Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority vs. M/S Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd.

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 89

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.929 OF 2020

BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VS.
M/S SCOPE SALES PVT. LTD. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS
with

CIVIL APPEAL NO.930 OF 2020

STATE OF BIHAR … APPELLANT
VS.
M/S SCOPE SALES PVT. LTD. & ORS … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1
1. Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority and the State of Bihar are
in appeal, by special leave, challenging the judgment and order dated
st 2
21 October 2014 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
3 4 5
at Patna on an intra-court appeal presented by the first respondent .
The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s judgment and order
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.01.27
18:14:52 IST
Reason:
1
BIADA
2
impugned order
3
High Court
4
Letters Patent Appeal No. 335 of 2014
5
M/s. Scope
1


th 6
dated 24 January 2014 of dismissal of M/s. Scope’s writ petition and
consequently, allowed the writ petition of M/s. Scope.
2. A brief factual conspectus of the appeal is as follows:
th
a. Pursuant to an advertisement dated 6 June, 2007 issued by BIADA
inviting offers for auction of plots, M/s. Scope applied for allotment of a
plot. Upon its emergence as the highest bidder, M/s. Scope was allotted
7 th
Plot No. C-34 , Patna Industrial Area, Patliputra, Patna, on 9 June, 2007
for a sum of Rs. 2,32,20,000/- (subsequently for a sum of Rs.
3,38,98,000/- due to increase in area). M/s. Scope wanted to construct
a multiplex cum shopping mall on the plot, possession whereof was
th
delivered on 9 October, 2007.
b. In the meanwhile, a decision was taken to set up the Indian Institute of
8
Technology at Patna. The campus of a Government Polytechnic was
chosen to house the IIT until the IIT developed its own campus. The plot
in question is adjacent to the campus of the polytechnic.
c. Five months after delivery of possession of the plot in question in favour
th
of M/s. Scope, BIADA, vide letter dated 29 March, 2008 directed M/s.
Scope to stop construction on the plot in question till further notice.
d. Records show that the State decided to reserve the plot in question for
future development of the IIT campus and, thus, had directed BIADA to
initiate action for cancellation of allotment in favour of M/s. Scope.

6
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 4532 of 2009
7
plot in question
8
IIT
2


th
e. Consequently, BIADA, on 10 November, 2008, issued a show cause
notice to M/s. Scope proposing cancellation of the allotment (with refund
th
and interest) followed by a second notice on 4 March, 2009. The
relevant part of the notice reads as follows:
“In reference to the aforesaid subject matter, the Indian Institute of
Technology has been opened in the State of Bihar also and is
presently running at New Govt Polytechnic, Patliputra, Patna-13. The
same is expected to remain in place for another 5 to 7 years, until
IIT, Patna develops its own campus and facilities such as
Administrative building and hostel etc. The land allotted to you Is
contiguous to the present campus of IIT, Patna and in fact has a
common boundary wall. Across the land in question, two buildings
are also in possession of IIT, which houses the boys and girls hostel.
IIT is a prestigious Institution and its beginning in the State of
Bihar is a great contribution to the academic atmosphere of the
State. It has to be allowed all facilities which are required in making
of an institution of the standard of IIT and therefore, it has been
decided to cancel the allotment in greater public interest.
Accordingly, this is to communicate as why not the allotment
as made to you be cancelled and possession be resumed by BIADA
upon refund of the payment made by you with interest for the period
during which money has remained with BIADA. The land is being
needed for facilitation of the IIT, Patna and under such
circumstances; this greater public interest needs to be addressed. It
is requested that you may give your reply to this notice within 30
days of the issuance of this letter.
Thanking you,”

th
f. Vide its response dated 12 March, 2009, M/s. Scope pointed out that
the notice did not cite any legal provision of the Bihar Industrial Area
9
Development Authority Act, 1974 or the Rules framed thereunder which
allowed BIADA to cancel the allotment or to take back possession of the
plot in question on the ground of public interest; therefore, the proposed
cancellation was without any legal authority. M/s. Scope also gave an

