SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD vs. INSPECTOR GENERAL, CISF

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 7130 OF 2009 SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS INSPECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE & ORS.           ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order th dated   17   July,   2008   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Orissa dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. 2. The   brief   seminal   facts   which   may   be   relevant   for Signature Not Verified consideration  of   the  present   appeal  are   that   while   serving   as Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2019.08.01 16:33:30 IST Reason: Constable in Central Industrial Security Force (in short “CISF”) 1 Unit,   Rourkela   Steel   Plant,   Rourkela,   a   criminal   case   was instituted against the appellant in Plantsite P.S. Case No. 378 of 1992 under Section 25(1) of the Arms Act and he was arrested on th 30   November, 1992 on the allegation that he had provided a country   made   revolver   to   Subash   Chandra   Agarwalla,   who murdered   his   aunt   with   it,   giving   rise   to   Sessions   Trial   No. 188/41 of 1993.  At the same time, for a gross misconduct being committed   by   him   in   discharge   of   his   duties,   disciplinary proceedings   were   initiated   against   him   by   serving   a th Memorandum along with the charge­sheet dated 9   February, 1993 under Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 1969. 3. After holding disciplinary inquiry in terms of the procedure prescribed under the scheme of Rules, 1969, the Inquiry Officer after due compliance of the principles of natural justice, recorded a finding of guilt and the charge against the delinquent appellant stood proved as it reveals from the report of Inquiry(Annexure P­4 th of the paper book) dated 27   April, 1994.   After copy of the inquiry   report   was   made   available   to   the   appellant   and   after affording   him   an   opportunity   of   hearing,   the   Disciplinary Authority   concurred   with   the   finding   recorded   by   the   Inquiry 2 Officer and while upholding the guilt inflicted him with a penalty st of dismissal from service vide Order dated 21  May, 1994.  It may be relevant to note that the Sessions Trial No. 188/41 of 1993 was also proceeded against him and it reveals from the record   that   since   the   material   prosecution   witnesses   stood hostile, he was acquitted by the competent Court of jurisdiction th vide judgment dated 12  September, 1995.   4. Being dissatisfied with the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary   Authority,   the   appellant   preferred   departmental appeal primarily on the ground that since he has been acquitted in the criminal case which is based on the same set of facts and evidence,   the   order   of   dismissal   passed   by   the   Disciplinary Authority is not legally sustainable.  The appeal was rejected by th the appellate authority vide order dated 24   April, 1996 which was further assailed before the Revisional Authority that also met with the fate of its dismissal.   That came to be challenged in a Writ Petition before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.  The High Court of Orissa, on appraisal of   the   material   on   record   and   taking   note   of   the   submission alleged by the appellant of his acquittal in the criminal trial vide 3 th judgment dated 12  September, 1995 still had faced the order of dismissal by the Disciplinary Authority being not sustainable but the   High   Court   after   examining   in   totality   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case,   dismissed   the   writ   petition   vide th judgment  dated 17   July,  2008  which is  a  subject matter of appeal before us. 5. The main thrust of submission of learned counsel for the appellant   is   that   since   both   the   criminal/departmental proceedings were based on same set of facts and evidence, and after   he   has   been   acquitted   by   the   Court   of   competent th jurisdiction   vide   judgment   dated   12   September,   1995,   the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority was under an obligation to give precedence   of   the   judicial   proceedings   and   in   the   given circumstances, inflicting penalty of dismissal from service based on the report of inquiry was not legally sustainable and further submitted that the error has not only been committed by the departmental   authorities   but   also   by   the   High   Court   in   not appreciating the submission made by the appellant in its right earnest and in the given circumstances, the judgment impugned th dated 17  July, 2008 deserves to be interfered by this Court. 4 6. In   support   of   his   submission,   learned   counsel   for   the appellant   has   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court reported in  M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and 1 2   Ors.      and  G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.        7. Per   contra,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents,   on   the other hand, while supporting the finding recorded by the High th Court   under   the   impugned   judgment   dated   17   July,   2008 further submits that the charge in a departmental inquiry and in the   criminal   case   stood   against   the   appellant   were   totally different, in the criminal case he was charged for committing an offence   under   Section   25(1)(a)   of   the   Arms   Act,   while   in   the departmental inquiry, the charge was of a delinquency which he committed   in   discharge   of   his   duties   in   handing   over   an unlicensed fire arm with ammunitions(a country made revolver) concealed in a brief case at the residence of Constable S.P. Patel th on 19   November, 1992 which has facilitated Subash Chandra Agarwalla (accused) in a criminal case against in committing an 1 1999(3) SCC 679 2 2006(5) SCC 446 5 offence under Section 302/392 IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 8. According to the learned counsel, both the allegations are based   on   different   sets   of   facts   and   evidence   having   no   co­ relationship and once the appellant has been held guilty in a disciplinary inquiry has been rightly punished with the penalty of dismissal from service, having no nexus with the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction.   9. Learned counsel further submits that what being urged by the appellant has been examined by the High Court and this being the settled principles of law that in a disciplinary inquiry one has to proceed on the “preponderance of probability” whereas in   the   criminal   case,   the   charge   is   to   be   “proved   beyond reasonable   doubt”   being   based   on   two   sets   of   fundamental principles which has been examined by the High Court in extenso needs no interference by this Court. 