S. MAHESH vs. THE CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR NEYVELI LIGNITE CORPORATION LTD. NEYVELI

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 29-10-2018

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Full Judgment Text

       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 10812 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.8774 of 2018] S. Mahesh                   .. Appellant(s) Versus The Chairman Cum Managing Director, Neyveli Lignite  Corporation Ltd. Neyveli  Tamil Nadu & Ors.      .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and   order   dated   05.03.2018   passed   by   the   High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.A. No. 273 of Signature Not Verified 2017 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2018.12.24 16:29:08 IST Reason: set aside the order dated 07.11.2016 passed by the 1 learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 15312/2010 and allowed   the   writ   appeal   filed   by   the   respondent herein. 3. The   controversy   involved   in   the   appeal   is short. However, few relevant facts herein below need mention to appreciate the controversy.  4. The   appellant   (employee)   was   the   writ petitioner whereas the respondent herein (employer) was the respondent in the writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court of Madras against the respondent out of which this appeal arises. 5. The   respondent   herein   is   the   Government Company known as Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. It is mainly engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of minerals (lignite). It has an office and business activity in South Arcot (Tamil Nadu).  6. The respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation”)   being   a   fully   owned   Government 2 Company is a  “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is thus amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 7. Pursuant   to   advertisement   issued   by   the Corporation   for   the   appointment   of   “Diploma Engineer Trainee Grade II (Electrical)”, the appellant was one of the candidates who applied for the said post.   The   appellant   was   interviewed   by   the Corporation   and   selected   for   the   said   post.   The Corporation  on 28.01.1988  accordingly  issued  an appointment letter to the appellant. (Annexure­P­1). 8. In   terms   of   the   appointment   letter,   the appellant was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years as Trainee and on its successful completion, was to be appointed on regular basis as Engineering Supervisor (Electrical) on probation for a period of one year and then to be absorbed as a 3 regular employee. The appellant was also required to execute Bond for a particular period.  9. At   the   time   of   the   interview   and   the appointment,   the   appellant   had   produced photocopy of his Scheduled Tribe Certificate to the Corporation   and   had   sought   time   to   produce   its original. The Corporation granted the indulgence to the appellant for producing his original Scheduled Tribe Certificate. 10. The appellant on 03.03.1988, however, sent a letter (Annexure R­3) to the Corporation informing them   that   he   belongs   a   community   known   as " Konda   Reddi "   which   is   a   backward   (ST) community. He said that he had approached the concerned Revenue Authorities for obtaining caste certificate in the prescribed form so as to enable him to submit it to the Corporation but the Revenue Authorities informed him that the Department has 4 stopped issuing any such certificate. The appellant, therefore,   expressed   his   inability   to   produce   the original Scheduled Tribe Certificate and requested the   Corporation   to   treat   him   as   a   candidate belonging   to   the   "General   Category"   instead   of "Reserved Category" in selection process. 11. The   Corporation,   on   receipt   of   the   aforesaid letter,   issued   a   posting   order   no.   1416/P&A/VI­ 2/88­3   dated   02.05.1988   to   the   appellant   and asked him to report for duty. The appellant was also allotted quarter in general category as a part of his service condition. The appellant accordingly joined his duty on 02.05.1988. 12. It was almost after four years of his joining i.e on 24.05.1993, the Corporation served a memo to the   appellant   stating   therein   that   appellant   had submitted false community certificate at the time of 5 joining and therefore why disciplinary action be not taken against him for filing such certificate.  13. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   Corporation though issued this memo to the appellant but did not  pursue  the   matter.     On  the   other  hand,  the appellant   was   promoted   to   the   rank   of   Junior Engineer Grade I with effect from 01.06.1993 vide order dated 16.12.1993. The appellant accordingly started working on the promotional post.  14. On 11.08.1995, the Corporation issued second memo to the appellant reiterating the same charge for which the first memo was issued. The appellant filed his reply and reiterated his stand which he had taken in his letter dated 03.03.1988.  