Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CHAUBE JAGDISH PRASAD AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GANGA PRASAD CHATURVEDI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
05/12/1958
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
DAS, S.K.
CITATION:
1959 AIR 492 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 733
CITATOR INFO :
R 1970 SC1193 (8)
R 1970 SC1727 (7)
R 1979 SC 404 (23)
ACT:
Revision-Revisional Powers of High Court-jurisdiction of
subordinate court dependent on existence of fact-Erroneous
finding as to such fact-Competence of High Court to
interfere-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), S. 115.
HEADNOTE:
Landlord and Tenant-Accommodation-Agreed monthly rent New
construction-Enhancement of rent-House Allotment Officer’s
findings-Power of the civil courts to interfere U. P.
Templeton Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. 3 of
1947), SS. 2(a)(f) 3A, 5(4), 6.
In 1938 the respondent took on rent from the appellant the
accommodation in dispute on a monthly rent of Rs. 21-4as.
On January 28, 1950, the appellant made an application to
the House Allotment Officer under s. 3A of the U.P.
Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, for an
increase in rent, on the allegation that according to the
instruction of the respondent lie had made a new
construction in January, 1949. The
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Officer considered that the accommodation was not a newly
constructed one as the respondent had been a tenant from
1938, but he increased the rent to Rs. 40 per mensem on the
basis of the building that was added by the new
construction. The appellant thereupon instituted a suit
under s. 5(4) Of the Act for the enhancement of " reasonable
annual rent ". The respondent’s defence inter alia, was that
the new construction was undertaken in order to put up
another storey on the top of the old building, that so far
as the accommodation in his possession was concerned there
was no new construction of accommodation after June 30,
1946, and that, therefore, the suit was not maintainable.
The trial court found that as a result of the new
construction the accommodation had increased and was of the
opinion that the portion of the building which had been
newly replaced must be treated as a new accommodation and
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hence the, court could determine its rent under s. 5(4). In
revision, the High Court held that though the construction
on the upper storey was a new construction, so far as the
accommodation in the occupation of the respondent was
concerned the construction could not be called a new one and
therefore S. 3A of the Act was not applicable. Accordingly
the revision petition was allowed and the suit was
dismissed. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court
it was contended for the appellant that the House Allotment
Officer having decided in his favour the question of the
date of construction which S. 3A of the Act authorised him
to decide, the High Court could not in revision go into the
correctness of the decision ; and, in any case, it was
within the jurisdiction of the trial court to decide the
question of the date of construction and in doing so it
could decide rightly or wrongly, and as the matter was one
of fact the High Court had no power to interfere under s.
115 Of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held:(1) that a wrong decision made by the House Allot-
ment Officer under s. 3A of the Act or an order made by him
in excess of his powers under that section could be
rectified by a suit under S. 5(4) of the Act; and
(2)that the maintainability of the suit brought under s.
3A of the Act depended on the determination of the
jurisdictional fact i.e., date of construction of the
accommodation, whether it was after June 30, 1946, and if
the court wrongly decided that fact and thereby assumed
jurisdiction not vested in it, the High Court had the power
to interfere under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and once it had the power it could determine whether the
question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly
decided.
Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, (1949) L.R. 76
I.A. 131, relied on.
Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income
Tax, (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313; Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu
Religious Endowment Board, Madras, (1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 67
and Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, [1953] S.C.R.
136, considered.
735
Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw and Bros., [1951] S.C.R.
145, distinguished
The relevant provisions of the Act are set out in the judg-
ment.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 153 of 1955.
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and decree dated
August 30, 1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Civil
Revision Application No. 540 of 1951, arising out of the
judgment and decree dated March 31, 1951, of the Court of
the Additional Civil Judge, Mathura, in Suit No. 19 of 1950.
G. C. Mathur, for the appellants.
C. B. Aggarwala and Ganpat Rai, for the respondent.
1958. December 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the
decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad passed
in revision under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The landlord who was the plaintiff in the trial court is the
appellant before us and the tenant who was the defendant is
the respondent.
