$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Judgment reserved on: 19 November,2019
th
Judgment pronounced on: 6 January,2020
+ CRL.A. 778/2019
KRISHNA & ANR. ..... Appellant
Through: Ms.Ritu Gauba, Advocate.
versus
STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through: Ms.Aashaa Tiwari, APP for the State. SI
Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, Advocate with
Mohd. Adil, Advocate for Complainant
WITH
+ CRL.A. 882/2019
CHAMAN ..... Appellant
Through: Ms. Kavita Jha, Advocate.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Ms.Aashaa Tiwari, APP for the State. SI
Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, Advocate with
Mohd. Adil, Advocate for Complainant.
AND
+ CRL.A. 924/2019
SWARN KANTA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Adit S. Pujari with Ms.Tusharika
Mattoo, and Mr. Viren Bansal, Advocates
versus
THE STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Ms.Aashaa Tiwari, APP for the State. SI
Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, Advocate with
Mohd. Adil, Advocate for Complainant.
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 1 of 67
AND
+ CRL.A. 961/2019
RAJ KUMAR ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. S.B. Dandapani, Advocate.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Ms.Aashaa Tiwari, APP for the State. SI
Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, Advocate with
Mohd. Adil, Advocate for Complainant.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
J U D G M E N T
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J
1. Present appeals are directed against a common judgment dated
20.05.2019 and order on sentence dated 25.05.2019 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge-02, West District, Delhi in Sessions
Case No. 56627/2016 arising out of FIR No. 280/2012 registered at
Police Station Khyala, Delhi under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ IPC’ ) whereby the appellants
were convicted and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
alongwith a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
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2. Brief facts of the case, as mentioned by the learned Trial Court, are
reproduced as under:-
“Accused Krishna, Swarn Kanta, Puran Chand,
Chaman and Raj Kumar were put on trial for the
allegations against them that all the accused persons
in furtherance of their common intention committed
the murder of one Vijay Arora by pouring kerosene
oil upon him lighting him on fire and putting him
inside the shop and then putting the shutter of the
shop down thereby they were charged for offence
punishable under section 302/34 IPC.
The brief facts arising out of the present case are that
on receipt of DD No. 12A dated 16.11.2012, IO
Inspector R.K. Ojha alongwith HC Phool Chand and
PSI Anoop reached at the spot i.e. Shop No. 147-148,
Guru Nanak Market, Khyala where the shutter of the
shop was open on the west direction in the corner of
the said shop, one person in burnt condition was
found dead and inside the shop as well as outside the
shop, some oil smelling like kerosene oil was found
spiller all over there. One person namely Saurabh
Arora s/o the deceased Vijay Arora met them and the
IO made enquiries from him and recorded his
statement wherein he alleged that his father Vijay
Arora was running spare parts shop at Shop No.
147-148, Guru Nanak Market, Khyala and in front of
the said shop, Puran @ Karan had placed earthen
pots (matke) for sale. His father had complained
against it to the MCD and MCD removed his earthen
pots. On the night of 15.11.2012, Krishna, Puran,
Raj, Chaman and Kanta had again placed the
earthen pots in front of the shop. In the morning on
16.11.2012 at about 8.20 am, when his father came
there to open his shop, he asked them to remove
them. Thereafter, Krishan and Puran caught hold of
his father and Chaman and Kanta poured oil over
him and Raj lit fire and thereafter, put the shutter of
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the shop down. The shop also caught fire. When he
rushed to the shop, then these people stopped him.
Krishna, Puran, Raj, Chaman and Kanta had in a
planned manner killed his father by setting him on
fire. He also stated that these people had earlier also
quarrel with his father. Thereafter, on the basis of
this statement, Insp. R.K. Ojha prepared rukka and
got the FIR registered U/S 302.34 IPC through HC
Phool Chand. During investigation, IO called the
Crime Team at the spot which inspected the site and
prepared its report CMT/SOC No. 1124 dated
16.11.2012 and submitted to IO. Thereafter, IO
prepared the site plan, exhibits were lifted from the
spot of the crime and seized. Expert team from FSL
Rohini also called at the spot which inspected the site
and prepared its report Vide No.
2012/SOC/153/CHEM No. 31/12 dated 28.12.2.102
(sic). The post mortem on the body of deceased was
got conducted and thereafter, body was handed over
to his relatives. As per the PM report, the cause of
death is due to asphyxia cause by inhalation of
suffocating/irrespirable gases into respiratory
passage subsequent to burning of kerosene, body and
other neighbouring objects into place of occurrence
(closed space) i.e room/shop as alleged history
available. After the post mortem, the exhibits were
seized and taken into possession by the IO. The
clothes worn by the deceased were handed over by
the complainant which were seized and taken into
police possession. Exhibits were sent to FSL Rohini.
Statement of one Satya Prakash Gupta was recorded
u/s 161 Cr.P.C. Efforts were made to arrest the
accused persons. On 22.11.2012, accused Krishna
and Swarn Kanta were apprehended and detailed
interrogation was made from them. During
interrogation, it was revealed that accused Krishna
and deceased were having good relations between
them and because of this, deceased had allowed
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accused Krishna to place earthen pots in front of his
shop but gradually, because of their relations, family
life of deceased got disturbed, due to which their
relationship got bitter and deceased wanted to
remove the earthen pots of Krishna and because of
this reason, they used to have frequent quarrels. In
this regard, police complaint was also lodged.
Subsequently, Krishna removed here earthen pots but
on 16.11.2012, in a pre planned manner, all the
accused persons killed the deceased.
On 09.01.2013, accused Puran Prasad, Chaman Lal
and Raj Kumar surrendered before the court and
after seeking permission, all three accused persons
were interrogated, arrested and their disclosure
statements were recorded. Their disclosure
statements also corroborated the version given by
accused Krishna and Swarn Kanta on the same lines.
IO obtained one day PC remand of the accused
persons in order to recover the clothes worn by them
on the date of incident, however, they disclosed that
the said clothes were thrown in the drain (ganda
Nala) and hence same could not be recovered.
Scaled site plan of the crime spot was got prepared
by draftsman.”
3. To bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution has
examined 25 witnesses in all. The incriminating evidence and
circumstances were put to the Appellants during their statement
recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C wherein they claimed to have
been falsely implicated in the present case and examined one witness
in their defence.
4. After appreciating and considering the rival contentions of the parties
and scrutinizing the evidence, the learned Trial Court held all the
accused persons guilty and convicted them for the charged offences.
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5. Learned counsel for the Appellants opened their submissions by
contending that the impugned judgment dated 20.05.2019 is based on
conjectures and surmises and the same is against the facts and the
settled proposition of law.
6. They further contended that the learned Trial Court has ignored and
omitted the material evidence and has disregarded the cogent evidence
in favour of the appellants and has failed to appreciate the basic issue,
as to how the appellants have been held to be the actual perpetrators of
the crime even though there is no evidence on record to establish that
the appellants were involved in the commission of the alleged offence.
7. Learned counsel for the Appellants further contended that the learned
Trial Court erred in relying on the testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora
( Son of the Deceased ) who is a planted witness and there are major
contradictions and discrepancies in his testimony. Moreover, his
evidence cannot be exclusively considered as trustworthy and reliable
because he was closely related to the deceased and is an interested
witness, with a very strong possibility of him being tutored. To
substantiate their arguments, learned Counsel for the Appellants relied
upon the case of Hasan Murtuza v. State of Haryana reported in 2002
3 SCC 1; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Pal & ors reported in 2018
SCC OnLine SC 325; Abdul Razak and ors v. State of Karnataka
reported in 2015 6 SCC 282.
8. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, further contended that initial
statement (Ex.PW10/A) made by PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the
deceased) is inadmissible as the same is hit by the bar under Section
162 Cr.P.C. It was further submitted that the investigation in the
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present case had commenced on the basis of the first PCR call made at
8.24.36 am which should have been treated as the primary source for
registration of the FIR instead of the initial statement (Ex.PW10/A) of
PW-10 Saurabh Arora recorded at 11.35 am.
9. Learned Counsel for the Appellants further argued that the police is
required to carry out a fair and thorough investigation and collect
favorable and unfavorable evidence against a suspect, but in the instant
case there are serious discrepancies in the investigation conducted by
the police which go to the root of the matter and the learned Trial
Court erred in ignoring the effect of the defective investigation.
Learned counsel while highlighting the lacunae in the investigation
pointed out: -
• That the prosecution has heavily relied on the testimony of
PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the deceased ) for falsely
implicating the appellants in the commission of the alleged
offence and has completely ignored the version of the DW-1
( Mohd. Salauddin Ansari ). The investigating officer has
wrongly projected a case of suicide into a case of murder
because as per the testimony of the aforesaid Defence Witness
the deceased had a suicidal tendency due to the matrimonial
discord with his wife.
• Further, as per the testimony of DW-1 ( Mohd. Salauddin
Ansari ) the deceased had stated to his wife that ‘ today I will
finish all the root cause of the quarrels ’ right before he
immolated himself, however being an important-link witness,
the wife of the deceased was not produced as defence witness
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 7 of 67
nor were her call detail records secured by the investigating
officer.
• Moreover, the Investigating Agency has failed to examine the
person who had made the second call from mobile number
9268317784, stating that ‘ A person is trying to immolate
himself by pouring kerosene oil at Shop No. 147-148, Guru
Nanak market, Khyala ’ and for causing prejudice to the
appellants the prosecution has deliberately not examined Satya
Prakash Gupta ( Pradhan of Market ).
• Further, as per the version of the prosecution, the site plan was
prepared by the investigating agency at the instance of PW-10
Saurabh Arora ( Son of the deceased ), however the same does
not bear his signature and the Investigating Agency has failed
to secure the fingerprints and the CCTV footage from the place
of incident and no endeavour was made to procure the Call
Detail Records and the Cell ID Location of the deceased.
• As per the version of the prosecution, a large number of people
had gathered at the place of the incident and had attempted to
set the house of the appellants ( Krishna, Puran, Chaman, and
Rajkumar ) on fire. However, despite a large crowd being
present at the place of incident, no independent witness was
examined by the investigating agency.
• Further, the version of the investigating agency had left a
glaring loop hole in the investigation as it was not certain
whether the deceased was burnt with kerosene or Mobil Oil.
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 8 of 67
More so, no kerosene oil was detected from the seized
exhibits, as per the FSL report.
10. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the Appellant relied
upon the case of Hemraj & ors vs State of Haryana reported in AIR
2005 SC 2110 ; State of UP vs. Bhagwant Kishori Joshi reported in
AIR 1964 SC 221 ; TN Antony vs State of Kerela & ors reported in
2001 SCC Cri 1048 ; Superintendent of Police, CBI & ors vs Tapan
Kumar Singh reported in 2003 SCC Cri 1305 ; Deo Pujan Thakur vs
State of Bihar reported in 2005 Cri LJ 1263 ; Santa Singh vs State of
Punjab reported in AIR 1956 SC 526; Jagdish Narain and Anr vs
State of UP reported in (1996) 8 SCC 199 .
11. Learned counsel for the Appellants further submitted that neither does
the medical & scientific evidence prove that the alleged incident was
homicidal, suicidal or accidental in nature nor does it find support
from the testimony of the doctor, who had conducted the post-mortem
of the deceased. To substantiate their arguments, learned counsel for
the appellants relied upon the case of Pavan Kumar Parasnath
Trivani vs State of Gujarat reported in 1999 SCC Cri 352 ; Mulakhraj
and ors vs Satish Kumar & ors reported in 1992 SCC Cri 482 ; Arvind
Singh vs State of Bihar reported in 2001 SCC Cri 1148 ; Bhim Singh
vs State of Haryana reported in 2003 SCC Cri 1469 .
