Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9
PETITIONER:
SMT. SAIYADA MOSSARRAT
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD: BHILLAI STEEL PLANT,BHILLAI (M.P.) & OR
DATE OF JUDGMENT31/10/1988
BENCH:
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
BENCH:
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 406 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 690
1989 SCC (1) 272 JT 1988 (4) 243
1988 SCALE (2)1208
CITATOR INFO :
E&F 1991 SC 855 (48)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 32 and Seventh
Schedule List I Entry 32, 43, 95 and 97--Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971--
Constitutional validity of--Fresh consideration on different
ground.
%
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971: Constitutional validity of Speedy eviction of
unauthorized occupants from property of Union Government in
the State--Necessity for.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence
by the respondent-company. The licence was cancelled on the
allegation that the petitioner had illegally made
encroachment on further land and had illegally raised a
structure on the land granted on licence. Proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner under the Act, and the
competent authority passed an order of eviction. The
Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal, the High Court
dismissed the petitioner’s petition, and this court refused
to grant him special leave. The petitioner then filed a
Civil Suit which was dismissed for default of appearance.
His special leave against this order too was dismissed by
this Court for default of appearance.
In the present petition under Art. 32, the petitioner
has6 challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on
the ground that Parliament does not have the legislative
competence to legislate on the subject.
The Solicitor-General raising a preliminary objection.
It was contended that the Constitution Bench of this Court
had already upheld the constitutionality of the Act, in Hari
Singh v. Military Estate Officer, [ 1973] l SCR 515, relled
upon.
Dismissing the writ petition, it was,
HELD: (1) In the present petition the petitioner has
contended that since the subject matter falls squarely under
PG NO 690
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9
PG NO 691
Entry 18 of List II (State List) and it does not fall under
any Entry under List I or List III, the Parliament has no
competence to legislate in respect of the subject matter.
Since this specific aspect was not debated before the
Constitution Bench, it would not be proper to shut out the
petitioner from raising the plea by recourse to the argument
that the point was concluded in Hari Singh’s case. [695H
696A-B]
(2) The Public Premises Act is concerned with the
eviction of those persons who have no authority in law to
remain in possession of the land belonging to the Union of
India. The unauthorised persons may be squatters, persons
having no rights whatsoever, or persons who were in
occupation by virtue of any agreement but whose right under
the agreement had come to an end. [699F-G]
(3) In order to ascertain under which entry the Act in
question would fall, it is necessary to ascertain what is
the subject matter of legislation applying the ’pitch and
substance’ test. [696C]
(4) The subject matter of the legislation. as pronounced
in Hari Singh’s case, is "providing a speedy procedure for
eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public
premises." [696D]
(5) On an analysis of Entry 32 of List 1 it inter alia
emerges that while the State can legislate in respect of
Union property situated in a State, with regard to such
legislation in respect of the Union property Parliament can
enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging to
the Union of India and the revenue therefrom and in that
event the legislation enacted by Parliament will prevail as
against the law enacted by the State. 1697G-H; 698A]
(6) Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislation
pertaining to the property of the Union of India including
the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from
the property belonging to the Union of India. Once the
conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under Entry
32 of List 1, it is unnecessary to examine the scope of
Entry 18 of List III. [699B-C ]
(7) In so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy
procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public
premises" is concerned, it is not shown that there is any
legislation enacted by the State legislature which deals
with this subject in so far as the property belonging to the
Union of India is concerned. Since there is no such
legislation, the legislation enacted by the Centre under the
PG NO 692
authority of entry 32 of List 1 cannot be successfully
assailed. Even if there was such a legislation, the Act
enacted by the Parliament would prevail. [698B-D]
(8) The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
does not pertain to the subject-matter of providing a speedy
remedy for eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public
premises belonging to the Union of India. It only deals with
eviction of tenants from premises owned by landlords other
than the Government. Therefore, there is no question of the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act prevailing vis-a-
vis the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)
Act. [698G-H: 699A ]
(9) A legislation pertaining to a Government Company
including one pertaining to eviction of trespassers, or
unlawful occupants of properties belonging to Government
Companies can be enacted by the Parliament. Government
Companies are governed by the Indian Companies Act which has
itself been enacted in exercise of the legislative
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9
authority conferred by Entry 43 of the Union List (List 1)
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. [701A-B]
(10) The need to speedily evict trespassers or
unauthorised occupants of such properties is self evident.
