Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDCTION
2025 INSC 533
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.9580/2025
JHARKHAND URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Exemption Application is allowed.
2. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dated 14.02.2025 in Commercial
Appeal No. 1 of 2025 by which the High Court rejected the Interim
Application No. 11269 of 2024 filed by the petitioner herein under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby declined to
condone the delay of 301 days in filing the main appeal under
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for short, the
“Act, 2015”.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent
herein M/s. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, a Central Government
Company, instituted a civil suit against the petitioners herein for
recovery of Rs. 26,59,34,854/- with interest at the rate of 15.75
per cent per annum calculated quarterly till realization from
12.11.2014 on the basis of the award passed by the MSME Council
Kanpur.
4. In filing the statutory appeal, there was a delay of 301 days
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.04.22
18:16:22 IST
Reason:
as noted above. In such circumstances, the petitioners herein
prayed for condonation of delay. The High Court declined to condone
the delay on the ground that no sufficient cause was assigned by
the petitioners for the purpose of condonation of delay.
Page 1 of 13
5. Mr. Saurabh Kripal, the learned Senior counsel along with Mr.
Zain A. Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners put
forward before us two submissions for our consideration:
(i) According to him the High Court committed a serious error
in dismissing the commercial appeal on the ground of
limitation without considering the true purport of the
provisions of Order XX Rule 1 CPC inserted specially for the
commercial courts.
(ii) The High Court failed to take into consideration an
important question of law that the pronouncement of the
judgment in the open court in accordance with the amended
provisions of Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be the starting point
of limitation unless a free copy of the judgment is provided
to the parties in the manner provided under Order XX Rule 1
CPC. In other words, according to the learned counsel, Order
XX Rule 1 CPC should be construed as mandatory and not
directory in so far as providing a copy of the order.
6. In support of the aforesaid two submissions, Mr. Kripal placed
reliance on two judgments of this Court (i) Housing Board, Haryana
v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others reported in
(1995) 5 SCC 672 and (ii) Sagufa Ahmed and Others. v. Upper Assam
Polywood Products Private Limited and Others reported in (2021) 2
SCC 317.
7. Before we proceed to consider the two submissions canvassed on
behalf of the petitioners as noted above, we must look into few
provisions of the Act, 2015:
(i) The objective of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (the
Principal Act) was speedy resolution of commercial disputes.
The “Commercial disputes” have been defined with an inclusive
definition and it covers almost all disputes arising out of the
commercial activities. The Act provides for a Schedule which
amends certain provisions of CPC. These provisions are
applicable to Commercial Disputes of Specified Value. The Act
has clarified that the provisions of the CPC as amended by the
Act would have an overriding effect over any rules of the High
Court, or the amendments to the CPC made by a State Government.
Page 2 of 13
(ii) Section 16 of the Act, 2015 reads thus:
“16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
its application to commercial disputes.—(1) The
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect
of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand
amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule. (2)
The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in
respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value. (3)
Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional
High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), by the State Government is
in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by
this Act shall prevail.”
(iii)Section 13 of the Act, 2015 provides for appeals. The same
reads thus:
“13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions.—(1) Any person aggrieved by the
judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the level
of a District Judge may appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Court within a period of sixty days from the
date of judgment or order. (1A) Any person aggrieved by
the judgment or order of a Commercial Court at the level
of District Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction
or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a High
Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of
that High Court within a period of sixty days from the
date of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed
by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are
specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act
and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (26 of 1996)
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High
Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a
Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
8. We must now look into Order XX Rule 1 of the CPC:
“1. Judgment when pronounced.—
(1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall
pronounce judgment in an open Court, either at once, or
as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when the
Page 3 of 13
judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the
Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due
notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders:
Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at
once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to
pronounce the judgment within thirty days from the date
on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where
it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the
exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case,
the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of
the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day
beyond sixty days from the date on which the hearing of
the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so
fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
(1) The Commercial Court, Commercial Division, or
Commercial Appellate Division, as the case may be, shall,
within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments,
pronounce judgment and copies thereof shall be issued to
all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
otherwise.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall
be sufficient if the findings of the Court on each issue
and the final order passed in the case are read out and it
shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole
judgment.