12. Learned Counsel for the appellants further contended that the
prosecution had failed to prove that the accused persons shared a
common intention or motive to commit the alleged offence and hence
they would not fall within the purview of the offence punishable under
Section 34 of IPC. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 9 of 67
failed to appreciate the fact that placing of matkas on a patri in front of
the deceased’s shop was a trivial reason to commit the murder of the
deceased; as such the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the
motive for commission of the alleged offence. In support of their
contention, learned counsel for the Appellant relied upon the case of
Dalip Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1953 SC 364 .
13. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has lastly urged that the trial court
has failed to properly appreciate the facts and circumstances of the
case; hence, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
14. Ms. Aashaa Tiwari, learned APP for State, on the other hand, strongly
refuted the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants and
submitted that as the impugned judgment is based on proper
appreciation of the facts and evidence adduced by the prosecution, no
interference in the impugned judgment is called for by this Court; that
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the medical/scientific
evidence are corroborative in nature and the prosecution has been able
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
15. Ms. Tiwari further submitted that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses are corroborating and trustworthy and have established the
incident without any iota of doubt, describing the detailed role played
by each appellant in the commission of the alleged crime. She further
submitted that the testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora is consistent
and corroborative in nature and minor contradictions and discrepancies
which have arisen in his testimony can be ignored, due to lapse of time
or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the
incident. To substantiate her arguments, learned APP for State relied
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 10 of 67
upon the case of Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR
1965 SC 202 ; Mano v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2007 13 SCC
795; Rana Pratap and ors v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1983
SC 680.
16. Learned APP for the State further submitted that the first telephonic
message which was made immediately after the alleged incident to the
police cannot be treated as the basis of FIR as the same was solely
made for the reason to get the police officials at the scene of crime and
the aforesaid cryptic telephonic message received by the police agency
will not constitute the basis of registration of FIR. To substantiate her
arguments, learned APP for the State relied upon the case of
Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported in AIR 2010 SC 2352 .
17. Learned APP for State further submitted that the medical/scientific
evidence is corroborating the version of the prosecution as it is
evidently established from the post mortem report (Ex.PW10/A) that
the deceased was burnt alive and further as per the FSL report
kerosene oil was detected from the exhibits seized from the place of
incident, which evidently supports the version of the prosecution that
kerosene oil was used to burn the deceased.
18. Learned Counsel for the State further contended that certain errors
were made by the Investigating Agency during Investigation, however,
those errors or omissions do not affect the outcome of the case and no
benefit can be extended to the accused. She further submitted that
though Satya Prakash Gupta ( Pradhan of Market ) was not examined
as a prosecution witness, yet the same has not caused any prejudice to
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the appellants, because overwhelming evidence is available on record,
the failure to examine material or independent witness is not always
fatal to the case of prosecution. To substantiate her arguments, learned
APP for State relied upon the case of Rohtash Kumar v. State of
Haryana reported in (2013) 14 SCC 434; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore
Kubersing Chamansingh & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145.
19. Based on these submissions Counsel for the State urged that this Court
should not interfere with the well-reasoned judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court convicting the appellants for the alleged offence.
20. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also
perused the material placed on record including the record of the trial
court.
Cryptic Telephonic Message
21. Learned counsel for the appellants, during the course of arguments had
contended that initial statement(Ex.PW10/A) made by PW-10 Saurabh
Arora( Son of the deceased) is inadmissible being hit by the legal bar
under Section 162 Cr.P.C. It was further submitted that the
investigation in the present case had commenced on the basis of the
first PCR call made at 8.24.36 am and the same should be treated as
the primary source for registration of FIR and not the initial statement
(Ex.PW10/A) of PW-10 Saurabh Arora recorded at 11.35am.
22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in plethora of judgments has held that a
cryptic telephonic message cannot be treated as the basis of First
Information Report under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
same is made solely for the reason of getting the police to the scene of
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 12 of 67
crime. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State Of A.P vs V.V.
Panduranga Rao reported in 2009 15 SCC 211 has held as under: -
| “9. Learned counsel for the appellant State | | |
|---|
| submitted that the reasons recorded by the High | | |
| Court to direct acquittal are not sustainable in law. | | |
| It is stated that the message purported to have been | | |
| given over telephone was a cryptic one and, | | |
| therefore, cannot be treated as an FIR. Learned | | |
| counsel for the respondent supported the judgment | | |
| of the High Court. | | |
| 10. Certain facts have been rightly noted by the | | |
| High Court. Where the information is only one | | |
| which required the police to move to the place of | | |
| occurrence and as a matter of fact the detailed | | |
| statement was recorded after going to the place of | | |
| occurrence, the said statement is to be treated as | | |
| FIR. But where some cryptic or anonymous oral | | |
| message which did not in terms clearly specify a | | |
| cognizable offence cannot be treated as FIR. The | | |
| mere fact that the information was the first in point | | |
| of time does not by itself clothe it with the | | |
| character of FIR. The matter has to be considered | | |
| in the background of Sections 154 and 162 of the | | |
| Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the | | |
| Code”). A cryptic telephonic message of a | | |
| cognizable offence received by the police agency | | |
| would not constitute an FIR. | | |
| 11. “7. … The object and purpose of giving [a] | | |
| telephonic message is not to lodge the first | | |
| information report, but to request the officer in | | |
| charge of the police station to reach the place of | | |
| occurrence. On the other hand, if the information | | |
| given on telephone is not cryptic and on the basis of | | |
| that information, the officer-in-charge, is prima | | |
| facie satisfied about the commission of a cognizable | | |
| offence and he proceeds from the police station after | | |
| recording such information, to investigate such | | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 13 of 67
| offence then any statement made by any person in | |
|---|
| respect of the said offence including details about | |
| the participants, shall be deemed to be a statement | |
| made by a person to the police officer ‘in the course | |
| of an investigation’ covered by Section 162 of the | |
| Code. That statement cannot be treated as first | |
| information report. [To put it differently] any | |
| telephonic information about the commission of a | |
| cognizable offence irrespective of the nature and | |
| details of such information cannot be treated as | |
| first information report.” [Ed.: As observed | |
| in Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (1994) | |
| 2 SCC 685, p. 689, para 7.] | |
Delhi) reported in (2010) 6 SCC 1 has held as under:-
| “102. It was further contended by the learned Senior | |
|---|
| Counsel for the appellant-accused that PW 2 Shyan | |
| Munshi's statement could not be looked into as the | |
| same is hit by Section 162 CrPC and on the other | |
| hand the defence seeks to rely on his testimony. In | |
| support of the above claim, the learned Senior | |
| Counsel for the appellant relying upon the | |
| judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant | |
| Kishore Joshi [AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ | |
| 140] and King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir | |
| Ahmad [(1943-44) 71 IA 203 : AIR 1945 PC 18] | |
| contended that investigation of an offence can start | |
| either on information or otherwise and that the | |
| receipt and recording of FIR is not a condition | |
| precedent to the setting in motion of criminal | |
| investigation. | |
| 103. Placing reliance upon the said judgments, it | |
| has been further argued by the learned Senior | |
| Counsel for the appellant that in the present case the | |
| three cryptic telephonic messages received by the | |
| police at around 2.20 a.m. on 30-4-1999 should be | |
| treated as FIR upon which the investigation started | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 14 of 67
and, therefore, the statement of PW 2 recorded by
the police later on around 3.40 a.m. could not be
treated as FIR but a statement under Section 162
CrPC.
xxx xxx xxx
105. The judgment in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [(1943-
44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18] is also
distinguishable as the law laid down in the said case
does not concern the issue involved in the present
case. Cryptic telephonic messages could not be
treated as FIR as their object only is to get the
police to the scene of offence and not to register the
FIR. The said intention can also be clearly culled
out from a bare reading of Section 154 of the
Criminal Procedure Code which states that the
information, if given orally, should be reduced in
writing, read over to the informant, signed by the
informant and a copy of the same be given free of
cost to the informant. In the case on hand, the
object of persons sending the telephonic messages
including PW 70 Rohit Bal was only to bring the
police to the scene of offence and not to register the
FIR.
xxx xxx xxx
107. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also
relied upon the judgment of the Gujarat High Court
in Mehr Vajsi Deva v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1965
Guj 143] . A perusal of the said judgment shows that
the details of the offence given by the telephonic
message in the said judgment clearly described that
“one man was assaulted by means of an axe at
Sudama Chowk”, on the other hand, in the case on
hand the telephonic message did not give any
details of the offence or accused and the same was
a vague information. The said judgment should be
read per incuriam in view of a plethora of
judgments of this Court wherein it has
categorically held that cryptic telephonic messages
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| not giving the particulars of the offence or accused | | |
|---|
| are bereft of any details made to the police only for | | |
| the purpose of getting the police at the scene of | | |
| offence and not for the purpose of registering an | | |
| FIR. | | |
| xxx xxx xxx | | |
| 109. It was further pointed out by the defence that | | |
| Ext. P 12-A wherein three PCR calls were recorded | | |
| is the real FIR and the statement of PW 2 which was | | |
| taken during investigation and got signed by him is | | |
| not the FIR and is thus to be treated as a statement | | |
| recorded under Section 161 CrPC and is hit by the | | |
| bar under Section 162 CrPC. This argument is | | |
| unacceptable since as observed in the earlier | | |
| paragraph the telephone call from PW 70 was too | | |
| cryptic to amount to an FIR. | | |
| 110. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the | | |
| decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. P.A. | | |
| Madhu [(1984) 4 SCC 83 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 598] , | | |
| wherein this Court has not accepted a similar | | |
| argument and held as under: (SCC pp. 84-87, paras | | |
| 5 & 11) | | |
“5. To begin with, it appears that there was some
dispute about the dearness allowance claim of the
labour from the management which was referred
to the Industrial Tribunal. The respondent, who
was the Secretary of the Union, was looking after
the case on behalf of the workers, while PWs 5
and 7 were the officers appearing on behalf of the
management before the Tribunal. The deceased,
S.J. Sirgaonkar, was Deputy Personnel Manager
of the Bombay Branch of M/s Hindustan
Construction Company. He was shot dead by the
respondent after he (deceased), along with the
other officers of the management, had come out of
the Tribunal's office at Meerut after filing their
written statements. Thereafter one of the
eyewitnesses, S.K. Gui (PW 7) asked someone to
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 16 of 67
give a telephone call to the police station, which
was nearby, on receipt of which the police
arrived at the spot, seized the pistol and took the
accused and some of the witnesses to the police
station where a formal FIR was registered. The
panchnama was prepared and other formalities
were, however, done at the spot.
| *** | |
| 11. Durga Das, DW 1 who was admittedly at the |
| scene of the occurrence has stated that as the |
| shooting started, PW 7 had given a telephonic |
| message to the police station. The High Court by |
| an implied process of reasoning has observed that |
| if PW 7 had given the telephonic message he |
| would have mentioned the name of the assailant |
| because he was a full-fledged eyewitness but since |
| his name had not been mentioned it is the |
| strongest possible circumstance to discredit the |
| prosecution case. We are, however, unable to |
| agree with this somewhat involved reasoning of |
| the High Court. In fact, DW 1 merely says that |
| Gui telephoned to the police station about the |
| firing and said something in English. The High |
| Court seems to have presumed that from this the |
| irresistible inference to be drawn is that Gui did |
| not mention the name of the assailant of the |
| deceased and on this ground alone the |
| prosecution must fail. This argument is based on |
| a serious error. In the first place, the telephonic |
| message was an extremely cryptic one and could |
| not be regarded as an FIR in any sense of the |
| term. Secondly, assuming that Gui had given the |
| telephonic message in utter chaos and confusion |
| when shots after shots were being fired at the |
| deceased, there was no occasion for Gui to have |
| narrated the entire story of the occurrence. In |
| fact, in his evidence Gui has denied that he |
| personally telephoned the police but he stated that |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 17 of 67
he asked somebody to telephone the police which
appears to be both logical and natural. Moreover,
such a cryptic information on telephone has
been held by this Court to be of no value at all.
In Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(1970) 2
SCC 113 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 328] this Court in
identical circumstances observed thus: (SCC p.
117, para 4)
‘4. … The telephone message was received by
Hari Singh, ASI Police Station, City Kotwali at
5.35 p.m. on 8-9-1969. The person conveying
the information did not disclose his identity,
nor did he give any other particulars and all
that is said to have been conveyed was that
firing had taken place at the taxi stand,
Ludhiana. This was, of course, recorded in the
daily diary of the police station by the police
officer responding to the telephone call. But
prima facie this cryptic and anonymous oral
message which did not in terms clearly specify
a cognizable offence cannot be treated as first
information report. The mere fact that this
information was the first in point of time does
not by itself clothe it with the character of first
information report.’ ”
Similar views have been expressed in Tapinder
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1970) 2 SCC 113 :
1970 SCC (Cri) 328] , Damodar v. State of
Rajasthan [(2004) 12 SCC 336 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
Supp 265] and Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v. State of
Gujarat [(1994) 2 SCC 685 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
609] .
111. It was argued and highlighted that since PW 2
Shyan Munshi has been confronted with his signed
statement i.e. Exts. PW 2-A and B, the whole
evidence goes in light
of Zahiruddin v. Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 75] . Apart
from the above decision reliance has further been
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 18 of 67
| placed on Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal | |
|---|
| Affairs v. Ram Ajudhya Singh [AIR 1965 Cal 348] | |
| (AIR para 9) and Mehr Vajsi Deva v. State of | |
| Gujarat [AIR 1965 Guj 143] (AIR pp. 148-49, paras | |
| 9-10). We have carefully perused those decisions. | |
| We are satisfied that nothing turns on this argument | |
| since the said decisions only provide that where a | |
| statement made/given by a witness under Section | |
| 161 of the Code and signed by the same is hit by the | |
| bar prescribed under Section 162 of the Code, but | |
| nowhere do they say that the evidence deposed to in | |
| court by the said witness becomes admissible. | |
| xxx xxx xxx | |
| 113. The information about the commission of a | |
| cognizable offence given “in person at the police | |
| station” and the information about a cognizable | |
| offence given “on telephone” have forever been | |
| treated by this Court on different pedestals. The | |
| rationale for the said differential treatment to the | |
| two situations is, that the information given by any | |
| individual on telephone to the police is not for the | |
| purpose of lodging a first information report, but | |
| rather to request the police to reach the place of | |
| occurrence; whereas the information about the | |
| commission of an offence given in person by a | |
| witness or anybody else to the police is for the | |
| purpose of lodging a first information report. | |
| Identifying the said objective difference between | |
| the two situations, this Court has categorically held | |
| in a plethora of judgments that a cryptic telephonic | |
| message of a cognizable offence cannot be treated | |
| as a first information report under the Code. | |
| 114. It has also been held in a number of | |
| judgments by this Court that merely because the | |
| information given on phone was prior in time | |
| would not mean that the same would be treated as | |
| the first information report, as understood under | |
| the Code. This view has been reiterated in Ramesh | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 19 of 67
| Baburao Devaskar v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) | | |
|---|
| 13 SCC 501 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 212] , that a | | |
| cryptic message given on telephone by somebody | | |
| who does not disclose his identity may not satisfy | | |
| the requirement of Section 154 of the Code of | | |
| Criminal Procedure. | | |
| 115. In view of the above discussion, the three | | |
| telephonic messages received by the police around | | |
| 2.25 a.m. on 30-4-1999 did not constitute the FIR | | |
| under Section 154 of the Code and the statement of | | |
| Shyan Munshi, PW 2 was rightly registered as the | | |
| FIR.” | | |
24. The aforesaid judgments were followed by the Apex Court in the case
of Yanob Sheikh v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 6 SCC
428 . The relevant para’s is reproduced as under:
| “10. In Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of | | |
|---|
| Delhi) [(2010) 6 SCC 1 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1385] , | | |
| a Bench of this Court took the view that cryptic | | |
| telephone messages could not be treated as FIRs as | | |
| their object is only to get the police to the scene of | | |
| offence and not to register the FIR. The said | | |
| intention can also be clearly culled out from the | | |
| bare reading of Section 154 of the Code which | | |
| states that the information if given orally should be | | |
| reduced to writing, read over to the informant, | | |
| signed by the informant and a copy of the same be | | |
| given to him free of cost. Similar view was also | | |
| expressed by a Bench of this Court in State of | | |
| A.P. v. V.V. Panduranga Rao [(2009) 15 SCC 211 : | | |
| (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 394] , where the Court observed | | |
| as under: (V.V. Panduranga Rao case [(2009) 15 | | |
| SCC 211 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 394] , SCC p. 213, | | |
| para 10) | | |
| “10. Certain facts have been rightly noted by the | |
| High Court. Where the information is only one | |
| which required the police to move to the place of | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 20 of 67
| occurrence and as a matter of fact the detailed | |
|---|
| statement was recorded after going to the place | |
| of occurrence, the said statement is to be treated | |
| as FIR. But where some cryptic or anonymous | |
| oral message which did not in terms clearly | |
| specify a cognizable offence cannot be treated as | |
| FIR. The mere fact that the information was the | |
| first in point of time does not by itself clothe it | |
| with the character of FIR. The matter has to be | |
| considered in the background of Sections 154 | |
| and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, | |
| 1973 (in short ‘the Code’). A cryptic telephonic | |
| message of a cognizable offence received by the | |
| police agency would not constitute an FIR.” | |
“32. … We are not oblivious of the fact that a
mere information received on phone by a police
officer without any details as regards the identity
of the accused or the nature of injuries caused to
the victims as well as the name of the culprits
may not be treated as FIR, but had the same
been produced, the nature of information
received by the police officer would have been
clear .”
| xxx xxx xxx | |
| 14. In light of the above settled principle, we are | |
| unable to accept that Ext. 1/3 was a second FIR with | |
| regard to the same occurrence with similar details | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 21 of 67
| and was hit by Section 162 of the Code. On the | |
|---|
| contrary, Ext. 7 was not a first information report | |
| upon its proper construction in law but was a mere | |
| telephonic information inviting the police to the | |
| place of occurrence. Thus, we have no hesitation in | |
| rejecting this contention raised on behalf of the | |
| appellant.” | |
25. In the present case the police machinery was set into motion when on
16.11.2012 at about 8:24 am, PCR Control Room, PHQ, ITO received
a call informing that “ Ek Admi Apne Upar Kerosene Ka Oil Dal Raha
Hai ”. The said PCR form (Ex.PW24/A) has been proved by PW-24
HC Anil, who deposed that:
“On 16.11.2012, I was posted in PCR Control
Room PHQ ITO. On that day, a call was received
at 8:24 am in which the caller stated that “Ek Admi
Apne Upar Kerosene Ka oil Dal Raha Hain” I had
pass on the above said information on power 14,
Power 15 and Tiger 48 and it was also passed on
the concerned West Distt. The PCR form is Ex
PW24/A.”
26. Subsequent thereto PW-9 HC Phool Chand received an information at
08:30 am from the Police Control Room, that “ a person has poured
kerosene oil upon him in Shop No. 147, 148 near the Bus stand of 830
at Chhoti Sabzi Mandi ” and the same was registered as DD No. 12A
( Ex.PW-9/A ) at Police Station Khyala. English Translation of the
relevant portion of DD No. 12A ( Ex.PW-9/A ) registered at Police
Station Khyala is reproduced herein below: -
“ The Duty Officer
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Information received through PCR Call and
departure
Time: 08:30 AM
At this time, it is entered that W-50 operator
has informed through telephonic call to the effect
‘that Ct. Devesh No. 3652/PCR has informed that a
person has poured Kerosin oil upon him in Shop No.
147, 148 near the Bus Stand of 830 at Chhoti Sabzi
Mandi
-9210848821’
The information so received from the PCR,
was entered into the Roznamcha and a copy of the
report after having being separated was handed over
to HC Phool Chand No. 325/W for initiating proper
action who alongwith PSI(?) Anoop Kumar left for
the spot. The circumstances were apprised to the SHO
who also left for the spot alongwith the accompanying
staff, while seeing the gravity of the matter through
Government vehicle no. DL1CJ-7405.
Scribed by HC/DO HC Rahbeer Singh No. 442/W”
27. On receipt of DD No. 12A (Ex.PW-9/A), Head Constable Phool
Chand along with PW-16 SI Anoop Kumar went to the place of
incident and met with PW-10 Saurabh Arora (Son of the deceased ).
Relevant portion from the testimony of PW-9 HC Phool Chand is
reproduced herein below:-
“On 16.11.2012, I was posted at PS Khyala and on
that day on receipt of call no. 12 A Ex.PW9/A I along
with PSI anoop and SHO at about 8.30 am went to
shop no. 1470148, near 830 bus stand, Guru Nanak
Market, Khyala. On reaching there we found one
person was lying dead in burn condition in the shop
and there was smell of kerosene oil/ mobil oil. Even
the oil was also spotted. One Saurabh Arora met us
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 23 of 67
there who identified the dead body as Vijay Arora.
SHO recorded the statement of Saurabh Arora.
IO/SHO prepared Rukka and handed over the same
to me . I went to PS got lodged the FIR and returned
to the spot at about 1.00pm with the copy of FIR and
original rukka and handed over the same to SHO.”
28. Relevant portion from the testimony of PW-16 SI Anoop Kumar is
reproduced herein below:-
“On 16.11.2012, I was posted at PS Khyala as
Probational Sub-Inspector. On that day at about 8.30
am, a call vide DD no. 12A Ex. PW-9/A was received
at PS Khyala and the same was marked to HC Phool
Chand who was on emergency duty. SHO Insp. R.K.
Ojha was also briefed about the said DD.
Thereafter, I alongwith Insp. R.K. Ojha and HC
Phool Chand reached at the spot i.e. shop no. 147-
148, Guru Nanak Market, Khayal, Delhi. On
reaching over there, we found that shutter of the
said shop was opened and one dead body in burnt
condition was lying inside the said shop and smell of
kerosene oil was also coming out from the dead
body. Some substance like Mobil oil was spread over
inside and outside of the said shop and smell of
kerosene oil was also there in said mobil oil.
One person namely Sh. Saurabh Arora who is
complainant in the present case, met us there. Ins.
R.K. Ojha made inquiry from said person and
recorded his statement. Same is already Ex.PW-
10/A. Insp. R.K. Ojha also made endorsement on the
said statement and thereafter he gave the rukka to
HC Phool Chand and sent him to PS for registration
of the FIR. After about one hour, HC Phool Chand
came from PS after registration of the FIR in the
present case and gave the rukka and FIR to Insp. R.K.
Ojha whom the investigation was entrusted.”
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 24 of 67
29. Corroborating the version of the aforesaid police witnesses, PW-17
ACP RK Ojha has deposed that: -
“On 16.11.2012, I was posted as SHO PS khayala.
On that day at about 8.30 am, a call was received at
PS vide DD no. 12A and the same was marked to HC
Phool Chand as he was on emergency duty. The
matter was brought into my notice and thereafter I
alongwith HC Phool Chand, PSI Anoop reached the
spot i.e. shop no. 147-148, Guru Nanak Market,
Khyala near bus stand of route no. 830 . On reaching
there, I found a male dead body in burnt condition
inside the shop near shutter. There was liquid like
mobil oil spread inside and outside the shop. A smell
like kerosene oil was coming from the said mobil oil
like liquid.
