Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2766-2767 of 2005
PETITIONER:
Secretary, O.N.G.C. Ltd. and Anr.
RESPONDENT:
V.U. Warrier
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/04/2005
BENCH:
Ruma Pal & C.K. Thakker
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
C.K. THAKKER, J.
Leave granted.
The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated February 15, 2003 in Writ
Petition No. 3947 of 1994 and also against an order dated January 14, 2004
passed in Civil Application No. 63 of 2003.
To understand the controversy raised in the appeals, relevant facts in
brief may be stated.
The respondent herein - petitioner before the High Court - was in service
of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, ("Commission" for short) appellant
herein. He was holding the post of Additional Director (Finance and
Accounts) prior to his retirement. As an employee of the Commission, he was
allotted quarter on December 10, 1982. He retired from service on reaching
the age of superannuation with effect from February 28, 1990. It is the
case of the appellant that after the retirement, an employee has to vacate
the residential accommodation given to him by the Commission. The
respondent, therefore, was informed by the Commission that he had to vacate
the quarter. It was the policy of the Commission to grant four months’ time
to retain a quarter by an employee after his retirement. Accordingly, the
respondent was asked to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the
quarter to the Commission latest by 30th June, 1990. It is an admitted fact
that the respondent did not vacate the quarter. It has come on record that
he made representations to permit him to continue to occupy the quarter but
those representations were rejected. Since the respondent did not vacate
the quarter, proceedings were also initiated by the Commission under the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. In those
proceedings, an undertaking was given by the respondent that he would
vacate the quarter latest by May 30, 1991. Pursuant to the said
undertaking, the respondent vacated the quarter on May 16, 1991. Eviction
proceedings were then dropped.
The respondent claimed an amount of gratuity payable to him. According to
the respondent, he was entitled to Rs. one lakh towards payment of
gratuity. The Commission, however, deducted an amount of Rs.53,632 towards
unauthorized occupation charges of official accommodation from July 01,
1990 to May 15, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5,100 being 75 per cent of the basic
pay of Rs.6,800 per month. According to the respondent, it was not open to
the Commission to deduct any amount payable to him towards gratuity. He,
therefore, approached the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging
the action. He prayed for quashing of an order of appropriation of
Rs.53,632 as unauthorized occupation charges of official accommodation from
July, 1990 to May, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5,100 by permanently restraining
the Commission from recovering the said amount. A prayer was also made to
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direct the Commission to pay the amount of gratuity with interest.
An affidavit in reply was filed by the Commission. In the counter, the
Senior Deputy Director (Personnel and Administration), stated that the
Commission was a statutory Corporation established in 1960 under the Oil
and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959. The said Act was repealed by the Oil
and Natural Gas Commission (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 1993.
It was stated that the respondent (petitioner before the High Court), had
concealed several material facts. He was working as Additional Director and
retired at the age of 58 years on superannuation after office hours on
February 28, 1990. As Additional Director, he belonged to "gold collar"
class of employee as observed by this Court in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian
Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337. In the
capacity of an employee of the Commission and for efficiently discharging
his duties, he was allotted accommodation in Building No. D/63, Vidya
Vihar, ONGC Colony, Chittaranjan Nagar, Bombay vide allotment letter dated
December 10, 1982. The said accommodation was on certain terms and
conditions.
Clauses 11 and 12 read as under-
"Cl.11 If the employee to whom a residence is allotted retires or
resigns or is dismissed or removed from service, the allotment
shall be cancelled with effect from two months after the date of
his retirement, and one month after the date of his resignation,
dismissal, or removal as the case may be, or with effect from any
date after such dismissal or removal or retirement on which the
residence is vacated, whichever is earlier."
Cl.12 After cancellation of the allotment, if the premises are not vacated,
the occupation thereof shall be considered unauthorized, and the ex-
allottee shall be liable to pay liquidated damages for occupation of the
premises either twice of the standard rent or at the rate of the rent as
may be determined by the Commission from time to time."