(3) The judgment may be pronounced by dictation in open
Court to a shorthand writer if the Judge is specially
empowered by the High Court in this behalf: Provided that,
where the judgment is pronounced by dictation in open
Court, the transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall,
after making such correction therein as may be necessary,
be signed by the judge, bear the date on which it was
pronounced, and form a part of the record.”
9. We need to interpret the expression “pronounced judgment and
copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute
through electronic material or otherwise”. The argument canvassed
on behalf of the petitioners is that the aforesaid expression
should be construed as mandatory and not directory. In other words,
the argument is that the period of limitation would start only
after the copy of the judgment is provided to the party concerned
through any one of the modes as provided in law.
10. We are afraid it is difficult for us to take the view that the
provision referred to above is mandatory. It comes to this that
Page 4 of 13
till the Registry does not provide the copy of the judgment, though
not demanded, the period of limitation would not commence from the
date of the pronouncement of the judgment.
11. Placing reliance on the decision of Housing Board, Haryana
(supra) it has been contended by the appellants herein that where
the rules themselves enjoin a duty of communicating any order or
judgment that has been passed by a court or forum, then in such
cases, the period of limitation prescribed has to be computed from
the date of such communication.
12. In Housing Board, Haryana (supra), the facts germane for our
consideration are that three appeals were filed before the State
consumer commission by the appellants therein. The State consumer
commission dismissed all the three appeals on the ground that those
were barred by limitation. In appeal before this court, the
appellant therein contended that the delay in filing those appeals
was on account of the non-availability of the certified copy of the
decision rendered by the District Forum which was sought to be
challenged. The appellant therein contended that as per Rule 4(10)
of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 all orders of the
District Forum are required to be signed and communicated to the
parties free of charge. However, since the order in question after
being pronounced could not be signed due to non-availability of the
President of the District Forum the certified copy of the order
could not be provided in time. In such circumstances, this Court
held that the period of limitation would begin to run only from the
date on which the copies of the order were made available. The
relevant observations read as under: -
“13. In the present case as laid before the State
Commission the appellant contended that the order was
pronounced by the District Forum in the open court on
22-10-1992, it was not signed and dated as the President
had proceeded on leave soon thereafter and therefore,
neither the reasons on which the said order was based
were known nor a copy thereof was furnished to the
appellant-Board so as to know the reasons and contents
of the order. It was also the case of the appellant that
on an enquiry by the counsel for the appellant-Board he
Page 5 of 13
was informed by the stenographer of the President that
the order would be dictated and typed after the return
of the President and that the copy would be made
available to the parties only on 30-10-1992 under the
signature of the President and the copy was in fact made
available to the counsel for the appellant only on 3-11-
1992. It may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before
the National Commission had filed his own affidavit
affirming these facts which have not been controverted
by the respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in
this Court by Shri K.C. Chug, President, Housing Board
Colony Welfare Association, Kurukshetra on behalf of the
respondents has admitted that “in the present case free
copies were ready with the office on 30-10-1992 which
were collected by the counsel for the answering
respondent on 30-10-1992 whereas the counsel for the
petitioner got the same on 3-11-1992”. From these facts
it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed
and dated by the members of the forum on 30-10-1992.
That being so the period of limitation in view of the
above discussion will commence from the date on which
the copies of the order were ready and made available
i.e. 30-10-1992. In the present case the appeals were
filed before the State Commission on 30-11-1992 and
since 29-11-1992 was Sunday, the appeals were prima
facie within time. In these facts and circumstances
there was no question of making any application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeals as there was
no delay at all.”
