RAM RATAN vs. STATE OF M.P.

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 17-12-2021

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Full Judgment Text

            REPORTABLE                                                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1333 OF 2018  Ram Ratan         .…Appellant(s) Versus State of Madhya Pradesh             ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.S. Bopanna,J. The appellant is before this Court in this appeal 1. assailing the judgment dated 23.02.2017 passed by the High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   Criminal   Appeal Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2021.12.17 16:06:10 IST Reason: No.691/2013   titled   Ram   Ratan   vs.   State   of   Madhya 1 Pradesh. Though the said appeal was disposed of by the High   Court   along   with   the   companion   appeal,   the consideration herein is limited to the case against the appellant herein i.e. Ram Ratan who was arrayed as the first accused before the trial court.  The appeal before the High Court was filed by the 2. appellant,   being   aggrieved   by   the   judgment   dated 31.07.2013 passed by the Special Judge (MPDVPK Act) 1981,   Sheopur   in   Special   Case   No.13/2013   (old   case No.26/2012). Through the said judgment, the trial court has   convicted   the   appellant   along   with   the   other   two accused namely, Chotu and Raju alias Rajendra under Section   392   and   397   of   Indian   Penal   Code   (“IPC”   for short)   read   with   Section   11/13   of   Madhya   Pradesh Dakaiti   Aur   Vyapharan   Pravbhavit   Kshetra   Adhiniyam 1981 Act (“MPDVPK Act, 1981” for short) and sentenced the   appellant     and   other   accused   to   rigorous imprisonment of 7 years with fine of Rs.1000/­, in default of   the   same,   to   undergo   imprisonment   for   a   further 2 period of 4 months. The co­accused Raju alias Rajendra was further convicted and sentenced under Section 25 (1­ B) (a) of Arms Act to one­year rigorous imprisonment with fine   of   Rs.500/­,   in   default   of   the   same,   to   further undergo 2 months rigorous imprisonment. Though all the three accused had filed the respective appeals before the High Court against the said conviction and sentence, the co­accused   Chotu   died   during   the   pendency   of   his appeal, due to which the said appeal abated. As noted above, though the appeal of Raju alias Rajendra was also considered   by   the   High   Court   through   the   common judgment, the present appeal is filed by the appellant alone and as such the conviction and sentence of the appellant   based   on   the   contentions   put­forth   on   his behalf only are adverted to in this judgment. The brief facts are that one, Rajesh Meena lodged a 3. complaint on 27.06.2012, alleging that on the intervening night of 26­27/6/2012, while he was sleeping in the hut constructed   in   the   field   to   guard   the   crops,   at   about 3 02:30 a.m, the appellant along with Raju alias Rajendra and Chotu came to him and woke him up. The said Raju alias   Rajendra   was   having   a   gun   with   him   and   on pointing the same towards the chest of the complainant, demanded   to   part   with   the   money.   The   complainant informed that he did not have any money, due to which the key of his motorcycle was snatched and the said Raju alias Rajendra also took out the mobile phone from the pocket   of   his   shirt.   Thereafter,   all   the   three   accused persons forced the complainant to sit on the motorcycle along with them. When they reached the village Nanawat, the   motorcycle   got   punctured   and   therefore   all   the persons compelled the complainant to get down from the motorcycle and the motorcycle was taken away. By the said time since it was dawn, his uncle named Tulsiram was passing by to milk the buffaloes. The complainant narrated the incident, following which, steps were taken to lodge the complaint. The police having taken action, recovered the motorcycle as also the mobile phone and 4 apprehended the accused. The police on completing the investigation filed the chargesheet against the appellant for   the   offences   under   Sections   392/397   of   IPC   and under Sections 11/13 of MPDVPK Act, 1981.  The trial court framed charges through the order 4. dated 26.02.2013  under  Sections  392/397 of  IPC and Sections   11/13   of   MPDVPK   Act,   1981   against   the appellant and Chotu, while an additional charge under Section   25   (1­B)   (a)/27   of   the   Arms   Act   was   framed against   the   other   co­accused   namely,   Raju   alias Rajendra.   