MOHD. INAM vs. SANJAY KUMAR SINGHAL

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO._2697 OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20133 OF 2018] MOHD. INAM   ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SANJAY KUMAR SINGHAL & ORS.  .... RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT  B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 26.10.2017 passed by the learned single judge of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition No.1074 of 2008 (M/S) thereby, allowing the writ petition filed by the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – landlords herein. Date: 2020.06.26 17:13:14 IST Reason: 2 3. The facts, in brief, necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are thus: Rashid Ahmed, the father of the present appellant, was   the   original   tenant   of   House   No.61/8,   Ground   Floor, Green Pasture View, Landhour Bazar, Mussoorie (hereinafter referred to as “the suit premises” or “the premises”) since 1965.    The  respondents  had  purchased the  suit  premises from the original landlord Sudesh Kumar Singhal in the year 1998 and,  as such, became  the tenant ­ Rashid  Ahmed’s landlord from 1998. The respondents – landlord moved an application before the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer, Mussoorie   on   10.6.1999,   contending   therein,   that   Rashid Ahmed had sub­let the property to some other persons who were not the family members of the tenant.   As such, they prayed   for   declaration   of   vacancy   under   the   provisions   of Section   16(1)(b)   of   U.P.   Urban   Buildings   (Regulation   of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “U.P. Act, 1972” or “the Act”). On the application of the landlord, a Rent Control Inspector was appointed to inspect the suit premises.   The 3 Rent   Control   Inspector   visited   the   suit   premises   and submitted his report on 16.08.1999.   In the report, it was stated, that  Rashid Ahmed, who was  the  tenant,  was not present in the premises at the time of the inspection and he was informed by the occupants that he had gone to his village Bhatpura in Saharanpur District.  The report further stated, that Rashid and Akbar were sons of Hasunuddin and, as such,   real   brothers.     The   report   stated   that,   there   were several persons residing in the premises and they comprised of four separate families, namely, (1) Rashid Ahmed; (2) Inam s/o Rashid Ahmed along with his six children; (3) Shabbir Ahmed, wife Shafikan and daughter; and (4) Ayyub and his children Naseem and Nashima respectively.  The original tenant ­ Rashid Ahmed filed objections to   the   inspection   report   stating   therein,   that   he   and   his brother   and   their   families   are   living   in   the   premises   as tenant.  He further stated, that tenancy was in his name and there   was   no   other   person   who   was   outside   his   family residing   in   the   said   premises.       He,   therefore,   resisted declaring the suit premises as vacant.  4 During the pendency of the proceedings, the house owner informed the competent authority that, on 19.1.2000 Rashid Ahmed died in his village Bhatpura leaving behind his son Mohd. Inam, the present appellant, as his legal heir.  As such, the name of Rashid Ahmed came to be substituted with that of the present appellant.  The present appellant filed his application stating therein, that he along with other family members   of   late   Rashid   Ahmed   was   residing   in   the   said premises.   The Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion that the persons, who were presently residing in the premises had not produced any evidence to prove, that they were living as tenants since 1965 along with late Rashid Ahmed.  As such, he came to the conclusion, that the tenants had allowed persons to reside in the premises, who are not members   of   the   family   and,   as   such,   declared   the   suit premises as vacant vide order dated 4.6.2003.   Being aggrieved thereby, the present appellant along with his cousin Shabbir Ahmed filed Writ Petition before the 5 High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital being Writ Petition No. 7 (MS) of 2003.  The High Court vide order dated 23.8.2006 by  referring   to  the  judgment  of   this   Court  in  the  case of 1 vs.   granted Achal Misra  Rama Shanker Singh and others liberty to the petitioners therein to challenge the order dated 4.6.2003 after the final order i.e. order of release/allotment was passed under Section 16 of the U.P. Act, 1972. The   Rent  Controller   and  Eviction   Officer  passed a final   order   under   Section   16   of   the   U.P.   Act,   1972   on 31.5.2007   thereby,   declaring   the   suit   premises   ‘vacant’   in favour of the respondents – landlord.  Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   appellant   and   said Shabbir Ahmed filed a revision being R.C.R. No.122 of 2007 before   the   District   Judge,   Dehradun   as   provided   under Section 18 of the U.P. Act, 1972. The learned District Judge, Dehradun, by a well­reasoned order dated 5.6.2008, allowed the revision thereby, setting aside the order of vacancy dated 4.6.2003 and the final order dated 31.5.2007.   1 (2005) 5 SCC 531 6 Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents No.1 and 2 – landlord filed a writ petition before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital being Writ Petition No.1074 of 2008 (M/S). As stated earlier, the said writ petition is allowed by the impugned order dated 26.10.2017.   Being aggrieved, the present appeal by special leave.  4. We have heard Shri Ashok Kumar Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents – landlord.  5. The main ground on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is that, the learned District Judge had committed illegality in entertaining the joint revision filed against the vacancy order as well as the final order.  The High Court in the impugned order has observed, that the judgment and order dated 23.8.2006, passed by the said High Court dismissing the writ petition had not been challenged before this Court by the respondents No. 1 and 2 therein (appellant and   proforma   respondent   No.3   herein).     The   High   Court further   goes   to   observe,   that   the   respondents   therein 7 (appellant and proforma respondent No.3 herein) had elected not to assail the vacancy order as well as the order dated 23.8.2006, passed by the High Court dismissing the said writ petition.  It goes to further observe, that after dismissal of the writ petition there was no occasion for the High Court to grant liberty to the respondents therein, to avail remedy of revision,  challenging  the  order  of  vacancy  dated  4.6.2003. The   learned   Judge   has   gone   to   further   observe,   that   the revision   against   the   order   dated   4.6.2003   was   not maintainable   and   that   the   District   Judge   had   committed patent illegality in entertaining the revision.   6. We find, that the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court is not only on misreading of the law but also misreading of the facts.   It will be relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of  (supra).  It Achal Misra  will also be relevant to refer to the background in which the said judgment by the learned three Judges was rendered.  7. In   Tirlok Singh and Co.   vs.   District Magistrate, 2 , two learned Judges of this Court had held, that Lucknow 2 (1976) 3 SCC 726 8 under the scheme of the Act, an order notifying a vacancy by itself does no injury and causes no prejudice to the interests of any party.  It was held, that a notification of the vacancy was only a step in aid of an order of allotment or release and only when such orders are passed, the landlord or the tenant can have a grievance.   After considering the provisions of Section 16 and Section 18 of the U.P. Act, 1972, as they existed at the time of delivery of the judgment, it was held in Tirlok Singh     (supra) that, a writ petition filed against an order declaring a vacancy only, was premature, as the order did not affect the rights of the person who challenges that order.   8. The decision in   Tirlok Singh   (supra) came up for consideration before a Bench of three learned Judges in the 3 case of   vs.  .  In   (supra), the Ganpat Roy ADM Ganpat Roy Bench of three learned Judges disagreed with the proposition laid down in   Tirlok Singh   (supra), that the rights of the landlord   or   the   tenant   are   not   affected   merely   by   the notification of a vacancy.   No doubt, in the meantime, U.P. 3 (1985) 2 SCC 307 9 Act,1972   had   undergone   an   amendment   and   an   appeal against the final order of allotment had been replaced by a revision under more restricted conditions.   In   Ganpat Roy (supra),   it   was   observed,   that   the   observations   in   Tirlok Singh   (supra),   holding,   that   it   was   unnecessary   for   the District Magistrate to hear the parties before notifying the vacancy, did not appear to be correct.  It was also observed, that it also did not appear to be correct to hold, that an order notifying the vacancy did no injury and caused no prejudice to the interests of any party because an order notifying the vacancy   could   be   objected   to.       It   was   held,   that   the correctness of the decision in  (supra) was open Tirlok Singh  to doubt. Their Lordships in   Ganpat Roy   (supra) therefore held, that the scheme of the Act would show that a tenant of a premises, in whose case it was found that there was a deemed   vacancy,   had   no   efficacious   or   adequate   remedy under the Act to challenge that finding. It was, therefore, held,   that   a   petition   under   Article   226   or   227   of   the 10 Constitution filed by such a tenant in order to challenge that finding could not, therefore, be said to be premature.   