9
BIADA Act
3


estimate of the expenses incurred by it in course of construction activity
till that date, reading as under:

th
g. BIADA cancelled the allotment vide cancellation order dated 4 April,
2009 and refunded the “cost of land originally deposited by the Unit
amounting to Rs.3,38,98,000/- ” along with 5% interest which was
equivalent to the “rate of interest charged upon dues of BIADA from the
allottees ”.
h. Aggrieved, M/s. Scope invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court
seeking a writ of Certiorari for quashing of the cancellation order. The
alternative prayer made by M/s. Scope in the writ petition, for award of
“actual compensation and not fanciful compensation”, read as follows:
“Alternatively, if at all the Respondents are able to demonstrate that
under the facts of the case, the impugned action is justified and legal
then the Respondents should be directed to award actual
compensation and not fanciful compensation which has been
awarded by the Respondents and the compensation should be
commensurate with the amount invested by the Petitioner in the
aforesaid land/project pursuant to the allotment which interalia
4


would should include compensation to the Petitioner in accordance
with the present market rate of the land as fixed by the Respondent
No.2 itself and further award compensation for the investment made
in relation to the aforesaid project pursuant to the allotment in favour
of the Petitioner (more specifically described in the schedule enclosed
at Annexure-11) along with commercial rate of interest as notified by
the Scheduled Banks from time to time;”

i. During pendency of the writ petition, and almost two years after its
th
institution, BIADA vide letter dated 25 November, 2011 proposed
allotment of alternate plots in a nearby area which M/s. Scope refused
finding the same inappropriate.
j. As noted, a Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition
th
on 24 January, 2017.
i. The Single Judge took note of the sudden development for
establishment of IIT Patna which “compelled the respondent State
authorities to do some out of the hat thinking to provide
immediate infrastructure by way of a temporary campus, before
the main campus could be developed for which identification of
land and acquisition was a cumbersome and time taking process” .
In view of the above and after finding that the cancellation of
allotment was not diseased by mala fide , the Single Judge found
that there were convincing reasons arising out of larger public
good to effect cancellation of the order of allotment and to take
possession of the land as a natural corollary thereof. It was further
noted that fact of an IIT being set up, was not “even in the horizon
when the decision to auction the land with the petitioner was
taken” .
5


ii. Further, the Single Judge held that cancellation was permissible
10
and well within the ambit of Section 9(3) of the BIADA Act, which
provides for the power of the State Government to seek, at any
time, the restoration of land which is placed at the disposal of the
Authority.
k. Crestfallen, M/s. Scope carried the order of dismissal of its writ petition
in an intra-court appeal where it succeeded. Its appeal was allowed vide
the impugned order. The reasons for reversal are as follows:
i. Upon a reading of Section 9(3) of the BIADA Act, the Division
Bench acknowledged that the BIADA is obligated to restore the
land to the State Government whenever the land is required.
However, it opined that such restoration is permissible only so long
as the land remains at the disposal of BIADA. Once third-party
rights are created, restoration to the State Government is not
possible. The expression “at any time” was held not to extend to
a stage when the land is no longer at the disposal of BIADA.
ii. Section 9(3) of the BIADA Act cannot be construed as conferring
upon BIADA the power to cancel an allotment for the purpose of
restoring the land to the State Government.
iii. Power of cancellation under Section 6 of the BIADA Act is
circumscribed by Sections 6(2-a) and 6(2-b), which contemplate
cancellation as a punitive measure only where the allottee fails to

10
"If any land so placed at the disposal of the Authority under sub-section (2) is required
at any time by the State Government, the Authority shall restore it to the State
Government."
6


take steps to establish the industry within the stipulated time
frame.
iv. Allotment constitutes “property” within the meaning of Article
300A of the Constitution of India, as the allottee acquires
proprietary rights in the land allotted by the authority, and
deprivation of such property cannot be effected even upon
payment of compensation.
v. To cancel an allotment in favour of an investor would be contrary
to public interest.
l. Accordingly, the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge
and ordered the respondents (State authorities) to take “necessary
consequential steps, which may be warranted” .
S UBMISSIONS
3. Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, learned senior counsel, appearing for BIADA
submitted that the Division Bench erred in its interpretation of Section
6 by restricting BIADA’s power of cancellation only to situations covered
by Sections 6(2-a) and 6(2-b). BIADA, it was contended, possesses a
general power of cancellation under Section 6(2) and the reasoning that
Sections 6(2-a) and 6(2-b), inserted in 1997, were intended to curtail
BIADA’s power under Section 6(2) is untenable. Insertion of these
provisions, according to him, does not dilute or override the general
power of cancellation vested in BIADA, which remains unaffected. He
further contended that when allotment of land is cancelled as per Section
7