The facts of this appeal are that in 1938 the respondent
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took on rent the accommodation in dispute which is termed a
’ tal’ on a monthly agreed rent of Rs. 21-4 as. and was
using the same for the purpose of stacking timber. A
portion of it was a covered godown which had three walls and
a kucha roof. On January 28, 1950, the appellant made an
application to the House Allotment Officer under s. 3-A of
the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. III of 1947) (hereinafter termed
the Act) for the fixation of " reasonable annual rent " of
the accommodation in dispute. He therein alleged that in
January 1949 he had " constructed anew " a big godown 80 x
25 x 11 feet according to the instructions of the respondent
and expended a fairly large sum of money on it and was
therefore entitled to a monthly rent of Rs. 165. The House
Allotment Officer fixed on February 18, 1950, the rent at
Rs. 35
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per mensem which on review was raised on May 25, 1950, to
Rs. 40 per mensem. He held that the accommodation was not a
newly constructed accommodation as the respondent had been a
tenant from 1938. He determined the increase of rent on the
basis of the building that was added by the new
construction. He also held that:
" The cost of land, the floor area of godown and rent of
other similar premises would be irrelevant as all of these
existed before new construction and were included in rent
before new construction ".
The appellant thereupon instituted a suit on the ground of
inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent under s. 5(4) of
the Act alleging that he had constructed the portion of the
accommodation " anew " and put up ferro-concrete roof 80 x
25 feet and that the construction was undertaken at the
request of the respondent who had agreed to pay enhanced
rent but had refused to do so; that although the House
Allotment officer, Mathura, had fixed the rent of the
accommodation at Rs. 35 which wag subsequently raised to Rs.
40 per mensem, the proper rent should not be less than Rs.
115 per mensem and therefore prayed for the enhancement of "
reasonable annual rent ". The defence was that there was no
construction at the request of the respondent but it had
been undertaken in order to put up another storey on the top
of the old building; that as far as the accommodation in
possession of the respondent was concerned there was no new
construction of accommodation after June 30, 1946; that the
ferro-concrete roof had in no way benefited him, on the
other hand the space at his disposal had diminished because
of the number of pillars constructed and the lowering of the
roof. He also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable
under the Act and that no suit could be filed " after the
order of the House Allotment Officer ". The relevant issues
raised were :-
(1)" Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of any
provisions of the Act No. 3 of 1947 ?
(2)Whether the suit after the fixation of rent by the
House Allotment Officer is not maintainable ?
737
(5) What should be the reasonable and proper rent of the
accommodation in suit ? "
The learned Additional Civil Judge found that the suit was
not barred because of the Act; that the suit against the
order of the House Allotment Officer was maintainable; that
newly constructed accommodation on the whole was bigger and
more spacious than the old kacha hall and that the
accommodation had increased and after taking into
consideration the amount spent on the construction be
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increased the " reasonable adequate rent " to Rs. 55-8-0.
Against this decree of the learned Judge the respondent took
a revision to the High Court under s. 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The High Court was of the opinion that if
the accommodation was a new construction erected after June
30, 1946, the suit was maintainable and- the High Court
could not interfere with the finding of the Civil Judge as
to the amount of rent. If on the other hand, the
construction was an old one, the suit did not lie and the
agreed rent would continue to be payable. It also held that
the construction on the upper storey was a new construction
but as far as the accommodation in the occupation of the
respondent was concerned the construction could not be
called new construction and therefore B. 3-A was not
applicable and as no suit lay at the instance of the
landlord to have the agreed rent enhanced, the tenant was
only liable to pay the agreed rent and no more. The
revision petition was therefore allowed and the suit of the
appellant was dismissed.
