Full Judgment Text
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Date of decision: 4 April, 2018
+ CM(M) No.37/2013 & CMs No.548/2013 & 549/2013 (both for
stay).
NDMC THROUGH: EDUCATION OFFICER ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vivek B. Saharya, Mr.
Mananjay Kumar Mishra and Ms.
Neha Makhija, Advs.
Versus
ARYA DHARAM SEVA SANGH
(SUBSTITUTED BY ABHISHEK
BUILDCON (P) LTD.) ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanat Kumar, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Sanjay Sharma, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
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impugns the order dated 2 March, 2012 of the Additional Rent Control
Tribunal, Delhi of dismissal of RCA No.1-A/11 preferred by the
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petitioner against the order dated 20 November, 2010 in E-66/09 (old
numbers E-RC—992/03, RC/ARC 880/2006 and E-22/08) of the Court
of Additional Rent Controller, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi
allowing the petition filed by the respondent under Section 14(1)(b) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for eviction of the petitioner from the
portion of premises No.1, Doctor‘s Lane, Gole Market, New Delhi and
axiomatically passing the order of eviction of the petitioner from the said
premises.
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2. This petition came up first before the Court on 11 January, 2013
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when notice thereof was ordered to be issued to the respondent. On 23
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 1 of 17
January, 2013, the counsel for the respondent stated that the respondent
will not execute the order of eviction till the next date of hearing. The
petition was adjourned from time to time and the said interim
arrangement continued. The counsel for the petitioner and the senior
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counsel for the respondent were heard on 30 August, 2017 and 31
August, 2017 and judgment reserved.
3. I have considered the contentions of the counsels for the parties
and perused the copies of the Trial Court record filed.
4. The respondent sought eviction of the petitioner, pleading (i) that
the petitioner is an old tenant in the premises at a rent of Rs.172/- per
month; (ii) that the premises are residential and are being used as
‗Udayan‘, a house for keeping orphan babies by the SOS Children‘s
Villages of India, a Non-Governmental Organisation; (iii) that the
petitioner/tenant had sublet/assigned and/or otherwise parted with
possession of the premises to SOS Children‘s Villages of India, 506/507,
Vishal Bhavan, 95, Nehru Place, New Delhi (SOS), a Non-
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Governmental Organisation, by an Agreement dated 23 March, 1981,
without obtaining the consent in writing of the respondent/landlord; (iii)
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this fact came to the knowledge of the respondent/landlord on 24
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March, 2003 and 5 May, 2003 in the course of an earlier petition filed
by the respondent/landlord for eviction of the petitioner/tenant under
Sections 14(1)(a), (j) and (k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act; (iv) earlier
the respondent/landlord was under the impression that the premises are
being used as ‗Udayan orphan house‘ for keeping orphan babies by the
petitioner/tenant itself; and, (v) that the entire tenancy premises are in
full control and possession of SOS.
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 2 of 17
5. The petitioner contested the petition for eviction by filing a written
statement denying that the respondent/landlord has sublet or assigned or
otherwise parted with possession of the tenancy premises to SOS and
pleading, (i) that the petitioner/tenant had desired to undertake in the
tenancy premises the establishment of a centre namely ‗Udayan‘, for the
children born in unwanted circumstances and also requiring
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convalescence; (ii) an Agreement was executed on 23 March, 1981
between the petitioner/tenant and SOS, wherein it was agreed (a) that the
petitioner/tenant will bear all the expenses for running of Udayan at the
premises in dispute and that Udayan will be run by SOS on behalf of the
petitioner/tenant; (b) that SOS will not charge any overhead expenditure
for running of Udayan; (c) that the petitioner/tenant will make half
yearly payment to SOS in January and July each year for expenditure as
per details in the Agreement; (d) that the petitioner/tenant will place the
said tenancy premises at the disposal of SOS, free of any rent, electricity
charges and water charges; (e) that the maintenance cost of the tenancy
premises will be borne by the petitioner/tenant; and, (f) that in the event
of the petitioner/tenant deciding to wind up Udayan, the possession of
the tenancy premises would revert back to the petitioner/tenant and SOS
will be bound to handover the possession without any demur and the
assets created would be the property of the petitioner/tenant; (iii) that
Udayan is a joint venture of SOS and the petitioner/tenant; (iv) the
children received at Udayan, usually come in a deplorable state and after
giving good care, they are safely placed in families; (v) that due to
non-settlement of outstanding advances by the SOS and in view of
certain unreplied audit paras, the release of the grant to SOS was stopped
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 3 of 17
by the petitioner/tenant and which was confirmed vide Resolution
