Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 338
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2356 OF 2024
YUVRAJ LAXMILAL KANTHER & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated 02.11.2017 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay (briefly ‘the High Court’
hereinafter) in Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017.
2. By the aforesaid judgment and order dated
02.11.2017, the revision application filed by the appellants
assailing the order dated 01.04.2017 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No. 749 of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2025.03.07
17:07:02 IST
Reason:
2014 came to be dismissed.
2.1. Be it stated that by the aforesaid order dated
01.04.2017, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune
dismissed the discharge applications filed by the appellants
being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.
3. Appellants are Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and
Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah.
4. Appellant No. 1 was doing interior decoration of
the concerned shop in Pune on contract basis. Appellant No.
2 was the Store Operation Manager of M/s. lntergold Gems
Private Limited which had taken the concerned shop on lease.
4.1. On 27.09.2013, at about 09:00 PM, the work of
decoration of the front side of the shop was being undertaken
by two employees of appellant No.1, Salauddin Shaikh and
Arun Sharma. It is alleged that both the employees viz.
Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma were provided with an
iron ladder and they were working on the sign board which
was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground
level. While they were working on the sign board, they were
struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted
and fell down. Due to the fall, they suffered head injuries as
2
well as injuries on their arms. They were taken to Pune
Hospital and Research Centre where they were declared dead
on arrival.
4.2. Accidental reports bearing Nos. 67/23 and 68/23
under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC) were registered.
4.3. After more than two months, on 04.12.2013, FIR
was lodged at Vishrambag Police Station, Pune by the Police
Sub-Inspector Shri S.G. Patil against the appellants which
was registered as FIR No. 316/2013. It was stated that the
appellants did not provide any safety equipments like belt,
helmet, rubber shoes etc to the two deceased employees.
According to the investigating officer, the two accused
persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing
safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though the
work assigned to them was quite risky. Informant opined that
both the appellants were responsible for the unnatural death
of the two employees since they had knowledge that there was
risk to the lives of the employees. Therefore, the first
informant summed up by saying that both the accused
3
persons were responsible for the unnatural death of the two
deceased persons. Accordingly, it was alleged that appellants
had committed offences under Sections 304 and 304A IPC.
4.4. On 04.12.2013 itself both the appellants were
arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIR. They were
subsequently released on the same day. After completion of
investigation, police submitted chargesheet in which the two
appellants were arrayed as accused. Appellants were
chargesheeted for committing an offence under Sections
304A/182/201 read with Section 34 IPC.
4.5. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune,
before whom the chargesheet was filed, was of the view that
there were material to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. Since
it became a sessions triable case, the same was committed to
the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune where it was
registered as Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.
5. Appellants filed Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 applications
in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune seeking their
discharge under Section 227 of CrPC.
4
5.1. Contention of the appellants in the discharge
applications was that there were no materials to show that
the appellants had committed the alleged offence. Ingredients
of the alleged offence charged were not even prima facie
established against the appellants. Charge levelled by the
prosecution against the appellants was groundless. FIR was
totally silent about any overt act of the appellants. Appellants
were not present at the place of occurrence when the incident
took place. There was no negligence on the part of the
appellants; not to speak of having any knowledge or intention
to cause the death of the two employees or such bodily injury
as would likely cause their death.
5.2. Even if all the statements of the witnesses were
considered and accepted as correct, the trial would not end
in conviction of the appellants. Going ahead with the trial
would be a futile exercise. There were no materials to show
that appellants had committed the offence as charged. In the
circumstances, appellants sought for discharge as
contemplated under Section 227 of the CrPC.
5
6. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune vide his
order dated 01.04.2017 dismissed both the discharge
applications. He held that the two appellants were certainly
not oblivious of the fact that they had not provided safety gear
to the employees which was certainly dangerous to them as
they got exposed to electrocution risk. Learned Additional
Sessions Judge was also of the view that there was much
force in the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution
that there was sufficient material justifying framing of charge
against the accused for the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC. In that view of the
matter, the discharge applications were dismissed.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, appellants
preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017
before the High Court. After going through the materials on
record and after hearing the parties, High Court was of the
view that there was strong suspicion against both the
appellants for committing the offence for which they were
charged. It could not be said that there were no grounds to
proceed against the appellants. No case for interference was
6
made out. Hence, the revision petition was dismissed vide the
judgment and order dated 02.11.2017.
8. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated
02.11.2017 of the High Court, appellants preferred the
related SLP(Crl.) No. 9928 of 2017. By order dated
09.01.2018, this Court had issued notice and granted stay of
further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014
pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune.
8.1. The matter was heard on 30.04.2024 when leave
was granted. Hence, the appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
both the Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in
rejecting the discharge applications filed by the appellants.
Though the prosecution had submitted chargesheet alleging
commission of offence under Sections 304A/182/201 IPC
read with Section 34 IPC, learned Magistrate while
committing the case to the Court of Sessions concluded that
there was material to invoke Section 304 Part II IPC. Trial
Court took the view that there is sufficient material justifying
framing of charge against the appellants for the offence
7
punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34
IPC. Interestingly, High Court proceeded on the basis that
appellants were accused of committing offences under
Sections 304 and 304A IPC while dismissing the revision
application of the appellants.
9.1. Learned counsel submits that no offence is made
out against the appellants under Section 304 Part II IPC or
even under Section 304A IPC. The two deceased employees of
appellant No. 1 were working on the sign board as part of
cleaning the front side of the shop. It was an accident that
they got electrocuted and fell down because of which they
suffered multiple injuries leading to their death.
9.2. The only reason for filing of chargesheet against
the appellants is that according to the prosecution,
appellants had not provided safety equipments to the two
deceased employees such as rubber shoes, safety belt etc. He
submits that non-furnishing of such equipments would not
make it a criminal offence.
9.3. Adverting to the order of the High Court, learned
counsel submits that the High Court proceeded on the basis
8
that it was expected from a prudent person to have provided
the deceased employees wooden scaffolding instead of an iron
ladder. Therefore, by applying the test of a prudent person,
High Court found shortcomings on the conduct of the
appellants. Therefore, it observed that a strong suspicion
could be inferred against the appellants that they had
knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to
work in the manner in which they did would cause their
death.
9.4. Learned counsel submits that such observations
by the High Court are way off the mark and cannot justify
initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants.
Neither any negligent or rash act was committed by the
appellants nor any specific overt act can be attributed to the
appellants. It was a case of sudden accident.
9.5. Learned counsel also submits that appellants have
paid compensation to the legal heirs of the two deceased
employees to the extent of Rs. 5,91,180.00 (Arun Sharma)
and Rs. 5,20,584.00 (Salauddin Shaikh). Appellant No. 1 has
also provided employment to the brother of the deceased
9
Salauddin Shaikh. That apart, educational expenses of the
children of Arun Sharma have been taken care of by appellant
No. 1.
9.6. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the
appellants submits that there is no material to justify launch
of criminal trial against the appellants. Therefore, the
appellants should be discharged.
10. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent
submits that appellants knew fully well about the risk that
the two deceased employees had to undertake to do the work
assigned to them. Yet the appellants did not provide any
safety equipments to them. The two deceased employees
sustained electric shock and fell down because of which they
suffered multiple injuries causing their death. There is, thus,
a strong prima facie case made out against the appellants.
10.1. Learned counsel submits that there is sufficient
material to justify framing of charge against the appellants
for the offence punishable under Section 302 Part II IPC read
with Section 34 thereof. In any case, police had filed the
charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section
10
304A IPC by the appellants. There are sufficient materials to
substantiate such a charge. In this connection, learned
counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
1
Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P.
10.2. Finally, learned counsel for the respondent
submits that there is no merit in the appeal and, therefore,
the same should be dismissed.
11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties have received the due consideration of the court.
11.1. At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the
relevant legal provisions.
12. We have noted above that the appellants have been
charged for committing offence under Section 304 Part II IPC
read with Section 34 IPC. Since Section 34 IPC covers
common intention, the substantive charge against the
appellants is under Section 304 Part II IPC which reads as
under:
Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder –
1
(1996) 6 SCC 129
11
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting
to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten
years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with
the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but
without any intention to cause death or to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
12.1. The ingredients constituting an offence under
Section 304 Part II IPC are as follows:
(i) he must commit culpable homicide not
amounting to murder;
(ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it
is likely to cause death;
(iii) but such act is done without any intention to
cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.