It was also stated by the deponent that the Commission had issued Allotment
of Residences Instructions, 1970. Clause 14(1) of 1970-Instructions reads
as under-
"After cancellation of the allotment, if the premises are not vacated, the
occupation thereof shall be considered unauthorized and the ex-allottee
shall be liable to pay liquidated damages for occupation of the premises
either at the rate of twice of the standard rent or at the rate of the rent
as may be determined by the Commission from time to time."
On retirement from the service of the Commission, the respondent was
entitled to the following benefits :
"(i) Provident Fund Full Paid
(ii) TTA Advance for settling
at Home Town Rs.17,000
(iii) Leave encashment 253 days Rs.49,083
(iv) Gratuity payable under the
Commission’s Death-Cum-
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Retirement payment of Gratuity
Regulations 1969, as amended
from time to time. Rs.1,00,000
According to the Commission the gratuity payable on the retirement of
respondent had been paid and appropriated as under :
Total amount of Gratuity payable under
the 1969 Regulations as amended : Rs.1,00,000
Less Appropriations
(i) Outstanding House Building
Advance/Loan as on 28/2/1990 Rs.(-)23,000
(ii) Cumulative overdue interest at 6%
p.a. as on 28.2.90 Rs.(-)27,744
Net amount payable Rs.49,256
(iii) Permissive occupation of staff Rs. 820
accommodation from 1/3/1990
to 30/6/1990 @ Rs.205 p.m. i.e.
205 x 4
(iv) Unauthorised occupancy Rs.53,632
from 1/7/90 to 16/5/91 @
Rs.5100 p.m. (being 75% of
the basic pay of Rs.6800 p.m.) Rs.53,632 (-) Rs.54,452
Deficit amount Recoverable (-) Rs.5,196
The Commission was paying 30 per cent basic pay as HRA to those employees
who could not be allotted accommodation by the Commission at selected
centres like Delhi, Bombay, etc., but used to recover only 7 + per cent
basic pay as HRA from the employees on allotment of accommodation. In the
event of unauthorized occupation of staff accommodation, liquidated damages
are recoverable as double the rent i.e. 37- + x 2 = 75% of basic pay till
the accommodation is vacated by the incumbent. A copy of the office order
dated January 30, 1990 was also annexed to the affidavit in reply. It was
submitted that though the respondent retired on February 28, 1990 and was
allowed four months’ time to occupy the quarter as per the policy of the
Commission, he failed to vacate the quarter. His prayer for retention of
quarter was considered by the Commission but in view of non-availability of
quarters to several other employees, the prayer was rejected and the
respondent was asked to vacate it. He was also informed that in case, he
would not vacate the quarter, penal rent at the rate of 75% of basic salary
would be recovered from him. In spite of such communications and letters,
the respondent failed to vacate the quarter. The Commission was required to
initiate eviction proceedings and only thereafter an undertaking was filed
and possession of quarter was given back to Commission. In the
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circumstances, the Commission was within its power to deduct the amount
recoverable from the respondent towards unauthorized occupation of
residential quarter from July 1, 1990 till May 15, 1991 and the employee
had no reason to make grievance against it.
It was also the case of the Commission that the respondent was not covered
by Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as amended from time to time. Statutory
regulations framed by the Commission are more liberal and beneficial than
the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. It was further stated that
the respondent had constructed a flat bearing No. B-209, Dewan Mansion,
Plot No. 29/36, Vasai, Bombay by taking concessional loan at the rate of 6%
per annum from the Commission. The said quarter was leased by him to the
Commission at the rate of Rs.880 per month. In view of the retirement of
the respondent on February 28, 1990 and in view of the fact that he had to
vacate the residential quarter of the Commission, possession of the quarter
that belonged to the respondent and let out to the Commission was given
back to him on June 3, 1990. For four months from March 1, to June 30,
1990, the respondent was charged nominal rent of Rs.205 per month. Since
the respondent did not vacate the quarter, the impugned action of charging
penal rent was taken and the amount was appropriated from gratuity benefits
payable to the respondent. The said action was legal and valid. It was
further stated that there was a list of senior officers waiting for years
for allotment of staff accommodation in Bombay. The Commission was paying
30 per cent of basic pay as HRA to twelve officers for non-allotment of
residential quarter. Particulars thereof had also been annexed to the
affidavit in reply.