15. The   Corporation   then   conducted   a Departmental Enquiry and recorded the statements of   the   Corporation’s   officials   wherein   the   officials admitted that the appellant had sent a letter dated 6 03.03.1988   expressing   therein   his   inability   to produce   the   original   caste   certificate   and   further requesting the Corporation to treat him as general candidate instead of reserved candidate. They also admitted that the appellant's request was accepted by DGM/P&A.  16. Despite this, the Corporation concluded in the enquiry   that   the   charge   leveled   against   the appellant   has   been   proved.   The   appellant   was accordingly awarded a punishment of " reduction of rank to a lower stage by two stages in his time scale for a period of 2 years with cumulative effect ".  The Corporation   also   ordered   that   henceforth   the appellant   be   considered   as   general   category candidate and that he would not be allowed to avail any   benefits   which   are   extended   to   the   reserved category   candidates.   The   appellant   felt   aggrieved 7 and   filed   Departmental   Appeal.   It   was,   however, dismissed. 17. After   three   years   i.e.   on   20.09.2000,   the Corporation for the third time issued a memo again asking   the   appellant   to   produce   his   community certificate   in   original   for   its   verification.   The appellant replied to the said memo reiterating his earlier stand saying that he had already informed vide his letter dated 03.03.1988 and in the enquiry proceedings   to   the   Corporation   that   it   was   not possible to produce the original certificate for the reasons   mentioned   therein.   The   appellant   further said   that   he   never   took   any   benefit   of   reserved candidate in the service because his request to treat him   as   general   candidate   was   accepted   by   the Corporation.  18. The Corporation did not stop here and lodged an FIR against the appellant on 30.07.2001 in PS 8 Neyveli Town (Crime No.219) for filing false caste certificate.   On   04.11.2003,   the   Police   Authorities submitted a report that there was no case made out against the appellant in the FIR.   On 15.07.2008, the Magistrate in RC No.56/2008, on perusal of the FIR and final report of the Police Authorities, closed the case against the appellant. 19. After two years, the Corporation again renewed their efforts and this time, its director invoked the powers   under   Rule   30   of   the   NLC   Employees (Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as   “the   Rules”)   and   by   order   dated   07.07.2010 substituted   the   punishment   imposed   on   the appellant   vide   order   dated   30.8.1997   to   that   of declaring   appellant's   appointment   to   be   null   and void. 20. The appellant, felt aggrieved, filed writ petition (W.P.   No.15312/2010)   in   the   Madras   High   Court 9 questioning therein the legality and correctness of the   order   dated   07.07.2010.   The   Corporation contested the writ petition. 21. By order dated 07.11.2016, the learned Single Judge   allowed   the   appellant's   writ   petition   and quashed   the   order   dated   07.07.2010.     Feeling aggrieved of the order passed by the learned Single Judge,   the   Corporation   filed   intra   court   appeal before the Division Bench.  22. By   impugned   order,   the   Division   Bench allowed the Corporation’s appeal, and while setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, dismissed the appellant's writ petition and upheld the order dated 07.07.2010 by which the appellant's appointment was held as null and void. It is against this order, the writ petitioner (appellant herein) felt aggrieved   and   filed   the   present   special   leave   to appeal in this Court. 10 23. Heard Ms. V. Mohana, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Anil Nag, learned counsel for the respondent(s). 24. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the parties and on perusal of the written submissions filed by the parties, we are constrained to allow the appeal   and   while   setting   aside   of   the   impugned order, allow the appellant's writ petition and restore the order of the Single Judge. 25. In our considered opinion, the entire action of the  Corporation starting from issuance of  second charge   memo   dated   11.08.1995   and   ending   by passing   the   order   dated   07.07.2010   is   arbitrary, unreasonable, and   exercise of the powers mala fide by the Corporation against the appellant and hence the same is not sustainable in law.  26. In   any   event,   the   order   dated   07.07.2010 which   is   subject   matter   of   this   appeal   and   with 11 which   we   are   really   concerned   in   this   appeal   is wholly   arbitrary,   unreasonable   and   is   not   legally sustainable.  This we say for following reasons. 27. First,   the   appellant   at   the   first   available opportunity and before joining the duties had sent a letter on 03.03.1988 of his own to the Corporation informing therein that it was not possible for him to produce  the  original caste  certificate  because  the Revenue   Authorities   had   declined   to   issue   the original caste certificate to him. 28.   