13. Although in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) this Court had held
that where the provisions enjoin a duty of communicating any order
or judgment that has been pronounced, the limitation for
challenging the same would begin from the date of such
communication, yet the aforesaid observations cannot be construed
devoid of the context in which they were made. A close reading of
the decision would indicate that in the said case, after the
pronouncement of the order, the appellants therein had made active
efforts for procuring the said order, and this is evident from the
fact that few days after the pronouncement, the counsel of the
appellants therein had made inquires as regards the unavailability
of the order in response to which he was informed that the order
was yet to be signed.
14. Thus, when this Court in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) held
that the limitation for challenging the same would begin from the
Page 6 of 13
date of such communication, the same would be applicable only where
despite best of efforts at the end of the parties in procuring the
order the same could not be obtained and thereby resulting in
unavoidable delay in the filing of appeals. One of the core tenets
of the law of limitation is to enthuse diligence amongst parties as
to their rights. The law of limitation cannot be read in such a
manner whereby parties stop showing any modicum of regard for their
own rights and on the pre-text of untimely communication continue
to litigate without being vigilante themselves.
15. Similarly, we find that the reliance by the appellants on the
decision of Sagufa Ahmed (supra) is also misplaced. In the said
case, this Court while considering Section 421 sub-section (3) of
the Companies Act, 2013 held that the period of limitation
prescribed therein would start running only from the date on which
a copy of the order is made available to the person aggrieved.
However, yet again in the said case, the appellants therein had
made some efforts to procure a certified copy of the order to be
assailed during the period of limitation.
16. In the present case we find that after the order in question
came to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the
appellants herein during the limitation period did not bother to
even inquire as to why the said order was not available. It was
only eight-months after the pronouncement of the said order and
almost 150-days after the expiry of the limitation period, that the
realization suddenly dawned upon the appellants herein to apply for
the certified copy.
17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial
Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the
Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay
in disposal of the commercial suit. Once specific time lines are
fixed and there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the
Commercial Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice
that they have to very carefully contest the suits filed as
commercial suits and that failing to comply with statutory
Page 7 of 13
timelines and a strict procedure, certain adverse consequences may
flow on account of lack of application by a contesting party.
18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the
commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment that does
not mean that the parties can shirk away all responsibility of
endeavoring to procure the certified copies thereof in their own
capacity. Any such interpretation would result in frustrating the
very fundamental cannons of law of limitation and the salutary
purpose of the Act, 2015 of ensuring timely disposals.
19. At this stage, we must look into some of the relevant findings
recorded by the High Court. The High Court, in para 18 of its
judgment, framed the following question for its consideration. Para
18 reads thus:
“18. The question for consideration is:
“whether the applicants herein can plead that the
period of limitation for filing the appeal to
Commercial Appellate Division of this Court did not
commence at all because the certified copy of the
judgment had not been issued to the applicants by the
Commercial Courts?””
20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the aforesaid
question as under:
“19. In order to answer this question, we cannot lose
sight of the whole purpose of enactment of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., to provide for speedy
disposal of high value commercial dispute.
20. No doubt there was a similar provision in Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was considered by
the Supreme Court in the case of Housing Board, Haryana
(1 supra).
The said provision in the Haryana Consumer Protection
Rules, 1988 also provided for communication of the order
of the District forum to the parties free of charge in
order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties
from the burden of expenses that may he incurred for
obtaining the certified copy.
Page 8 of 13
The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Consumer
Protection Act was to provide for better protection of
the interest of the consumers as a measure for
economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of the
dispute and the matters connected therewith and
therefore, the said rule should be understood in a
manner so that it would protect the interest of the
parties before the District forum by making it
obligatory on the District forum to provide a copy of
the order duly signed and dated by the members of the
Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed with
regard to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the
said Act therefore, has to be computed as commencing
from the date of communication of the order in the
manner laid down in the rules.
It was in that context that it was Held that mere
pronouncement of an order in the open Conn would not be
enough, but under the scheme of the rules copy of the
said judgment has to be communicated to the parties
affected by the said order so that the parties adversely
affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable
opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents
thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the
appellate or before the higher forums. In absence of
such communication of signed and dated order, it was
held that the parties adversely affected by it will have
no means of knowing the contents of the order so to
challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate
authority or by the higher forums.