At the time of hearing of the petition, an advocate appeared for the
respondent (petitioner before the High Court). None, however, appeared for
the Commission. According to the High Court, the legal position was no more
res integra that pension and gratuity were rights accrued in favour of
employees on their retirement. Those benefits, therefore, could not be
withheld even if an employee unauthorisedly occupied accommodation and was,
therefore, liable to pay damages or penal rent under the relevant rules.
The only remedy available to the employer was to take appropriate action
but the amount of pensionary benefit could not be set off against the so-
called dues for unauthorized occupation. The Court also referred to State
of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, [1985] 1 SCC 429, R. Kapur v. Director of
Inspector (Painting & Publication) Income Tax and Anr., [1994] 6 SCC 589
and Gorakhpur University and Ors. v. Shilla Prasad Nagendra (Dr.) and Ors.,
[2001] 6 SCC 591.
The writ petition was accordingly allowed and the following directions were
issued by the Court;
"(a) It is declared that appropriation of a sum of Rs.53,637 towards
unauthorized occupancy of the official accommodation by the petitioner from
1st July 1990 to 16th May, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5100 per month was
illegal. However, this will not preclude the Respondents from proceeding
against the petitioner for recovery of due amount of unauthorized occupancy
of the official quarter for the period from 1st July 1990 to 16th May, 1991
in accordance with law.
(b) The Petitioner is entitled to payment of Rs.49,924 towards gratuity
under the relevant Regulations along with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from 1st March 1990 until payment is made. We grant time of two
months to Respondent for making the aforesaid payment to the petitioner.
(c) Since the respondent have not chosen to appear today at the time of
hearing of Writ Petition, we direct the parties to bear costs."
According to the Commission, it was not aware of the decision of the High
Court dated 15th February, 2003, since none appeared on behalf of the
Commission in the High Court at the time of hearing of the petition and the
decision was ex parte. It, therefore, made necessary enquiry. As soon as it
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came to know about the decision of the High Court, it addressed a letter
dated May 22, 2003, to the advocate appearing for the Commission and asked
him under what circumstances he could not attend the matter which came to
be decided ex parte against the Commission. The advocate vide his letter
dated May 24, 2003 informed the appellant that he had been advised to take
rest as he was suffering from Filariasis. According to the appellant, thus,
absence of the advocate appearing for the Commission was neither
intentional nor deliberate but due to his ill health. The appellant
thereafter applied for certified copy of the judgment which was sent to
Head Office, Dehradun. Relevant papers were then collected from the office
of the advocate. After getting approval from the Head Office, new advocate
was appointed on August 11, 2003, who was asked to file Review Petition
which was filed on December 12, 2003. There was thus delay of 116 days in
filing the review petition. The Division Bench rejected the Review Petition
observing that there was no explanation for the period from May 24, 2003 to
September 6, 2003. In the opinion of the Court, there was no cause much
less sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The review application was,
therefore, rejected.
On March 29, 2004, this Court issued notice on the Special Leave Petition
as well as on the prayer of interim relief. On October 25, 2004, an order
was passed to place the matter for final disposal on any miscellaneous day.
The matter was accordingly placed for hearing on January 31, 2005 and
remained part heard. On February 4, 2005, the matter was heard and the
learned counsel for the parties completed their arguments.
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court was
clearly wrong in allowing the petition and in directing the Commission to
pay the amount of gratuity to the respondent with interest at the rate of
6% per annum. According to the counsel, it was perfectly within the powers
of the Commission to deduct the amount of liquidated damages towards
unauthorized occupation of quarter by the respondent. Such action cannot be
said illegal, unlawful or otherwise improper. The Commission is a statutory
Corporation established by an Act of Parliament and in exercise of
statutory powers it has framed regulations. Those regulations, therefore,
are statutory in character, they are having force of law and are
enforceable. It was also submitted that the provisions of Payment of
Gratuity Act would not apply to the respondent. The counsel urged that
sufficient quarters are not available to the Commission in cities like
Delhi and Bombay. If the employees who had been allotted quarters do not
vacate even after their retirement, it would create serious problems to the
Commission as well as its employees. In the instant case, admittedly the
respondent retired on February 28, 1990. He was allowed four months’ time
up to June 30, 1990 to vacate the quarter. His prayer for retention of
quarter was duly considered and rejected expressly informing him that in
view of several officers waiting for quarters it would not be possible to
accede to the request and he must vacate the quarter by June 30, 1990. He
was specifically intimated that in case he did not vacate the accommodation
within the stipulated time, penal rent would be charged from him. He
ignored all those letters and continued to occupy the quarter. So much so
that eviction proceedings had to be initiated against him. It was only
thereafter that the respondent gave an undertaking and vacated the quarter.