The States cannot legislate for such properties in respect
of properties situated in more than one State or Government
companies situated in different states all over India.
Surely, the Parliament, in obeisance of its obligation to
protect and safeguard the national and overall public
interest, can legislate in this respect under the residuary
all-pervasive entry--Entry 97 of the Union List [List 1] of
the Constitution of lndia-which clothes the Parliament with
the requisite legislative authority in regard to "any other
matter not enumerated in List II or List Ill including any
tax not mentioned in either of these lists." The source of
authority can thus in any case be traced to Entry 97 read
with Entry 95 of List I of the Constitution of India. [701C-
D; E]
L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhillai, A.l.R. 1980,
Madhya Pradesh 106 concurred.
Indu Bhushan Bose v. Ram Sundarl, A.1.R. 1970 SC 228.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTlON: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3615
of 1978.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
PG NO 693
Altemesh Rein for the Petitioner.
Milon K. Banerjee, Solicitor General, V.C. Mahajan,
Amlan Ghosh, L.K. Gupta, S.R. Grover and Miss. A. Subhashini
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
THAKKAR, J. A Seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision in
Hari Singh & Ors. v. The Military Estate Officer & Anr.,
[1973] 1 SCR, 515 upholding the constitutionality of the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1971 Act 40 of 1971 Act notwithstanding, the petitioner has
renewed the challenge by way of this petition under Art. 32
of the Constitution of India. Of course the epicentre of the
present challenge has shifted and is now located in the plea
that Parliament does not have the legislative competence to
legislate on the subject of the impugned legislation which
dimension was not in focus in Hari Singh’s case.
The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence
by the Respondents. The licence was cancelled on the
allegation that petitioner had illegally made encroachment
on further land and had illegally raised a structure on the
land granted on licence. The respondent terminated the
licence. Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner
under the Act. The competent authority passed an order of
eviction against the petitioner. Petitioner’s appeal to the
appellate authority under the Act was dismissed. The High
Court also dismissed the petition preferred by the
petitioner. This Court refused to grant special leave and
dismissed petitioner’s Special Leave Petition. Petitioner
even so filed a Civil Suit which came to be dismissed for
default of appearance. Meanwhile the petitioner had
approached this court by way of a Special Leave Petition
against an interlocutory order passed by the Civil Court.
The said special leave petition also came to be dismissed
for default of appearance. And thereafter the present Writ
Petition has been instituted under Art. 32 ot the
Constitution of India. In the petition as originally framed
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9
the constitutionality of the Act was not challenged. The
said challenge was incorporated by amending the petition.
When the matter came up for hearing this Court issued a Rule
Nisi limited to the question of constitutionality of the Act
as is evident from the relevant part of the order extracted
hereinbelow:
Application for amendment allowed. Rule Nisi on the
PG NO 694
question of constitutional validity of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Notice to
the Attorney General and the Union of India ordered."
Thus the only question before the court presently is as
regards the constitutional validity of the Act. The scheme
of the Act as set out in Hari Singh’s case is as under:
"The scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers power on
Estate Officer to issue notice to persons who are in
unauthorised occupation of any public premises to show cause
why an order of eviction should not be made. ’Unauthorised
occupation’ under the Act in relation to any public premises
means the occupation by any person of the Public premises
without authority for such occupation, and includes the
continuance in occupation by any person of the public
premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any
other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy
the premises has expired or has been determined for any
reason whatsoever. ’Premises’ are defined to mean any land
or any building or part of a building and includes the
garden, grounds and outhouses, appertaining to such building
or part of a building and fitting affixed to such building
or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment
thereof. Public premises means any premises belonging to or
taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the
Central Government as enumerated in Section 2(e) of the Act.
The notice to show cause against order of eviction shall
specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is
proposed to be made. The Estate Officers under the Act are
appointed by the Central Government. The Estate Officers are
Gazetted Officers or officers of equivalent rank. ’Corporate
authority’ under the Act means any company or Corporation or
any committee or the Authority as mentioned in the Act. The
Estate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry
under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a
civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while
trying a suit, in respect of matters mentioned in Sec. 8 of
the Act. These matters are summoning and enforcing the
attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
secondly, requiring the discovery and production of
document; and thirdly, any other matter which may be
prescribed. Sec. 10 of the Act provides for finality of
PG NO 695
orders in circumstances mentioned in Sec. tO of the Act
therein."