10. We  have  heard learned counsel for the parties and  with their assistance perused the material available on record. 6 11. At the outset, it may be apposite to take note of the Article of charge which was imputed against him in the departmental proceedings: ­ “ No : 884481265 Constable Sashi Bhushan Prasad is charged with gross misconduct and serious breach of discipline unbecoming of a member of the armed force in that he handed over an unlicensed fire arm with ammunitions (a country made revolver) concealed in a brief case at the residence of No. 88441220 Constable S.P. Patel on 19.11.92 in the evening by suppressing the fact that the same was used in a case of murder in the same day.” 12. Disciplinary inquiry was held against him under Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 1969 for the gross misconduct and serious breach committed by him in discharge of his official duties in handing over   unlicensed   fire   arm   with   ammunitions   (a   country   made revolver) concealed in a brief case at the residence of Constable th S.P. Patel on 19  November, 1992 and in support of the charge, the statement of PW­5 Smt. Laxmi Patel w/o Constable S.P. Patel was recorded.   In the course of disciplinary inquiry, she had categorically   stated   that   the   appellant   Constable   came   to   her house in the evening and handed over small brief case to her for keeping it in the house.   When she asked the appellant at the time of handing over of the brief case as to what it contained, the 7 appellant replied that it contained clothes.   When her husband came back from duty, she told him of the brief case handed over to her by the appellant for keeping it in the house.  Her husband PW­4   Constable   S.P.   Patel   also   narrated   the   fact   which   was reported by his wife PW­5 Laxmi Patel when he returned back on th 19  November, 1992.   13. There   was   further   allegation   against   him   that   he   had suppressed the fact that the country made revolver was used in the murder case the same day.  After an independent inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer the charge stood proved against him and   it was confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority, after affording him  an  opportunity of  hearing, and  being a serious misconduct on the part of the appellant, which he had committed in discharge of duties, penalty of dismissal was inflicted upon him, after due compliance of the principles of natural justice in terms of the scheme of CISF Rules 1969 and that came to be confirmed   on   rejection   of   his   appeal/revision   by   the Appellate/Revisional Authority and also by the High Court on th dismissal   of   the   writ   petition   vide   judgment   dated   17   July, 2008. 8 14. At the same time, in the criminal case which was instituted against   him,   the   charge   against   the   appellant   was   Accused “ Sashi bhusan Prasad stands charged U/s 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.    ” 15. So far as the charge in the departmental inquiry and the charge   in   the   criminal   case   is   concerned,   indubitably   it   was different having been inquired on an independent set of facts and evidence in a departmental/judicial proceedings.  That apart, the fact which reveal from the judgment of acquittal passed by the th Court of competent jurisdiction dated 12  September, 1995 that Shankar Prasad Patel and his wife Laxmi Patel had appeared in a criminal case as PW­4 and PW­5 and both were declared hostile. Apart from that, the other material witnesses were also declared hostile and that was the reason for which the Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the charge against th him while acquitting him vide judgment dated 12   September, 1995. 9 16. The   facts   noticed   by   us   which   have   been   inquired   in   a disciplinary inquiry and in the judicial proceedings indisputedly are based on different allegations and the set of evidence not based on the same facts and circumstances and in the given situation, the very submission made by the appellant of taking the benefit of acquittal in a judicial proceedings instituted against him on the plea of having nexus with the disciplinary inquiry loses its foundation. 17. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial proceedings and the effect of acquittal by a criminal Court has been examined by a three Judge Bench of this Court in   Depot Manager A.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya 3 .  The relevant para is as under:­   and Others   “…The   purpose   of   departmental   enquiry   and   of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for   violation   of   a   duty,   the   offender   owes   to   the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of   omission   of   public   duty.   The   departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient   that   the   disciplinary   proceedings   are conducted   and   completed   as   expeditiously   as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down 3 1997(2) SCC 699 10 any   guidelines   as   inflexible   rules   in   which   the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would   be   no   bar   to   proceed   simultaneously   with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public ( sic  duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable   under   criminal   law.   When   trial   for criminal   offence   is   conducted   it   should   be   in accordance   with   proof   of   the   offence   as   per   the evidence   defined   under   the   provisions   of   the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates   to   conduct   or   breach   of   duty   of   the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position.  The   enquiry   in   the   departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an   offence   in   criminal   charge.   It   is   seen   that invariably   the   departmental   enquiry   has   to   be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take   its   own   course.  The   nature   of   evidence   in criminal   trial   is   entirely   different   from   the departmental   proceedings.   In   the   former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt   on  the  touchstone  of  human  conduct.  The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also   is   different   from   the   standard   point   of   the Evidence   Act.   The   evidence   required   in   the departmental   enquiry   is   not   regulated   by   the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required   to   be   seen   is   whether   the   departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his   defence   at   the   trial   in   a   criminal   case.   