12.2. Therefore, the first important expression is
‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. Culpable
homicide is defined in Section 299 IPC. It says that whoever
causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing
death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely
by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
12
12.3. All culpable homicides are murders except in the
cases excepted under Section 300 IPC. Thus, except the
cases specifically exempted under Section 300 IPC, all other
acts within the meaning of Section 299 IPC would amount
to committing the offence of culpable homicide. However,
what is important to note is that for committing the offence
of culpable homicide, a positive act must be done by the doer
with the intention that such act would cause death or cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or he having
the knowledge that by such an act, death may be caused.
What, therefore, is significant is that the doer of the act must
have the intention of causing death or the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or has
the knowledge that by doing such an act he is likely to cause
death. Therefore, to commit the offence of culpable
homicide, intention or knowledge is of crucial importance.
12.4. Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC, we find
that the said section would be attracted if anyone commits
culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act is
done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but
without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily
13
injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the requirement
of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the doer must have the
knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or
to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but
without any intention to cause death. Thus, the basic
ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is presence of
knowledge and absence of intention. The doer must have the
knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause
death etc but there should not be any intention to cause
death.
13. This being the legal framework, let us now deal
with the charge against the appellants taking the same as
correct. According to the prosecution and accepted by the
Trial Court and the High Court, the two accused persons
had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety
shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though they were
asked to perform the job of working on the sign board as
part of decorating the front side of the shop which was
approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level.
The accused persons had provided only an iron ladder to the
two employees but while working they were struck by
14
electricity as a result of which they suffered electrocution
and fell down. They suffered multiple injuries which led to
their death. Therefore, both the accused persons were
declared to be responsible for the unnatural death of the two
deceased employees.
14. Even if we take the allegation against the
appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can
be said to have been made out against the appellants for
committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. From
the record of the case, it is evident that there was no
intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death
or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death
of the two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that
the appellants had knowledge that by asking the two
deceased employees to work on the sign board as part of the
work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, they had the
knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of
the two deceased employees. As such, no prima facie case of
culpable homicide can be said to have been made out
against the appellants. If that be so, the subsequent
requirement of having knowledge that the act was likely to
15
cause the death but not having any intention to cause death
would become irrelevant though we may hasten to add that
nothing is discernible from the record of the case that the
appellants had the knowledge that by asking the two
employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their
death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their
death.
15. Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of
offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the
present case.
16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What
Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration
of the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused
and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that
there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the
accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his
reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of
discharge, the court is not required to undertake a
threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the
16
prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is
that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the
accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient
to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the
accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused
may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge, court is only
required to consider as to whether there are sufficient
materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against
the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher
pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial
process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or
the prosecution could not prove the charge against the
accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that
there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial
against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer
an accused.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed
reliance on a decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra
(supra). However, on going through the aforesaid judgment,
we are of the view that facts in Keshub Mahindra and facts
in the present case are poles apart. Keshub Mahindra arose
17
out of the in-famous Bhopal Gas tragedy. A highly
dangerous and toxic gas escaped from a tank in the Bhopal
factory belonging to Union Carbide India Limited. As a result
of such leakage, 3828 human beings lost their lives; 18922
suffered permanent injuries; 7172 suffered temporary
disablement; 1313 suffered temporary disablement caused
by permanent injuries; and permanent partial disablement
was suffered by 2680 persons. While 40 human beings
suffered from permanent total disablement, a total of 2544
animals died. Criminal proceedings were initiated against
the company and officials belonging to the company.
Charges were framed under Sections 304 Part
II/324/326/429 IPC read with Section 35 IPC. Some of the
accused persons challenged such framing of charge before
the High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. However, the High Court
dismissed the criminal revision application whereafter the
matter came up before this Court. In Keshub Mahindra
(supra), this Court upon perusal of the material on record
held that charges under Section 304 Part II, 324, 326 and
429 of IPC were not attracted at all. Framing of such charges
against the concerned accused persons fell short of even
18
prima-facie case. It was observed that mere act of running a
plant as per permission granted by the authorities would not
be a criminal act. This Court held that:
20 . …….Consequently in our view taking the
entire material as aforesaid on its face value and
assuming it to represent the correct factual position
in connection with the operation of the plant at Bhopal
on that fateful night it could not be said that the said
material even prima facie called for framing of a
charge against the accused concerned under Section
304 Part II IPC on the specious plea that the said act
of the accused amounted to culpable homicide only
because the operation of the plant on that night
ultimately resulted in deaths of a number of human
beings and cattle.