21. Normally petitioners before the District forums
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are individuals
and not corporate entities like the
appellant/instrumentality of the State. So, there is
justification for taking the view as regards petitioners
in District forums that the provisions in the Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 which mandated
communication of the order of the said forums to the
parties free of charge was to save the parties from the
burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining
the certified copy.
22. We are afraid that the logic behind the provision
contained in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
framed under the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot be
applied to the litigants before the Commercial Court.
For Commercial entities and in particular litigants like
the applicants herein who are the State Government
Undertakings, the expenses of obtaining a certified copy
of a judgment of the Commercial Court would be very
small compared to the stakes involves in the litigation.
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as
Page 9 of 13
a petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the
logic of counting the period of limitation from the date
of communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot
be applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial
entities are parties.
24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and
made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be
treated as only directory and not mandatory. So
notwithstanding the provision contained in the amended
Order XX Rule 1 CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the
parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
otherwise), if such copies are not issued within a
reasonable time, the parties to the dispute have to
apply for the same, and after obtaining it, prefer an
appeal within the time prescribed in Section 13(1-A) of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value
commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an
interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and
object of the Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any
interpretation of the nature advanced by the counsel for
the applicants would defeat the whole purpose of the
object of the Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to provide for
speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes.
26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel
for the applicants that the period of limitation for
filing the appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division
of the High Court would not commence unless the judgment
of the Commercial Court in the Commercial suit was
communicated by the said Commercial Court to the
parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days
in filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in
exercise of power conferred on this Court under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 fell for consideration of
the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (2
supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment in
Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the
statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and
may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to
why they should not be strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under
Page 10 of 13
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in
the context of the object of speedy resolution of the
dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object
sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes,
expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal
provision itself; and that the expression "sufficient
cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in
exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 a delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date
on which the appeal could have been filed can be
condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date of
pronouncement of the judgment) by invoking Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, but where there is negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides, such power ought not to
be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely
because the Government is involved, a different
yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down.
(This rule would thus apply equally to instrumentalities
of Government like the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause
has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is
no right in the applicants or the appellants to have the
delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration An and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals pled under section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A)of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days.
respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and
not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has
otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner,
a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion
of the court, he condoned, always bearing in mind that
the other side of the picture is that the opposite party
may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or
laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra
Page 11 of 13
(2 supra) permitted condonation of delay beyond 60 days
in a case falling under the Commercial Courts Act only
by way of exception and not by way of rule. If the
applicants for condonation of delay had not acted bona
fide and had acted in a negligent manner as in the
instant case, the delay is not liable to be condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal
is 301 days – way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days
permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be
condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay
caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to
be condoned.
32. We may also point out that the applicants were
represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by
counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced in the
presence of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it appears
that the application for issuance of certified copy was
made on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on 07.09.2024, and
the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy of
its judgment to the applicants within the reasonable
time, it was incumbent on the part of the counsel for
the applicants or the employees in the Legal Department
of the applicants to apply for issuance of certified
copy from the Commercial Court, but they have failed in
their duty to apply for it when they did not receive it
within a reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301
days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not
communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal
and for not making any demand of payment in terms of the
decree of the Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of
the counsel engaged by them in not informing the
applicants about the judgment of the Commercial Court.
This is because the applicants have a Legal Department
and employees engaged by the applicants in that
department have a duty to monitor what is happening in
the cases to which the applicants are parties, keep
track of the progress of the said cases and the
decisions therein, and ensure that applications for
issuance of certified copy are made to the concerned
court so that the appeals, if required, can be preferred
within the period of limitation prescribed by law.”
Page 12 of 13
21. We are in complete agreement with the line of reasoning
assigned by the High Court.
22. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
……………………………………….J.
(R.MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI.
15 APRIL, 2025.
Page 13 of 13
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDCTION
2025 INSC 533
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.9580/2025
JHARKHAND URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Exemption Application is allowed.
2. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dated 14.02.2025 in Commercial
Appeal No. 1 of 2025 by which the High Court rejected the Interim
Application No. 11269 of 2024 filed by the petitioner herein under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby declined to
condone the delay of 301 days in filing the main appeal under
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for short, the
“Act, 2015”.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent
herein M/s. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, a Central Government
Company, instituted a civil suit against the petitioners herein for
recovery of Rs. 26,59,34,854/- with interest at the rate of 15.75
per cent per annum calculated quarterly till realization from
12.11.2014 on the basis of the award passed by the MSME Council
Kanpur.
4. In filing the statutory appeal, there was a delay of 301 days
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.04.22
18:16:22 IST
Reason:
as noted above. In such circumstances, the petitioners herein
prayed for condonation of delay. The High Court declined to condone
the delay on the ground that no sufficient cause was assigned by
the petitioners for the purpose of condonation of delay.
Page 1 of 13
5. Mr. Saurabh Kripal, the learned Senior counsel along with Mr.
Zain A. Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners put
forward before us two submissions for our consideration:
(i) According to him the High Court committed a serious error
in dismissing the commercial appeal on the ground of
limitation without considering the true purport of the
provisions of Order XX Rule 1 CPC inserted specially for the
commercial courts.
(ii) The High Court failed to take into consideration an
important question of law that the pronouncement of the
judgment in the open court in accordance with the amended
provisions of Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be the starting point
of limitation unless a free copy of the judgment is provided
to the parties in the manner provided under Order XX Rule 1
CPC. In other words, according to the learned counsel, Order
XX Rule 1 CPC should be construed as mandatory and not
directory in so far as providing a copy of the order.
6. In support of the aforesaid two submissions, Mr. Kripal placed
reliance on two judgments of this Court (i) Housing Board, Haryana
v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others reported in
(1995) 5 SCC 672 and (ii) Sagufa Ahmed and Others. v. Upper Assam
Polywood Products Private Limited and Others reported in (2021) 2
SCC 317.
7. Before we proceed to consider the two submissions canvassed on
behalf of the petitioners as noted above, we must look into few
provisions of the Act, 2015:
(i) The objective of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (the
Principal Act) was speedy resolution of commercial disputes.
The “Commercial disputes” have been defined with an inclusive
definition and it covers almost all disputes arising out of the
commercial activities. The Act provides for a Schedule which
amends certain provisions of CPC. These provisions are
applicable to Commercial Disputes of Specified Value. The Act
has clarified that the provisions of the CPC as amended by the
Act would have an overriding effect over any rules of the High
Court, or the amendments to the CPC made by a State Government.
Page 2 of 13
(ii) Section 16 of the Act, 2015 reads thus:
“16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
its application to commercial disputes.—(1) The
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect
of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand
amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule. (2)
The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in
respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value. (3)
Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional
High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), by the State Government is
in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by
this Act shall prevail.”
(iii)Section 13 of the Act, 2015 provides for appeals. The same
reads thus:
“13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions.—(1) Any person aggrieved by the
judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the level
of a District Judge may appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Court within a period of sixty days from the
date of judgment or order. (1A) Any person aggrieved by
the judgment or order of a Commercial Court at the level
of District Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction
or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a High
Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of
that High Court within a period of sixty days from the
date of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed
by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are
specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act
and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (26 of 1996)
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High
Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a
Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
8. We must now look into Order XX Rule 1 of the CPC:
“1. Judgment when pronounced.—
(1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall
pronounce judgment in an open Court, either at once, or
as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when the
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judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the
Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due
notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders:
Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at
once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to
pronounce the judgment within thirty days from the date
on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where
it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the
exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case,
the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of
the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day
beyond sixty days from the date on which the hearing of
the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so
fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
(1) The Commercial Court, Commercial Division, or
Commercial Appellate Division, as the case may be, shall,
within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments,
pronounce judgment and copies thereof shall be issued to
all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
otherwise.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall
be sufficient if the findings of the Court on each issue
and the final order passed in the case are read out and it
shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole
judgment.