The   appellant   and   his   co­accused   having pleaded not guilty, stood trial in the matter. The trial court having noted the evidence tendered 5. through   PW1   to   PW12,   the   documents   which   were marked and the material objects identified, arrived at its ultimate conclusion. While doing so, the trial court has referred   in   detail   to   the   evidence   tendered   by   the complainant   Rajesh   (PW1)   who   narrated   the   entire incident from the time he was woken up in the midnight 5 and stated about having identified the accused as there was a light burning in the hut. Tulsiram (PW2), uncle of the   complainant   and   Mukesh   (PW3),   brother   of   the complainant   corroborated   the   version   stated   by   the complainant. Dhanpal (PW5), father of the complainant had also stated with regard to the sequence in which he had   come   to   know   about   the   incident   in   the   same sequence as had been stated by PW3. Mahavir (PW4), Ramjilal (PW6) and Dhanjeet (PW7) are the witnesses to the   seizure   of   motorcycle   and   the   gun   respectively. However,   PW6   and   PW7   had   turned   hostile. Chandrabhan Singh (PW8) is the witness who examined the 12­bore gun. A.L. Azad (PW11) is the police officer who arrested the accused and the other witnesses are the procedural official witnesses. The   trial   court   on   analysing   the   said   evidence 6. returned   the   finding   that   the   appellant   and   his   co­ accused had indulged in the incident complained of and therefore held the charge to be proved. The conviction 6 and   the   sentence   were   accordingly   handed   down.   The appellant   and   his   co­accused   while   assailing   the judgment of the trial court, apart from contending that the case has been falsely alleged against them, had also contended   that   the   charge   under   Section   397   of   IPC cannot be sustained. It was their case that the firearm even if was proved to be carried, had not been used and as such the charge under Section 397 IPC would not lie. The High Court having adverted to the matter in detail has   reappreciated   the   evidence   with   regard   to   the incident and accordingly upheld the judgment passed by the trial court convicting the appellant and sentencing him   in   the   manner   as   has   been   done.   The   appellant therefore   claiming   to   be   aggrieved   by   the   judgment passed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court, is assailing the same in this appeal. Heard Mr. Shishir Kumar Saxena, learned counsel 7. for the appellant, Mr. Sunny Choudhary, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the appeal papers. 7 The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   while 8. assailing the judgments would at the outset contend that the complaint lodged by PW1 and the evidence tendered by him are not sufficient to indicate that the appellant is guilty of the charge alleged against him. It is contended that the appellant has been implicated due to political rivalry, though no such incident as alleged had taken place. In addition to the judgments cited before the High Court   and   the   contentions   put­forth   therein,   learned counsel   has   also   relied   on   the   decision   of   this   Court dated 29.10.2021 in     titled Crl. Appeal No.903 of 2021   Ganesan vs. State   Rep. by Station House Officer  and connected appeal  With  i.e Crl. Appeal No.904 of 2021. reference   to   the   said   judgment,   it   is   contended   that firstly, the charge under Section 397 of the IPC would not be sustainable since the gun has not been used and the conviction   can be sustained only if the ‘offender’ uses any deadly weapon while committing robbery. It is contended that even otherwise, the charge under Section 397 IPC 8 would  not be sustainable  against the appellant herein since   there   is   no   serious   allegation   or   proof   of   the appellant   having   used   any   weapon   much   less   deadly weapon even if the incident of robbery which occurred is held to be proved against the appellant. In that view, it is contended that the appellant is liable to be acquitted or in the alternative, even if it is held that the charge under Section 392 IPC is proved, the appellant has undergone sentence   of   nearly   4   years   which   is   sufficient punishment, which aspect be considered by this Court.   The learned counsel for the State would refer to 9. the evidence tendered   before the trial court in detail and has   pointed   out   that   the   trial  court  as   also  the   High Court has taken note of the said evidence. The charge having been proved, both the Courts have arrived at the conclusion   that   the   contention   as   put­forth   by   the appellant   or   his   co­accused   was   not   acceptable.   It   is contended   that   the   motorcycle   and   the   mobile   phone which   had   been   stolen   by   the   accused   had   been 9 recovered and the gun which was used was also seized and examined by the expert. In that circumstance, it is contended that when the expert has opined that the gun was in working condition, the actual use of the firearm by firing   from   it   is   not   required   but  the   exposure   of   the weapon so as to create fear in the mind of the victim is sufficient to prove the charge under Section 397 IPC. It is, therefore, contended that the judgment passed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court does not call for interference. From the evidence as noted by the trial court and 10. the   High   Court,   it   is   seen   at   the   outset   that   the complainant   Rajesh   (PW­1)   has   spoken   in   detail   with regard to the incident which occurred on the intervening night  of  26­27/6/2012.  