17.1. However, considering the gravity of the incident,
this Court exercised power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India and examined the question as to
whether the material led by the prosecution could prima
facie support a charge under Section 304A IPC against the
concerned accused persons. This Court thereafter opined as
under:
22 . ……..It cannot be gainsaid that the voluminous
evidence led by the prosecution in this connection at
least prima facie shows that the accused concerned
19
who operated the plant on that fateful night at Bhopal
could be alleged to be at least guilty of rash and
negligent act in the way this highly volatile substance
MIC was handled by them and which ultimately
escaped in vaporous form and extinguished the lives
of thousands of human beings and animals apart from
causing serious bodily injuries to thousands of others.
However for framing charge under Section 304-A on
the aforesaid material it cannot be said that the said
material even prima facie did not point out the
culpability of the accused concerned in running a
defective plant having a number of operational defects
and in being prima facie guilty of illegal omissions to
take safety measures in running such a limping plant
on that fateful night which resulted into this colossal
tragedy. The aforesaid conclusion of ours, therefore,
would make out a prima facie case against accused 5,
6, 7, 8 and 9 who were in actual charge of running of
the Bhopal Plant and would require them to face the
trial for charge under Section 304-A of the IPC.
17.2. The aforesaid conclusion of this Court and the
consequential directions issued was in exercise of power
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India considering
the gravity and magnitude of the incident.
17.3. In so far facts of the present case is concerned, the
two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking
20
the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part
of the said work, they were working on the sign board which
was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground
level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron
ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck
by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and
fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death.
It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie
case can be said to be made out against the appellants for
committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak
of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only
considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part
II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case
to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the
appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A
IPC.
17.4 Therefore, Keshub Mahindra (supra) can be of no
assistance to the respondent.
18. That being the position and having regard to the
discussions made above, we are of the view that both the
21
Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in rejecting the
discharge applications of the appellants. For the reasons
stated above, the order of the Trial Court dated 01.04.2017
and that of the High Court dated 02.11.2017 are hereby set
aside and quashed. Consequently, the discharge
applications being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case
No. 749 of 2014 are hereby allowed. Appellants are
discharged from Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014.
Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024 is allowed.
………………………………J.
[ABHAY S. OKA]
………………………………J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 07, 2025.
22
2025 INSC 338
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2356 OF 2024
YUVRAJ LAXMILAL KANTHER & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated 02.11.2017 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay (briefly ‘the High Court’
hereinafter) in Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017.
2. By the aforesaid judgment and order dated
02.11.2017, the revision application filed by the appellants
assailing the order dated 01.04.2017 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No. 749 of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2025.03.07
17:07:02 IST
Reason:
2014 came to be dismissed.
2.1. Be it stated that by the aforesaid order dated
01.04.2017, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune
dismissed the discharge applications filed by the appellants
being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.
3. Appellants are Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and
Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah.
4. Appellant No. 1 was doing interior decoration of
the concerned shop in Pune on contract basis. Appellant No.
2 was the Store Operation Manager of M/s. lntergold Gems
Private Limited which had taken the concerned shop on lease.
4.1. On 27.09.2013, at about 09:00 PM, the work of
decoration of the front side of the shop was being undertaken
by two employees of appellant No.1, Salauddin Shaikh and
Arun Sharma. It is alleged that both the employees viz.
Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma were provided with an
iron ladder and they were working on the sign board which
was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground
level. While they were working on the sign board, they were
struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted
and fell down. Due to the fall, they suffered head injuries as
2
well as injuries on their arms. They were taken to Pune
Hospital and Research Centre where they were declared dead
on arrival.
4.2. Accidental reports bearing Nos. 67/23 and 68/23
under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC) were registered.
4.3. After more than two months, on 04.12.2013, FIR
was lodged at Vishrambag Police Station, Pune by the Police
Sub-Inspector Shri S.G. Patil against the appellants which
was registered as FIR No. 316/2013. It was stated that the
appellants did not provide any safety equipments like belt,
helmet, rubber shoes etc to the two deceased employees.
According to the investigating officer, the two accused
persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing
safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though the
work assigned to them was quite risky. Informant opined that
both the appellants were responsible for the unnatural death
of the two employees since they had knowledge that there was
risk to the lives of the employees. Therefore, the first
informant summed up by saying that both the accused
3
persons were responsible for the unnatural death of the two
deceased persons. Accordingly, it was alleged that appellants
had committed offences under Sections 304 and 304A IPC.
