (Crl.) No. 6029 of 2025
9
Court, to which two of us (The Chief Justice of India and
Mr. Justice K.V. Chandran) were a party, decided a reference with
regard to the difference of opinion between two learned Judges of
this Court over the issue of the sentence to be imposed on two
lawyers of this Court. In the said order, we observed that the
majesty of law lies not in punishing someone, but in forgiving
someone who acknowledges their mistake. We, therefore, agreed
with the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court who had
accepted the unconditional apology made by the lawyers therein.
17. Since the learned Judge of the High Court against whom
scandalous and scurrilous allegations were made, has accepted
the unconditional apology tendered by the alleged contemnors, we
are also inclined to accept the unconditional apology tendered by
them. However, we put a note of caution that the lawyers who are
expected to act as officers of Court, should be careful while
subscribing their signatures on the pleadings which are in the
nature of making scandalous and scurrilous allegations against
the Judges of the Court.
10
18. With the aforesaid observations, the apology tendered by the
alleged contemnors is accepted.
19. The Contempt Proceedings are closed.
……………………………….CJI
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………………….J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 10, 2025.
11