The main controversy raised between the parties was whether
the High Court could, in revision under S. 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, interfere with this decision of the
trial court. The respective contentions were these: The
appellant contended that it was within the jurisdiction of
the Additional Civil Judge to decide the question of the
date of construction of the accommodation and in doing so he
could decide rightly or wrongly as the matter was within his
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738
jurisdiction and therefore the High Court had no power to
interfere merely because in its opinion the decision was
erroneous. In other words, this question was -merely one of
the facts in issue between the parties unconnected with
jurisdiction. He also contended that the House Allotment
Officer having decided in his favour the question of the
date of construction which s. 3-A of the Act authorises him
to decide, his right to bring the suit was established and
therefore the High Court could not in revision under s. 115,
Code of Civil Procedure, go into the correctness of that
decision. The respondent’s counsel on the other hand
submitted that the decision of the court as to the date of
construction was in this case a jurisdictional fact i.e. a
fact which went to the root of the jurisdiction of the court
because unless the accommodation was held to have been a new
construction made after June 30, 1946, the appellant would
be bound by the agreed rent and would have no right of suit
under s. 5(4) and the court would have no jurisdiction to
entertain the suit. In order to decide the question at
issue, it is necessary at this stage to refer to the scheme
of the Act. The object of the Act was to control letting
and the rents of residential and nonresidential
accommodations.
"Accommodation" was defined in s. 2(a) as follows:
2.(a) "accommodation means residential and non-residential
accommodation in any building or part of the building and
includes...................
" Reasonable annnal rent " is defined in s. 2(f):
2.(f) " Reasonable annual rent in the case of
accommodation constructed before July 1, 1946, means
(1)if it is separately assessed to municipal assessment,
its municipal assessment plus 25 per cent thereon ;
(2)if it is a part only of the accommodation so assessed,
the proportionate amount of the municipal assessment of such
accommodation plus 25 per cent. thereon ;
(3) if it is not assessed to municipal assessment-
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739
(i)but was held by a tenant on rent between April 1, 1942,
and June 30, 1946, fifteen times the rent for the one month
nearest to and after April 1, 1942, and
(ii)if it was not so held on rent, the amount determined
under section 3-A
and in the case of accommodation constructed on or after
July 1, 1946, means the rent determined in accordance with
section 3-A ".
As to how reasonable annual rent of a building was to be
determined was provided for in s. 3-A:
S.3-A " (1) In the case of any accommodation constructed
after June 30, 1946, or falling under subclause (ii) of
clause (3) of sub _ section (f) of section 2, the District
Magistrate may, on the application of the land lord or the
tenant, determine the reasonable annual rent thereof.
(2)In determining the reasonable annual rent under sub-
section (1) the District Magistrate shall take into account-
(a)if the accommodation was constructed after June 30,
1946, the cost of construction and of maintenance and
repairs of the accommodation, its situation and any other
matter, which in the opinion of the District Magistrate, is
material and
(b) if it is accommodation-
(i) falling under clause (2) or sub-clause (1) of clause
(3) of sub-section (f) of section 2, the principles therein
,set forth, and
(ii)falling under sub-clause(1) of clause (3) of subsection
(f) aforesaid, the principles set forth in clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of section 6.
(3)Subject to the result of any suit filed under sub-
section (4) of section 5, the rent fixed by the District
Magistrate under this section shall be the annual reasonable
rent of the accommodation."
" Agreed rent " was defined in s. 5(1) of the Act to
be........................ the rent payable for any ac-
commodation to which this Act applies shall be such as may
be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant."
Section 5(4) of the Act provided:
740
" If the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, claims
that the annual reasonable rent of any accommodation to
which the Act applies is inadequate or excessive, or if the
tenant claims that the agreed rent is higher than the annual
reasonable rent, he may institute a suit for fixation of
rent in the Court of the Munsif having territorial
jurisdiction, if the annual rent claimed or payable is Rs.
500 or less, and in the Court of the Civil Judge having
territorial jurisdiction if it exceeds Rs. 500, provided
that the Court shall not vary the agreed rent unless it is
satisfied that the transaction was unfair, and in the case
of lease for a fixed term made before April 1, 1942, that
the term has expired ".