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No.3(XII) dated 30 October, 1998 of the petitioner/tenant and it was
decided that the Agreement may be revoked and SOS be asked to get the
audit objections settled; (vi) despite issue of notices and even after the
stoppage of grant, SOS did not come forward to get the matter settled;
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(vii) the petitioner/tenant has issued a notice dated 19 August, 2003 to
SOS, informing SOS of the decision of the petitioner/tenant to wind up
Udayan run in the tenancy premises and calling upon SOS to handover
peaceful possession of the premises to the petitioner/tenant; (viii) that the
petitioner/tenant has decided to use the premises for other welfare
activities namely for shifting of Paawan School for hearing impaired
managed by the petitioner/tenant and which Paawan School is facing
severe shortage of space; (ix) that as long as the petitioner/tenant retains
the right to possession, there is no parting with the possession within the
meaning of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act; (x) there was no subletting by
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the petitioner/tenant to SOS as Clause 6 of the Agreement dated 23
March, 1981 categorically provides that the premises are free of any rent,
electricity charges and water charges and the maintenance cost thereof is
also to be borne by the petitioner/tenant; (xi) that the petitioner/tenant in
the past had been giving grants to SOS and even the salaries of the
employees were being given by the petitioner/tenant as per the
Agreement; and, (xii) that the legal possession of the premises has
always been retained by the petitioner/tenant.
6. Though the respondent/landlord is found to have filed a
replication to the aforesaid written statement but need to deal with the
contents thereof is not felt.
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 4 of 17
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7. The learned Additional Rent Controller, vide order dated 20
November, 2010, found:-
(i) that the petition for eviction was originally filed by Shri
Arya Dharm Seva Sangh through its General Attorney Shri
S.K. Jain; subsequently M/s. Abhishek Buildcon (P) Ltd.
purchased the tenancy premises from the original petitioner
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vide Sale Deed dated 18 August, 2005 and came to be
substituted in place of Shri Arya Dharm Seva Sangh;
(ii) the witness of the respondent/landlord, in cross-
examination, stated that the premises were under the
tenancy of the petitioner/tenant since about the year 1950;
(iii) that of the two witnesses examined by the
respondent/landlord, AW2 was the Senior Executive of M/s.
Abhishek Buildcon (P) Ltd. who only proved the purchase
of the tenancy premises and mutation thereof and in cross-
examination stated that he was not aware of the situation of
the property prior to the purchase of the property by M/s.
Abhishek Buildcon (P) Ltd.;
(iv) the only other witness of the respondent/landlord in his
cross-examination admitted that Udayan had been
functioning from the tenancy premises since prior to his
joining Shri Arya Dharm Seva Sangh in the year 1990 and
that Shri Arya Dharm Seva Sangh had learnt of SOS
running Udayan in the tenancy premises, in the year 1993,
and he could not explain why the petition for eviction was
filed after ten years, in the year 2003; he also expressed
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 5 of 17
ignorance regarding SOS paying any rent to the
petitioner/tenant and whether the entire expenditure of
running Udayan was borne by the petitioner/tenant and
whether all the expenses towards electricity, water charges
and other expenditure were also being borne by the
petitioner/tenant; he however admitted that the rent was
being paid by the petitioner/tenant to the
respondent/landlord; he also showed ignorance whether
SOS was working under the petitioner/tenant as a licensee
under an Agreement between the parties and whether
Udayan was being run jointly by the petitioner/tenant and
SOS;
(v) the sole witness of the petitioner/tenant denied subletting,
assignment or parting with possession of the premises and
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proved the Agreement dated 23 March, 1981 between the
petitioner/tenant and SOS and revocation of the said
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Agreement vide Resolution dated 30 July, 1998 and the
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decision dated 19 August, 2003 for winding up of Udayan;
(vi) that the witness of the petitioner/tenant also proved that Shri
Arya Dharm Seva Sangh was having its office in the same
premises and was fully aware of SOS running Udayan in the
premises, in joint venture with the petitioner/tenant;
(vii) that the sole witness of the petitioner/tenant in cross-
examination:-
(a) admitted that SOS is an independent body and not
under control of the petitioner/tenant;
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 6 of 17
(b) stated that he could not say whether electricity bills of
the tenancy premises were being paid by the
petitioner/tenant;
(c) admitted that the premises is in exclusive physical
and legal possession and occupation of SOS;
(d) denied that Udayan was being run independently by
SOS without the control of petitioner/tenant;
(e) stated that the petitioner/tenant maintained the
premises till 1998 when the license given to SOS was
terminated; and,
(f) admitted that even after 1998, possession of the
tenancy premises was with SOS and petitioner/tenant
was not able to take back the possession.
