JAIBUNISHA vs. MEHERBAN

1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.76  OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 6329 OF 2020) JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS MEHARBAN & ANR.                        ….RESPONDENT(S) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.77  OF 2022 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 1337 OF 2021) JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS JUMMA & ORS.                        ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T NAGARATHNA J.  These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the   informant   ­ th th appellant assailing the orders dated 7  October, 2020 and 17 November,   2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at Allahabad   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Bail   Application   Nos. 29759 of 2020 and 39886 of 2021 respectively whereby bail has Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2022.01.18 13:43:59 IST Reason: been granted to six persons accused in Sardhana P.S. Crime Case No.955 of 2018.  2 2. It is the case of the appellant that she is the mother of the deceased Yameen. She is stated to be an eyewitness to the attack on   her   sons,   namely   Yameen   and   Mobin   and   her   husband, Jamshed. The appellant herein is the person who lodged the First Information Report being FIR No. 955/2018 for offences under sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the ‘IPC’). In all eleven accused were named in the FIR, being respondent no.1 in Criminal Appeal No.76/2022, namely Meherban; respondent no. 1   to   5   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.77/2022,   namely   Jumma, Hakmeen,   Yaseen,   Arshad   and   Firoz,   and   five   more   persons namely, Bhoora, Shahid, Sullad, Yamin and Dev.  th 3. That FIR No. 955/2018 dated 27  August, 2018 is stated to have been filed by the appellant herein at around 21:05 hrs in the night stating that at around 18:00 hrs of the same day the accused,   armed   with   swords   and   knives   entered   appellant’s house with a common intention to attack and kill Yameen and Mobin, sons of the appellant and Jamshed, appellant’s husband. That on entering the house, they started hurling abuses and attacked the sons and husband of the appellant, attempting to kill them. The neighbours of the appellant came to their rescue. 3 However, as a result of such assault, Yameen died and Mobin and   Jamshed   sustained   serious   injuries.   The   informant­ appellant   has   further   stated   that   there   was   a   pre­existing dispute   between   the   deceased   and   Bhoora,   one   among   the accused, which was settled by the residents of their locality. However,   the   accused,   in   continuation   of   the   said   dispute attacked the sons and the husband of the appellant and killed one of her sons, namely, Yameen.  4. Appellant’s son, Mobin was medically examined on the date of the incident and the medical report records that that incised wounds were found on his hand, which could be caused by a sharp edged object. The injury report of Jamshed described three injuries,   i.e.   an   incised   wound   on   the   scalp,   abrasion   and contusion on the back and arm.  5. After   conducting   an   investigation,   the   Police   filed   a charge­sheet only against three accused, namely, Sullad, Bhoora alias Shadab and Yamin. They were subsequently arrested by the Police. The accused­respondents in the instant appeals are the   eight   other   accused   named   in   the   FIR   but   were   not charge­sheeted.  4 6. The appellant filed an application under section 319 of the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “CrPC”   for   the   sake   of   brevity)   for   summoning   the   accused­ respondents herein who were not charge sheeted by the Police. The   accused­respondents   were   summoned   by   the   Additional st Sessions Judge by order dated 21  September, 2019.  7. On the date of commencement of trial before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, the accused Sullad, Bhoora alias Shadab and Yamin were presented before the Court by the Police.   However,   the   accused­respondents   summoned   under section 319 of the CrPC, failed to appear before the trial court. Therefore, the Additional District and Sessions Judge by order th dated 15  October, 2019 issued Non­Bailable Warrants against the respondents herein.  8. On the next date fixed for trial, the accused­respondents against whom Non­Bailable Warrants were issued, again failed to appear before the court and it was reported by the Police that the said accused were absconding and were not found even at their residences. The Additional District and Sessions Judge by order th dated 4   November, 2019 issued a proclamation under section 82 of the CrPC against the accused­respondents.  5 9. In the meantime, the accused­respondents summoned by the Sessions Court preferred an application under section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court, praying for an order to quash st the order dated 21  September, 2019 whereby the respondents had been summoned to appear before the Additional District and th Sessions Judge, Meerut. By order dated 11   November, 2019, the High Court dismissed the said application and granted 30 days’ time to the accused to surrender before the Trial Court. The accused­respondents assailed the said order by preferring a Special Leave Petition, being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before th this   Court,   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   order   dated   6 December 2019.  th 10. On 8  January, 2020, the next date on which the sessions trial was presented, the accused­respondents once again failed to   appear   notwithstanding   the   direction   by   this   Court   to surrender.   Hence   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Meerut,   by th order   dated   8   January,   2020,   directed   that   proceedings   for attachment of property of the accused­respondents be initiated under section 83 of the CrPC.  th 11. The accused­respondents were arrested by the Police on 5 February, 2020 and remained in judicial custody till they were 6 enlarged on bail by the impugned orders of the High Court dated th th 7  October, 2020 and 17  November 2020.  12. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut. The th same   came   to   be   rejected   by   order   dated   8   July,   2020. Similarly, the bail applications preferred by accused­respondents Jumma, Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz were also rejected th by a separate order dated 8   July, 2020, having regard to the seriousness of the offences alleged against the respondents.  13. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application before   the   High   Court   and   the   same   was   allowed   by   the th impugned order dated 7  October 2020 with a direction that the accused be released on bail. Subsequently, the bail application preferred   by   the   accused­respondents   Jumma,   Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz was also allowed by the High Court by th impugned order dated 17   November 2020 by relying on the order granting bail to co­accused Meherban. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred these appeals before this Court.  14. We have heard Sri. Ronak Karanpuria, learned counsel for the   appellant,   Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for 7 accused­   respondents   and   Sri.   R.K.   Raizada,   learned   Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh and perused the material on record.  15. The Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned orders of the High Court have been passed without exercising jurisdiction in a judicious manner. In support of this contention, it was submitted that the accused­respondents had failed to appear before the Trial Court notwithstanding multiple directions issued by the Trial Court, High Court and even this Court to that effect. That they were under judicial custody for a period less than nine months and had earlier absconded but have now been granted bail by the High Court contrary to the settled principles of law and the judgments of this Court. That by directing that the accused be released on bail, the High Court has invited the risk of them absconding again and that this would prove to be prejudicial to the investigation and trial.  It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the possibility of the accused ­respondents tampering with evidence and/or influencing witnesses while on bail, cannot be ruled out.  16. Further it was urged that the High Court has not assigned reasons for the grant of bail in the instant cases. That the High 8 Court could not have granted bail to the accused having scant regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences   alleged   against   them. According  to  the learned  counsel for  the  appellant,  the High Court in a very cryptic order  de hors  any reasoning has granted bail to the accused­respondents. It was submitted on behalf of the mother of the deceased, that the instant appeals may be allowed by setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon certain judgments of this Court which shall be referred to later.  17. Per   contra,  Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for accused­   respondents   supported   the  impugned   orders   and submitted   that   the   same  do   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity warranting   interference   by   this   Court.   That   the   informant­ appellant has narrated an untrue version of events in order to falsely   implicate   the   accused.   The   learned   counsel   for   the respondents has stated that there was a scuffle between the sons   and   the   husband   of   the   appellant,   and   the   accused­ respondents on the day of the alleged incident. That four of the accused   have   also   been   seriously   injured   as   a   result   of   the attack by appellant’s husband and sons. That an FIR in this regard   had   been   lodged   against   the   appellant,   her   sons   and 9 husband, in connection with which case the said persons have been granted bail by the competent court. That no prima facie case   has   been   made   out   against   the   accused   and   this   is evidenced by the fact that they were not charge­sheeted.  It   has   further   been   submitted   that   the   accused­ respondents  have  no   criminal  antecedents  and   therefore,   the High   Court   acted   in   accordance   with   law   in   enlarging   the accused­respondents on bail.  It has also been contended that a court deciding a bail application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits of the case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage is bound to prejudice fair trial.  It   was   submitted   that   the   allegations   against   the respondent­accused are false and hence the impugned orders of the High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals.  18. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Ronak Karanpuria, learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   the   impugned   orders granting   bail   to   the   accused   respondents   are   bereft   of   any reasoning and they are cryptic and bail has been granted in a casual   manner,   we   extract   those   portions   of   the   impugned th th orders dated 7  October, 2020 and 17  November, 2020 passed 10 by the High Court which provide the “reasoning” of the Court for granting bail, as under:  th   Impugned Order dated   7      October, 2020 “Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of punishment   in   case   of   conviction   and   the nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witnesses and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is entitled to be released on bail in this case.  Let the applicant Meharban involved in Case Crime No. 955 of 2018 under sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506, 34 I.P.C., police station Sardhana, District Meerut be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond of Rs. One lac with two sureties (out of which one should be of his family member) each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the   court   concerned   with   the   following conditions. (i) The applicant shall file an undertaking to the effect that he shall not seek any adjournment   on   the   dates   fixed   for evidence   when   the   witnesses   are present in court. In case of default of this condition, it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in accordance with law. (ii) The   applicant   shall   remain   present before   the   trial   court   on   each   date fixed, either personally or through his counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence, without sufficient cause, the trial court may   proceed   against   him   under Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal Code. 11 (iii) In   case,   the   applicant   misuses   the