Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BOMBAY LABOUR UNION REPRESENTING THE WORKMEN OF MESSRS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MESSRS INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISES PVT. LTD
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/11/1965
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 942 1966 SCR (2) 477
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1981 SC1829 (92)
ACT:
Industrial Dispute--Rule terminating employment of women
automatically on marriage--Validity of rule-Industrial
adjudication whether should interfere.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent concern had a rule in its packing and
labelling department that if a woman employee got married
her service would stand automatically terminated. The
appellant union raised an industrial dispute on this
question and it was referred to the Industrial Tribunal,
Maharashtra. The Tribunal held that the rule was justified
whereupon, the appellant came to this Court by special
leave.
The justification given on behalf of the respondent for the
said rule was that in the particular department where the
rule operated team work was required for which regular
attendance was necessary, and married women, for obvious
reasons, could not be expected to be regular in attendance.
It was also contended for the respondent that industrial
adjudication should not interfere with the employer’s right
to impose any condition in the matter of employment when he
employs new workmen. Rule 5(3) of the Indian Administrative
Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1964, was referred to as
carrying a similar condition.
HELD: (i) There was nothing to show that married women
would by the more likely to be absent than unmarried women
or widows. The only difference was that married women would
ask for maternity leave. This could be provided for by
having a few extra women as leave reserve. So far as
efficiency was concerned it could hardly be said that
married women would be less efficient than unmarried ones or
widows. The economic interest of the concern was also not
affected in any material way. There was thus no good and
convincing reason why such a rule should continue in one
department of the pharmaceutical industry. The fact that
such a rule existed in other concerns also was no
justification, if the rule could not be justified on its own
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merits. The rule, therefore, had to be abrogated. [495E, G-
H; 496A-B, D]
(ii) It is too late in the day to stress the absolute
freedom of an employer to impose any condition which he
likes on labour. It is always open to industrial
adjudication to consider the conditions of employment of
labour and to vary them if it is found necessary. [496 E-F]
(iii) Rule 5(3) of the Indian Administrative Service
(Recruitment) an unmarried woman marries subself the
maintenance of the efficiency her to resign. This rule
does on marriage as a matter of course as the case of the
respondent concern. [497 B-C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 274 of 1964.
494
Appeal by special leave from the award dated May 31, 1963 of
the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra in Reference (I.T.) No.
59 of 1963.
S. B. Naik and K. R. Chaudhury, for the appellants.
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, G. B. Pal, J. B.
Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent
No. 1.
A. S. R. Chari, K. Raiendra Chaudhury, M. S. K. Aiyangar
and M. R. K. Pillai, for respondent No. 2.
A. S. R. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, for interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, J. The only question raised in this appeal by spe-
cial leave is the propriety of a service condition in the
respondent concern by which unmarried women in a particular
department have to resign on their getting married. A
dispute was raised about this condition by the appellant-
union on behalf of the workmen and was referred to the
Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, in the following terms
"The existing bar on ladies that on their getting married
they have to leave the service of the company should be
removed."
The respondent is a pharmaceutical concern. It appears that
there is a rule in force in the respondent-concrn according
to which if a lady workman gets married, her services are
treated as automatically terminated. It appears that such a
rule is in force in other pharmaceutical concerns in that
region and the matter came up on two occasions before
industrial tribunals for adjudication with reference to
other pharmaceutical concerns, and on both occasions the
challenge by the workmen to such a rule failed. On the
first occasion the dispute was between the Boots Pure Drug
Co. (India) Limited v. Their Workmen(1) and a similar rule
was upheld in 1956. On the second occasion the dispute was
between Sandoz (India,) Limited v. Workmen employed under
it(2). There was agitation in the respondent concern in
connection with this rule and the present reference was
eventually made in February 1963. The tribunal followed its
earlier decision in Sandoz Limited case(2 ) and rejected the
contention that the rule be abrogated. The appellant
obtained special leave to appeal from this Court; and that
is how the matter has come up before us.
(1) B.G.G. Part I -L, dated Jan. 26,1966.
(2) (1962) Industrial Court Reporter 22.
495
Ordinarily we see no reason for such a rule requiring un-
married women to give up service on marriage, particularly
when it is not disputed that no such rule exists in other
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industries. It is also not in dispute that no such rule
exists in other departments of the respondent-concern itself
and it is only in one department that the rule is in force.
It can only be upheld if the respondent shows that there are
good and convincing reasons why in this particular
department of the pharmaceutical industry it is necessary to
have such a rule. The only reason given for enforcement of
this rule in this department of the respondent-concern is
that the workmen have to work in teams in this department
and that requires that they should be regular and that this
cannot be expected from married women for obvious reasons,
and that there is greater absenteeism among married women
than among unmarried women or widows against whom there is
no bar of this kind.