8. The Additional Rent Controller, on the aforesaid pleadings and
evidence, concluded (i) that there was no dispute that the premises had
been given by the petitioner/tenant to SOS for running Udayan, without
obtaining consent in writing of the respondent/landlord; (ii) this way the
petitioner/tenant parted with possession of the premises to SOS and lost
control over the premises to SOS; (iii) that the petitioner/tenant even
after termination of Agreement of SOS in 1998 and even after deciding
to wind up Udayan had been unable to get the possession back and SOS
was in exclusive physical and legal possession of the tenancy premises;
(iv) that the petitioner NDMC had failed to take any step for removal of
SOS from the premises; (v) that though initially SOS functioned from
the tenancy premises in collaboration and arrangement with the
petitioner/tenant but later on SOS became a self proclaimed authoritative
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 7 of 17
body and started running the centre in defiance to the terms and
conditions as laid down in the Agreement and this defiance continued for
a very long time; (vi) that the witness of the petitioner/tenant, in the
earlier petition for eviction under Sections 14(1) (a), (j) and (k) of the
Act, had deposed that the entire control of the orphanage was then with
SOS though initially the control was with the petitioner/tenant; (vii) that
the petitioner/tenant had been lethargic in taking action against SOS for
about 10-12 years; (viii) it stood amply proved that the petitioner/tenant
had for long lost control over the functioning of Udayan and SOS went
on acting and functioning in defiance to the terms and conditions of the
Agreement executed with the petitioner/tenant; (ix) inspite of knowing
that SOS had become hostile towards the petitioner/tenant, the
petitioner/tenant had remained lethargic; and, (x) thus a case for eviction
under Section 14(1)(b) of the Rent Act was made out.
9. The counsel for the petitioner/tenant argued, that a perusal of the
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Agreement dated 23 March, 1981 between SOS and petitioner/tenant
does not show a case of subletting, assignment or parting with
possession of the premises by the petitioner/tenant to SOS and relied on,
A] Achutananda Baidya Vs. Prafullya Gayen (1997) 8 SCC 76 – on the
scope of exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India; B] S.F. Engineer Vs. Metal Box India Ltd. (2014) 6 SCC 780,
United Bank of India Vs. Cooks and Kelvey Properties (P) Ltd. (1994)
5 SCC 9, Delhi Stationers & Printers Vs. Rajendra Kumar (1990) 2
SCC 331 – on relevant factors to be considered qua subletting,
assignment and parting with possession; C] Gopal Saran Vs.
Satyanarayana (1989) 3 SCC 56 – on what is legal possession and that
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 8 of 17
mere occupation is not possession; D] Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Vs. Pradip Oil Corporation (2002) 100 DLT 442 (FB) and Associated
Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R.N. Kapoor AIR 1959 SC 1262 – on difference
between lease and licence.
10. On enquiry, as to the obligation of the petitioner/tenant to run
orphans home, the counsel for the petitioner/tenant drew attention to
Section 12(q) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994, including
in the discretionary functions of the petitioner/tenant, the function of
providing for relief to destitute and disabled persons.