liberty of bail during trial and in order to   secure   his   presence   proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and the applicant fails to appear before the court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court shall initiate proceedings against him, in accordance with law, under Section 174­A of the Indian Penal Code. (iv) The applicant shall remain present, in person,   before   the   trial   court   on   the dates fixed for (i) opening of the case, (ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court absence of the applicant is deliberate or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it shall be open for the trial court to treat such default as abuse of liberty of bail and proceed against him in accordance with law. It is further directed that the identity, status and   residence   proof   of   the   sureties   be verified by the authorities concerned before they are accepted. In case of breach of any of the above conditions, the trial court will be liberty to cancel the bail.” th   Impugned Order dated 17      November, 2020 “Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of punishment   in   case   of   conviction   and   the nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witnesses and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is entitled to be released on bail in this case. 12 Let   the   applicants­   Jumma,   Hakmeen, Yaseen,   Arshad,   and   Firoz   involved   in aforesaid case crime be released on bail on his   furnishing   a   personal   bond   and   two sureties   each   in   the   like   amount   to   the satisfaction of the court concerned with the following   conditions   which   are   being imposed in the interest of justice:­ (i) The   applicants   shall   file   an undertaking   to   the   effect   that   they shall not seek any adjournment on the dates   fixed   for   evidence   when   the witnesses are present in court. In case of default of this condition, it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in accordance with law. (ii) The   applicants   shall   remain   present before   the   trial   court   on   each   date fixed, either personally or through his counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence, without sufficient cause, the trial court may   proceed   against   him   under Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal Code. (iii) In   case,   the   applicants   misuses   the liberty of bail during trial and in order to   secure   his   presence   proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and the   applicants   fails   to   appear   before the   court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court shall initiate proceedings against him, in accordance with law, under Section 174­A of the Indian Penal Code. (iv) The applicants shall remain present, in person,   before   the   trial   court   on   the dates fixed for (i) opening of the case, (ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court absence of the applicant is deliberate or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it 13 shall be open for the trial court to treat such default as abuse of liberty of bail and proceed against him in accordance with law. (v) The party shall file computer generated copy   of   such   order   downloaded   from the   official   website   of   High   Court   of Allahabad. (vi) The computer generated copy of such order   shall   be   self   attested   by   the counsel of the party concerned. (vii) The concerned/Authority/Official shall verify   the   authenticity   of   such computerized   copy   of   the   order   from the   official   website   of   High   Court   of Allahabad   and   shall   make   a declaration   of   such   verification   in writing. In   view   of   the   extraordinary   situation prevailing in the State due to Covid­19, the directions   of   this   Court   dated   6.4.2020 passed in Public Interest Litigation No. 564 of 2020 (In re vs. State of U.P.), shall also be complied. The order read thus: Looking   to   impediments   in   arranging sureties because of lockdown, while invoking powers   under   Article   226   and   227   of   the Constitution of India, we deem it appropriate to   order   that   all   the   accused­applicants whose bail application came to be allowed on th or after 15  March, 2020 but have not been released due to non­availability of sureties as a consequence to lockdown may be released on executing personal bond as ordered by the Court or to the satisfaction of the jail authorities   where   such   accused   is imprisoned, provided the accused­applicants undertakes   to   furnish   required   sureties within a period of one month from the date of his/her actual release.” 14 19. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an accused as under: a) In   Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh ­­   (1978) 1  Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content SCC 240, of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail, which are extracted as under: “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8.   Another   relevant   factor   is   as   to   whether   the course   of   justice   would   be   thwarted   by   him   who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. 9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the Court   considering   the   likelihood   of   the   applicant interfering   with   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only   traditional   but   rational,   in   this   context,   to enquire   into   the   antecedents   of   a   man   who   is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record –  particularly   a  record  which  suggests  that  he  is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard   to   habituals,   it   is   part   of   criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee   to   exploit   the   opportunity   to   inflict   further about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” 15 b) In     – Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS (2001)   4   SCC   280   this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows:  “The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the   bail,   the   court   has   to   keep   in   mind   the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character, behavior, means and standing of the accused, circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether   there   is   a   genuine   case   against   the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.”