One Saurabh Arora also met us and told that the
deceased was his father namely Sh. Vijay Arora. I
recorded his statement and same is already Ex.PW-
10/A, bearing my signatures at point B and
signatures of Saurabh at point A . I made an
endorsement at point “D to D” on statement Ex.PW-
3/B, bearing my signatures at point ‘C’. I gave the
rukka to HC Phool Chand and sent him to PS for
registration of the FIR. HC Phool Chand returned to
the spot after about 1-1 ½ hour and gave me copy of
FIR and original rukka.”
30. Perusal of the aforesaid testimony reveals that the initial statement of
PW-10 Saurabh Arora (Son of the deceased ) was recorded by PW-17
RK Ojha, subsequent to which the Rukka was prepared and the same
was handed over to Head Constable Phool Chand for registration of
FIR. Relevant portion from the initial statement (Ex.PW10/A) made
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 25 of 67
by PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the deceased) and Rukka
(Ex.PW1/B) is reproduced herein below:-
“Saurabh Arora S/o Vijay Arora Age 22 years, R/o T-
137, Vishnu Garden, Khyala, Delhi, Ph. 9717360071
made the following statement:
“I reside at the above mentioned address and
am appointed on the post of JE in the BSES. My
father Vijay Arora runs a spare part shop bearing
No. 147 – 148 at Khyala, Gurunanak Market. One
Pooran alias Karan had hung pitchers in front of
our shop. My father had made a complaint to the
MCD in the said regard and the MCD had removed
the pitchers. On the night of 15.11.12 Krishna,
Pooran, Raj, Chaman and Kanta had again hung
the pitchers in front of our shop. Today on 16.11.12,
at about 8:20 am when my father came over there to
open the shop and saw pitchers in front of the shop,
he asked them to remove those. Whereupon, Krishna
and Pooran secured my father and Chaman and
Kanta poured oil on him and Raj set him afire and
lowered down the shutter of the shop as a result
whereof, the shop was also set afire. When I rushed
towards the shop, the said person stopped me.
Krishan, Pooran, Chaman, Raj and Kanta have
committed the murder of my father in a well planned
manner after setting him afire. The aforesaid
persons had earlier picked up a quarrel with my
father many a times. Legal action may please be
initiated against them. I have heard the statement
and it is correct.”
Sd/- S. Arora
(In English)
16.11.12
Attested:
Sd/- Illegible
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 26 of 67
16.11.12
SHO Khyala
To
The Duty Officer
PS Khyala
Sir,
It is officially submitted that on receipt of DD No.
12 A, I, the Inspector along with the accompanying
Head Constable Phool Chand No. 325/W and SI
Anoop Kumar reached the place of occurrence i.e.
Shop No. 147-148, Gurunanak Market, Khyala where
the shutter of the shop was found opened and a
person was found lying dead in burnt condition in a
corner towards the west direction besides shutter of
the shop. Oil like Mobil oil was scattered in and
outside the shop from where smell like kerosene oil
was emanating. A person who disclosed his name and
address as Saurabh Arora S/o Vijay Arora, Aged 22
years, R/o R-137, Vishnu Garden, Khyala met me
over there at the spot and whatever he narrated was
recorded by me. The circumstances prevailing over
the spot and the contents of the aforesaid statement
disclose the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 302/34 IPC. The Crime Team may be
deputed at the spot. I, the inspector, am busy
commencing investigation at the spot. The
information in the said regard may be sent through
the special messenger. HC Phool Chand, No. 325/W
has been sent to the Police Station for the purpose of
registration of case (FIR).
Date and time of Occurrence: 16.11.12 at about 8:20 AM
Place of occurrence: Shop No. 147-1148 Gurunanak
Market, Khyala, Delhi
Date and time of despatch of
Writing: 16.11.12 at 11:15 AM
Sd/- Illegible
16.11.12
SHO
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 27 of 67
PS Khyala
Case (FIR) No. 280/12 dated 16.11.12 U/Ss. 302/34
IPC PS Khayala vide DD No. 14 A dated 16.11.12 at
11:35 AM PS Khyala
Sd /- Rajbeer
(In English)
HC Rajbir Singh
No 442/W
PS Khyala
PIS No. 28930299
16.11.12”
31. From the perusal of the facts of the present case, four PCR calls were
made i.e., firstly at 8.24.36 am informing that “ Caller Keh raha hain
Ek Admi Apne Upar Kerosene Ka Oil Dal Raha Hai ”, secondly at
8.27.17 am informing that “ Aadmi ne apna gate band karke aag lga li
hain ”, thirdly at 8.28.48 am informing that “ Caller Keh raha hain Ek
Admi Apne Upar Kerosene Ka Oil Dal Raha Hai” and fourthly at
8.32.17 am informing that “Ek Admi ne aag laga li hai”.
32. The aforesaid PCR calls were received before the recording of
statement of PW-10 Saurabh Arora (Ex.PW10/A) and the same were
cryptic and anonymous in nature which were not sufficient to form the
basis of registration of First Information Report. The statement of
PW-10 Saurabh Arora detailing the commission of crime falls under
the purview of complete information which cannot be overlooked. The
Investigating officer being satisfied with the statement given by
PW-10 Saurabh Arora was well within its authority to initiate the
investigation against the appellants coupled with the facts that all the
four call which were earlier made were cryptic and anonymous.
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 28 of 67
33. Further, as far as the inadmissibility of the statement made by PW-10
Saurabh Arora is concerned, we rely on the following decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manu Sharma (supra) wherein the
Apex Court in similar circumstances held that the signed statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. is not hit by the bar under Section
162 Cr. P.C.:-
| “109. It was further pointed out by the defence that | |
|---|
| Ext. P 12-A wherein three PCR calls were recorded | |
| is the real FIR and the statement of PW 2 which was | |
| taken during investigation and got signed by him is | |
| not the FIR and is thus to be treated as a statement | |
| recorded under Section 161 CrPC and is hit by the | |
| bar under Section 162 CrPC. This argument is | |
| unacceptable since as observed in the earlier | |
| paragraph the telephone call from PW 70 was too | |
| cryptic to amount to an FIR.” | |
counsel for the appellants in relation to inadmissibility of statement of
PW-10, Saurabh Arora forming the basis of registration of First
Information Report holds no ground.
Credibility Of Material Prosecution Witness
35. During the course of arguments it was strongly urged that the
testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the Deceased ) cannot be
exclusively relied on as trustworthy and reliable because he was
closely related to the deceased and was categorized as an interested
witness and was planted by the prosecution to falsely implicate the
appellants in the commission of the alleged offence.
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 29 of 67
36. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the basis of the
sole testimony of a single witness. It is the quality and not the quantity
of evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. The
legal system has laid emphasis on the value, weight and quality of
evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses.
The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible
and trustworthy or otherwise.
37. The Apex Court in Veer Singh & Ors. Vs State of UP reported in
(2014) 2 SCC 455 , has observed that:
| " | 21. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, |
|---|
| weight and quality of evidence rather than on | |
| quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is | |
| not the number of witnesses but quality of their | |
| evidence which is important as there is no | |
| requirement under the law of evidence that any | |
| particular number of witnesses is to be examined to | |
| prove/disprove a fact. The evidence must be weighed | |
| and not counted. It is quality and not quantity which | |
| determines the adequacy of evidence as has been | |
| provided under Section 134 of the Evidence Act. As a | |
| general rule the court can and may act on the | |
| testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly | |
| reliable. (Vide Vadivelu Thevar v. State of | |
| Madras [AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ | |
| 1000], Kunju v. State of T.N. [(2008) 2 SCC 151: | |
| (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 331 : AIR 2008 SC 1381], Bipin | |
| Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. [(2010) 12 SCC 91: | |
| (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150: AIR 2010 SC | |
| 3638], Mahesh v. State of M.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 626: | |
| (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 783], Prithipal Singh v. State of | |
| Punjab [(2012) 1 SCC 10: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) | |
| 1], Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana [(2013) 2 SCC | |
| 502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807 : JT (2013) 1 SC 222] | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 30 of 67
| and Gulam Sarbar v. State of Jharkhand [(2014)3 | | |
|---|
| SCC 401 : (2013) 12 Scale 504].)” | | |
| (emphasis supplied) | |
adduced by the prosecution, more particularly the testimony of
Saurabh Arora (son of the deceased ), is cogent, trustworthy and can be
relied upon. Saurabh Arora (son of the deceased ) stepped into the
witness box as PW-10 and deposed that:
“I am working as J.E. in BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd.
My father Vijay Arora was running shop of spare
parts at Shop No. 147-148 Guru Nanak Market
Khayala. Accused Krishna, Puran, Chaman and
Raj Kumar had placed Matkas in front of our said
shops. My father had made complaint in this regard
with MCD. Officials of MCD got removed Matkas
from in front of our shop.
On the intervening night of 15/16.11.2012 accused
Krishna, Puran, Chaman, Raj Kumar and Kanta
had again placed Matkas in front of our said shops .
On 16.11.2012 at about 8.00 am when my father
reached at our shops in order to open the shops and
he asked the accused persons to remove the Matkas
from in front of said shops. Accused Krishna and
Puran caught hold my father and accused Chaman
and Kanta poured oil upon my father and accused
Raj lit fire upon my father and shut down the
shutter of the shop . My father as well as the shop
caught fire due to above said reason. When I rushed
towards the shops the accused persons caught hold
me and restrained me to reach the shops in order to
safe my father. Accused Chaman also tried to pour
oil upon me. The above said accused persons
caused death of my father by committing the above
said act. The accused persons had also quarreled
with my father prior to the above said incident. I do
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 31 of 67
not know who informed to the police. My statement is
Ex PW10/A was recorded by the police bearing my
signatures at point A.”
During his cross-examination PW-10 Saurabh Arora deposed as
39.
under:-
“xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
It is wrong to suggest that my father was not running
his business from Shop No. 147-148. It is wrong to
suggest that my father was running his business from
Shop No. 16-17. It is wrong to suggest that accused
persons did not pour oil on the person of my deceased
father. It is wrong to suggest that the bone of
contention namely the Matkas are being placed in
front of Shop No. 16-17. It is wrong to suggest that
the copy of complaint in respect of those Matkas
never handed over to the police. It is wrong to suggest
that I am not the real son of deceased Vijay.
I have joined the BSES about five years back. It is
wrong to suggest that the relation between my father
and my mother were not cordial. It is wrong to
suggest that at the time of incident there was no
motor parts in the shops. It is wrong to suggest that
shop no. 147-148 was neither used by my father for
business or for storage. It is wrong to suggest that
due to soured relations with my mother, my father
was running in depression.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
I reached on the spot at about 8.00AM in the
morning. I remained at the spot till 11/11.30AM. I
reached at the spot alone. Number of Police officials
had reached the spot, however, I cannot tell the exact
number of the same. I cannot tell the exact time as to
when the police officials have reached the spot. Vol.
They had reached at the spot after sometime. Police
had obtained my signatures on 2-3 papers. It is wrong
to suggest that the police got my signatures on blank
papers. Vol. My statement was recorded on it. It is
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 32 of 67
wrong to suggest that no site plan was prepared by
the police in my presence. Vol. I have given the basic
informations before the same was made.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
When I opened the shutter of my shop, at that time my
father had expired. It is wrong to suggest that I did
not shout or raise any voice with regard to saving of
life of my father.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
It is correct that I had tried to save my father
(deceased) from the accused person. I was restraint
by the accused persons when I tried to save my father.
The distance between me and my father was
approximately 7 to 8 ft. It is wrong to suggest that I
was not present at the spot at the time of incident. The
accused person set fired of my father in the shop No.