The  manner   in which  he  was woken up by the accused and the demand for money that was made by brandishing the firearm has been narrated in   detail.   The   identification   of   the   persons   which   was possible due to the light which was on, is also stated. 10 Though lengthy cross­examination has been made, in so far as the incident relating to which PW1 had given the detailed account, has remained intact and has not been discredited.  Insofar  as the  contention put­forth by the learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   he   has   been implicated due to political reasons, there is no material on record. It is no doubt true that as pointed out from the cross­examination contained in paras 27, 28 and 29 of the cross­examination, PW1 has stated that his cousin Ramcharan   is   a   political  leader.   Further,   in  the   same paragraph, though he has stated that all the members of his family advised him that he should file a report against the accused persons and that he had filed the report after getting the said suggestion, it does not indicate that there was any incident of political rivalry due to which the story was created and the complaint was filed. It is only an attempt by the learned counsel to try and connect the unconnected matters.   The cousin being a political leader may be a fact but with regard to the complaint, all that 11 PW1   has   mentioned   is   the   manner   in   which   the complaint was lodged relating to the incident which had taken   place   after   the   suggestion   given   by   the   family members that the law should be set in motion. The same does not take away the gravity of the situation or alter the truth of the matter. Having taken note of the manner in which the trial 11. court has referred to the evidence and the same has been reappreciated   by   the   High   Court,   we   do   not   deem   it necessary to once again go into the evidence of the other witnesses,  having   noted   the  detailed   account   given  by PW1 which would be of substance in this proceeding to answer the relevant contention. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient and convincing to arrive at the conclusion that the incident as narrated by PW1 had occurred and the appellant and his co­accused had committed robbery. Though,   this   remains   the   position,   the   question 12. which   needs   consideration   is   with   regard   to   the contention that the firearm had not been put to use and 12 therefore   the   charge   under   Section   397   IPC   is   not sustainable   and   also   the   further   contention   that   the charge under Section 397 even otherwise would not be sustainable   against   the   appellant   since   there   is   no material or evidence to indicate that the appellant had used the firearm, even if it is held that the incident had occurred as alleged. 13. For better understanding, it would be appropriate  to take note of the provisions contained in Sections 392  and 397 of IPC which read as hereunder:                          “ 392.   Punishment   for   robbery. ­   Whoever commits   robbery   shall   be   punished   with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the highway   between   sunset   and   sunrise,   the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years. 397. Robbery, or dacoity, with attempt to cause   death   or   grievous   hurt. ­   If,   at   the time of committing robbery  or dacoity,   the offender   uses   any   deadly   weapon,   or causes   grievous   hurt   to   any   person ,   or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any   person, the   imprisonment with which such offender  shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.”       (Emphasis supplied) 13 14. On the said aspect, it would be appropriate to take note of the decision in the case of  Shri Phool Kumar vs. Delhi Administration   (1975) 1 SCC 797 wherein it is observed as hereunder: ­ “5. Section 392 of the Penal Code provides: Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable   to   fine;   and,   if   the   robbery   be committed   on   the   highway   between   sunset and   sunrise,   the   imprisonment   may   be extended to fourteen years. The sentence of imprisonment to be awarded under Section 392 cannot be less than seven years if at the time of committing robbery the offender uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any   person   or   attempts   to   cause   death   or grievous   hurt   to   any   person:   vide   Section 397.   A   difficulty   arose   in   several   High Courts   as   to   the   meaning   of   the   word “uses” in Section 397. The term ‘offender’ in that section, as rightly held by several High Courts, is confined to the offender who uses any deadly weapon. The use of a deadly weapon by one offender at the time of   committing   robbery   cannot   attract Section   397   for   the   imposition   of   the minimum punishment on another offender who had not used any deadly weapon.   