Section 6 provided for the procedure as follows
(1) " In determining the amount of annual or monthly rent
in any suit under section 5 the court shall take into
account-
(a)in the case of accommodation constructed before July 1,
1946, the pre-war rent, the reasonable annual or monthly
rent, the prevailing rent on the date of the suit for
similar accommodation in the locality, the cost of
maintenance and repairs of such accommodation and any
material circumstances proved by the plaintiff or the
defendant,
(b)in the case of accommodation constructed on or after
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July 1, 1946, the cost of construction and of maintenance
and repairs of accommodation, its situation and any other
circumstance which the court may consider material.
(2)No appeal shall lie from any decree or order of the
Munsiff or the Civil Judge in a suit brought under sub-
section (4) of section 5:
Provided that (except as regards the rate of rent but no
further) the decree or order so passed shall not operate as
res judicata between the parties or their representatives in
interest in any suit or proceedings under any other law
It is not necessary to refer to other sections of the Act.
The Act therefore in the preamble sets out the objects of
the Act. In s. 2(a) it defined the meaning of
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the word accommodation’ to mean residential and non-
residential accommodation in any building or part of the
building and in s. 2(f) it laid down in three parts what the
reasonable annual rent was, one part dealing with
accommodation constructed before July 1, 1946, and assessed
to municipal assessment, the second part with accommodation
so constructed and not assessed to municipal assessment but
held by a tenant between April 1, 1942, and June 30, 1946,
and the third part with accommodation constructed on or
after July 1, 1946, and these last two were to be determined
in accordance with the provisions of s. 3-A which empowered
the District Magistrate to do so. Sub-section (1) of this
section gave power to the District Magistrate to determine
the reasonable annual rent in the case of accommodation
constructed after June 30, 1946, or falling under cl. (ii)
of sub-s. 3 of section 2 (f) i.e. if it was not assessed to
municipal assessment though constructed before July 1, 1946,
and was not held by a tenant between April 1, 1942, and June
30,1946. Subsection 2 of s. 3-A laid down the factors to be
taken into consideration in determining the reasonable
annual rent and under sub-s. 3 the rent so fixed was to be
the annual reasonable rent of the accommodation but this was
subject to the result of a suit filed under s. 5(4).
Therefore under s. 3-A the District Magistrate was entitled
to determine the amount of reasonable annual rent when
either of the two facts on which his power depended was
shown to exist i.e. (1) the accommodation was constructed
after June 30, 1946, or (2) although it existed previously
it was not assessed to municipal assessment and had not been
held by a tenant on rent between April 1, 1942, and June 30,
1946. The District Magistrate’s power to determine the rent
under s. 3-A therefore was not confined to accommodation
constructed after June 30,1946, alone. The rent determined
by the District Magistrate under s. 3-A was the reasonable
annual rent under the Act subject to the result of any suit
filed under sub-s. (4) -of s. 5. A wrong decision by the
District Magistrate under s. 3-A or an order made by him in
excess of his
742
powers under that section could be rectified by a suit under
s. 5(4).
This provision of the Act i.e. s. 5(4) provided for three
classes of suits, one by a landlord that the reasonable
annual rent was inadequate and (2) by the tenant that the
annual rent was excessive and (3) also by the tenant that
the agreed rent was higher than the reasonable annual rent.
Hence under this section the appellant landlord’s right of
suit was restricted to challenging the inadequacy of the
reasonable annual rent but he could not sue for varying the
agreed rent. The appellant in the present case brought his
suit on the around of inadequacy of the reasonable rent as
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determined under s. 3-A and consequently its maintainability
depended on the determination of the jurisdictional fact i.
e. date of its construction, whether it was before or after
June 30, 1946, on the decision of which would depend his
right to bring the suit; because if there was no new
construction, the agreed rent would be operative and the
appellant would have no right of suit under s. 5(4) of the
Act.