 speaking through Banerjee, J., Singh –  (2002) 3 SCC 598, emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of 16 bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. This Court highlighted   that   bail   cannot   be   granted   as   a   matter   of course, bereft of cogent reasoning.  d)  In   Kalyan  Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias  this Court held Pappu Yadav & Anr.  – (2004) 7 SCC 528, that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.  e) In  Prasanta  Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chaterjee  ­­ (2010) 14 SCC 496  this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from   the   vice   of   non­application   of   mind,   rendering   it illegal.   This   Court   has   enumerated   the   circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside.  f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody. However, as noted in  Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh , the period of @ Lalla Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446 17 custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the totality of the circumstances and the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any.  Further,  the circumstances  which  may justify the grant of bail are to be considered in the larger context of the societal concern involved in releasing an accused,   in   juxtaposition   to   individual   liberty   of   the accused seeking bail.  g) In  Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr.  – (2016) 15 SCC 422,  after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was) in paragraph18 as under:    18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order passed by the High Court is sought as many relevant   factors   have   not   been   taken   into consideration   which   includes   the   criminal antecedents   of   the   accused   and   that   makes   the order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result is the lancination of the impugned order.” h) In  Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)  – (2018) 12 SCC 129,  this Court, while considering an appeal from an order  of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be 18 mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this Court has stated that while it is not possible to prescribe an exhaustive list of considerations which are to guide a court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of an   order   granting   bail,   is   that   it   should   result   from judicious exercise of the court’s discretion.  i) Recently in  Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.   –   2021   SCC   Online   SC   1020 ,   this   Court   made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power to   determine   whether   bail   has   been   granted   for   valid reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court  distinguished between setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts requiring such cancellation. Quoting  Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar  ­ (2020) 2 SCC 118 , this Court observed as under: “16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an   order   granting   bail   stand   on   a   different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test   is   whether   the   order   granting   bail   is perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence 19 of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted.”  j) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is   Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar and Anr.   – Criminal Appeal No. 1663/2021,  wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows:  “While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time   while   considering   an   application   for   bail Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that   have   a   bearing   in   the   case,   particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or   vexatious   in   nature   but   are   supported   by adequate   material  brought   on   record   so   as   to enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a   prima   facie conclusion. While considering an application for grant of bail a   prima facie   conclusion must be supported   by   reasons   and   must  be   arrived   at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a   conviction   vis­à­vis   the   offence/s   alleged against an accused.” 20.  On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial 20 authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in   Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited   &   Anr.   Vs.   Masood Ahmed   Khan   &   Ors.   –   (2010)   9   SCC   496,   wherein   after referring to a number of judgments this Court summarised at paragraph 47 the law on the point. The relevant principles for the purpose of this case are extracted as under: 

21

Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the context of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by the National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission,   reliance could be placed on the said judgment on the need to give reasons while deciding a matter. 21. The Latin maxim “ cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex ” meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of 22 any   particular   law   ceases,   so   does   the   law   itself”,   is   also apposite. 22. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned orders above. At the outset, we find that the extracted portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High court while granting bail. As evident from the judgments of this Court   referred   to   above,   a   court   deciding   a   bail   application cannot   grant   bail   to   an   accused   without   having   regard   to material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the   allegations   made against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   would   result   in   a conviction;   reasonable   apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being influenced   by   the   accused;   tampering   of   the   evidence;   the frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the   accused;   and   a   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in support of the charge against the accused.  While we are conscious of the fact that it is not necessary for   a   Court   to   give   elaborate   reasons   while   granting   bail particularly   when   the   case   is   at   the   initial   stage   and   the allegations of the offences by the accused may not have been crystalised as such, an order  de hors  any reasoning whatsoever cannot result  in  grant   of  bail.  If  bail  is  granted  in  a  casual 23 manner, the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the order before a higher forum. As noted in  Gurcharan Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.)  ­ 1978 CriLJ 129,  when bail has been granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) of the CrPC. However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal or   has   been   arrived   at   by   ignoring   material   aspects   which establish a prima­facie case against the accused.  23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider the facts of the present cases. The allegations against accused­ respondents as well as the contentions raised at the Bar have been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of the same, the following aspects of the case would emerge:  a) The allegations against the accused­respondents are under 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with section 34 of the IPC,   with   regard   to   murder   of   the   deceased,   Yameen   and attempt to murder Mobin and Jamshed. Thus the offences alleged against the accused are of grave and heinous nature 24 inasmuch as there was death of appellant’s son and serious injuries caused to her husband and another son. b) That allegedly the accused­respondents attacked with deadly weapons such as swords and knives.  c) That there was allegedly a pre­existing enmity between the deceased and Bhoora, one of the accused, which apparently had been settled by the local residents.  d) The accused­respondents were summoned by the Trial Court st by order dated  21   September, 2019. The accused preferred an application under section 482 CrPC praying for an order st quashing the order dated 21  September, 2019. By an order th dated 11  November, 2019, the High Court dismissed the said application   and   granted   30   days’   time   to   the   accused   to surrender before the Trial Court. The accused­respondents assailed the said order by preferring a Special Leave Petition, being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before this Court, which th came to be dismissed by order dated 6  December 2019.  e)   The   accused­respondents   resisted   arrest   for   a   period   of approximately   three   and   a   half   months   as   they   were absconding. The accused failed to surrender before the Trial Court in gross violation of the directions of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, the High Court and even this 25 Court.   This   is   a   glaring   instance   of   gross   violation   of   the courts’ orders and rule of law.  f) The accused­respondents had preferred applications before the Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge   which   came   to   be th rejected by separate orders dated 8  July, 2020.  g)   The   chances   of   the   accused   absconding   are   grave   having regard to their previous conduct, if they are on bail. This would delay commencement and conclusion of the trial and consequently have an adverse impact on the cause of justice.  h) The propensity of accused­respondents tampering with the evidence and influencing the witnesses is an important factor to be borne in mind in such cases. As a result, the accused being beneficiaries of the same cannot be ruled out.   i) The High Court in the impugned orders has failed to consider the aforestated aspects of the case in the context of the grant of bail and has granted bail to the accused by cryptic orders.   24. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present cases in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that these cases are fit cases for grant of bail to the accused­respondents, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations against them as well as the aforesaid reasons.  26 25. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material aspects   of   the   cases   and   has,   by   a   very   cryptic   and   casual orders,   de   hors   any   coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the accused­respondents. We find that the High Court was not right in   allowing   the   applications   for   bail   filed   by   the   accused­ th respondents. Hence the impugned orders dated 7   May, 2020 th and 17  November, 2020 are set aside. The appeals are allowed.  26. The   accused­respondents   are   on   bail.   Their   bail   bonds stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the concerned jail  authorities  within  a  period of two  weeks  from today.  ……………………………J.  (M.R. SHAH)  ……………………….…..J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA) NEW DELHI;  TH 18  JANUARY, 2022.