The learned Solicitor General has raised a preliminary
objection on the threshold. It is contended that the
Constitution Bench in Hari Singh’s case has already
pronounced that the legislature had the legislative
competence to enact the impugned Act. Reliance in this
context is placed-on the following passage from the Majority
Judgment of Ray, J:
"Therefore, a validating law is upheld first by finding
out whether the legislature possesses competence over the
subject matter, and, secondly, whether by validation the
legislature has removed the defect which the courts had
found in previous law.
The legislature had legislative competence to enact the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9
1971 Act. It means that it could legislate on the subject of
providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in
unauthorised occupation of public premises."
(Emphasis added)
Now a perusal of the judgment reveals that the debate
centred on the issue as to whether Sec. 15 of the Act
provided only one procedure for ejectment of all persons in
unauthorised occupation of the public premises or whether
there was the further option to make recourse to the
ordinary law. This court has concluded that Sec. 15 of the
Act provides only one procedure for ejectment of persons in
unauthorised occupation of the premises for public purposes,
unlike Sec. 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land
(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 which was held to be
unconstitutional in Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd., [
L967] 3 SCR 399. Debate did not at all centre around the
issue of legislative competence. While it is true that in
Hari Singh’s case it has in terms been stated that the
concerned legislature, that is to say the Parliament, has
legislative competence to enact the impuged Act, as is
evident from the passage extracted hereinabove, it is
equally true that the legislative competence of the
Parliament to enact the Act does not appear to have been
debated at all before the court as is evident from the
circumstances that there is no discussion whatsoever as to
under which entry of which List the subject matter of the
Act would fall. In the present matter the petitioner has
contended that the subject matter does not fall under any
entry either in List I (union list) or List III (Concurrent
List), but it squarely falls under entry 18 of the List Il,
PG NO 696
that is to say, the State List. It has been argued that
since the subject matter falls squarely under the State List
(List II) and it does not fall under any entry under List I
or List III, the Parliament has no competence to legislate
in respect of the subject matter. Since this specific aspect
was not debated before the Constitution Bench, it would not
be proper to shut out the petitioner from raising the plea
by recourse to the argument that the point was concluded in
Hari Singh’s case regardless of whether the matter was
debated or not. Accordingly we will deal with this point in
the light of the submissions urged before us bearing in mind
that the Constitution Bench has categorically observed that
the Parliament has legislative competence to enact the Act,
albeit in the absence of any debate on this point.
Before turning to the entries in List I, List Il and
List III, with a view to ascertain under which entry the Act
in question would fall, it is necessary to ascertain what is
the subject matter of legislation applying the ’pith and
substance’ test. Now so far as this question is concerned,
the Constitution Bench in Hari Singh’s case has in clear and
unequivocal terms pronounced that the subject matter of the
legislation is "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of
persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises." As
is evident from the passage extracted earlier.
Apart from the name of the Act, the preamble to the Act
itself makes it abundantly clear that the Act is designed to
’provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from the
public premises and for certain incidental matters. The
scheme of the Act also indicates that the central theme of
the legislation is to provide for speedy procedure in order
to evict persons in unauthorised occupation of public
premises. The scheme of the Act shows that apart from the
dictionary of terms and expressions used in the Act, the
vital provisions of the Act pertain to eviction of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9
unauthorised occupants in exercise of powers conferred by
Section 5 after following the procedure under Section 4. The
incidental provisions are: ( 1) with regard to the disposal
of the property left in the public premises by the
unauthorised occupants and (2) recovery of arrears referable
to the point of time prior to the occupation becoming
unauthorised and damages in respect of the period of
unauthorised occupation as provided in Section 7. Section 8
pertains to the incidental powers of summoning witnesses
etc. And Section 9 provides for the appeals. Section l5
excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. There are
similar provisions in regard to incidental and ancillary
matters. It is, therefore, evident that the whole Act
revolves around the issue of eviction of unauthorised
occupants and incidental matters. In any view of the matter
PG NO 697
it is not open to contend that the subject-matter of the
legislation is other than the designing of speedy procedure
for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public
premises and incidental matters in view of the law declared
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Singh’s
case. It is in the light of this perspective that the
question as to under ’which entry’ of ‘which list’ the
subject matter falls, will have to be examined.