The counsel also submitted that the respondent applied for loan for
residential accommodation at concessional rate which was given to him. He
had constructed a house. He let that house to the Commission at the rate of
Rs.880 per month as against Rs.205 per month which he was paying towards
rent. Considering the fact that the respondent had retired on February 28,
1990 and was to vacate the quarter allotted to him by the Commission by
June 30, 1990, the possession of the quarter belonged to the respondent and
let out to the Commission was given back to him on June 3, 1990. In spite
of that, the respondent did not vacate the quarter. In the circumstances,
the High Court was wholly wrong in granting relief to the respondent. The
High Court was also wrong in not reviewing the order passed ex parte
observing that no ‘sufficient cause’ had been made out for condonation of
delay. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed
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by quashing and setting aside the order of the High Court and by upholding
the order passed by the Commission.
The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the
order passed by the High Court. He submitted that as rightly held by the
High Court, pensionary and retrial benefits are the "right accrued" in
favour of an employee and not in the nature of "bounty". It was, therefore,
not open to the Commission to withhold any amount payable to the employee
from gratuity and other terminal benefits. The point is covered by several
decisions of this Court. Following those decisions, an order was passed
which deserves no interference. It was also submitted that the High Court
has granted liberty to the Commission by reserving right to the Commission
to take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law to recover the
amount of unauthorized occupation charges from the respondent. So far as
review is concerned, the counsel submitted that according to the High Court
there was no sufficient cause for recalling/reviewing the order passed ex
parte and even that order also cannot be said to be illegal. He, therefore,
prayed for dismissal of appeals.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the
appeals deserve to be allowed. It is no doubt true that pensionary
benefits, such as gratuity, cannot be said to be ‘bounty’. Ordinarily,
therefore, payment of benefit of gratuity cannot be withheld by an
employer. In the instant case, however, it is the specific case of the
Commission that the Commission is having a statutory status. In exercise of
statutory powers under Section 32(1) of the Act, regulations known as the
Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Death, Retirement and Terminal Gratuity)
Regulations, 1969 have been framed by the Commission. In Sukhdev Singh v.
Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Anr., [1975] 1 SCC 421 the
Constitution Bench of this Court held that regulations framed by the
Commission under Section 32 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act 1959
are statutory in nature and they are enforceable in a court of law. They
provide for eligibility of grant of gratuity, extent of gratuity, etc.
Regulation 5 deals with recovery of dues of the Commission and reads thus :
"Recovery of Dues :
The appointing authority, or any other authority empowered by the
Commission in this behalf shall have the right to make recovery of
Commission’s dues before the payment of the death-cum retirement gratuity
due in respect of an officer even without obtaining his consent or without
obtaining the consent of the members of his family in the case of the
deceased officer, as the case may be."
The above regulation leaves no room of doubt that the Commission has right
to effect recovery of its dues from any officer without his consent from
gratuity. In the present case admittedly the respondent retired after
office hours of February 28, 1990. According to the Commission, he could be
allowed four months’ time to occupy the quarter which was granted to him.
His prayer for extension was considered and rejected stating that it would
not be possible for the Commission to accept the prayer in view of several
officers waiting for quarters. He was also informed that if he would not
vacate the quarter, penal rent as per the policy of the Commission would be
recovered from him. But the respondent did not vacate the quarter. It was
only after eviction proceedings were initiated that he vacated the quarter
on May 16, 1991. In the circumstances, in our opinion, it cannot be said
that the action of the Commission was arbitrary, unlawful or unreasonable.