Consequently, by wrongly deciding this question the court
would be entertaining a suit by the landlord for enhancement
of the agreed rent and thereby assuming jurisdiction it did
not possess and the landlord would be circumventing the
restriction on his right to sue for enhancement of agreed
rent which the law did not allow.
As the issues raised show the learned Additional Civil Judge
was alive to the fact that the maintainability of the suit
depended on the determination of this question. The
appellant had specifically alleged that the accommodation
had been constructed after June 30, 1946, a fact which was
denied by the respondent. That gave rise to the first two
issues and the learned Civil Judge held:-
" I am therefore of the opinion that portion of the building
in suit which has been newly replaced must be treated as a
new accommodation, and hence this Court can determine its
rent under the provisions of s. 5(4). In view of the fact
that it is a new
743
accommodation no question of agreed rent arises and the
landlord can bring a suit for fixation of rent ".
Two facts therefore stand out clearly in the judgment of the
trial court (1) that it was the existence of a newly
constructed accommodation which gave jurisdiction to the
court to determine its reasonable annual rent and (2) that
as it was a newly constructed accommodation, the question of
agreed rent did not arise.
The High Court, in our view, approached the question quite
correctly when it stated that the question for determination
was whether the accommodation had been constructed before or
after June 30, 1946, and that if it was constructed before
that date the suit was incompetent and if after, the suit
would lie. The contention raised by the appellant in this
Court was that the decision of the trial Court as to whether
the accommodation was constructed before or after July 1,
1946, cannot be challenged in revision in the High Court and
he relied on the following observation of Lord Esher, M. R.,
in the Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the
Income Tax (1):-
" When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to
exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established
by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider, what
powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect
say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to
such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain
things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but
not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to
decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they
exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they
do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have
acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of
things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the
tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the
jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of
facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it
does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When
the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body
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with limited jurisdiction,
(1) (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313, 319.
744
they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give
them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision,
for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two
cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the
formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves
jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist,
because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine
all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary
facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction
depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide,
without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such
exercise of their jurisdiction.
These observations which relate to inferior courts or
tribunals with limited jurisdiction show that there are two
classes of cases dealing with the power of such a tribunal
(1) where the legislature entrusts a tribunal with the
jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine whether
the preliminary state of facts on which the exercise of its
jurisdiction depends exists and (2) where the legislature
confers jurisdiction on such tribunals to proceed in a case
where a certain state of facts exists or is shown to exist.
The difference is that in the former case the tribunal has
power to determine the facts giving it jurisdiction and in
the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of
facts exists. In the present case the appellant asked for a
determination of reasonable annual rent under s. 3-A on the
ground that the accommodation was constructed after June 30,
1946, and the House Allotment Officer therefore had power to
determine the reasonable annual rent.
In order to give jurisdiction to the civil court there bad
to be in existence a reasonable annual rent as defined under
s. 2(f) whether it fell within its first two clauses or was
determined under s. 3-A. The reason. able annual rent could
be varied at the instance of the landlord or the tenant on
the ground of its inadequacy or excess but the landlord
could not. bring a suit to vary the agreed rent nor could
the court entertain such a suit although it was open to the
tenant to do so and the court could at his instance
entertain
745
such a suit. The proceedings before the civil court are not
by way of an appeal from any order under s. 3-A made by the
District Magistrate.
Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, empowers the High
Court, in cases where no appeal lies, to satisfy itself on
three matters:- (a) that the order made by the subordinate
court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one
in which the court ought to exercise its jurisdiction; (e)
that in exercising the jurisdiction the court has not acted
illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law or
with material irregularity that is by committing some error
of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in
that it may have affected the ultimate decision. Per Sir
John Beaumont in Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious
Endowment Board, Madras (1). Therefore if an erroneous
decision of a subordinate court resulted in its exercising
jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise
the jurisdiction so vested or acting with material
irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its
jurisdiction the case for the exercise of powers of revision
by the High Court is made out. In Joy Chand Lal Babu v.