4.4. On 04.12.2013 itself both the appellants were
arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIR. They were
subsequently released on the same day. After completion of
investigation, police submitted chargesheet in which the two
appellants were arrayed as accused. Appellants were
chargesheeted for committing an offence under Sections
304A/182/201 read with Section 34 IPC.
4.5. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune,
before whom the chargesheet was filed, was of the view that
there were material to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. Since
it became a sessions triable case, the same was committed to
the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune where it was
registered as Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.
5. Appellants filed Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 applications
in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune seeking their
discharge under Section 227 of CrPC.
4
5.1. Contention of the appellants in the discharge
applications was that there were no materials to show that
the appellants had committed the alleged offence. Ingredients
of the alleged offence charged were not even prima facie
established against the appellants. Charge levelled by the
prosecution against the appellants was groundless. FIR was
totally silent about any overt act of the appellants. Appellants
were not present at the place of occurrence when the incident
took place. There was no negligence on the part of the
appellants; not to speak of having any knowledge or intention
to cause the death of the two employees or such bodily injury
as would likely cause their death.
5.2. Even if all the statements of the witnesses were
considered and accepted as correct, the trial would not end
in conviction of the appellants. Going ahead with the trial
would be a futile exercise. There were no materials to show
that appellants had committed the offence as charged. In the
circumstances, appellants sought for discharge as
contemplated under Section 227 of the CrPC.
5
6. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune vide his
order dated 01.04.2017 dismissed both the discharge
applications. He held that the two appellants were certainly
not oblivious of the fact that they had not provided safety gear
to the employees which was certainly dangerous to them as
they got exposed to electrocution risk. Learned Additional
Sessions Judge was also of the view that there was much
force in the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution
that there was sufficient material justifying framing of charge
against the accused for the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC. In that view of the
matter, the discharge applications were dismissed.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, appellants
preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017
before the High Court. After going through the materials on
record and after hearing the parties, High Court was of the
view that there was strong suspicion against both the
appellants for committing the offence for which they were
charged. It could not be said that there were no grounds to
proceed against the appellants. No case for interference was
6
made out. Hence, the revision petition was dismissed vide the
judgment and order dated 02.11.2017.
8. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated
02.11.2017 of the High Court, appellants preferred the
related SLP(Crl.) No. 9928 of 2017. By order dated
09.01.2018, this Court had issued notice and granted stay of
further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014
pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune.
8.1. The matter was heard on 30.04.2024 when leave
was granted. Hence, the appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
both the Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in
rejecting the discharge applications filed by the appellants.
Though the prosecution had submitted chargesheet alleging
commission of offence under Sections 304A/182/201 IPC
read with Section 34 IPC, learned Magistrate while
committing the case to the Court of Sessions concluded that
there was material to invoke Section 304 Part II IPC. Trial
Court took the view that there is sufficient material justifying
framing of charge against the appellants for the offence
7
punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34
IPC. Interestingly, High Court proceeded on the basis that
appellants were accused of committing offences under
Sections 304 and 304A IPC while dismissing the revision
application of the appellants.
9.1. Learned counsel submits that no offence is made
out against the appellants under Section 304 Part II IPC or
even under Section 304A IPC. The two deceased employees of
appellant No. 1 were working on the sign board as part of
cleaning the front side of the shop. It was an accident that
they got electrocuted and fell down because of which they
suffered multiple injuries leading to their death.
9.2. The only reason for filing of chargesheet against
the appellants is that according to the prosecution,
appellants had not provided safety equipments to the two
deceased employees such as rubber shoes, safety belt etc. He
submits that non-furnishing of such equipments would not
make it a criminal offence.
9.3. Adverting to the order of the High Court, learned
counsel submits that the High Court proceeded on the basis
8
that it was expected from a prudent person to have provided
the deceased employees wooden scaffolding instead of an iron
ladder. Therefore, by applying the test of a prudent person,
High Court found shortcomings on the conduct of the
appellants. Therefore, it observed that a strong suspicion
could be inferred against the appellants that they had
knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to
work in the manner in which they did would cause their
death.
9.4. Learned counsel submits that such observations
by the High Court are way off the mark and cannot justify
initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants.
Neither any negligent or rash act was committed by the
appellants nor any specific overt act can be attributed to the
appellants. It was a case of sudden accident.