6, the same vests in BIADA and can, thus, be restored to the State
Government in accordance with Section 9(3). Supporting the view taken
by the Singe Judge, it was submitted that the cancellation of the plot in
question was done in view of overwhelming public interest. He,
therefore, prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the decision
of the Single Judge restored.
4. Mr. Azmat Hayat Amanullah, learned counsel appearing for the State,
being the appellant in the connected appeal, adopted the submissions
of Mr. Nandrajog.
5. Opposing these submissions, Mr. Satyabir Bharti, learned senior counsel
appearing for M/s. Scope, argued that the appellants failed to
demonstrate any statutory power enabling BIADA to cancel an allotment
in the absence of any default on the part of M/s. Scope. Reading such
wide powers into Section 6, he cautioned, would discourage investors
from making investments. He further argued that the decision to cancel
the allotment was not in public interest, as it was inconsistent with the
Industrial Incentive Policies of the State Government. He pointed out the
absence of clarity regarding any concrete scheme requiring the land for
the construction of additional buildings for the IIT or the Polytechnic.
th
The cancellation order dated 4 April 2009, according to him, merely
stated that the land was required “for many of its activities such as a
playground etc.”. In the absence of a defined scheme, he contended that
equity favoured M/s. Scope. Lastly, it was argued that the BIADA Act
does not contemplate the grant of compensation upon cancellation of an
8


allotment. Upholding a practice of cancelling allotments by offering
compensation, he warned, would permit misuse of such power by BIADA
in future cases. He, accordingly, prayed that the appeals be dismissed.
I SSUE
6. The sole issue before us is, whether the Division Bench of the High Court
was right in its interference with the order of dismissal of the writ petition
of M/s. Scope passed by the Single Judge?
A NALYSIS
7. Learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties have been heard and the
materials on record perused.
8. Mr. Nandrajog sought to trace the power to cancel allotment of the plot
in question by referring to various provisions of the BIADA Act. He
invited us to examine whether, under the statutory scheme, BIADA was
indeed vested with the authority to effect such cancellation. Per contra ,
Mr. Bharti contended that power to cancel the allotment could not have
been exercised since BIADA lacked the authority to do so.
9. We would attempt to resolve the dispute based on a true construction of
the BIADA Act if, at all, a preliminary question is answered in favour of
M/s. Scope.
10. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the
preliminary question that arises for our consideration is: whether the
Division Bench ought to have interfered with the Single Judge’s
judgment and order of dismissal of M/s. Scope’s writ petition as well as
9


the order cancelling allotment of the plot in question, having due regard
to the overarching public interest involved.
11. It is trite law that the remedy of a writ is discretionary in nature. Even
where a writ petition raises a substantial point of law, the High Court
may decline to entertain it for a variety of reasons. Inter alia , relief may
be denied to the suitor notwithstanding the existence of a strong legal
case should grant of such relief not serve or advance public interest. If
interfering with an impugned order/decision etc. would result in more
harm to society, the writ courts may decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
The high courts, being the custodian of the Constitution, carry the
responsibility to maintain social balance by its interference when justice
of the case so demands and in not interfering when such an interference
would affect public interest.
12. The above principle has been reiterated in a catena of precedents. For
the purpose of this discussion, we may profitably refer to a few of them.
11
12.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu , a three – Judge Bench of this
Court held that the High Court should refuse to interfere in its equity
jurisdiction when the same would be detrimental to public interest.
The relevant passage reads as follows:
4. Even assuming that the construction placed by the High Court and
vehemently defended by the learned counsel for respondent is
correct should the High Court have interfered with the order of
Government in exercise of its equity jurisdiction. The distinction
between writs issued as a matter of right such as habeas corpus and
those issued in exercise of discretion such as certiorari and
mandamus are well known and explained in countless decisions given
by this Court and English Courts. It is not necessary to recount them.