It has to be realised that if the subject matter of the
legislation falls under List I, the Union of India will have
jurisdiction to legislate on the subject, having regard to
the mandate embodied in Article 246(1) 1 of the Constitution
of India which provides that the Parliament has exclusive
power to make, laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule. We must,
therefore, address ourselves to the issue as to whether the
subject matter of the legislation falls in any of the
entries in the Union List (List I).
[ "[1] Art. 26(1)--"Notwithstanding anything in clauses
[2] and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in
the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as
the Union List")." ]
A scrutiny of the contents of entry 32 of List I is
essential in this connection. The entry is in the following
terms:
"Property of the Union and the revenue therefrom, but as
regards property situated in a State subject to legislation
by the State, save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise
provides."
On an analysis of the entry, it emerges that:
(1) The Parliament can legislate in respect of property
of the Union and revenue therefrom regardless of whether the
property is situated in Union Territory or in a State.
(2) But as regards the property situated in a State the
property will be subject to legislation made by the State
subject to the rider which follows.
(3) While the State can legislate in respect of Union
property situated in a State, with regard to such
legislation in respect of the Union property Parliament can
enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging to
the Union of India and the revenue therefrom and in that
PG NO 698
event the legislation enacted by the Parliament will prevail
as against the law enacted by the State.
In so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy
procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public
premises" is concerned, it is not shown that there is any
legislation enacted by the State Legislature which deals
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9
with this subject in so far as the property belonging to the
Union of India is concerned. When the challenge to the Act
came up for scrutiny in the Madhya Pradesh High Court in L.
S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai and Ors., A.l.R.
1980 Madhya Pradesh 106 it was not the basis of the
challenge that there was any State legislation in regard to
this subject matter. Nor has it been contended before us
that there is any legislation for eviction of unauthorised
occupants enacted by the State Legislature which deals with
the aforesaid subject matter, or that the properties
belonging to the Union of India are covered of any such
State Act. Since there is no such legislation, the
legislation enacted by the Centre under the authority of
Entry 32 of List I cannot be successfully assailed. What is
more. even if there was such a legislation, the Act enacted
by the Parliament would prevail as per proposition Nos. 2
and 3 which have emerged on the analysis of Entry 32 made a
short while ago. It may be mentioned that in L.S. Nair s
case it was contended before the Madhya Pradesh High Court
that the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1961
would prevail as against the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1971 enacted by the
Parliament inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
Control Act was enacted later. The High Court rightly
repulsed the plea. In the first place, the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act has an altogether different
perspective It is an act for the Regulation and Control of
letting on rent accommodation in respect of tenants as
revealed by the Preamble. In the second place the Act does
not apply to property which is the property of the
Government having regard to the provision contained in
Section 3(1)(a)1. Since the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
Control Act does not apply to the property of the
Government, there is no question of the said Act prevailing
vis-a-vis the Central Act. What is more the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act does not pertain to the subject-
matter of providing a speedy remedy for eviction of
"unauthorised occupants" from public premises belonging to
the Union of India. It deals merely with eviction of tenants
from premises owned by landlords other than the Government
Under the circumstances, there is no question of the Madhya
1. "3. Act not to apply certain accommodation [1]
Nothing in this Act shall apply to-
[a] accommodation which is the property of the
Government:"
PG NO 699
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act prevailing vis-a-vis the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. It
cannot be gain-said that even if both the legislations
pertain to the same subject-matter, the legislation enacted
by the Parliament in regard to the property belonging to
Union of India would prevail having regard to the mandate
contained in Entry 32 as has been discussed earlier. Under
the circumstances it is futile to contend that the
Parliament has no legislative competence to legislate in
respect of providing for a speedy remedy for eviction of
unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the
Union of India. Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all
legislations pertaining to the property of the Union of
India including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised
occupants from the property belonging to the Union of lndia.
Once the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls
under Entry 32, of List I, it is unnecessary to examine the
scope of Entry 18 of List III, pertaining to land that is
to say rights in or over land tenures including the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9
relationship of land-lord-tenant and the collection of
rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land
improvement, agricultural lands and acquisitions. Again, as
explained by this Court in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Ram Sundari
& Anr., A.l.R. 1970 SC 228 "the relation of landlord and
tenant’ as mentioned in this Entry, is with reference to
land tenures which would not appropriately cover tenancy of
buildings or of house accommodation and that the expression
is only used with reference to relationship between Iandlord
and tenant in respect of vacant lands.