11. Per contra, the senior counsel for the respondent/landlord argued,
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(i) that the Agreement dated 23 March, 1981 between petitioner/tenant
and SOS, is an Agreement of parting with possession; (ii) that the
petitioner/tenant had not taken any steps since 1998; (iii) that as per
Roop Chand Vs. Gopi Chand Thelia AIR 1989 SC 1416, granting a
licence is parting with possession; (iv) that Clauses 6 & 12 of the
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Agreement dated 23 March, 1981 show a case of parting with
possession; (v) that the petitioner/tenant is not paying rent since 1998
and is not entitled to seek a discretionary relief under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India; (vi) that the words ‗otherwise parted with
possession‘ in Section 14(1)(b) are wide enough; (vii) that the
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petitioner/tenant, by providing in the Agreement dated 23 March, 1981
with SOS that on winding up of Udayan, the possession will come back
to petitioner/tenant, admitted having parted with possession to the SOS;
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(viii) drew attention to the letter dated 18 September, 2012 of Udayan
to the Managing Director of M/s. Abhishek Buildcon (P) Ltd. showing
SOS to be agreeing to handover possession of the premises to M/s.
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 9 of 17
Abhishek Buildcon (P) Ltd. and argued that the respondent/landlord has
already received possession of rear open courtyard portion of the tenancy
premises from SOS; (ix) that SOS has carried out unauthorized
construction in the premises and qua which the earlier petition for
eviction under Section 14(1)(k) was filed and SOS could not have
carried out unauthorized construction without being in possession of the
premises; (x) reliance was placed on Vinaykishore Punamchand
Mundhada Vs. Bhumi Kalpataru 2010 (9) SCC 129 to contend that the
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respondent/landlord, being a stranger to the Agreement dated 23
March, 1981 between SOS and petitioner/tenant, is not bound with the
same; (xi) that it is SOS which is in control and possession of the
premises and thus is in legal possession of the premises; and, (xii) that
there are concurrent findings of fact and this Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India ought not to
interfere.
12. I had during the hearing enquired from the senior counsel for the
respondent/landlord, whether M/s. Abhishek Buildcon (P) Ltd., being a
purchaser of the tenancy premises during the pendency of the petition for
eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, could take advantage of the
ground of eviction if any accrued earlier.
13. The senior counsel for the respondent/landlord drew attention to
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the clauses in the Sale Deed dated 18 August, 2005 providing for sale
of the property on as is where is basis and subject to the pending
litigation and entitling the vendee to carry on all such litigations in its
own name and be substituted in such pending litigations in place of Shri
Arya Dharm Seva Sangh.
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 10 of 17
14. The senior counsel for the respondent/landlord, besides the
aforesaid judgments, also referred to Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. Vs.
H.C. Sharma (1988) 1 SCC 70, Harihar Prasad Vs. State of U.P. JT
2001 (Suppl.2) SC 373, Narain Singh Vs. Shanti Devi 2010 (115) DRJ
601, G. Amalorpavam Vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai 2006 (3) SCC 224
and Girijanandini Devi Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary AIR 1967 SC
1124.
15. The senior counsel for the respondent/landlord during the hearing
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also handed over copy of the internal file noting dated 30 April, 2012 of
Law Officer of the petitioner/tenant in response to taking opinion qua
filing of this petition, that it was not clear from the note of the
Department or of the note of the Advocate of the Department whether
the possession of the tenancy premises was with the petitioner/tenant or
with sublettee or with landlord.
16. I am however of the opinion that such file notings in the course of
decision making cannot be relied on and no benefit can be taken thereof.
Reference if any required in this regard can be made to Union of India
Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (2013) 16 SCC 14, Union of India Vs.
Vartak Labour Union (2) (2011) 4 SCC 200, Jasbir Singh Chhabra Vs.
State of Punjab (2010) 4 SCC 192, Shanti Sports Club Vs. Union of
India (2009) 15 SCC 705 and Sethi Auto Service Station Vs. Delhi
Development Authority (2009) 1 SCC 180.
17. The counsel for the petitioner/tenant, in rejoinder could not inform
whether since the filing of this petition also no action had been taken by
the petitioner/tenant against SOS. It was however further contended that
the respondent/landlord in its evidence had failed to prove a case of
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 11 of 17
subletting, assignment or parting with possession and the learned
Additional Rent Controller had misread the cross-examination of the
witness of the petitioner/tenant.