It also cannot be said that the Commission had no right to withhold
gratuity by deducting the amount which is found ‘due’ to Commission and
payable by the respondent towards penal charges for unauthorized occupation
of the quarter for the period between July 1, 1990 and May 15, 1991.
So far as the Payment of Gratuity Act is concerned, according to the
appellant, the said Act was not applicable to the respondent. We are
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concerned with the position as in 1990. Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act
defined "employee". The said definition read as under :
"S 2(e) - ‘employee’ means any persons (other than an apprentice) employed
on wages, not exceeding two thousand five hundred rupees per mensem, in any
establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company
or shop, to do any skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled, manual,
supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such
employment are express or implied, but does not include any such person who
is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, or who holds a
civil post under the Central Government or a State Government, or who is
subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, the Army Act 1950, or the Navy Act,
1957."
(emphasis supplied)
From the above definition, it is clear that a person can be said to be an
"employee" if his wages did not exceed two thousand five hundred rupees per
month. According to the Commission, the salary of the respondent was
Rs.6800 approximately which was more than Rs.2500 and hence, he could not
be held "employee" covered by the definition. The definition of "employee"
was no doubt amended subsequently and the provision as to amount of wages
had been deleted. But the amendment was made in 1994 and was not
retrospective in nature and thus was not applicable in the case of the
respondent who retired in 1990.
As held by this Court in Union of India v. All India Services Pensioners’
Association and Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 580, an incumbent is entitled to those
benefits as he could claim on the date of retirement. He could not claim
any benefit prior to his appointment or subsequent to his retirement.
It is well settled that gratuity is earned by an employee for long and
meritorious service rendered by him. Gratuity is not paid to the employee
gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon. It is paid to him for the
service rendered by him to the employer [vide Garment Cleaning Works v. Its
Workmen, [1962] 1 SCR 711]. In Calcutta Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Their
Workmen, [1967] 2 SCR 596, after considering earlier decisions, this Court
observed that "long and meritorious service" must mean long and unbroken
period of service meritorious to the end. As the period of service must be
unbroken, so must the continuity of meritorious service be a condition for
entitling the workman to gratuity. If a workman commits such misconduct as
causes financial loss to his employer, the employer would under the general
law have a right of action against the employee for the loss caused and
making a provision for withholding payment of gratuity where such loss
caused to the employer does not seem to aid to the harmonious employment of
labourers or workmen. The Court proceeded to state that the misconduct may
be such as to undermine the discipline in the workers - a case in which it
would be extremely difficult to assess the financial loss to the employer.
In Jarnail Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ors, [1993] 1
SCC 47, this Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of the
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. The definition of "pension"
included gratuity under Rule 3. Rule 9 conferred on the President right to
withhold or withdraw pension in certain circumstances. The order was passed
against the appellant withholding pension and the entire amount of death-
cum- retirement gratuity otherwise admissible to him. The direction was
given on serious irregularities found to have been committed by the
appellant. The appellant challenged that order unsuccessfully before the
Central Administrative Tribunal. He, therefore, approached this Court. His
contention was that an amount of gratuity could not have been withheld.
Negativing the contention, the Court held that the power to withhold
gratuity was conferred on the President under the relevant rules and hence,
such action could not be said to be illegal. According to the Court, there
could be adjustment of Government dues against the amount of death-cum-
retirement gratuity payable to Government servant.
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The ratio in R.Kapoor, in our opinion, does not help the respondent as in
that case, the claim for damages for unauthorized occupation against the
appellant-retired employee was "pending" and the proceedings were not
finally disposed of. In the present case, the facts clearly reveal that the
last day of lawful occupation of quarter by the respondent was June 30,
1990 and before that date, the appellant Commission had informed the
respondent that his prayer for extension or retention of quarter had not
been accepted and he should vacate by June 30, 1990. If he would not vacate
the quarter, penal rent would be recovered from him. He did not challenge
the action of not extending the period nor the recovery of penal rent. He,
therefore, cannot make grievance against the action of the Commission.