9.5. Learned counsel also submits that appellants have
paid compensation to the legal heirs of the two deceased
employees to the extent of Rs. 5,91,180.00 (Arun Sharma)
and Rs. 5,20,584.00 (Salauddin Shaikh). Appellant No. 1 has
also provided employment to the brother of the deceased
9
Salauddin Shaikh. That apart, educational expenses of the
children of Arun Sharma have been taken care of by appellant
No. 1.
9.6. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the
appellants submits that there is no material to justify launch
of criminal trial against the appellants. Therefore, the
appellants should be discharged.
10. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent
submits that appellants knew fully well about the risk that
the two deceased employees had to undertake to do the work
assigned to them. Yet the appellants did not provide any
safety equipments to them. The two deceased employees
sustained electric shock and fell down because of which they
suffered multiple injuries causing their death. There is, thus,
a strong prima facie case made out against the appellants.
10.1. Learned counsel submits that there is sufficient
material to justify framing of charge against the appellants
for the offence punishable under Section 302 Part II IPC read
with Section 34 thereof. In any case, police had filed the
charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section
10
304A IPC by the appellants. There are sufficient materials to
substantiate such a charge. In this connection, learned
counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
1
Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P.
10.2. Finally, learned counsel for the respondent
submits that there is no merit in the appeal and, therefore,
the same should be dismissed.
11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties have received the due consideration of the court.
11.1. At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the
relevant legal provisions.
12. We have noted above that the appellants have been
charged for committing offence under Section 304 Part II IPC
read with Section 34 IPC. Since Section 34 IPC covers
common intention, the substantive charge against the
appellants is under Section 304 Part II IPC which reads as
under:
Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder –
1
(1996) 6 SCC 129
11
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting
to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten
years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with
the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but
without any intention to cause death or to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
12.1. The ingredients constituting an offence under
Section 304 Part II IPC are as follows:
(i) he must commit culpable homicide not
amounting to murder;
(ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it
is likely to cause death;
(iii) but such act is done without any intention to
cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.
12.2. Therefore, the first important expression is
‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. Culpable
homicide is defined in Section 299 IPC. It says that whoever
causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing
death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely
by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
12
12.3. All culpable homicides are murders except in the
cases excepted under Section 300 IPC. Thus, except the
cases specifically exempted under Section 300 IPC, all other
acts within the meaning of Section 299 IPC would amount
to committing the offence of culpable homicide. However,
what is important to note is that for committing the offence
of culpable homicide, a positive act must be done by the doer
with the intention that such act would cause death or cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or he having
the knowledge that by such an act, death may be caused.
What, therefore, is significant is that the doer of the act must
have the intention of causing death or the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or has
the knowledge that by doing such an act he is likely to cause
death. Therefore, to commit the offence of culpable
homicide, intention or knowledge is of crucial importance.
12.4. Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC, we find
that the said section would be attracted if anyone commits
culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act is
done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but
without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily
13
injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the requirement
of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the doer must have the
knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or
to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but
without any intention to cause death. Thus, the basic
ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is presence of
knowledge and absence of intention. The doer must have the
knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause
death etc but there should not be any intention to cause
death.
13. This being the legal framework, let us now deal
with the charge against the appellants taking the same as
correct. According to the prosecution and accepted by the
Trial Court and the High Court, the two accused persons
had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety
shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though they were
asked to perform the job of working on the sign board as
part of decorating the front side of the shop which was
approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level.
The accused persons had provided only an iron ladder to the
two employees but while working they were struck by
14
electricity as a result of which they suffered electrocution
and fell down. They suffered multiple injuries which led to
their death. Therefore, both the accused persons were
declared to be responsible for the unnatural death of the two
deceased employees.
14. Even if we take the allegation against the
appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can
be said to have been made out against the appellants for
committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. From
the record of the case, it is evident that there was no
intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death
or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death
of the two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that
the appellants had knowledge that by asking the two
deceased employees to work on the sign board as part of the
work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, they had the
knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of
the two deceased employees. As such, no prima facie case of
culpable homicide can be said to have been made out
against the appellants. If that be so, the subsequent
requirement of having knowledge that the act was likely to
15
cause the death but not having any intention to cause death
would become irrelevant though we may hasten to add that
nothing is discernible from the record of the case that the
appellants had the knowledge that by asking the two
employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their
death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their
death.
15. Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of
offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the
present case.