It   is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence 11 under  Sections 304­A and 338, IPC. Under these circumstances,   the   High   Court   was   not   right   in staying the proceedings.”          (Emphasis supplied) 18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in  Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager 4 ,   (PJ),   Indian   Oil   Corporation   Limited,   Haldia   and   Others   this Court held as under: ­ “As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in   force.   The   two   proceedings,   criminal   and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different   fields   and   have   different   objectives. Whereas   the   object   of   criminal   trial   is   to   inflict appropriate   punishment   on   the   offender,   the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating   statement   made   by   the   accused   in certain   circumstances   or   before   certain  officers   is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence   and   procedure   would   not   apply   to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the   degree   of   proof   necessary   to   record   the commission   of   delinquency.   The   rule   relating   to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able   to   prove   the   guilt   of   the   accused   “beyond reasonable   doubt”,   he   cannot   be   convicted   by   a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other 4 2005(7) SCC 764 12 hand,   penalty   can   be   imposed   on   the   delinquent officer   on   a   finding   recorded   on   the   basis   of “preponderance   of   probability”.   Acquittal   of   the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does   not      ipso facto    absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the   appellant   that   since   he   was   acquitted   by   a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”   (Emphasis supplied) 19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down   by   this   Court   and   it   is   fairly   well   settled   that   two proceedings   criminal   and   departmental   are   entirely   different. They   operate   in   different   fields   and   have   different   objectives. Whereas   the   object   of   criminal   trial   is   to   inflict   appropriate punishment on an offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is   to   deal   with   the   delinquent   departmentally   and   to   impose penalty in accordance with the service Rules.  The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree   of   proof   necessary   to   record   the   commission   of delinquency.  Even the rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar.  In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot   be   convicted   by   a   Court   of   law   whereas   in   the 13 departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent on   a   finding   recorded   on   the   basis   of   ‘preponderance   of probability’.  Acquittal by the Court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto absolve the delinquent from   the   liability   under   the   disciplinary   jurisdiction   of   the authority.   This what has been considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment in detail and needs no interference by this Court.   20. The judgment in     (supra) on which M. Paul Anthony case the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where a question arose for consideration as to whether the departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case on the basis of same sets of facts and evidence can be continued simultaneously and this Court answered in para 22 as under:­

14 delinquent   employee   is   of   a   grave   nature   which involves complicated questions  of law  and fact,  it would   be   desirable   to   stay   the   departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. ( iii ) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge­sheet. ( iv ) The factors mentioned at ( ii ) and ( iii ) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact   that   the   departmental   proceedings   cannot   be unduly delayed. ( v ) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is   being   unduly   delayed,   the   departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his   honour   may   be   vindicated   and   in   case   he   is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 21. It may not be of assistance to the appellant in the instant case for the reason that the charge levelled against the appellant in   the   criminal   case   and   departmental   proceedings   of   which detailed reference has been made were on different sets of facts and   evidence   having   no   nexus/co­relationship.     The   kind   of criminal act/delinquency which he had committed in discharge of his duties in the course of employment.   That apart, much 15 before the judgment of the criminal case could be pronounced, the departmental enquiry was concluded and after the Inquiry Officer had held him guilty, he was punished with the penalty of dismissal from service. 22. The   judgment   in   (supra)   on   which   the G.M.   Tank   case learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where this Court had proceeded on the premise that the charges in   the   criminal   case   and   departmental   enquiry   are   grounded upon the same sets of facts and evidence.  This may not be of any assistance   to   the   appellant   as   we   have   observed   that   in   the instant case the charge in the criminal case and departmental enquiry were different having no nexus/co­relationship based on different sets of facts and evidence which has been independently enquired in the disciplinary proceedings and in a criminal trial and acquittal in the criminal proceedings would not absolve the appellant from the liability under the disciplinary proceedings instituted against him in which he had been held guilty and in sequel   thereto   punished   with   the   penalty   of   dismissal   from service.   16 23. It is not the case of the appellant that any error committed in the procedure prescribed under the scheme of Rules 1969 has been violated or opportunity to hearing has not been afforded or the principles of natural justice has been violated, in absence thereof, it is otherwise not open for the Courts to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings under its limited scope of review under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 24. Consequently, in our considered view, the appeal is without substance and is accordingly dismissed.  No costs. 25. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. ………..………………………………J. (N.V. RAMANA) ………..………………………………J. (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) ………………………………………..J. (AJAY RASTOGI) New Delhi August 01, 2019 17 18