Not only that, the appellant further on his own requested the Corporation not to treat him as " reserved   candidate "   but   treat   him   as   " general candidate ".     In   this   way,   the   appellant,   in   our opinion, did not suppress any information relating to his caste certificate from the Corporation. 29. Second,   the   Corporation,   in   these circumstances,   had   three   options;   first,   not   to 12 appoint the appellant which the Corporation did not opt; Second, to grant some more time to produce the caste certificate or any other material to prove the appellant’s caste which again the Corporation did not opt and the third, to condone the lapse in filing the caste certificate and proceed to consider the   appellant's   case   treating   him   as   a   candidate belonging   to   the   general   category   for   selection purpose which the Corporation opted. 30. Third,   the   Corporation   by   their   express conduct   having   followed   the   third   option   and condoned the lapse by asking the appellant to join the   duties,   which   the   appellant   did,   and   later further promoting him to the next higher grade, the issue   relating   to   caste   certificate   lost   its significance.  31. Fourth,   in   the   light   of   afore­mentioned reasons, the Corporation, in our opinion, had no 13 right to hold any Departmental Enquiry in relation to the issue of appellant's caste certificate because they   condoned   the   issue   of   caste   certificate   by allowing the appellant to join the duties and later by promoting him to the next higher grade.  32. Assuming,   however,   that   the   Corporation could   still   probe   the   issue   in   relation   to   the appellant's   caste   certificate   after   allowing   him   to join, the Corporation having held a Departmental Enquiry   and   imposing   the   punishment   on   the appellant of “ reduction of his rank to a lower stage by two stages in his time scale for a period of 2 years   with   cumulative   effect”   by   order   dated 30.08.1997, the issue of caste certificate attained finality in all respect.  33. The   Corporation   had   thereafter   no   power   to raise the issue of caste certificate again in any form against the appellant. In other words, the issue of 14 caste   certificate   did   not   survive   for   any   more consideration between the parties inasmuch as it was not a live issue between the parties. 34. Fifth, assuming that the higher authority had the power to enhance the punishment imposed on the appellant by taking recourse to powers under Rule 30, such power, in our view, could be exercised by the authorities within 90 days from the date of the order of punishment.  35.     In   this   case,   the   punishment   order   was passed on 30.08.1997 whereas the higher authority exercised his power under Rule 30 on 07.07.2010 by which the punishment order dated 30.08.1997 was   cancelled   and   was   substituted   by   an   order declaring the appellant's appointment as null and void.  This order was passed beyond a period of 30 days as provided in Rule 30 (3) which in clear terms provides that " no order enhancing the punishment 15 under this rule shall be made after a period of 90 days from the date on which the original order of punishment was served on the employee charged  ". 36. In   other   words,   the   higher   authority   could pass   the   order   under   Rule   30   for   revoking   the original order of punishment dated 30.08.1997 as being bad and substituting it with another order declaring the appellant's appointment as null and void within 90 days from the date of punishment order i.e, it could be passed on or before 30.11.1997 but not beyond this date.  37. Since   in   this   case,   the   order   was   passed almost after 13 years from the date of passing of the original punishment order, and hence on the face, it was bad in law. 38. In the light of afore­mentioned reasons, we are of the opinion that in whatever way the question is examined, the entire action of the Corporation and 16 in particular the order dated 07.07.2010 which is subject matter of this appeal is found to be wholly arbitrary,   unreasonable   and,   therefore,   it   is   held legally unsustainable.  39. The Single Judge, therefore, rightly set aside the order impugned in the writ petition whereas the Division Bench was not right in setting aside the order of the Single Judge.  40. We cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Division Bench but are inclined   to   concur   with   the   reasoning   and   the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge in addition to our own reasoning given above. 41. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds   and   is   hereby   allowed.   The   impugned order passed by the Division Bench is set aside and the order passed by the Single Judge (Writ Court) is restored.  17 42. As   a   consequence,   order   dated   07.07.2010 passed by the Director (Power) of the Corporation which   set   aside   the   order   of   punishment   dated 30.08.1997 and in its place substituted the order by declaring the appellant's appointment  void ab initio is hereby quashed.   ………………………………..J  (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)             …..………………………………J.      (INDU MALHOTRA) New Delhi, October 29, 2018 18