11
(1994) 2 SCC 481
10


The High Courts exercise control over Government functioning and
ensure obedience of rules and law by enforcing proper, fair and just
performance of duty. Where the Government or any authority passes
an order which is contrary to rules or law it becomes amenable to
correction by the courts in exercise of writ jurisdiction. But one of the
principles inherent in it is that the exercise of power should be for
the sake of justice. One of the yardstick for it is if the quashing of the
order results in greater harm to the society then the court may
restrain from exercising the power.
5. …… Therefore, even if the order of the Government was vitiated
either because it omitted to issue a proper show-cause notice or it
could not have proceeded against the respondent for his past
activities the High Court should have refused to interfere in exercise
of its equity jurisdiction as the facts of the case did not warrant
interference. What could be more harmful to society than appointing
the respondent as member of the Board, a position of importance
and responsibility, who was found responsible for mass copying at
the examination centre of which he was a supervisor. It shakes the
confidence and faith of the society in the system and is prone to
encouraging even the honest and sincere to deviate from their path.
It is the responsibility of the High Court as custodian of the
Constitution to maintain the social balance by interfering where
necessary for sake of justice and refusing to interfere where it is
against the social interest and public good.
(emphasis ours)
12
12.2 In Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra , this Court
made similar observations while dealing with a case related to
exercise of discretion in a writ petition concerning land acquisition
proceedings reading thus:
10. Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a
few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. ………...
Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come
where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while
exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under
Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of
interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point.
And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests
of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one
and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other
similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally
discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-à-vis
the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 —
indeed any of their discretionary powers. ……….. There are many

12
(1997) 1 SCC 134
11


ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing
the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit,
it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond
this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust
that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts
while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.
(emphasis ours)
12.3 In Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson
13
(P) Ltd. , while dealing with a case concerning a dispute as to grant
of tender, this Court observed:
15. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public
sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin
International Airport Ltd. [(2000) 2 SCC 617] and it was held that
the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is
essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method
to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona
fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was
further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and
agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when
some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must
exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution
and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not
merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always
keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its
intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion
that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court
should interfere.
(emphasis ours)
12.4 Relevant extract from the decision of this Court in Ritesh Tewari v.
14
State of U.P. , is as follows:
26. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary
and supervisory in nature. It is not issued merely because it is lawful
to do so. The extraordinary power in the writ jurisdiction does not
exist to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion any
substantial injustice. A writ can be issued only in case of a grave
miscarriage of justice or where there has been a flagrant violation of
law. The writ court has not only to protect a person from being
subjected to a violation of law but also to advance justice and not to
thwart it. The Constitution does not place any fetter on the power of

13
(2005) 6 SCC 138
14
(2010) 10 SCC 677
12


the extraordinary jurisdiction but leaves it to the discretion of the
court. However, being that the power is discretionary, the court has
to balance competing interests, keeping in mind that the interests of
justice and public interest coalesce generally. A court of equity, when
exercising its equitable jurisdiction must act so as to prevent
perpetration of a legal fraud and promote good faith and equity. An
order in equity is one which is equitable to all the parties concerned.
...
(emphasis ours)
13. We must also bear in mind the nature and extent of jurisdiction that an
intra-court appellate Bench of a high court exercise. Such appellate
jurisdiction is conferred either under the Letters Patent or by the relevant
statutory provisions. It is pertinent to note that both - Single Bench and
Division Bench - exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In our view, the exercise of intra-court appellate
jurisdiction is warranted only where the judgment or order under
challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity. Such
jurisdiction ought not to be invoked merely because another view is
possible on the same set of facts, particularly where the view adopted
by the Single Judge is a plausible and reasonable one. In other words,
an intra-court appellate Bench ought not to substitute its own view,
merely because such Bench considers its view to be better than the one
taken by the Single Bench; so long as the view taken by the Single Bench
is a plausible one, interference should stay at a distance.
14. We find it profitable to refer to certain precedents, relevant paragraphs
wherefrom are reproduced below:
13


15
14.1 In Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple , it was
held:
2. Mr Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, inter alia
contends that the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court could not
have upset a finding of fact recorded by a learned Single Judge on
fresh reconciliation of the two documents, arriving at different results
than those arrived at earlier by the two courts aforementioned.
Though the argument sounds attractive, it does not bear scrutiny.
Against the orders of the trial court, first appeal lay before the High
Court, both on facts as well as law. It is the internal working of the
High Court which splits it into different ‘Benches’ and yet the court
remains one. A letters patent appeal, as permitted under the Letters
Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters
Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders
in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench.
Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate court. In such
appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court
of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent
is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in
procedural language. That apart the construction of the
aforementioned two documents involved, in the very nature of their
import, a mixed question of law and fact, well within the powers of
the Letters Patent Bench to decide. The Bench was not powerless in
that regard.
(emphasis ours)
16
14.2 This Court in Narendra & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Workmen noted that:

5. … Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact,
unless the Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of
the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely
because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no
interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single
Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.