147-148.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
Two person caught hold of my father and another two
poured oil on him and one person namely raj Kumar
lit fire. It is correct that my father was burnt in front
of my eyes. The shutter was open at that time”
40. From a perusal of the aforesaid testimony, it is evidently established
that the testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora (son of the deceased ) is
trustworthy, credible and the witness withstood the test of cross-
examination. Perusal of the testimony clearly depicts that he has
witnessed the incident and all the accused persons were actively
involved in the commission of the alleged offence and had poured oil
on the deceased and had set him on fire. Perusal of the aforesaid
testimony also reveals that when the deceased had arrived at his shop
in the morning of 16.11.2012 at about 8.20 am, various earthen pots
were lying in front of his shop and the deceased had asked the
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 33 of 67
appellants-accused to remove them. However, despite his continuous
request, the appellants-accused did not remove the earthen pots and
thereafter the appellants-accused Krishna and Puran caught hold of the
deceased and appellant-accused Chaman and Swarn Kanta poured oil
over him and appellant-accused Raj Kumar set him on fire. Perusal of
the aforesaid testimony also reveals that the appellants-accused in
furtherance of their common intention and preconcert committed the
alleged offence as the accused persons had also previously quarrelled
with the deceased prior to the above alleged incident.
41. Learned counsel for the appellants doubting the credibility of PW-10
Saurabh Arora( Son of the deceased ) contended that it would be highly
improbable that the son of the deceased despite being present at the
spot, allowed the appellants to set the deceased on fire without raising
an alarm which clearly shows that he is a planted witness.
42. In this regard, the testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the
deceased ) reveals that “accused Krishna and Puran caught hold my
father and accused Chaman and Kanta poured oil upon my father
and accused Raj lit fire upon my father and shut down the shutter of
the shop. My father as well as the shop caught fire due to above said
reason. When I rushed towards the shops the accused persons
caught hold me and restrained me to reach the shops in order to safe
my father .” Further during his cross examination, he deposed that
‘ when I opened the shutter of my shop, at that time my father had
expired. It is wrong to suggest that I did not shout or raise any voice
with regard to saving of life of my father ’.
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43. In view of the deposition of PW-10 Saurabh Arora (son of the
deceased ) in relation to the efforts made by him to save his father, we
have no reason to disbelieve the case of prosecution. Further the
presence of PW-10 Saurabh Arora (Son of the deceased ) at the spot
was established with the testimony of PW-16 SI Anoop Kumar who
deposed that ‘ One person namely Sh. Saurabh Arora who is
complainant in the present case, met us there. Insp. R.K. Ohja made
enquiry from said person and recorded his statement. ’ The presence of
PW-10 Saurabh Arora (Son of the deceased ) was further established
by the testimony of PW-17 ACP RK Ojha who deposed that ‘ I also
taken into possession the cloths stained with oil of Saurabh Arora
given by him to me. I made the parcel of the same and sealed them
with the seal of PC and seized them vide seizure memo Ex. PW-9/D
bearing my signature at point B.’
44. Moreover, as far as the stand taken by learned counsel for the
appellants, that PW-10 Saurabh Arora (son of the deceased ) is an
interested witness and was closely related to the deceased and his
evidence cannot be exclusively relied on as being trustworthy and
reliable, is not a credible ground to discard his testimony completely.
In Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh reported in (2017) 11 SCC 195 ,
the Supreme Court had held with respect to the evidence of interested
witnesses and the germane portion of the judgment is extracted below:
“24. On the issue of appreciation of evidence of
interested witnesses , Dalip Singh v. State of
Punjab [Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC
364 : 1954 SCR 145 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465] is one of the
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earliest cases on the point. In that case, it was held as
follows: (AIR p. 366, para 26)
“26. A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which are likely to be tainted and that usually
means unless the witness has cause, such as
enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate
him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be
the last to screen the real culprit and falsely
implicate an innocent person. It is true, when
feelings run high and there is personal cause for
enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an
innocent person against whom a witness has a
grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must
be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of
relationship far from being a foundation is often
a sure guarantee of truth.”
25. Similarly, in Piara Singh v. State of
Punjab [Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC
452 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 614] , this Court held: (SCC p.
455, para 4)
“4. … It is well settled that the evidence of
interested or inimical witnesses is to be
scrutinised with care but cannot be rejected
merely on the ground of being a partisan
evidence. I f on a perusal of the evidence the
Court is satisfied that the evidence is creditworthy
there is no bar in the Court relying on the said
evidence.”
26. In Hari Obula Reddy v. State of A.P. [Hari Obula
Reddy v. State of A.P., (1981) 3 SCC 675 : 1981 SCC
(Cri) 795] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court
observed: (SCC pp. 683-84, para 13)
“13. … it is well settled that interested evidence
is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even
partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for
discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. Nor
can it be laid down as an invariable rule that
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 36 of 67
interested evidence can never form the basis of
conviction unless corroborated to a material
extent in material particulars by independent
evidence. All that is necessary is that the
evidence of interested witnesses should be
subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with
caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested
testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or
inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient,
in the circumstances of the particular case, to
base a conviction thereon.”
27. Again, in Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish
Singh [Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish Singh, (2005) 10
SCC 498 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1611] , the following
observations were made by this Court: (SCC p. 501,
para 7)
“7. … The requirement of law is that the
testimony of inimical witnesses has to be
considered with caution. If otherwise the
witnesses are true and reliable their testimony
cannot be thrown out on the threshold by
branding them as inimical witnesses . By now, it
is well-settled principle of law that enmity is a
double-edged sword. It can be a ground for false
implication. It also can be a ground for assault.
Therefore, a duty is cast upon the court to
examine the testimony of inimical witnesses with
due caution and diligence.”
28. A survey of the judicial pronouncements of this
Court on this point leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the evidence of a closely related
witness is required to be carefully scrutinised and
appreciated before any conclusion is made to rest
upon it, regarding the convict/accused in a given
case. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved
merely on the ground that the witnesses are related
to each other or to the deceased. In case the evidence
has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and
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| trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied | | |
|---|
| upon. (See Anil Rai v. State of Bihar [Anil Rai v. State | | |
| of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1009] | | |
| , State of U.P. v. Jagdeo [State of U.P. v. Jagdeo, | | |
| (2003) 1 SCC 456 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 351] , Bhagaloo | | |
| Lodh v. State of U.P. [Bhagaloo Lodh v. State of U.P., | | |
| (2011) 13 SCC 206 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 813] | | |
| , Dahari v. State of U.P. [Dahari v. State of U.P., | | |
| (2012) 10 SCC 256 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 22] | | |
| , Raju v. State of T.N. [Raju v. State of T.N., (2012) 12 | | |
| SCC 701 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 184] | | |
| , Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat | | |
| Reddy [Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, | | |
| (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182] | | |
| and Jodhan v. State of M.P. [Jodhan v. State of M.P., | | |
| (2015) 11 SCC 52 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 275] )” | | |
| (emphasis supplied) | |
45. Keeping in view the facts of the present case and applying the
principles laid down by the Apex court nothing has been brought on
record to prove that the evidence of PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the
deceased ) cannot be believed and relied upon or he has falsely
implicated the appellants due to some personal vengeance or has
implicated them in the present case at the instance of the prosecution.
Therefore, the aforesaid testimony cannot be rejected on the mere
ground of his relationship with the deceased because relationship by
itself is not a sufficient ground to discard the evidence of the witness
and specify it as inappropriate for credence.
46. Further, the Court, after going through the entire evidence must form
an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and otherwise also, in
all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the
depositions of the witnesses due to normal errors of observation,
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namely, error of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental
disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the incident. In case
of Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab @ Kuti Biswas and Anr. , reported at
(2013) 12 SCC 796 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“28. As is evincible, the High Court has also taken
note of certain omissions and discrepancies treating
them to be material omissions and irreconcilable
discrepancies. It is well settled in law that the minor
discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and
the evidence is to be considered from the point of
view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same
inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the
evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the
test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the
prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy
goes to the root of the matter and ushers in
incongruities, the defense can take advantage of such
inconsistencies. The omission should create a serious
doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a
witness. It is only the serious contradictions and
omissions which materially affect the case of the
prosecution but not every contradiction or omission
(See Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana and another,
Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of M.P. and
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal).
(emphasis supplied)
47. Learned counsel for the Appellants had further contended that the
prosecution has wrongly projected the present case and the trial court
erred in relying on the testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora ( Son of the
deceased ) completely negating the version of DW-1 ( Mohd. Salauddin
Ansari ). The Learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment while not
relying on the version of the DW-1 ( Mohd. Salauddin Ansari ) and
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convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section
302/34 IPC gave its reasoning, which is reproduced herein below: -
“ 84. I have carefully scrutinized the testimony of DW-1
Mohd Salauddin Ansari. DW-1 has narrated the entire
incident in his testimony in an elaborate manner . He
has deposed that deceased Vijay made a call to his wife
on mobile phone by saying on mobile “Today I will
finish all the root cause of the quarrels, from today
onwards you would not come there ( shops)”. After
that, the deceased Vijay Arora went to the shop No.
147-148. He opened the shutter of the said shop and
went inside the shop and shut down the shutter . After
five minutes from the said shop smoke started coming
out. Accused Krishna was standing in front of her
shop/house. Accused Krishna made a call at 100
number. PCR Van came at the spot.”
85. In his cross examination, he has admitted that he
had stood surety of accused Krishna and that he was
having good relations with the accused persons. He
has further admitted that one cannot see anything of
shop no. 16-17 while sitting at his shop. He has also
admitted that there is a gali between his shop and shop
no. 147-148.
86. From his deposition as well as on perusal of site
plan Ex.PW17/A, it becomes doubtful that DW-1 could
hear the deceased what he said on mobile phone to his
wife before the alleged incident took place. He has
admitted that there was a gali in between his shop and
the shop of deceased where the incident took place.
Therefore, it is highly doubtful that he could witness
the entire incident. His testimony becomes even more
doubtful due to the fact that when he had heard the
deceased talking to his wife, he must have acted and
after seeing the smoke coming out of the shutter, he
must have rushed to save him. However, it is even
more surprising that he did not even make a call to the
police and asked accused Krishna to make call. It is a
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matter of common sense that in the event of any
emergency, one does his best to rescue other even if
that person is not known to him. In the instant case, he
knew the deceased very well and was his neighbour and
instead of helping out to him, he remained as a mute
spectator which casts shadow on his testimony and as
such , I am of the considered opinion that he is a
planted/interested witness examined by the accused
persons to depose in their favour and as such, his
testimony because of full of doubts, cannot be relied at
all.”
48. Consequently, this Court is in agreement with the finding of the Trial
Court, as the perusal of the above extracted findings clearly and
unequivocally lead to one inescapable conclusion that the version of
DW-1 ( Mohd. Salauddin Ansari ) is surrounded by suspicion and casts
a shadow of doubt, which evidently makes it unsafe to rely upon.
49. Thus, in the present case nothing has been brought on record to prove
that the evidence of PW-10 Saurabh Arora( Son of the deceased)
cannot be believed and relied upon or they have falsely implicated the
Appellants due to some personal vengeance or have implicated the
Appellants in the present case at the instance of the prosecution.
Hence, the argument of the counsel for the Appellants with regard to
PW-10 Saurabh Arora been categorized as interested witnesses with
the sole prospective of the prosecution to falsely implicate the
appellants in the commission of the alleged offence holds no ground.