18. Though neither of the counsels referred to the impugned order, of
the Additional Rent Control Tribunal, but on a reading thereof it is found
that the Tribunal has dealt with the matter in only paragraph 8 of the
impugned order as under:-
“7. I have considered the submissions and have
gone through the file.
8. Section 14(1)(b) of the Act legalizes only
those subtenancies in which the consent in writing is
obtained by the tenant from the land lord. In the
present case, admittedly no written consent had been
obtained by the appellant from the respondent. In
the cross examination of Ravinder Kumar (RW1) it
was admitted by him that SOS Children’s villages of
India is an NGO, an independent body and is not
under the control of NDMC. It was also admitted by
him that the possession of the premises in dispute
was with SOS Children’s Villages of India and the
NDMC was not able to take the possession back. In
view of this categorical admission of Sh. Ravinder
Kumar (RW1) (a witness of the appellant) and the
fact that no written consent had been obtained by the
appellant from the respondent to sub let the
premises, the findings arrived at by the Ld. Addl.
Rent Controller can’t be faulted.
9. The appeal has no merit and is accordingly
dismissed.”
19. I am afraid, the aforesaid does not constitute a proper discharge of
function by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control
Tribunal under the Delhi Rent Control Act, against whose order no
further statutory remedy is provided inasmuch as the provision for
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 12 of 17
second appeal to this Court against the order of the Tribunal as existed in
the Delhi Rent Control Act since inception thereof was done away with
by amendment thereto of the year 1988. Though appeal before the
Tribunal is maintainable only on a question of law, but is required to, on
appreciation of evidence, address the question of law if any arising in the
appeal.
20. The impugned order does not dismiss the appeal of the
petitioner/tenant holding the same to be not entailing any question of
law. The appeal has been dismissed cursorily, without even appreciating
the issues entailed for consideration.
21. As would be apparent from the aforesaid narrative, the Additional
Rent Controller, did not find the act of the petitioner/tenant of entering
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into the Agreement dated 23 March, 1981 with SOS to constitute
subletting or assignment of tenancy rights. The Additional Rent
Controller, however, without construing the terms of the Agreement,
generally observed that the petitioner / tenant had parted with possession
of premises to SOS, disregarding that the expression ―parted with
possession‖ has a definite connotation in law and mere presence of a
person other than tenant in the tenancy premises does not constitute
parting with possession. The finding of the petitioner / tenant having
―parted with possession‖ of the tenancy premises is also found to be not
emanating from the evidence discussed by the Additional Rent
Controller in his order. Moreover, the Additional Rent Controller was
swayed by the fact and passed the order of eviction, on the ground of the
petitioner/tenant having not taken any step for recovery of possession
from SOS even after the Agreement with SOS was terminated and the
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 13 of 17
decision to wind up Udayan taken. That was however not the ground on
which the petition for eviction was filed. The petition for eviction was
filed expressly on the plea of the petitioner/tenant, by entering into the
said Agreement, having sublet, assigned or parted with possession of the
premises. Besides the question whether the said Agreement constituted
subletting, assignment or parting with possession which remains
unadjudicated, the question also arises whether eviction order can be
passed on facts not pleaded. If it were to be held that the Agreement
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dated 23 March, 1981 does not constitute subletting or assigning or
parting with possession a question would also arise whether inaction of
the tenant, on which ground the Additional Rent Controller has passed
the order of eviction of the petitioner, can amount to parting with
possession. Ordinarily the expression subletting or assignment of
tenancy rights or parting with possession mean positive acts of
subletting, assignment or parting with possession and not negative acts.
22. It cannot be lost sight of that the petitioner/tenant is a
Governmental organization, having been constituted for performing
municipal functions for New Delhi area of city of Delhi, with none of the
officials through which it functions having any personal interest.
Considering the said fact, the Courts qua various other aspects, have
been safeguarding the interests of such bodies, even though their
officials have failed to do so.