(3) The judgment may be pronounced by dictation in open
Court to a shorthand writer if the Judge is specially
empowered by the High Court in this behalf: Provided that,
where the judgment is pronounced by dictation in open
Court, the transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall,
after making such correction therein as may be necessary,
be signed by the judge, bear the date on which it was
pronounced, and form a part of the record.”
9. We need to interpret the expression “pronounced judgment and
copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute
through electronic material or otherwise”. The argument canvassed
on behalf of the petitioners is that the aforesaid expression
should be construed as mandatory and not directory. In other words,
the argument is that the period of limitation would start only
after the copy of the judgment is provided to the party concerned
through any one of the modes as provided in law.
10. We are afraid it is difficult for us to take the view that the
provision referred to above is mandatory. It comes to this that
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till the Registry does not provide the copy of the judgment, though
not demanded, the period of limitation would not commence from the
date of the pronouncement of the judgment.
11. Placing reliance on the decision of Housing Board, Haryana
(supra) it has been contended by the appellants herein that where
the rules themselves enjoin a duty of communicating any order or
judgment that has been passed by a court or forum, then in such
cases, the period of limitation prescribed has to be computed from
the date of such communication.
12. In Housing Board, Haryana (supra), the facts germane for our
consideration are that three appeals were filed before the State
consumer commission by the appellants therein. The State consumer
commission dismissed all the three appeals on the ground that those
were barred by limitation. In appeal before this court, the
appellant therein contended that the delay in filing those appeals
was on account of the non-availability of the certified copy of the
decision rendered by the District Forum which was sought to be
challenged. The appellant therein contended that as per Rule 4(10)
of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 all orders of the
District Forum are required to be signed and communicated to the
parties free of charge. However, since the order in question after
being pronounced could not be signed due to non-availability of the
President of the District Forum the certified copy of the order
could not be provided in time. In such circumstances, this Court
held that the period of limitation would begin to run only from the
date on which the copies of the order were made available. The
relevant observations read as under: -
“13. In the present case as laid before the State
Commission the appellant contended that the order was
pronounced by the District Forum in the open court on
22-10-1992, it was not signed and dated as the President
had proceeded on leave soon thereafter and therefore,
neither the reasons on which the said order was based
were known nor a copy thereof was furnished to the
appellant-Board so as to know the reasons and contents
of the order. It was also the case of the appellant that
on an enquiry by the counsel for the appellant-Board he
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was informed by the stenographer of the President that
the order would be dictated and typed after the return
of the President and that the copy would be made
available to the parties only on 30-10-1992 under the
signature of the President and the copy was in fact made
available to the counsel for the appellant only on 3-11-
1992. It may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before
the National Commission had filed his own affidavit
affirming these facts which have not been controverted
by the respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in
this Court by Shri K.C. Chug, President, Housing Board
Colony Welfare Association, Kurukshetra on behalf of the
respondents has admitted that “in the present case free
copies were ready with the office on 30-10-1992 which
were collected by the counsel for the answering
respondent on 30-10-1992 whereas the counsel for the
petitioner got the same on 3-11-1992”. From these facts
it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed
and dated by the members of the forum on 30-10-1992.
That being so the period of limitation in view of the
above discussion will commence from the date on which
the copies of the order were ready and made available
i.e. 30-10-1992. In the present case the appeals were
filed before the State Commission on 30-11-1992 and
since 29-11-1992 was Sunday, the appeals were prima
facie within time. In these facts and circumstances
there was no question of making any application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeals as there was
no delay at all.”
