Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.2530 OF 2012
Birla Institute of Technology ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 02.04.2008 passed by the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No.53 of 2007 whereby
the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
LPA filed by the appellant herein and confirmed the
order dated 12.01.2007 passed by the Single Judge of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2019.01.07
17:40:00 IST
Reason:
the High Court in W.P. No.2572 of 2005.
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2. The controversy involved in this appeal is a short
one as would be clear from the facts stated infra .
3. The appellant is a premier technical educational
institute of repute in the country. It is known as “Birla
Institute of Technology” (BIT).
4. Respondent No.4 joined the appellantInstitute as
Assistant Professor on 16.09.1971 and superannuated
on 30.11.2001 after attaining the age of
superannuation.
5. Respondent No.4 then made a representation to
the appellant and prayed therein for payment of
gratuity amount which, according to respondent, was
payable to him by the appellant under the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short called “The Act”). The
appellant, however, declined to pay the amount of
gratuity as demanded by respondent No.4.
6. Respondent No.4, therefore, filed an application
before the controlling authority under the Act against
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the appellant and claimed the amount of gratuity
which, according to him, was payable to him under the
Act.
7. By order dated 07.09.2002, the controlling
authority (respondent No.3) allowed the application
filed by respondent No.4 and directed the appellant to
pay a sum of Rs.3,38,796/ along with interest at the
rate of 10% p.a. towards the gratuity to respondent
No.4.
8. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed appeal
before the appellate authority under the Act. By order
dated 15.04.2005, the appellate authority dismissed
the appeal. The appellant felt aggrieved and carried the
matter to the High Court in a writ petition. The High
Court (Single Judge) by order dated 12.01.2007
dismissed the writ petition and upheld the orders of
the authorities passed under the Act. The appellant
then filed Letters Patent Appeal before the Division
Bench against the order passed by the Single Judge.
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The LPA was also dismissed by the impugned order
which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by
way of special leave by the appellantInstitute in this
Court.
9. The short question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the Courts
below were justified in holding that respondent No.4
was entitled to claim gratuity amount from the
appellant (employer) under the Act.
10. Heard Mr. Shambo Nandy, learned counsel for
the appellant and Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, learned
counsel for respondent Nos.13 and Mr. Sunil Roy,
learned counsel for respondent No.4.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we find merit
in this appeal.
12. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the
appellant, the issue involved in this appeal remains no
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longer res integra and is decided by this Court in
Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association vs.
(2004) 1 SCC 755
Administrative Officer and Others
in favour of the appellant.
13. The question arose for consideration in the case
of
Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association
(supra) as to whether “Teacher” could be regarded as
an “employee” under Section 2(e) of the Act and, if so,
whether he/she is entitled to claim gratuity amount
from his employer in accordance with the provisions of
the Act.
14. The twoJudge Bench examined this question in
detail. Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari speaking for the
Bench held that a teacher is not an employee within
the meaning of the expression "employee" as defined
under Section 2(e) of the Act and hence he/she is not
entitled to claim any gratuity amount from his
employer under the Act. In other words, it was held
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that since a teacher is not an employee under Section
2(e) of the Act, he has no right to invoke the provisions
of the Act for claiming gratuity under the Act from
his/her employer.
15. It is apposite to quote the reasoning of Their
Lordships in paras 20 to 26 of the judgment which
reads as under:
“ 20. An educational institution,
therefore, is an “establishment”
notified under Section 1(3)(c) of the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. On
behalf of the Municipal Corporation, it
is contended that the only beneficial
effect of the notification issued under
Section 1(3)(c) of the Act of 1972, is
that such nonteaching staff of
educational institutions as answer the
description of any of the employments
contained in the definition clause 2(e),
would be covered by the provisions of
the Act. The teaching staff being not
covered by the definition of “employee”
can get no advantage merely because by
notification “educational institutions”
as establishments are covered by the
provisions of the Act.
21. Having thus compared the various
definition clauses of the word
“employee” in different enactments,
with due regard to the different aims
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and objects of the various labour
legislations, we are of the view that
even on plain construction of the words
and expression used in the definition
clause 2(e) of the Act, “teachers” who
are mainly employed for imparting
education are not intended to be
covered for extending gratuity benefits
under the Act. Teachers do not answer
description of being employees who are
“skilled”, “semiskilled” or “unskilled”.
These three words used in association
with each other intend to convey that a
person who is “unskilled” is one who is
not “skilled” and a person who is “semi
skilled” may be one who falls between
the two categories, meaning he is
neither fully skilled nor unskilled. The
Black’s Law Dictionary defines these
three words as under:
“Semiskilled work.—Work that
may require some alertness and
close attention, such as
inspecting items or machinery for
irregularities, or guarding
property or people against loss or
injury.
Skilled work.—Work requiring the
worker to use judgment, deal with
the public, analyze facts and
figures, or work with abstract
ideas at a high level of
complexity.
Unskilled work.—Work requiring
little or no judgment, and
involving simple tasks that can be
learned quickly on the job.”
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22. In construing the abovementioned
three words which are used in
association with each other, the rule of
construction noscitur a sociis may be
applied. The meaning of each of these
words is to be understood by the
company it keeps. It is a legitimate rule
of construction to construe words in an
Act of Parliament with reference to
words found in immediate connection
with them. The actual order of these
three words in juxtaposition indicates
that meaning of one takes colour from
the other. The rule is explained
differently: “that meaning of doubtful
words may be ascertained by reference
to the meaning of words associated
with it”. [See Principles of Statutory
Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,
8th Edn., Syn. 8, at p. 379.]