16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What
Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration
of the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused
and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that
there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the
accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his
reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of
discharge, the court is not required to undertake a
threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the
16
prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is
that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the
accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient
to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the
accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused
may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge, court is only
required to consider as to whether there are sufficient
materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against
the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher
pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial
process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or
the prosecution could not prove the charge against the
accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that
there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial
against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer
an accused.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed
reliance on a decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra
(supra). However, on going through the aforesaid judgment,
we are of the view that facts in Keshub Mahindra and facts
in the present case are poles apart. Keshub Mahindra arose
17
out of the in-famous Bhopal Gas tragedy. A highly
dangerous and toxic gas escaped from a tank in the Bhopal
factory belonging to Union Carbide India Limited. As a result
of such leakage, 3828 human beings lost their lives; 18922
suffered permanent injuries; 7172 suffered temporary
disablement; 1313 suffered temporary disablement caused
by permanent injuries; and permanent partial disablement
was suffered by 2680 persons. While 40 human beings
suffered from permanent total disablement, a total of 2544
animals died. Criminal proceedings were initiated against
the company and officials belonging to the company.
Charges were framed under Sections 304 Part
II/324/326/429 IPC read with Section 35 IPC. Some of the
accused persons challenged such framing of charge before
the High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. However, the High Court
dismissed the criminal revision application whereafter the
matter came up before this Court. In Keshub Mahindra
(supra), this Court upon perusal of the material on record
held that charges under Section 304 Part II, 324, 326 and
429 of IPC were not attracted at all. Framing of such charges
against the concerned accused persons fell short of even
18
prima-facie case. It was observed that mere act of running a
plant as per permission granted by the authorities would not
be a criminal act. This Court held that:
20 . …….Consequently in our view taking the
entire material as aforesaid on its face value and
assuming it to represent the correct factual position
in connection with the operation of the plant at Bhopal
on that fateful night it could not be said that the said
material even prima facie called for framing of a
charge against the accused concerned under Section
304 Part II IPC on the specious plea that the said act
of the accused amounted to culpable homicide only
because the operation of the plant on that night
ultimately resulted in deaths of a number of human
beings and cattle.
17.1. However, considering the gravity of the incident,
this Court exercised power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India and examined the question as to
whether the material led by the prosecution could prima
facie support a charge under Section 304A IPC against the
concerned accused persons. This Court thereafter opined as
under:
22 . ……..It cannot be gainsaid that the voluminous
evidence led by the prosecution in this connection at
least prima facie shows that the accused concerned
19
who operated the plant on that fateful night at Bhopal
could be alleged to be at least guilty of rash and
negligent act in the way this highly volatile substance
MIC was handled by them and which ultimately
escaped in vaporous form and extinguished the lives
of thousands of human beings and animals apart from
causing serious bodily injuries to thousands of others.
However for framing charge under Section 304-A on
the aforesaid material it cannot be said that the said
material even prima facie did not point out the
culpability of the accused concerned in running a
defective plant having a number of operational defects
and in being prima facie guilty of illegal omissions to
take safety measures in running such a limping plant
on that fateful night which resulted into this colossal
tragedy. The aforesaid conclusion of ours, therefore,
would make out a prima facie case against accused 5,
6, 7, 8 and 9 who were in actual charge of running of
the Bhopal Plant and would require them to face the
trial for charge under Section 304-A of the IPC.
17.2. The aforesaid conclusion of this Court and the
consequential directions issued was in exercise of power
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India considering
the gravity and magnitude of the incident.
17.3. In so far facts of the present case is concerned, the
two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking
20
the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part
of the said work, they were working on the sign board which
was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground
level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron
ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck
by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and
fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death.
It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie
case can be said to be made out against the appellants for
committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak
of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only
considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part
II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case
to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the
appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A
IPC.
17.4 Therefore, Keshub Mahindra (supra) can be of no
assistance to the respondent.
18. That being the position and having regard to the
discussions made above, we are of the view that both the
21
Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in rejecting the
discharge applications of the appellants. For the reasons
stated above, the order of the Trial Court dated 01.04.2017
and that of the High Court dated 02.11.2017 are hereby set
aside and quashed. Consequently, the discharge
applications being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case
No. 749 of 2014 are hereby allowed. Appellants are
discharged from Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014.
Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024 is allowed.
………………………………J.
[ABHAY S. OKA]
………………………………J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 07, 2025.
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