23. The Additional Rent Control Tribunal in appeal is however found
to have dealt with the case in an extremely superficial and unsatisfactory
manner. There is no discussion on pleadings, evidence led in the
proceedings. This Court in Saroj Kumar Vs. Lalit Kumar (1969) 5 DLT
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 14 of 17
268 set aside the order of the Rent Control Tribunal which was found to
be suffering from similar legal error, which was termed as ―grave‖ and
remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh decision. Similarly, in
Nihal Chand Agrawal Vs. Gopal Sahai Bhartia AIR 1987 Delhi 206,
though in the context of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC, it was held that it is
mandatory upon the appellate Court to independently weigh the evidence
of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for
adjudication and a mere general expression of concurrence with the trial
Court judgment is not enough. As far back as in Kirani Ahmedula Vs.
Suba Bhat 8 Bombay 28, it was held that when an appeal against an
order based on facts is given from a subordinate Court to a superior
Court, the discretion vested in former is absorbed in the latter and that it
is the duty of the superior Court to weigh the facts which formed the
basis upon which the subordinate Court proceeded and to arrive at its
own independent conclusion and to hold otherwise would be to deny the
appellant the benefit of appeal. In Ganapati Ranu Kolapure Vs.
Sevakram Mansukhram AIR 1918 Bom. 235 (DB), it was expounded
that Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC requires that there should be some
statement by the appellate Judge to show that he has applied his mind
independently on the questions involved in the appeal because a litigant
is entitled as of right to a first appeal and which includes an entitlement
to know the reason which have moved the appellate Judge to the
conclusion drawn. Recently in C. Venkata Swamy Vs. H.N. Shivanna
(2018) 1 SCC 604 also, finding the appeal to have been dismissed very
cursorily and without undertaking any appreciation of evidence, dealing
with various issues arising in the case and discussing the arguments
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 15 of 17
raised by the parties in support of their case, also the need to remand the
case was felt. It was held, (i) that a right to file first appeal is a valuable
legal right of the litigant; (ii) the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court
while hearing the first appeal is very wide like that of the Trial Court;
(iii) it is the duty of the first appellate Court to appreciate the entire
evidence and arrive at its own independent conclusion, for reasons
assigned, either of affirmance or difference; (iv) a litigant is entitled to a
full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the
appellate stage and anything less than this is unjust to him; and, (v)
where the appellate Court fails to discharge the obligation placed on it
and the order of appellate Court is cryptic and none of the relevant
aspects are noticed, there is no option but to set it aside.
24. I intend to remand the present lis also to the Tribunal for
adjudication afresh and therefore refrain from making any further
observations on merits.
25. I am thus of the view that this petition should be allowed and the
matter remanded to the Additional Rent Control Tribunal for decision
afresh after hearing the counsels and in the light of aforesaid
observations. It is also made clear that it shall be open to the Additional
Rent Control Tribunal to during the said hearing entertain any other
aspect and / or if finds a need to remand the matter to the Additional
Rent Controller, to do so.
26. In light of aforesaid I am also not making any observation on the
aspect on which query was made from the senior counsel for the
respondent/landlord during the hearing.
27. The petition is thus allowed.
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 16 of 17
28. The impugned order of the Additional Rent Control Tribunal is set
aside and the matter remanded for decision afresh after hearing the
counsels.
29. However since the proceedings have been pending for a very long
time, the Additional Rent Control Tribunal is directed to render
judgment after such hearing within four months of the date of first
appearance of the parties before it.
30. The parties to appear before the Additional Rent Control Tribunal,
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New Delhi, Patiala House Courts on 24 April, 2018.
31. Till such decision of the Additional Rent Control Tribunal, the
respondent/landlord to keep the portion of the tenancy premises of which
it claims to have received possession, under its lock and key, as was
stated to be the case till now and not to itself occupy or use the same or
allow any other person to occupy or use the same. The eviction from
remaining portion of the tenancy premises to remain stayed till the
decision of the Additional Rent Control Tribunal.
32. The Additional Rent Control Tribunal, while deciding the appeal
afresh, would be entitled to make appropriate orders with respect to the
portion of which the respondent / landlord claims to have received
possession.
The petition is disposed of.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
APRIL 04, 2018
‗pp‘..
CM(M) No.37/2013 Page 17 of 17