Medical & Scientific Evidence
50. At this stage, it is relevant to examine whether the medical evidence
adduced by the prosecution finds support from the testimony of the
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prosecution witnesses. Dr. B.N. Mishra, Medical Officer-cum-Medico
legal Expert and Criminologist Department Of Forensic Medicine,
DDU Hospital, conducted the post-mortem of the deceased and
proved the report as (Ex.PW10/A) wherein he opined that “ cause of
death was due to asphyxia caused by inhalation of suffocating gases
into the respiratory passage subsequent to burning of kerosene ”. The
relevant portion from his testimony is reproduced as under:-
“On 16.11.2012 I was posted as above. On that day I
had conducted the post mortem examination on body of
deceased Vijay Arora S/o Late K.L. Arora aged 50 years
male. The body was sent by Inspector R.K. Ojha for
post mortem examination. On examination of the body I
had observed that the body was 100 per cent burnt out,
superficial to deep in nature. After completion of post
mortem examination I had opined that the cause of
death was due to asphyxia caused by inhalation of
suffocating / irreparable gases into the respiratory
passage subsequent to burning of kerosene, body and
other neighbouring objects into place of
occurrence(closes space) i.e. room/shop as alleged
history available. My detailed report is Ex PW10/A
which bears my signatures at point A on each four
running pages.”
51. Relevant portion from the Post Mortem Report of the deceased reads
as under:-
GENERAL EXAMINATION
• Rigor mortis: Thermal stiffness present all over the
body and exhibited state of pugilistic.
• Post Mortem Staining: Absent due to burn injury.
• Condition of eyes: Both eyes closed with highly
congested conjunctivae and burnt out lashes.
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• Mouth/Tongue: Partially opened with tongue protruded
and partly burnt out.
• All hairs of the body i.e. scalp, eye brow, eye lashes,
pubic hair either burnt out or singed out.
• The smell of kerosene emitted from the body and
remnants of clothing.
• Whole body blackened and charred out.
EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: External Injuries
100% deep to superficial thermal burn injury present all
over the body with multiple blister formation at different
parts containing serous fluid. The right lower limb and
trunk part exhibits line of redness at different locations
while rest part of the body shows post mortem burn in
appearance. The muscle components on the right thigh
partly burnt out and exposed. There are multiple
thermal rupture of muscles present on the different part
of the body with exposed underlined fact tissue.
xxx xxx xxx
OPINION:
1. TIME SINCE DEATH: is consistent to time of incident
(i.e. 08:30 AM dated 16.11.2012)
2. The cause of death is due to asphyxia caused by
inhalation of suffocating / irrespirable gases into
respiratory passage subsequent to burning of kerosene,
body and other neighbouring objects into place of
occurrence (closed space) i.e. room / shop as alleged
history available.
3. Manner of death shall be concluded after receipt of
FSL reports of preserved samples however in this stage
there is nothing to suggest that person (deceased)
would not has been burnt alive by manner alleged, as
the autopsy findings are suggestive of that the few of
burn injuries are ante mortem in nature and rest of
(maximum parts) burn injuries are appearing post
mortem in nature.
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4. The deposition of soot particles into all level of
respiratory passage supports that person was alive
before setting of fire upon him.”
52. After examining the testimony of Dr. B.N. Mishra and the post
mortem report (Ex.PW10/A), it is observed that deceased had died
subsequent to burning from kerosene oil as various burn injuries were
ante-mortem and certain were post-mortem in nature. Moreover, the
soot particles detected in the respiratory passage of the deceased
corroborated the version of the prosecution that the deceased was alive
before he was set on fire by the appellants-accused.
53. Further, it is relevant to highlight that, PW-19 Sh. Santosh Tripathi, Sr,
Scientific Officer Chemistry, FSL Rohini was called at the place of
incident on 19.11.2012. He had prepared a detailed report
(Ex.PW19/A) and had opined “ that there was incidence of burning
inside Shop No. 147/148, Khyala, Delhi ”. The relevant portion from
his testimony is reproduced as under:-
“On 19.11.2012, I was posted as Sr. Scientific Officer
(Chemistry) at FSL Rohini. On that day, I along with Sh.
S.S. Badwal, SSO Physics and team of Crime reached at
Guru Nanak Market Shop NO. 147-148, Khyala, Delhi
and inspected the spot and prepared my detailed report
Ex. PW19/A bearing my signatures at point A and
opined that there was incidence of burning inside the
above mentioned shop adjacent to the metallic
shutters.”
54. Relevant portion of crime scene visit report No. 2012/SOC-
153/CHEM No. 31/12 (Ex.PW.19/A) is reproduced below:
“The undersigned along with the team members
thoroughly examined the scene of crime at Gurunanak
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Market, Shop No. 147-148, Khyala, Delhi on Dt.
19.11.2012 and the following observations were made:
1) The above-mentioned shop had two metallic shutters
and was found to have metallic spare parts, empty
plastic canes, wooden planks, motor vehicle batteries,
wooden metallic boxes, a wooden cupboard, metal
pipes, folding bed and set of blankets inside the shops.
2) Burnt and charred ash debris were found on the floor
of the adjacent to the metallic shutters.
3) Some plastic canes were found with sign of burning.
4) Some motor vehicle batteries were found with the sign
of burning.
5) There was mobil oil like material found on the floor
insides the shop.
6) One wooden cupboard was found partially burnt at
the bottom.
7) One wooden box was found partially burnt and
blackened adjacent to the metallic shutters.
8) Right side metallic shutter was found with the sign of
burning.
9) One electric switch box with connecting wire were
also found in burnt & melted condition.
From the above observations it is opined that there was
incidence of burning inside the above mentioned shop
adjacent to the metallic shutters. I.O. was advised to
collect the exhibit and forward to the laboratory for
further chemical analysis for the presence of inflammable
substance, if any.”
55. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid testimony and the crime scene visit
report reveals that the following exhibits were forwarded to the
forensic laboratory for chemical analysis:-
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 45 of 67
| No. of Parcels<br>/Exhibits | No. of Seals & seal<br>impression | Description of<br>parcels/exhibits |
|---|
| Parcel-1 | Four seals of “P.C.” | One sealed cloth parcel<br>stated to be containing<br>‘cloths of complaint<br>Saurabh Arora’.it was<br>found to contain exhibit<br>‘1’ |
| Exhibit-‘1’ | | Some unburnt cloth<br>material (one full sleeved<br>warmer & one light<br>brown coloured knicker). |
| Parcel-2 | One seal of ‘P.C.’ | One sealed plastic<br>container stated to be<br>‘oiled piece of cotton’. It<br>was found to contain<br>exhibit’2’ kept in a<br>polythene bag. |
| Exhibit’-2’ | | Some black coloured<br>deposits sticking on a<br>piece of cotton swab |
| Parcel-3 | One seal of “P.C.” | One sealed plastic<br>container stated to be<br>‘earth control’. It was<br>found to contain exhibit<br>’3’ |
| Exhibit-‘3’ | | Some greyish black<br>coloured coarse &<br>powdery material. |
| Parcel-4 | One seal of “P.C.” | One sealed plastic<br>container stated to be<br>earth lifted near dead<br>body’. It was found to<br>contain exhibit’4’ |
| Exhibit-‘4’ | | Some black coloured<br>burnt debris (pieces of<br>metal few coins concrete<br>& plastic pieces etc) |
| Parcel-5 | One seal of “P.C.” | One sealed plastic<br>container stated to be<br>containing one pair |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 46 of 67
| | Kolhapur sleeper<br>(chappal) and spectacles.<br>It was found to contain<br>exhibit ’5’ |
|---|
| Exhibit-‘5’ | | A pair of sleepers & one<br>spectacle. |
| Parcel-6 | One seal of “P.C.” | One sealed plastic can<br>stated to be containing<br>plastic can with small<br>quantity of mobil oil; It<br>was found to contain<br>exhibit ‘6’ |
| Exhibit-“6” | | Some black coloured<br>thick liquid, volume<br>approx. 2 it |
| Parcel-7 | One seal of “DFMT<br>DDU HOSPITAL” | One sealed white<br>polythene labelled as<br>PMR No. 1510/12 dated<br>16.11.2012 stated to be<br>containing ‘burnt<br>remnants taken from<br>wall floor’. it was found<br>to contain exhibit ’8’ |
| Exhibit-‘7’ | | Some partially burnt<br>cloth pieces. |
| Parcel-8 | One seal of ‘Y.P’ | One sealed plastic<br>container stated to be<br>containing ‘burnt<br>remnants taken from<br>wall floor’. It was found<br>to contain exhibit ‘8’ |
| Exhibit-“8” | | Some partially burnt<br>debris(metal pieces.<br>Pieces of wood piece of<br>burnt cloth, etc.) |
| Parcel-9 | One seal of ‘Y.P’ | One sealed plastic jar<br>stated to be containing<br>earth control from wall<br>floor. It was found to<br>contain exhibit ‘9’ |
| Exhibit-“9” | | Some partially burnt |
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| | debris. (metal parts,<br>concrete pieces, etc.) |
|---|
| Parcel-10 | One seal of “DFMT<br>DDU HOSPITAL” | One sealed small glass<br>jar labelled as PMR No.<br>1510/12 dated 16.11.12<br>stated to be containing<br>blood sample of Vijay<br>Arora. It was found to<br>contain exhibit ‘10’ |
| Exhibit - ‘10’ | | Blood sample volume<br>approx. 15 ml |
56. The result of analysis of the FSL report No. 2012/C-8661 dated
29.01.2014 was concluded with the following opinion and the relevant
portion is reproduced below:
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION REPORT
On chemical, Microscopic, GC and GC-HS
examination,
(i) Exhibits’1’,’2’,’4’,’6’,’7’ & ‘8’ were found to
contain residue of kerosene.
(ii) Petrol, Kerosene, Diesel and their residue could not
be detected in exhibits; ;3’, ‘5’ & ‘9’
(iii) Ethyl alcohol and carbon monoxide could not be
detected in exhibit ‘10’
57. Perusal of the FSL report evidently establishes the fact that the residue
of kerosene was found in Exhibit-1 (Some unburnt cloth material (one
full sleeved warmer & one light brown coloured knicker), Exhibit-2
(Some black coloured deposits sticking on a piece of cotton swab),
Exhibit-4 (Some black coloured burnt debris (pieces of metal few
coins concrete & plastic pieces etc), Exhibit-6 (Some black coloured
thick liquid, volume approx. 2 lt), Exhibit-7 (Some partially burnt
cloth pieces) & Exhibit-8 (Some partially burnt debris(metal pieces.
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Pieces of wood, piece of burnt cloth, etc) and no residue of mobil oil
was detected on any of the aforesaid exhibits.
58. Hence, in view of the postmortem report of the deceased and the FSL
report detailed above, it is established that the medical evidence
corroborates the version of the prosecution and thus the prosecution
has discharged its onus to prove the fact that the deceased was burnt
alive by kerosene oil.
Defective Investigation
59. Another argument raised by the Appellants is that the police while
conducting the investigation failed to follow the procedure prescribed
under the Code of Criminal Procedure and further contended that the
investigating agency failed to conduct a fair and transparent
investigation.