At the cost of repetition it may be stated that the pith
and substance’ of the legislation under scrutiny viz. Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1961 is
eviction of unauthorised occupants from properties belonging
to the Union of India and incidental and ancillary matters.
It does not pertain to any matter relating to rights in
relation to landlord and tenants for eviction of tenants
from lands which have been leased. The Public Premises Act
is concerned with the eviction of those persons who have no
authority law to remain in possession of the land belonging
to the Union of India. The unauthorised persons may be
squatters. persons having no rights whatsoever, or persons
who were in occupation by virtue of any agreement but whose
right under the agreement had come to an end Thus, there is
no substance in the contention that the Parliament had no
legislative competence to enact Public Premises Act.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has however urged
an argument in the context of the definition of ’Public
Premises’ as embodied in Section 2(e)( I)(i) of the Act. The
PG NO 700
definition envelops premises belonging to or taken on lease
by or on behalf of any Company as defined in Section 3 of
the Companies Act of 1956 in which not less than 51 per of
the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government. This
contention was raised before the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in L. S. Nair’s case and has been repulsed by the High Court
on the reasoning unfolded in the passage extracted from
paragraph 4 of the judgment:
"The first contention raised by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that the Act in so far as it includes in
the definition of public premises "any premises belonging to
or taken on lease by or on behalf of any company as defined
in S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than
51% of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central
Government," is ultra vires and void, as to that extent the
Act is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. The
argument of the learned counsel is that the Act was enacted
under Entry 32, List I of the VII Schedule to the
Constitution, which relates to "property of the Union and he
revenue therefrom", and that this entry cannot be construed
to include the property of a Government company which is a
different and distinct legal entity from the Union. It may
be conceded that the expression "property of the Union", as
used in Entry 32, List 1, cannot be Construed to include the
property of a Government Company. But if Entry 32 gives
jurisdiction to Parliament to enact the Act in respect of
Government premises, as contended by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, Entry 43 which relates to incorporation,
regulation and winding up of trading jurisdictions read with
Entry 95 which relates to jurisdiction and powers of all
courts except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the
matters in List 1, can be construed to confer power on
Parliament to enact the Act in respect of premises belonging
to a Government company. It seems however, more appropriate
that in so far as the Act deals with a lessee or licensee of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9
premises belonging to a Government company, the subject-
matter of the Act would be covered by Entries 6, 7 and 46 of
List III. These entries broadly deal with transfer of
property, contracts and jurisdiction and powers of Courts
with respect to any of the matters in List III. Taking
either view in our opinion it is not correct to say that the
Act in so far as it relates to premises belonging to a
Government company suffers from want of legislative
competence."
PG NO 701
Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to
show that there is any infirmity in the reasoning of the
High Court. Besides, a legislation pertaining to a
Government Company including one pertaining to eviction of
trespassers, or unlawful occupants of properties belonging
to Government Companies speedily can be enacted by the
Parliament. Government Companies are governed by the Indian
Companies Act which has itself been enacted in exercise of
the legislative authority conferred by Art. 43 of the Union
List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
It is idle to contend and it has accordingly not been
contended, that a State can legislate under the authority to
legislate conferred by the State List (List 11) in regard to
properties of a Government Company which may have properties
in more than one State and even in Union Territories. The
need to speedily evict trespassers or unauthorised occupants
of such properties is self evident. The States cannot
legislate for such properties in respect of properties
situated in more than one State or Government companies
situated in different states all over India. Surely, the
Parliament, in obeisance to its obligation to protect and
safeguard the National and overall public interest, can
legislate in this respect under the residuary all-pervasive
entry Entry 97 of the Union List (List 1) of Constitution of
India which clothes the Parliament with the requisite
legislative authority in regard to "any other matter not
enumerated in List 11 or List 111 including any tax not
mentioned in either of those lists". It has not been shown
that any of the entries in List 11 or List 111 would be
attracted to the subject-matter of speedy eviction of
unauthorised occupations from properties belonging to a
Government Company wherein Central Government has more than
51% of the paid-up share capital. The source of authority
can thus in any case be traced to Entry 97 read with Entry
95 of the Constitution of India.
In any view of the matter therefore it is futile to
contend that Parliament had no legislative competence in
this behalf. We therefore concur with the conclusion reached
by the High Court in L.S. Nair’s case (supra) and repel the
challenge unhesitatingly.
The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. The
interim order will stand vacated. No costs.
R.S.S. Petition dismissed.