13. Although in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) this Court had held
that where the provisions enjoin a duty of communicating any order
or judgment that has been pronounced, the limitation for
challenging the same would begin from the date of such
communication, yet the aforesaid observations cannot be construed
devoid of the context in which they were made. A close reading of
the decision would indicate that in the said case, after the
pronouncement of the order, the appellants therein had made active
efforts for procuring the said order, and this is evident from the
fact that few days after the pronouncement, the counsel of the
appellants therein had made inquires as regards the unavailability
of the order in response to which he was informed that the order
was yet to be signed.
14. Thus, when this Court in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) held
that the limitation for challenging the same would begin from the
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date of such communication, the same would be applicable only where
despite best of efforts at the end of the parties in procuring the
order the same could not be obtained and thereby resulting in
unavoidable delay in the filing of appeals. One of the core tenets
of the law of limitation is to enthuse diligence amongst parties as
to their rights. The law of limitation cannot be read in such a
manner whereby parties stop showing any modicum of regard for their
own rights and on the pre-text of untimely communication continue
to litigate without being vigilante themselves.
15. Similarly, we find that the reliance by the appellants on the
decision of Sagufa Ahmed (supra) is also misplaced. In the said
case, this Court while considering Section 421 sub-section (3) of
the Companies Act, 2013 held that the period of limitation
prescribed therein would start running only from the date on which
a copy of the order is made available to the person aggrieved.
However, yet again in the said case, the appellants therein had
made some efforts to procure a certified copy of the order to be
assailed during the period of limitation.
16. In the present case we find that after the order in question
came to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the
appellants herein during the limitation period did not bother to
even inquire as to why the said order was not available. It was
only eight-months after the pronouncement of the said order and
almost 150-days after the expiry of the limitation period, that the
realization suddenly dawned upon the appellants herein to apply for
the certified copy.
17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial
Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the
Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay
in disposal of the commercial suit. Once specific time lines are
fixed and there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the
Commercial Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice
that they have to very carefully contest the suits filed as
commercial suits and that failing to comply with statutory
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timelines and a strict procedure, certain adverse consequences may
flow on account of lack of application by a contesting party.
18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the
commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment that does
not mean that the parties can shirk away all responsibility of
endeavoring to procure the certified copies thereof in their own
capacity. Any such interpretation would result in frustrating the
very fundamental cannons of law of limitation and the salutary
purpose of the Act, 2015 of ensuring timely disposals.
19. At this stage, we must look into some of the relevant findings
recorded by the High Court. The High Court, in para 18 of its
judgment, framed the following question for its consideration. Para
18 reads thus:
“18. The question for consideration is:
“whether the applicants herein can plead that the
period of limitation for filing the appeal to
Commercial Appellate Division of this Court did not
commence at all because the certified copy of the
judgment had not been issued to the applicants by the
Commercial Courts?””
20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the aforesaid
question as under:
“19. In order to answer this question, we cannot lose
sight of the whole purpose of enactment of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., to provide for speedy
disposal of high value commercial dispute.
20. No doubt there was a similar provision in Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was considered by
the Supreme Court in the case of Housing Board, Haryana
(1 supra).
The said provision in the Haryana Consumer Protection
Rules, 1988 also provided for communication of the order
of the District forum to the parties free of charge in
order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties
from the burden of expenses that may he incurred for
obtaining the certified copy.
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The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Consumer
Protection Act was to provide for better protection of
the interest of the consumers as a measure for
economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of the
dispute and the matters connected therewith and
therefore, the said rule should be understood in a
manner so that it would protect the interest of the
parties before the District forum by making it
obligatory on the District forum to provide a copy of
the order duly signed and dated by the members of the
Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed with
regard to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the
said Act therefore, has to be computed as commencing
from the date of communication of the order in the
manner laid down in the rules.
It was in that context that it was Held that mere
pronouncement of an order in the open Conn would not be
enough, but under the scheme of the rules copy of the
said judgment has to be communicated to the parties
affected by the said order so that the parties adversely
affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable
opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents
thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the
appellate or before the higher forums. In absence of
such communication of signed and dated order, it was
held that the parties adversely affected by it will have
no means of knowing the contents of the order so to
challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate
authority or by the higher forums.