14.3 On whether a remand could be ordered in exercise of intra-court
appellate jurisdiction, this Court in Roma Sonkar v. M.P. State
17
Public Service Commission expressed reservations in the
following words:

15
(1996) 3 SCC 52
16
(2016) 3 SCC 340
17
(2018) 17 SCC 106
14


3. We have very serious reservations whether the Division Bench in
an intra-court appeal could have remitted a writ petition in the matter
of moulding the relief. It is the exercise of jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned
Single Judge as well as the Division Bench exercised the same
jurisdiction. Only to avoid inconvenience to the litigants, another tier
of screening by the Division Bench is provided in terms of the power
of the High Court but that does not mean that the Single Judge is
subordinate to the Division Bench. Being a writ proceeding, the
Division Bench was called upon, in the intra-court appeal, primarily
and mostly to consider the correctness or otherwise of the view taken
by the learned Single Judge. Hence, in our view, the Division Bench
needs to consider the appeal(s) on merits by deciding on the
correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, instead of
remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge.


18
14.4 In AAI v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee , while referring to its decision
in Narendra (supra), this Court observed as follows:
41. The position is, thus, settled that in an intra-court writ appeal,
the appellate court must restrain itself and the interference into the
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is permissible only if
the judgment of the learned Single Judge is perverse or suffers from
an error apparent in law. However, the Division Bench, in the present
case, failed to record any such finding and rather, proceeded to delve
into extensive reappreciation of evidence to overturn the judgment
of the learned Single Judge.
(emphasis ours)

15. Bearing in mind the larger public interest that was involved coupled with
the fact that the plot of land in question was sought to be reserved for
establishment of an educational institution, we are of the firm opinion
that dismissal of the writ petition was an available option for the Single
Judge. The view taken by the Division Bench that BIADA lacked the
authority to cancel the allotment though prima facie may appear to be
appealing, yet, the same is debatable.

18
(2025) 4 SCC 111
15


15.1 Applying the principles governing the exercise of intra-court appellate
jurisdiction, as laid down in the aforesaid precedents, to the facts of
the present case, we observe that judicial discipline demanded due
deference to the exercise of discretion by the court of first instance,
particularly when such discretion was exercised on relevant
considerations. The Single Judge having refused exercise of discretion
on a ground which, in our opinion, is valid, the Division Bench ought
to have been loath to allow the writ petition, and that too in exercise
of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction. The judgment and order of the
Single Judge was far from being wholly incorrect or perverse.
15.2 Further, it is a matter of record that cancellation of allotment of the
plot in question was necessitated by the requirement of the land for
setting up and future expansion of an institute like IIT, a circumstance
which was neither contemplated nor known at the time of the original
allotment. The decision of BIADA to cancel the allotment was taken
bona fide and in furtherance of a larger public purpose. BIADA, to
demonstrate its bona fide , also offered to M/s. Scope an alternate
piece of land, which it declined. There is no material on record which
suggests that BIADA’s action is infected by any malice in fact. We also
note that M/s Scope, in its writ petition, sought compensation in the
alternative, in the event the primary relief could not be granted. While
balancing the equities in favour of the parties, this aspect assumes
considerable importance.
16


15.3 Taking these factors cumulatively – namely, the absence of any
perversity in the order of the learned Single Judge, the larger public
interest involved owing to involvement of an educational institution,
and the availability of an alternate prayer for compensation –
interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the present case
would hinder a project of undeniable national importance and, in our
opinion, thwart public interest.
16. Beyond doubt, institutes such as the IITs not only cater to a large
number of students but also play a critical role in the development of
individuals, society, and the nation at large. Suffice it to observe, their
importance cannot be measured merely in quantitative terms. For their
effective functioning and sustained growth, the availability of adequate
resources, including land, is indispensable.
17. It is not that we are unmindful of the rights of the individual allottee,
i.e., M/s. Scope. While such rights merit due respect and consideration,
it cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than the collective public
interest. Where the two come into conflict, individual interest must
necessarily yield to the larger public good.
C ONCLUSION
18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order of the Division
Bench is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored with the result
that the present appeals succeed.
17


19. The original amount of Rs. 3,38,98,000/-, paid by M/s Scope, is ordered
to be refunded to M/s Scope with interest @ 7% per annum. If the
original amount has been returned to M/s. Scope, the balance amount
on account of interest shall be paid within 3 (three) months from date.
20. It is also directed that the plot in question shall not be put to any
commercial use whatsoever by any of the appellants and shall be utilised
strictly and exclusively for educational purposes and activities incidental
thereto.
21. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

………..…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



………………..……..………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)


NEW DELHI.
JANUARY 23, 2026.
18