Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER CHITTOOR ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, MADRAS (P) LTD. & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT05/09/1980
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KOSHAL, A.D.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 1872 1981 SCR (1) 627
1980 SCC (4) 597
CITATOR INFO :
R 1987 SC1399 (18)
ACT:
Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers
and Goods) Act, 1954, Section 4(1)-Power to make rules under
Section 4(1)-A delegate cannot exercise the same power of
the delegator unless there is special conferment thereof .
Retrospectivity in the rule-making power-Mere fact that
the rules framed by the State Government (delegate) had to
be placed on the table of the Legislature does not
automatically empower the former to make retrospective
rules.
HEADNOTE:
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court
^
HELD: (1) The legislature has no doubt plenary power in
the matter of enactment of statutes and can itself make
retrospective laws subject, of course, to the constitutional
limitations. But it is trite law that a delegate cannot
exercise the same power unless there is special conferment
thereof to be spelled out from the express words of the
delegation or by compelling implication. In the present case
the power under Section 4(2) does not indicate either
alternative. Therefore the authority of the State Government
under the delegation does not empower it to make
retrospective rules. [629 A-B; 630 B]
(2) The mere fact that the rules framed had to be
placed on the table of the legislature was not enough, in
the absence of a wider power in the Section, to enable the
State Government to make retrospective rules. The whole
purpose of laying on the table of the legislature the rules
framed by the State Government is different. [629E]
Hukum Chand v. Union of India, [1973] 1 S.C.R. 896
(902), followed.
Observation: The State Government should have been more
careful in giving effect to the resolution passed by the
legislature and should not have relied upon its delegated
powers which did not carry with it the powers to make
retrospective rules. [629C]
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303
of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1967 of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 138/63,
1256/63 and 1460/63.
A.V.V. Nair for the Appellant.
K. Rajendra Chowdhary for the Respondent.
628
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-We are in complete agreement with the
reasoning and conclusions of the High Court and a brief
statement of the short point that arises for decision and of
the grounds for dismissing the appeal is all that is needed.
The Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act
passed by the Madras legislature in the composite Madras
State was made applicable to Andhra Pradesh when that State
was carved out. There were certain difficulties in the
matter of levy of taxation on vehicles plying on inter-state
routes and the State of Andhra Pradesh thought it fit to
enact its own legislation, which it did in the form of the
Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and
Goods) Act, 1952, Section 4(2) whereof empowered the State
Government to make necessary rules to effectuate the
enactment. Pursuant to this power, certain rules were
framed, of which rule 1 consisted of three sub-rules. On 19-
6-1957 sub-rules (4) and (5) were added to that rule and
sub-rule (5) ran thus:
"The proviso to sub-rule 1 of Rule 1 shall cease
to be operative on and from 1st October, 1955 and the
composition fee calculated with reference to clause (a)
or clause (b) of sub-rule (1) in respect of vehicle
plying on inter State routes lying partly in Madras
State and partly in the Andhra State shall, with effect
from that date be paid in the State where the vehicles
are registered and normally kept."
This sub-rule enabled operators of Motor Vehicles on
inter-state routes lying partly in the Madras State and
partly in the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay the tax duly to
either of these two States. It was, however, deleted along
with sub-rules (3) and (4) on 29th March, 1963 with effect
from 1st April, 1962 and it is the retrospectivity of the
deletion that is challenged before us because the Andhra
Pradesh State sought to collect tax for the period
commencing 1st April, 1962 from the respondent under the Act
above referred to, although he had already paid the same to
the State of Madras. The ground of invalidity was stated to
be that S. 4(1) did not confer on the State Government power
to make rules with retrospective effect.
Thus, the only question which engages our attention is
as to whether S. 4(2) does confer on the delegate, namely,
the State Government, the power to make retrospective rules.
The High Court, after an elaborate discussion on the
jurisprudence of subordinate legislation, came to the
conclusion that no such power was conferred on the State
Government and that consequently the deletion which resulted
in retrospective operation of the liability to payment of
tax was bad in law.
629
The legislature has no doubt a plenary power in the
matter of enactment of statutes and can itself make
retrospective laws subject, of course, to the Constitutional
limitations. But it is trite law that a delegate cannot
exercise the same power unless there is special conferment
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thereof to be spelled out from the express words of the
delegation or by compelling implication. In the present case
the power under s. 4(2) does not indicate either
alternative. The position has been considered by the High
Court at length and there is no need for us to go through
the exercise over again. Indeed, considerable reliance was
placed by learned counsel for the appellant on two
circumstances. He argued that the impugned rule was framed
in pursuance of a dissolution passed by the legislature. The
fact does not have any bearing on the question under
consideration except for us to make the observation that the
State Government should have been more careful in giving
effect to the resolution and should not have relied upon its
delegated power which did not carry with it the power to
make retrospective rules. The second ground pressed before
us by learned counsel for the appellant is that the rules
had to be placed on the table of and approved by the
legislature. This was sufficient indication, in his
submission, for us to infer that retrospectively in the
rule-making power was implicit. We cannot agree. The mere
fact that the rules framed had to be placed on the table of
the legislature was not enough, in the absence of a wider
power in the Section, to enable the State Government to make
retrospective rules. The whole purpose of laying on the
table of the legislature the rules framed by the State
Government is different and the effect of any one of the
three alternative modes of so placing the rules has been
explained by this Court in Hukam Chand v. Union of India,(1)
Mr. Justice Khanna speaking for the Bench observed:
"The fact that the rules framed under the Act have
to be laid before each House of Parliament would not
confer validity on a rule if it is made not in
conformity with Section 40 of the Act. It would appear
from the observations on pages 304 to 306 of the Sixth
Edition of Craies on Statutes Law that there are three
kinds of laying:
(i) Laying without further procedure:
(ii) Laying subject to negative resolution:
(iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution.
The laying referred to in sub-section (3) of
Section 40 is of the second category because the above
sub-section contemplates that the rules would have
effect unless modified or annulled by
630
the House of Parliament. The act of the Central
Government in laying the rules before each House of
Parliament would not, however, prevent the courts from
scrutinising the validity of the rules and holding them
to be ultra vires if on such scrutiny the rules are
found to be beyond the rule making power of the Central
Government."
It is, therefore, plain that the authority of the State
Government under the delegation does not empower it to make
retrospective rules. With this position clarified there is
no surviving submission for appellant’s counsel. The appeal
must be dismissed and we do so with costs (one set).
S.R. Appeal dismissed
631