60. In this context, we find that a fair investigation is a sine qua non of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, wherein an investigation has to
be unbiased, and without any prejudice for or against the accused
because if the same is partial and unfair then the whole criminal
justice system will be at stake and the same will erode the confidence
of the common citizen. To discuss the law with regard to defective
investigation, reliance can be placed on Manu Sharma v. State (NCT
of Delhi) reported in (2010) 6 SCC 1 . Germane portion of the
judgment is extracted below:
“197. In the Indian criminal jurisprudence, the accused
is placed in a somewhat advantageous position than
under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in
the world. The criminal justice administration system in
India places human rights and dignity for human life at
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| a much higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an | |
|---|
| accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty, | |
| the alleged accused is entitled to fairness and true | |
| investigation and fair trial and the prosecution is | |
| expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime. | |
| The investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent | |
| and expeditious to ensure compliance with the basic | |
| rule of law. These are the fundamental canons of our | |
| criminal jurisprudence and they are quite in | |
| conformity with the constitutional mandate contained | |
| in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. | |
| 199. It is not only the responsibility of the investigating | |
|---|
| agency but as well as that of the courts to ensure that | |
| investigation is fair and does not in any way hamper | |
| the freedom of an individual except in accordance with | |
| law. Equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is | |
| that the high responsibility lies upon the investigating | |
| agency not to conduct an investigation in tainted and | |
| unfair manner. The investigation should not prima facie | |
| be indicative of a biased mind and every effort should be | |
| made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above | |
| law dehors his position and influence in the society | |
201. Historically but consistently the view of this Court
has been that an investigation must be fair and effective,
must proceed in proper direction in consonance with the
ingredients of the offence and not in haphazard manner.
In some cases besides investigation being effective the
accused may have to prove miscarriage of justice but
once it is shown the accused would be entitled to definite
benefit in accordance with law. The investigation
should be conducted in a manner so as to draw a just
balance between citizen's right under Articles 19 and
21 and expansive power of the police to make
investigation. These well-established principles have
been stated by this Court in Sasi
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| Thomas v. State [(2006) 12 SCC 421 : (2007) 2 SCC | | |
|---|
| (Cri) 72] , State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya | | |
| Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC | | |
| (Cri) 225] and T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 | | |
| SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] . | | |
| 202. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [(2009) | | |
| 1 SCC 441 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 523] this Court | | |
| specifically stated that a concept of fair investigation | | |
| and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of the | | |
| fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 of | | |
| the Constitution of India. We have referred to this | | |
| concept of judicious and fair investigation as the right | | |
| of the accused to fair defence emerges from this | | |
| concept itself. The accused is not subjected to | | |
| harassment, his right to defence is not unduly hampered | | |
| and what he is entitled to receive in accordance with | | |
| law is not denied to him contrary to law.” | | |
| | (emphasis supplied) |
Ors. Vs. State N.C.T. of Delhi reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Del
9549 has held as under:-
“56. The next submission made by the counsel for the
appellants was that in case PW5 was an eye witness to
the incident and had taken the deceased to the hospital
in a Maruti car driven by PW9 Manender, there would
have been blood on his clothes. However, his clothes
were not taken into possession by the police and not sent
for examination.
57. This submission of the learned counsel for the
appellants is also liable to be rejected. Even though the
blood stained clothes of PW5 and 9 were not seized but
their evidence establishes their presence at the place of
the incident. It is settled law that faulty investigation
cannot come in the way of dispensing justice.
Investigating Officer may have faulted in not
collecting the blood stained clothes of the eyewitnesses,
but the benefit of defective investigation cannot accrue
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 51 of 67
to the accused persons. We need not burden this
opinion with judicial pronouncements in this regard;
suffice to mention that one may usefully refer to Sathi
Prasad vs. The State of U.P. reported at AIR 1973 SC
448, State of U.P. v. Anil Singh reported at 1988 Supp
SCC 686 (paragraph 17), Mohan Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, reported at (1999) 2 SCC 428
(paragraph 11), Dhanaj Singh alias Shera & Ors. Vs.
State of Punjab reported at (2004) 3 SCC 654
(paragraphs 5 and 8), State of UP v Krishna Master,
reported at (2010) 12 SCC 324 (paragraph 15).”
(emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court in Ram Bali vs. State of U.P. reported in (2004)
62.
10 SCC 598 has also held as under:-
12. The investigation was also stated to be defective
since the gun was not sent for forensic test. In the case
of a defective investigation the court has to be
circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But it would
not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on
account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to
playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the
investigation is designedly defective. (See Karnel Singh
v. State of M.P. [(1995) 5 SCC 518 : 1995 SCC (Cri)
977])
13. In Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar [(1999) 2 SCC 126
: 1999 SCC (Cri) 104] it was held that if the lapse or
omission is committed by the investigating agency or
because of negligence there had been defective
investigation the prosecution evidence is required to be
examined dehors such omissions carefully to find out
whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what
extent, such lapse affected the object of finding out the
truth. The contaminated conduct of officials alone
should not stand in the way of evaluating the evidence
by the courts in finding out the truth, if the materials on
record are otherwise credible and truthful; otherwise
the designed mischief at the instance of biased or
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 52 of 67
interested investigator would be perpetuated and
justice would be denied to the complainant party, and
in the process to the community at large.
14. As was observed in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of
Bihar [(1998) 4 SCC 517 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1085] if
primacy is given to such designed or negligent
investigation, to the omission or lapses by perfunctory
investigation or omissions, the faith and confidence of
the people would be shaken not only in the law
enforcing agency but also in the administration of
justice. The view was again reiterated in Amar Singh v.
Balwinder Singh [(2003) 2 SCC 518 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
641] . As noted in Amar Singh case [(2003) 2 SCC 518 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 641] it would have been certainly better
if the firearms were sent to the Forensic Test Laboratory
for comparison. But the report of the ballistic expert
would merely be in the nature of an expert opinion
without any conclusiveness attached to it. When the
direct testimony of the eyewitnesses corroborated by
the medical evidence fully establishes the prosecution
version, failure or omission or negligence on the part
of the IO cannot affect the credibility of the
prosecution version.”
(emphasis supplied)
63. In view of the legal principles set out above, if the prosecution case is
established by the evidence adduced then any failure or omission on
the part of the Investigating Officer pales into insignificance when
ocular testimony is found credible and cogent and cannot render the
case of the prosecution doubtful. If direct evidence is credible then
failure, defect or negligence in investigation cannot adversely affect
the prosecution case. As a general principle, it can be stated that error,
illegality or defect in investigation cannot have any impact unless
miscarriage of justice is brought about or serious prejudice is caused to
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 53 of 67
the accused, though the Court should be circumspect while evaluating
the evidence. In the present case, as discussed above, we have
accepted the testimony of PW-10 Saurabh Arora being the eye
witness, hence, the plea of the counsel for the Appellants seeking
benefit of doubt to the appellants on the ground of defective
investigation, is bereft of any merit and declined.
Motive
64. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the learned
Trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that placing of matkas on a
patri in front of the deceased shop was too trivial a reason to commit
the murder of the deceased and the prosecution had miserably failed to
prove the motive for commission of the alleged offence
65. It is settled legal proposition that motive is a relevant factor in all
criminal cases whether based on the testimony of eye witnesses or
circumstantial evidence. The question in this regard is whether the
prosecution must fail because it failed to prove the motive or even
whether inability to prove motive would weaken the prosecution to
any perceptible limit. No doubt, if the prosecution proves the existence
of a motive it would be well and good for it, particularly in a case
depending on circumstantial evidence, for, such motive could then be
counted as one of the circumstances. But when it is a case of direct
evidence, even if the absence of motive as alleged is accepted that is of
no consequence when overwhelming evidence are already available on
record. While dealing with a similar issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 54 of 67
in the case of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh reported in (2017) 11
SCC 195 has held as under:-
“ 46. It has next been contended by the learned counsel
for the respondents that there was no immediate motive
with the respondents to commit the murder of the
deceased. However, the trial court found that there was
sufficient motive with the accused persons to commit the
murder of the deceased since the deceased had defeated
accused Harcharan in the Pradhan elections, thus
putting an end to his position as Pradhan for the last 28-
30 years. The long nursed feeling of hatred and the
simmering enmity between the family of the deceased
and the accused persons most likely manifested itself in
the outburst of anger resulting in the murder of the
deceased. We are not required to express any opinion on
this point in the light of the evidence adduced by the
direct witnesses to the incident. It is a settled legal
proposition that even if the absence of motive, as
alleged, is accepted that is of no consequence and pales
into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the
crime. Therefore, in case there is direct trustworthy
evidence of the witnesses as to commission of an
offence, motive loses its significance . Therefore, if the
genesis of the motive of the occurrence is not proved,
the ocular testimony of the witnesses as to the
occurrence could not be discarded only on the ground of
absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is worthy of
reliance. (Hari Shanker v. State of U.P. [Hari
Shanker v. State of U.P., (1996) 9 SCC 40 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 913] , Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar [Bikau
Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 616 : 2004
SCC (Cri) Supp 535] , State of U.P. v. Kishanpal [State
of U.P. v. Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Cri) 182] , Abu Thakir v. State of T.N. [Abu
Thakir v. State of T.N., (2010) 5 SCC 91 : (2010) 2 SCC
(Cri) 1258] and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 55 of 67
| W.B. [Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 | |
|---|
| SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150] )” | |
| (emphasis supplied) |
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment titled as Khurshid
Ahmed Vs State Of Jammu And Kashmir reported in 2018 7 SCC
429 , has held that the motive is a double edged weapon and the same
loses its importance when there is direct and reliable evidence
available on record. Relevant part from the aforesaid judgment is
extracted below:
“18. Another argument advanced is that there was no
motive to commit the offence and in the absence of
strong motive, the appellant cannot be held guilty
under Section 302 IPC. In the present case, motive can
be traced from the evidences produced by the
prosecution with regard to the prior incident that took
place between the deceased and accused in connection
with payment of money over a transaction where the
accused stood as a guarantor. Because of the earlier
scuffle, the subsequent incident has occurred in which
the accused hit the deceased with an iron rod due to
which the deceased lost his life. It is appropriate to
observe that in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd
Edn., with regard to “motive”, it is stated that “the
prosecution may prove, but it is not bound to prove
the motive for a crime”. “Motive” is an emotion
which compels the person to do a particular act. But
in all the cases, it will be very difficult for the
prosecution to prove the real motive . Motive is a
double-edged weapon when there is a direct and
reliable evidence available on record, motive loses its
importance. In a case of circumstantial evidence,
motive assumes greater importance than in the case
of direct evidence. In a case of direct and compelling
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 56 of 67
| evidence, even assuming that no motive is attributed, | |
|---|
| still the prosecution version has to be examined. | |
| 19. As regards to the importance of existence of motive | |
|---|
| in a criminal case, here it is worthwhile to look at the | |
| ratio laid down by this Court in Shivaji Genu | |
| Mohite v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Genu | |
| Mohite v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 3 SCC 219 : | |
| 1973 SCC (Cri) 214 : AIR 1973 SC 55] : (SCC pp. | |
| 224-25, para 12) | |
| “12. … In case the prosecution is not able to |
|---|
| discover an impelling motive, that could not reflect |
| upon the credibility of a witness proved to be a |
| reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to motive would, |
| no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent |
| on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would |
| form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial |
| evidence in such a case. But that would not be so |
| in cases where there are eyewitnesses of |
| credibility, though even in such cases if a motive |
| is properly proved, such proof would strengthen |
| the prosecution case and fortify the court in its |
| ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that |
| if a motive is not established the evidence of an |
| eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy.” |
| X X X | |
| 28. In view of the above discussion, we are of the | |
| considered view that the direct oral evidence available | |
| on record coupled with the medical evidence, points | |
| at the guilt of the accused and not proving the motive | |
| for commission of the offence lost its significance in | |
| the facts of the case.” | |
(emphasis supplied)
67. Herein, it is relevant to highlight that the present case is based on
direct evidence and proof of motive has been established by the
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prosecution which will be treated as an additional corroborative piece
of evidence.
Common Intention ‘Under Section 34 of The Indian
Penal Code’
68. Learned counsel for the accused persons argued that the prosecution
failed to prove that the accused persons shared a common intention to
commit the alleged offence and hence, they can’t be held guilty for the
offence punishable under Section 34 IPC.