We are not impressed by these reasons for retaining a rule
of this kind. The work in this department is not arduous
for the department is concerned with packing, labelling,
putting in phials and other work of this kind which has to
be done after the pharmaceutical product has been
manufactured. Nor do we think that because the work has to
be done as a team it cannot be done by married women. We
also feel that there is nothing to show that married women
would necessarily be more likely to be absent than unmarried
women or widows. If it is the presence of children which
may be said to account for greater absenteeism among married
women, that would be so more or less in the case of widows
with children also. The fact that the work has got to be
done as a team and presence of all those workmen is neces-
sary, is in our opinion no disqualification so far as
married women are concerned. It cannot be disputed that
even unmarried women or widows are entitled to such leave as
the respondent’s rules provide and they would be availing
themselves of these leave facilities. The only difference
in the matter of absenteeism that we can see between married
women on the one hand and unmarried women and widows on the
other is in the matter of maternity leave which is an extra
facility available to married women. To this extent only,
married women are more likely to be absent than unmarried
women and widows. But such absence can in our opinion be
easily provided for by having a few extra women as leave
reserve and can thus hardly be a ground for such a drastic
rule as the present which requires an unmarried woman to
resign as soon as she marries. We have been unable to
understand how it can be said that it is necessary in the
interest of efficient ope-
496
ration and in the company’s economic interest not to employ
married women. So far as efficient operation is concerned,
it can hardly be said that married women would be less
efficient than unmarried women or widows so far as pure
efficiency in work is concerned, apart of course from the
question of maternity leave. As to the economic interest of
the concern, we fail to see what difference the employment
of married women will make in that ,connection for the
emoluments whether of an unmarried woman ,or of a married
woman are the same. The only difference between the two as
we have already said is the burden on account ,of maternity
leave. But as to that the respondent contends that the
reason for having this rule is not the respondent’s desire
to -avoid the small burden to be placed on it on account of
maternity leave. If that is so, we fail to see any
justification for a rule ,of this kind which requires an
unmarried woman to give up service immediately she marries.
We are therefore of opinion that there is no good and
convincing reason why such a rule should continue in one
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department of the pharmaceutical industry. The fact that
such a rule exists in other such concerns is no
justification, if the rule cannot be justified on its own
merits.
Then it is urged that the employer was free to impose any
condition in the matter of employment when he employs a now
workman and that industrial adjudication should not
interfere with this right of the employer. AR that need be
said in this connection is that it is too late in the day
now to stress the absolute freedom of an employer to impose
any condition which he likes on labour. It is always open
to industrial adjudication to consider the conditions of
employment of labour and to vary them if it is found
necessary, unless the employer ran justify an ,extraordinary
condition like this by reasons which carry conviction. In-
the present case the reasons which the respondent has
advanced and which were the basis of the two decisions
referred -to earlier do not commend themselves to us as
sufficient for such -a rule. We are therefore of opinion
that such a rule should be abrogated in the interest of
social justice.
Lastly it is urged that a similar rule exists in certain
government services and in this connection our attention is
drawn in particular to r. 5(3) of the 1954 Indian
Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules. That rule reads
as follows :-
"No married woman shall be entitled as of
right to be appointed to the Service, and
where a woman appointed to the Service
subsequently marries, the Central Government
may, if the maintenance of the
497
efficiency of the Service so requires, call
upon her to resign."
It will be seen that this rule for the Indian Administrative
Service is not unqualified like the rule in force in the
respondent’s concern. It only lays down that where an
unmarried woman marries subsequently, the Central Government
may, if the maintenance of the efficiency of the Service so
requires call upon her to resign. Therefore this rule does
not compel unmarried women to resign on marriage as a matter
of course as is the case in the respondent concern. It is
only when the Central Government considers that marriage has
impaired the efficiency of the woman concerned that the
Central Government may call upon her to resign. The rule
which is in force in the respondent-concern however assumes
that merely by marriage the efficiency of the woman-employee
is impaired and such an assumption in our opinion is not
justified. At any rate this rule for the Indian
Administrative Service which has been brought to our notice
only for purposes. of comparison does not justify the
drastic rule that we have in the present case where an
unmarried woman is compelled to resign immediately she
marries without regard to her continued efficiency.
On a careful consideration of the reasons advanced on behalf
of the respondent in support of the existing rule we are of
opinion that the reasons do not justify such a drastic rule.
We therefore allow the appeal and direct that the rule in
question in the form in which it exists at present be
abrogated. The abrogation shall take effect from the date
of this judgment. The appellants will get their costs from
the respondent-company.
Appeal allowed.
498
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