In that view of the matter use of the gun by one of the culprits whether he was accused Ram Kumar   or   somebody   else,   (surely   one   was there who had fired three shots) could not be and has not been the basis of sentencing the appellant with the aid of Section 397. So far as he is concerned, he is said to be armed with a knife which is also a deadly weapon. 14 To be more precise from the evidence of PW 16 “Phool Kumar had a knife in his hand”. He was therefore carrying a deadly weapon open to the view of the victims sufficient to frighten or terrorize them. Any other overt act, such as,   brandishing   of   the   knife   or   causing   of grievous hurt with it was not necessary to bring the offender within the ambit of Section 397 of the Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. Further,   in   Dilawar   Singh   vs.   State   of   Delhi (2007) 12 SCC 641, it is held as hereunder: ­ “19. The essential ingredients of Section 397 IPC are as follows: 1. the accused committed robbery. 2. while committing robbery or dacoity (i) the accused used deadly weapon  (ii) to cause grievous hurt to any person (iii) attempted to cause death or grievous hurt to any person.  3.   “Offender”   refers   to   only   culprit   who actually used  deadly weapon.  When  only one has used the deadly weapon, others cannot   be   awarded   the   minimum punishment.   It   only   envisages   the individual   liability   and   not   any constructive liability. Section 397 IPC is attracted   only   against   the   particular accused   who  uses  the   deadly  weapon   or does   any   of   the   acts   mentioned   in   the provision. But the other accused are not vicariously   liable   under   that   section   for acts of the co­accused. 21. In the instant case admittedly no injury has   been   inflicted.   The   use   of   weapon   by offender for creating terror in mind of victim 15 is sufficient. It need not be further shown to have been actually used for cutting, stabbing or shooting, as the case may be.”  (Emphasis supplied) I n the decision of     (supra) referred to by 16. Ganesan the learned counsel for the appellant, the above noted decisions of this Court has been referred and this Court has held as hereunder: ­       “12.7. Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions the term ‘offender’ under Section 397 IPC is confined to the ‘offender’ who uses any deadly weapon and use of deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery cannot attract Section   397   IPC   for   the   imposition   of minimum   punishment   on   another   offender who has not used any deadly weapon. Even there   is   distinction   and   difference   between Section 397 and Section 398 IPC. The word used in Section 397 IPC is ‘uses’ any deadly weapon and the word used in Section 398 IPC   is   ‘offender   is   armed   with   any   deadly weapon’.   Therefore,   for   the   purpose   of attracting Section 397 IPC the ‘offender’ who ‘uses’   any   deadly   weapon   Section   397   IPC shall be attracted. In light of the above observations and the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the aforesaid two decisions the case on behalf of the   accused   in   the   present   appeals   is required to be considered. Even as per the case of the prosecution and even considering the evidence on record it can be seen that the present accused A1 and A3 are not alleged to have used any weapon. The allegation of use of   any   weapon   was   against   Benny   and Prabhakaran.   Therefore,   in   absence   of   any allegations of use of any deadly weapon by 16 the appellants herein­ Accused Nos.1 and 3 Section 397 IPC shall not be attracted and to that extent the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­ accused are right in submitting that they ought not to have been convicted   for   the   offence   punishable   under Section 397 IPC.” 17. From   the   position   of   law   as   enunciated   by   this Court and noted above, firstly, it is clear that the use of the weapon to constitute the offence under Section 397 IPC does not require that the ‘offender’ should actually fire from the firearm or actually stab if it is a knife or a dagger but the mere exhibition of the same, brandishing or   holding   it   openly   to   threaten   and   create   fear   or apprehension in the mind of the victim is sufficient. The other   aspect   is   that   if   the   charge   of   committing   the offence is alleged against all the accused and only one among   the   ‘offenders’   had   used   the   firearm   or   deadly weapon, only such of the ‘offender’ who has used the firearm   or  deadly   weapon  alone   would   be  liable  to  be charged under Section 397 IPC.  18. Though the above would be the effect and scope of   Section   397   IPC   as   a   standalone   provision,   the 17 application of the same will arise in the totality of the allegation   and   the   consequent   charge   that   will   be framed and the accused would be tried for such charge. In such circumstance, in the teeth of the offence under Section 397 IPC being applicable to the offender alone, the vicariability of the same will also have to be noted if the charge against the accused under Sections 34, 149 IPC   and   such   other   provisions   of   law,   which   may become relevant, is also invoked along with Section 397 IPC.   