69. Before delving into the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to
discuss the relevant provisions which are involved in the present case,
Section 34 of the IPC reads as under:
“ 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention . —When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that
act in the same manner as if it were done by him
alone.”
70. To bring an offence within the ambit of Section 34 IPC, the following
factors are necessary to be present there:
(1) The criminal act (consisting of a series of acts) should
have been done, not by one person, but more than one person.
(2) Doing of every such individual act cumulatively resulting
in the commission of criminal offence should have been in
furtherance of the common intention of all such persons.
71. The theory of common intention is based on the principle of joint
liability in the doing of a criminal act and the distinctive feature of the
section is the element of participation in action and the liability of one
person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 58 of 67
act perpetrated by several persons. Direct evidence with regard to
common intention is rarely available and in order to bring home the
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by
evidence, whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial
evidence, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused
persons to commit the offence, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the
moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the
crime.
72. Therefore, in order to constitute an offence under Section 34 IPC, the
prosecution must be able to demonstrate that the criminal act
complained of against the accused persons was done by one of the
accused in furtherance of a common intention of all the accused
persons and the common intention implies a pre-arranged plan that has
to be inferred from the act or conduct of other relevant circumstances
of the case.
73. The ambit of Section 34 IPC has been dwelled upon at length by the
Supreme Court in Suresh and Anr. vs. State of UP reported in (2001)
3 SCC 673 , wherein it was held as follows:-
“37. However, in view of the importance of the
matter, insofar as the interpretation of Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code is concerned, we have chosen
to express our views in the light of consistent legal
approach on the subject throughout the period of
judicial pronouncements. For the applicability of
Section 34 to a co-accused, who is proved to have
common intention, it is not the requirement of law
that he should have actually done something to
incur the criminal liability with the aid of this
section. It is now well settled that no overt act is
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 59 of 67
necessary to attract the applicability of Section 34 for
a co-accused who is otherwise proved to be sharing
common intention with the ultimate act done by any
one of the accused sharing such intention.
38. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code recognizes
the principle of vicarious liability in criminal
jurisprudence. It makes a person liable for action of
an offence not committed by him but by another
person with whom he shared the common intention.
It is a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. The section gives statutory
recognition to the commonsense principle that if more
than two persons intentionally do a thing jointly, it is
just the same as if each of them had done it
individually. There is no gainsaying that a common
intention presupposes prior concert, which requires
a prearranged plan of the accused participating in
an offence. Such preconcert or preplanning may
develop on the spot or during the course of
commission of the offence but the crucial test is that
such plan must precede the act constituting an
offence. Common intention can be formed previously
or in the course of occurrence and on the spur of the
moment . The existence of a common intention is a
question of fact in each case to be proved mainly as
a matter of inference from the circumstances of the
case.
39. The dominant feature for attracting Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”) is the element of participation in absence
resulting in the ultimate “criminal act”. The “act”
referred to in the later part of Section 34 means the
ultimate criminal act with which the accused is
charged of sharing the common intention. The
accused is, therefore, made responsible for the
ultimate criminal act done by several persons in
furtherance of the common intention of all. The
section does not envisage the separate act by all the
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 60 of 67
accused persons for becoming responsible for the
ultimate criminal act. If such an interpretation is
accepted, the purpose of Section 34 shall be rendered
infructuous.”
(emphasis supplied)
74. The aforesaid judgment was followed by the Apex Court in the case of
Asif Khan v. State of Maharashtra &Anr reported in 2019 5 SCC
210. The relevant paras are reproduced as under:
| 19. The test for applicability of Section 34 in a fact | |
|---|
| situation of an offence has been clearly and | |
| categorically laid down by this Court. Section 34 | |
| IPC provides as follows: | |
| “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance |
| of common intention.—When a criminal act is |
| done by several persons in furtherance of the |
| common intention of all, each of such persons is |
| liable for that act in the same manner as if it were |
| done by him alone.” |
| 20. The judgment of the Privy Council in Mahbub | |
| Shah v. King Emperor [Mahbub Shah v. King | |
| Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine PC 5 : (1944-45) 72 IA | |
| 148 : AIR 1945 PC 118] has elaborately considered | |
| the ingredients under Section 34 and the said | |
| judgment of the Privy Council has been relied on and | |
| approved by this Court time and again. The Privy | |
| Council in the above case laid down that under | |
| Section 34, the essence of that liability is to be found | |
| in the existence of a common intention animating | |
| the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in | |
| furtherance of such intention. In para 13, the | |
| following has been laid down: | |
“13. In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of
the words “in furtherance of the common
intention of all” after the word “persons” and
before the word “each,” so as to make the object
of the section clear. Section 34 lays down a
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| 21. In Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad [Pandurang | |
|---|
| v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 : 1955 Cri | |
| LJ 572] , Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Bench | |
| considered the ingredients of Section 34 and relying | |
| on the Privy Council judgment in Mahbub Shah v. | |
| King Emperor [Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor, 1945 | |
| SCC OnLine PC 5 : (1944-45) 72 IA 148 : AIR 1945 | |
| PC 118] laid down the following in paras 31 to 33: | |
| (Pandurang case [Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, | |
| AIR 1955 SC 216 : 1955 Cri LJ 572] , AIR pp. 221- | |
| 22) | |
CRL.A. 778/2019 & other connected matters Page 62 of 67
| “31. As we have just said, the witnesses arrived at | |
|---|
| a time when the beating was already in progress. | |
| They knew nothing about what went before. We | |
| are not satisfied that Tukaram is proved to have | |
| done anything except be present, and even if it he | |
| accepted that Nilia aimed a blow at Ramchander's | |
| thigh he was so half-hearted about it that it did | |
| not even hit him; and in Pandurang's case, though | |
| armed with a lethal weapon, he did no more than | |
| inflict a comparatively light head injury. It is true | |
| they all ran away when the eyewitnesses arrived | |
| and later absconded, but there is nothing to | |
| indicate that they ran away together as a body, | |
| or that they met afterwards. Rasikabai says that | |
| the “accused” raised their axes and sticks and | |
| threatened her when she called out to them, but | |
| that again is an all-embracing statement which we | |
| are not prepared to take literally in the absence of | |
| further particulars. People do not ordinarily act | |
| in unison like a Greek chorus and, quite apart | |
| from dishonesty, this is a favourite device with | |
| witnesses who are either not mentally alert or are | |
| mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking. | |
| They are often apt to say “all” even when they | |
| only saw “some” because they are too lazy, | |
| mentally, to differentiate. Unless therefore a | |
| witness particularises when there are a number | |
| of accused it is ordinarily unsafe to accept | |
| omnibus inclusions like this at their face value. | |
| We are unable to deduce any prior arrangement | |
| to murder from these facts. | |
32. Now in the case of Section 34 we think it is
well established that a common intention
presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-
arranged plan because before a man can be
vicariously convicted for the criminal act of
another, the act must have been done in
furtherance of the common intention of them
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| all: Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor [Mahbub | |
|---|
| Shah v. King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine PC 5 : | |
| (1944-45) 72 IA 148 : AIR 1945 PC 118] . | |
| Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting | |
| of minds. Several persons can simultaneously | |
| attack a man and each can have the same | |
| intention, namely the intention to kill, and each | |
| can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and | |
| yet none would have the common intention | |
| required by the section because there was no | |
| prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged | |
| plan. In a case like that, each would be | |
| individually liable for whatever injury he caused | |
| but none could be vicariously convicted for the | |
| act of any of the others; and if the prosecution | |
| cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal | |
| one he cannot be convicted of the murder however | |
| clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his | |
| case: Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor | |
| [Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, 1924 | |
| SCC OnLine PC 49 : (1924-25) 52 IA 40] and | |
| Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor [Mahbub Shah v. | |
| King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine PC 5 : (1944- | |
| 45) 72 IA 148 : AIR 1945 PC 118] . As their | |
| Lordships say in the latter case, ‘the partition | |
| which divides their bounds is often very thin: | |
| nevertheless, the distinction is real and | |
| substantial, and if overlooked will result in | |
| miscarriage of justice’. | |
33 . The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long
interval of time required. It could arise and be
formed suddenly, as for example when one man
calls on bystanders to help him kill a given
individual and they, either by their words or
their acts, indicate their assent to him and join
him in the assault. There is then the necessary
meeting of the minds. There is a pre-arranged
plan however hastily formed and rudely
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| conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be | |
|---|
| and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in | |
| the latter Privy Council case, to have the same | |
| intention independently of each other e.g. the | |
| intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to | |
| kill those who oppose. | |
22. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohan
Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174
had again reiterated the ingredients of Section 34.
Constitution Bench has also relied on and approved
the Privy Council judgment in Mehbub Shah Vs.
Emperor (supra) noticing the essential constituents
of vicarious liability under Section 34, Justice
Gajendragadkar speaking for the Bench laid down
following in Paragraph No.13:-
“13…………………………………The essential
constituent of the vicarious criminal liability
prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of
common intention. If the common intention in
question animates the accused persons and if the
said common intention leads to the commission
of the criminal offence charged, each of the
persons sharing the common intention is
constructively liable for the criminal act done by
one of them. Just as the combination of persons
sharing the same common object is one of the
features of an unlawful assembly, so the existence
of a combination of persons sharing the same
common intention is one of the features of Section
34. In some ways the two sections are similar and
in some cases they may overlap. But, nevertheless,
the common intention which is the basis of Section
34 is different from the common object which is
the basis of the composition of an unlawful
assembly. Common intention denotes action-in-
concert and necessarily postulates the existence
of a prearranged plan and that must mean a
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| prior meeting of minds. It would be noticed that | |
|---|
| cases to which Section 34 can be applied disclose | |
| an element of participation in action on the part | |
| of all the accused persons. The acts may be | |
| different; may vary in their character, but they are | |
| all actuated by the same common intention. It is | |
| now well settled that the common intention | |
| required by Section 34 is different from the same | |
| intention or similar intention. As has been | |
| observed by the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah | |
| v. King-Emperor4 common intention within the | |
| meaning of Section 34 implies a pre-arranged | |
| plan, and to convict the accused of an offence | |
| applying the section it should be proved that the | |
| criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the | |
| prearranged plan and that the inference of | |
| common intention should never be reached unless | |
| it is a necessary inference deducible from the | |
| circumstances of the case” | |
(emphasis supplied)
75. Keeping in view the facts of the present case and applying the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is established that
common intention necessitates prior concert which will make the
accused persons responsible for the ultimate criminal act done by
several persons. Further, on the basis of evidence borne out from the
previous part of the judgment, it is substantiated that all the accused
persons in furtherance of their common intention were actively
involved in the commission of the alleged offence. Hence, the
argument raised by learned counsel for the appellants that there was
no common intention under Section 34 IPC among the appellants to
commit the alleged offence holds no ground.
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Conclusion
76. In our view, in the instant facts before us, coupled with the law laid
down by the Apex Court unerringly leads to one conclusion and that is
the guilt of the appellants. Accordingly, in the background of such a
scenario, we are of the view that the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing its case through oral evidence of the eye witnesses, which
were found to be creditworthy and reliable and also consistent with
the medical and scientific evidence, that the appellants in furtherance
of their common intention committed the murder of the deceased.
77. The prosecution having proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt,
we find no infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court
and see no cogent reason to interfere with the same. The conviction of
the appellants under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code is
upheld. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.
78. Appellant/Swarn Kanta is directed to surrender within four weeks
before the Trial Court. Bail Bonds are cancelled and sureties stand
discharged.
79. Copy of the order be communicated to the Trial Court as well as to the
Jail Superintendent, Tihar Jail.
80. Trial Court record be sent back along with a copy of this order.
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J.
MANMOHAN, J.
JANUARY 6, 2020 / SU
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