21. Normally petitioners before the District forums
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are individuals
and not corporate entities like the
appellant/instrumentality of the State. So, there is
justification for taking the view as regards petitioners
in District forums that the provisions in the Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 which mandated
communication of the order of the said forums to the
parties free of charge was to save the parties from the
burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining
the certified copy.
22. We are afraid that the logic behind the provision
contained in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
framed under the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot be
applied to the litigants before the Commercial Court.
For Commercial entities and in particular litigants like
the applicants herein who are the State Government
Undertakings, the expenses of obtaining a certified copy
of a judgment of the Commercial Court would be very
small compared to the stakes involves in the litigation.
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as
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a petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the
logic of counting the period of limitation from the date
of communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot
be applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial
entities are parties.
24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and
made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be
treated as only directory and not mandatory. So
notwithstanding the provision contained in the amended
Order XX Rule 1 CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the
parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
otherwise), if such copies are not issued within a
reasonable time, the parties to the dispute have to
apply for the same, and after obtaining it, prefer an
appeal within the time prescribed in Section 13(1-A) of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value
commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an
interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and
object of the Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any
interpretation of the nature advanced by the counsel for
the applicants would defeat the whole purpose of the
object of the Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to provide for
speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes.
26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel
for the applicants that the period of limitation for
filing the appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division
of the High Court would not commence unless the judgment
of the Commercial Court in the Commercial suit was
communicated by the said Commercial Court to the
parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days
in filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in
exercise of power conferred on this Court under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 fell for consideration of
the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (2
supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment in
Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the
statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and
may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to
why they should not be strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under
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Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in
the context of the object of speedy resolution of the
dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object
sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes,
expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal
provision itself; and that the expression "sufficient
cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in
exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 a delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date
on which the appeal could have been filed can be
condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date of
pronouncement of the judgment) by invoking Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, but where there is negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides, such power ought not to
be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely
because the Government is involved, a different
yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down.
(This rule would thus apply equally to instrumentalities
of Government like the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause
has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is
no right in the applicants or the appellants to have the
delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration An and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals pled under section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A)of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days.
respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and
not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has
otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner,
a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion
of the court, he condoned, always bearing in mind that
the other side of the picture is that the opposite party
may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or
laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra
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(2 supra) permitted condonation of delay beyond 60 days
in a case falling under the Commercial Courts Act only
by way of exception and not by way of rule. If the
applicants for condonation of delay had not acted bona
fide and had acted in a negligent manner as in the
instant case, the delay is not liable to be condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal
is 301 days – way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days
permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be
condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay
caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to
be condoned.
32. We may also point out that the applicants were
represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by
counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced in the
presence of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it appears
that the application for issuance of certified copy was
made on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on 07.09.2024, and
the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy of
its judgment to the applicants within the reasonable
time, it was incumbent on the part of the counsel for
the applicants or the employees in the Legal Department
of the applicants to apply for issuance of certified
copy from the Commercial Court, but they have failed in
their duty to apply for it when they did not receive it
within a reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301
days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not
communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal
and for not making any demand of payment in terms of the
decree of the Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of
the counsel engaged by them in not informing the
applicants about the judgment of the Commercial Court.
This is because the applicants have a Legal Department
and employees engaged by the applicants in that
department have a duty to monitor what is happening in
the cases to which the applicants are parties, keep
track of the progress of the said cases and the
decisions therein, and ensure that applications for
issuance of certified copy are made to the concerned
court so that the appeals, if required, can be preferred
within the period of limitation prescribed by law.”
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21. We are in complete agreement with the line of reasoning
assigned by the High Court.
22. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
……………………………………….J.
(R.MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI.
15 APRIL, 2025.
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