In   such   event,   it   will   have   to   be   looked   at differently   in   the   totality   of   the   facts,   evidence   and circumstances involved in that case and the provisions invoked   in   that   particular   case   to   frame   a   charge against the accused. In the instant case, the charge under   Section   34   IPC   was   not   framed   against   the appellant nor was such an allegation raised and proved against   the   appellant.   Hence,   benefit   of   the interpretation raised on the scope of Section 397 IPC to hold   the   aggressor   alone   as   being   guilty,   will   be 18 available   to   the   appellant   if   there   is   no   specific allegation against him.  19. Keeping   this   aspect   in   view,   it   is   necessary   to examine the manner in which PW1 has alleged against the appellant so as to consider whether the appellant is also   an   ‘offender’   who   used   the   firearm   so   as   to   be charged under both, Section 392 and 397 IPC even if he is   complicit   to   the   incident,   more   particularly   when Section 34 IPC has not been invoked in the instant case. Apart from the narration of the incident contained 20. in the FIR, the evidence tendered by the victim Rajesh (PW1) about the incident is as hereunder: ­     “02. On the same night, at the aforesaid time of 2:30 AM, all these three accused persons who are present before me in this Court by names   Raju,   Chotu   and   Gujar   approached me at which time I was sitting on a temporary watch tower put by me near to the tube well for guarding my cultivation field and a bulb was glowing there. In the illumination of said bulb, I could see and identify them. At that relevant time, I was sleeping there.   Among them   Raju   Gujar   woke   up   me   from   my sleep   and   pointed   the   nozzle   of   the country rifle on my chest and demanded with   me   to   handover   whatever   money   I had   in   my   possession   at   that   relevant 19 moment. I informed Raju Gujar that I do not   have   any   money   with   me.   Still,   he continued to keep the said weapon on my chest itself and again asked me to hand over the keys of my motor cycle.   At that relevant   time,   I   was   having   my   Splendour Honda Motor Cycle.   On being scared by the fear   of   said   Raju   as   well   as   apprehending danger from his arm, I politely handed over the key of the Motorcycle to said Raju Gujar by putting those keys in his hand.  03. At that time in my pocket, my mobile was kept.   It   was   a   Spice­42   Model   branded company   phone.   By   again   putting   the firearm ­ Rifle on my chest he took my mobile by himself by inserting his hands in my pocket and taking out the mobile set from the pocket out.”     (Emphasis supplied) From the extracted portion and more particularly 21. the emphasized portion of the evidence tendered by PW1, his account is specific to the fact that it was Raju Gujar alias Rajendra who had pointed out the firearm to his chest   and   indulged   in   the   act   of   robbing   him   of   his possession namely, the mobile. It is no doubt true that in the further portion of the evidence tendered by PW1 he had referred to all the three accused having forced him to sit   on   the   motorcycle   and   had   taken   him   away.   It   is 20 further stated that after they reached Nanawat village and the tyre of the motorcycle got punctured, he was made to get down from the motorcycle. At this point, it has been stated that the appellant pointed his ‘gun rifle’ at him and made   him   to   step   down   from   the   motorcycle   and   by threatening   him,   had   taken   him   in   the   direction   of Amalada village. Though, he has deposed to that extent, the  fact  of  the   appellant  having   used   another   country made rifle other than the one which was being used by Raju alias Rajendra has not been established. It is no doubt  true,  that  the  appellant  had  participated  in  the offence   of   committing   robbery   since   ultimately   the motorcycle was hidden at a place which was known to the appellant and the property seizure memo indicates that the   motorcycle   was   recovered   at   the   instance   of   the appellant   that   certainly   constitutes   an   offender   under Section 392 IPC. Further, the relevant contents in the FIR reads as 22. hereunder: ­  21 “At about 2:30 in the morning the accused Raju, Co­accused Chotu and Ramratan came to him.   The Raju was having a gun with him   and   forced   him   to   wake   up   and demanded   money   when   the   complainant inform that he does not have any money, therefore   the   Raju   pointed   out   his   gun towards the chest of the complainant and the complainant in its turn handed over the  key  of   the  motorcycle  the   Raju  has also took out the mobile from the pocket of the shirt of the complainant,   thereafter all   three   accused   person   who   is   the complainant to sit on the motorcycle along with   them,   when   they   reached   near   the village Nanawat the motorcycle got punctured and therefore all the three person compelled to   complainant   to   get   down   from   the motorcycle   and   thereafter   they   took   his motorcycle   and   went   away   toward   Aamlda and Morkhudana, then I reached at Aamlda, and all happening narrated to his maternal uncle   Tulsiram,   and   then   his   father   also came   there,   thereafter   I   searched   the motorcycle   but   it   is   not   searched   out therefore   came   to   local   police   station   for lodging   the   report,   and   he   wants   to   take necessary action.”             (Emphasis supplied) 23. Therefore,   if   the   contents   of   the   FIR   and   the evidence tendered by PW1 are taken note of, it would stand established that though all the three accused had taken part in the offence of committing robbery, only one of the accused namely Raju alias Rajendra had used the 22 firearm. The said firearm was seized from the possession of Raju alias Rajendra and from the evidence of A.L. Azad (PW11) it is clear that the accused Raju alias Rajendra had disclosed that the firearm was kept in his house and it   was   recovered   in   the   presence   of   the   witnesses.   In addition, Pritam Singh (PW9) has stated that permission had been sought for prosecuting Raju alias Rajendra with regard to seizure of the 12­bore gun and permission had been granted. Chandrabhan Singh (PW8) in his evidence had stated that he had examined the gun and the same was capable of being fired. His evidence would disclose that only one gun had been seized and examined by him. Further,   based   on   the   said   evidence   it   is   Raju   alias Rajendra   alone   who   has   been   convicted   under   the provisions of the Arms Act. 24. If that be the position, it would stand established and proved beyond doubt that only one of the accused namely Raju alias Rajendra had used the firearm and there   was   neither   any   allegation   apart   from   a   stray 23 sentence  nor  was  such charge of  having  used  firearm proved against the appellant. In that light, if the position of law enunciated by this Court as noticed above is kept in   view,   the   charge   under   Section   397   IPC   can   be fastened on the ‘offender’ who actually uses the firearm. In the instant case, since the facts and the evidence does not indicate that the appellant could be construed as an ‘offender’   who   used   the   firearm,   the   charge   alleged against him and held to be proved by the trial Court as also the High Court under Section 397 IPC and Section 11/13   of   MPDVPK   Act,   1981   cannot   be   sustained. However, the appellant having participated in the offence of   committing   robbery   which   stands   established   with sufficient evidence, the conviction handed down by the trial court and upheld by the High Court under Section 392 IPC is sustainable to that extent. In   view   of   the   above   conclusion,   the   sentence 25. imposed on the appellant needs consideration. Since, we have   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the   charge   under 24 Section 397 and Section 11/13 of MPDVPK, Act, 1981 are not proved against the appellant, the sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment imposed by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court is liable to be set aside, which is accordingly done. Insofar as, the offence proved under Section 392 IPC, the same provides for the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and also to fine. As noted, the motorcycle and the mobile which was stolen have been recovered. However, the appellant having indulged in the offence of robbery, in our opinion, imprisonment of around 3 years would be sufficient punishment. In instant case, it is noticed that the appellant has undergone imprisonment for a period of 3 years 5 months and 1 day as on 10.11.2021, as per the statement filed before this Court. Hence, if the sentence undergone by the appellant is treated as the punishment, it would meet the ends of justice.  In the result, we pass the following order: ­ 26. 25 i) The   judgment   dated   19.10.2012   passed   by the Special Judge, (MPDVPK Act) in Special Case   No.13/2013   (Old   Case   No.26/2012) insofar it has convicted the appellant under Section 397 IPC read with Sections 11/13 of MPDVPK Act, 1981 and upheld by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.691/2013 are set aside to that extent. ii) The conviction of the appellant under Section 392 IPC by the trial court and upheld by the High Court, is sustained. iii) The   sentence   imposed   on   the   appellant   is modified to that of the period of imprisonment undergone by the him till this day. The fine imposed   and   default   sentence   thereof   is retained. (iv) The appellant is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith   if   the   fine   is   paid   and   he   is   not required to be detained in any other case. 26 (v) The appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. (vi) All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.     ….…………………….CJI. (N.V. RAMANA)   ..……………………….J.                                        (A.S. BOPANNA)                  …….……………………J.    (HIMA KOHLI) New Delhi, December 17, 2021  27