Kamalaksha Chaudhury (2), the subordinate court gave an
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erroneous decision that the loan was a commercial loan and
therefore refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by
law and the Privy Council held that it was open to the High
Court to interfere in revision under s. 115. Sir John
Beaumont said at p. 142:
" There have been a very large number of decisions of Indian
High Courts on s. 115, to many of which their Lordships have
been referred. Some of such decisions prompt the
observation that High Courts have not always appreciated
that although error in a decision of a subordinate court
does not by itself involve that the subordinate court has
acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to
justify interference in revision under sub-s. (c),
nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the
subordinate court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it
by law,
(1)(1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 67, 73.
(2) (1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 131.
94
746
or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for
revision arises under sub-s. (a) or sub.s. (b), and subs.
(c) can be ignored. The cases of Babu Ram v. Munnalal (1)
and Hari Bhikaji v. Naro Vishvanath (2), may be mentioned as
cases in which a subordinate court by its own erroneous
decison (erroneous, that is, in the view of the High Court),
in the one case on a point of limitation and in the other on
a question of res judicata, invested itself with a
jurisdiction which in law it did not possess; and the High
Court held, wrongly their Lordships think, that it had no
power to interfere in revision to prevent such a result. In
the present case their Lordships are of opinion that the
High Court, on the view which it took that the loan was not
a commercial loan, had power to interfere in revision under
sub-s. (b) of s. 115 ".
In Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria (3) both these
judgments of the Privy Council as also the previous
judgments in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (4 )
and Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar (5) were reviewed
and it was held that s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
applies to matters of jurisdiction alone, the irregular
exercise or non exercise of it or the illegal assumption of
it. Thus if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make
the order it made and has not acted in breach of any
provision of law or committed any error of procedure which
is material and may have affected the ultimate decision,
then the High Court has no power to interfere. But if on
the other hand it decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously
and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or
deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of
interference under s. 115 becomes operative.
The appellant also relied on Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K.
Shaw and Bros. (6) where this Court quoted with approval the
observations of Lord Esher in Queen v. Commissioner for
Special Purposes of the Income Tax(7) and The Colonial Bank
of Australia v. Willan where Sir James Co] ville said :-
(1)(1927) I.L.R. 49 All. 454.
(3)[1953] S.C.R. 136.
(5)(1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 261.
(7)(1888) 21 Q B.D. 313, 319.
(2) (1885) I.L.R. 9 Bom. 432.
(4) (1884) L.R. 11 I.A.237.
(6) [1951] S.C.R. 145.
(8) (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 417, 443.
747
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" Accordingly the authorities............... establish that
an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the
subject matter is, if no defect appears on the face of it,
to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein and
that the Court of Queen’s Bench will not on certiorari quash
such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact,
however essential has been erroneously found ".
But these observations can have no application to the
judgment of the Additional Civil Judge whose jurisdiction in
the present case is to be determined by the provisions of s.
5(4) of the Act. And the power of the High Court to correct
questions of jurisdiction is to be found within the four
corners of s. 115. If there is an error which falls within
this section the High Court will have the power to
interfere, not otherwise.
The only question to be decided in the instant case is as to
whether the High Court had correctly interfered under s. 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure with the order of the Civil
Judge. As we have held above, at the instance of the
landlord the suit was only maintainable if it was based on
the inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that
purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was
the date of the construction of the accommodation and if the
court wrongly decided that fact and thereby conferred
jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess, it
exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell
within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Joy
Chandlal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (1). The High Court
had the power to interfere and once it had the power it
could determine whether the question of the date of
construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court
held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the
construction was of a date after June 30, 1946, and
therefore fell within s. 3-A.
In these circumstances the appeal must fail and is dismissed
with costs throughout.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) (1949) L.R- 76 I.A. 131.
748