Similar is the case of Gorakhpur University. There retrial benefits were
withheld to adjust amount due from the employee but "disputed" by him. This
Court noted that the employee was keeping a quarter allotted to him and
continued to occupy after retirement. It was, inter alia, observed by this
Court that after the employee retired, his request and application as per
practice for allotment of quarters in the name of his son who was also an
employee in the University remained pending and no orders were passed
thereon. Moreover, there were resolutions of the University to waive penal
rent and such benefits were granted to other employees, but different
treatment was shown to him which constituted "hostile discrimination" and
the act was thus ‘unreasonable’. Though the employee retired in 1990 and
continued to keep the quarter up to 1996, the University did not choose to
take any action to evict him. On the contrary, it acquiesced in his
occupation "by accepting regularly the normal rent". Thus, there was lack
of bona fides on the part of the University.
In Wazir Chand v. Union of India and Ors., [2001] 6 SCC 596, a retired
employee continuously kept the quarter occupied unauthorisedly. He was
charged penal rent in accordance with rules and after adjustment of dues,
balance amount of gratuity was paid to him. He contended that it was
bounden duty of the Government not to withhold the gratuity amount. The
Court, however, dismissed the appeal observing that it was "unable to
accept" the prayer of the appellant. The Court observed that the appellant
having unauthorisedly kept the government quarter was liable to pay penal
rent in accordance with rules and there was no illegality in adjusting
those dues against death-cum-retirement benefits.
Wazir Chand was considered in Gorakhpur University but the Court stated
that it was not clear from the facts whether the person was allowed to
retain the accommodation on receipt of normal rent as in the University
case.
The matter can be considered from another angle also. It is well-settled
that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power under that Article
can be exercised by the High Court "to reach injustice wherever it is
found". Before more than fifty years, in G. Veerappa Pillai, Proprietor,
Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, Tanjore District, Madras v. Raman & Raman
Ltd., Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Ors., [1952] SCR 583, the
Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through Chandrasekhara Aiyer, J.,
observed that the writs referred to in Article 226 of the Constitution are
obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them "in grave cases
where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of
natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or
there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act,
omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice."
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the leading case of Sangram Singh v. Election Commissioner,
Kotah & Anr., [1955] 2 SCR 1, dealing with the ambit and scope of powers of
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High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, Bose, J., stated-
"That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be
exercised whenever there is an error of law. The High Courts do
not, and should not, act as Courts of appeal under Art. 226. Their
powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed
upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognized lines
and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the
Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in
this class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is
likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into
Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which
do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though
no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional
powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the
policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special
rights decided as speedily as may be. Therefore, writ petitions
should not be lightly entertained in this class of case."
(emphasis supplied)
The above principle has been reiterated and followed by this Court in
several subsequent cases.
As already adverted to by us hereinabove, the facts of the present case did
not deserve interference by the High Court in exercise of equitable
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondent-
petitioner before the High Court-, was a responsible officer holding the
post of Additional Director (Finance & Accounts). He was, thus, "gold
collar" employee of the Commission. In the capacity of employee of the
Commission, he was allotted a residential quarter. He reached the age of
superannuation and retired after office hours of February 28, 1990. He was,
therefore, required to vacate the quarter allotted to him by the
Commission. The Commission, as per its policy, granted four months’ time to
vacate. He, however, failed to do so. His prayer for continuing to occupy
the quarter was duly considered and rejected on relevant and germane
grounds. The residential accommodation constructed by him by taking loan at
the concessional rate from the Commission was leased to Commission, but the
possession of that quarter was restored to him taking into account the fact
that he had retired and now he will have to vacate the quarter allotted to
him by the Commission. In spite of that, he continued to occupy the quarter
ignoring the warning by the Commission that if he would not vacate latest
by June 30, 1990, penal rent would be charged from him. In our judgment,
considering all these facts, the High Court was wholly unjustified in
exercising extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction in favour of the
petitioner - respondent herein - and on that ground also, the order passed
by the High Court deserves to be set aside.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeals deserve to be allowed and are
accordingly allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and
the petition filed by the respondent-petitioner is ordered to be dismissed.
In the facts and circumstances, however, there shall be no order as to
costs.