23. The word “unskilled” is opposite of
the word “skilled” and the word “semi
skilled” seems to describe a person who
falls between the two categories i.e. he
is not fully skilled and also is not
completely unskilled but has some
amount of skill for the work for which
he is employed. The word “unskilled”
cannot, therefore, be understood
dissociated from the word “skilled” and
“semiskilled” to read and construe it
to include in it all categories of
employees irrespective of the nature of
employment. If the legislature intended
to cover all categories of employees for
extending benefit of gratuity under the
Act, specific mention of categories of
employment in the definition clause
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was not necessary at all. Any
construction of definition clause which
renders it superfluous or otiose has to
be avoided.
24. The contention advanced that
teachers should be treated as included
in the expression “unskilled” or
“skilled” cannot, therefore, be
accepted. The teachers might have
been imparted training for teaching or
there may be cases where teachers who
are employed in primary schools are
untrained. A trained teacher is not
described in the industrial field or
service jurisprudence as a “skilled
employee”. Such adjective generally is
used for an employee doing manual or
technical work. Similarly, the words
“semiskilled” and “unskilled” are not
understood in educational
establishments as describing nature of
job of untrained teachers. We do not
attach much importance to the
arguments advanced on the question as
to whether “skilled”, “semiskilled” and
“unskilled” qualify the words “manual”,
“supervisory”, “technical” or “clerical”
or the above words qualify the word
“work”. Even if all the words are read
disjunctively or in any other manner,
trained or untrained teachers do not
plainly answer any of the descriptions
of the nature of various employments
given in the definition clause. Trained
or untrained teachers are not “skilled”,
“semiskilled”, “unskilled”, “manual”,
“supervisory”, “technical” or “clerical”
employees. They are also not employed
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in “managerial” or “administrative”
capacity. Occasionally, even if they do
some administrative work as part of
their duty with teaching, since their
main job is imparting education, they
cannot be held employed in
“managerial” or “administrative”
capacity. The teachers are clearly not
intended to be covered by the
definition of “employee”.
25. The legislature was alive to various
kinds of definitions of the word
“employee” contained in various
previous labour enactments when the
Act was passed in 1972. If it intended
to cover in the definition of “employee”
all kinds of employees, it could have as
well used such wide language as is
contained in Section 2(f) of the
Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952
which defines “employee” to mean “any
person who is employed for wages in
any kind of work, manual or otherwise,
in or in connection with the work of an
establishment …”. Nonuse of such wide
language in the definition of
“employee” in Section 2(e) of the Act of
1972 reinforces our conclusion that
teachers are clearly not covered in the
definition.
26. Our conclusion should not be
misunderstood that teachers although
engaged in a very noble profession of
educating our young generation should
not be given any gratuity benefit. There
are already in several States separate
statutes, rules and regulations granting
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gratuity benefits to teachers in
educational institutions which are more
or less beneficial than the gratuity
benefits provided under the Act. It is
for the legislature to take cognizance of
situation of such teachers in various
establishments where gratuity benefits
are not available and think of a
separate legislation for them in this
regard. That is the subjectmatter solely
of the legislature to consider and
(
decide.” emphasis supplied)
16. Reading the aforementioned principle of law laid
down by this Court, we have no hesitation in holding
that respondent No.4, who was also a teacher and
worked with the appellant as such, was not eligible to
claim gratuity amount from the appellant (BIT) under
the Act.
17. In our opinion, the High Court though took note
of the decision rendered in the case of Ahmadabad
Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra) but erred
in distinguishing it on the ground that it is applicable
only to the primary teachers working in primary
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schools and since the case at hand is not a case of a
primary teacher, it has no application to this case.
18. In our view, the High Court failed to read last line
of Para 24 quoted above wherein this Court has held
in clear terms that “teachers” are clearly not intended
to be covered by the definition of “employee” . The High
Court was, therefore, not justified in making a
distinction between the “teachers working in the
primary schools” and the “teachers working in other
educational institutions”.
19. In other words, the High Court failed to see that
this Court had examined the expression “teacher” qua
the expression “employee” defined in Section 2(e) of the
Act and then held that “teacher” is not an employee
within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act. While
laying down the law, this Court did not make any
distinction between the teachers inter se and nor made
any distinction as to in which type of educational
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institute the teacher is working for determining his
entitlement to claim the gratuity under the Act.
20. We cannot, therefore, concur with the view taken
by the High Court, which in our view, is not in
conformity with the law laid down by this Court in the
case of
Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers
Association (supra). It is based on incorrect reading of
this Court’s decision and, therefore, it deserves to be
set aside.
21. We, however, make it clear that we have
examined the case at hand only in the light of the
provisions of the Act, which were akin to the facts of
the case in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers
(supra).
Association
22. In case there is any other State Act or Scheme in
force, which extends any benefit to the employees of
the Institute only then respondent No.4 would be at
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liberty to take benefit of such Act/Scheme in
accordance with law.
23. As a result, the appeal succeeds and is
accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside.
As a consequence, the application made by respondent
No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act
against the appellant is dismissed as not
maintainable.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
January 07, 2019
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