9. In  Achal Misra  (supra), the High Court had allowed the writ petitions filed by the allottees on the ground, that the landlord not having challenged the original order notifying the vacancy then and there, was precluded from challenging the order notifying the vacancy in revision against the final order or in further challenges to it in the High Court. When the judgment of the High Court came up for consideration before the two learned Judges of this Court, it was noticed, that it could   not   be   said   that   the   question   of   vacancy,   if   not challenged   by   a   separate   writ   petition   on   its   notification, could not be questioned along with the final order, in the revision filed under Section 18 of the Act.   It was observed, that the question of vacancy pertained to a jurisdictional fact and   can   be   challenged   in   the   revision   filed   against   the allotment order passed by the District Magistrate.   It was further observed, that in case it was found, that there was no vacancy, the order of allotment had to be set aside.  As such, the learned two Judges referred the matter to a larger Bench. 11 The learned three Judges in the judgment in   Achal Misra (supra) observed thus: “11.  On   the   scheme   of   the   Act,   it   is clear   that   the   preliminary   step   is   to declare   a   vacancy.   At   this   stage,   an enquiry   has   to   be   made   including   an enquiry   involving   at   least   two respectable neighbours. It is thereafter that the vacancy has to be notified and objections   invited.   This   is   followed   by either   dropping   of   the   proceedings   on the objections being upheld that there was no vacancy, or by allotment to a tenant   on   finding   the   vacancy,   or   in ordering   a   release   of   the   building,   in case   a  landlord   was   found  entitled  to have   such   a   release   under   the   Act. Therefore, the notifying of a vacancy is only a step in the process of making an allotment   of   the   building   to   a   tenant. The Act contemplates that no building should be let out by a landlord except through the process of allotment by the Rent Control Authority. Since the order notifying   a   vacancy   is   only   a   step   in passing the final order in a proceeding under the Act regarding allotment, it is clear that the same could be challenged while challenging the final order, unless there is anything in the Act precluding such a challenge or conferring a finality to the order notifying a vacancy. It was held   long   ago   by   the   Privy   Council in  Moheshur Sing  v.  Bengal Govt.  [(1859) 7 Moo IA 283] (Moo IA at p. 302) “We   are   not   aware   of   any   law   or regulation   prevailing   in   India   which 12 renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which   he   may   conceive   himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting forever the benefit of   the   consideration   of   the   appellate court.   No   authority   or   precedent   has been   cited   in   support   of   such   a proposition,   and   we   cannot   conceive that   anything   would   be   more detrimental   to   the   expeditious administration   of   justice   than   the establishment   of   a   rule   which   would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he   might   be   harassed   with   endless expense   and   delay,   and   on   the   other inflict   upon   his   opponent   similar calamities.” 12.  In  Sheonoth  v.  Ramnath  [(1865)   10 MIA   413]   the   Privy   Council   reiterated that a party is not bound to appeal from every interlocutory order which is a step in the procedure that leads to a final decree. It is open on appeal from such final decree to question an interlocutory order.  This   principle   is   recognised   by 13. Section   105(1)   of   the   Code   of   Civil Procedure and reaffirmed by Order 43 Rule   1­A   of   the   Code.   The   two exceptions   to   this   rule   are   found   in Section   97   of   the   Code   of   Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that a preliminary   decree   passed   in   a   suit could   not   be   challenged   in   an   appeal 13 against the final decree based on that preliminary decree and Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which precludes   a   challenge   to   an   order   of remand   at   a   subsequent   stage   while filing   an   appeal   against   the   decree passed   subsequent   to   the   order   of remand. All these aspects came to be considered by this Court in  Satyadhyan Ghosal  v.  Deorajin   Debi  [(1960)   3   SCR 590   :   AIR   1960   SC   941.  Ed. :  See also (1981) 2 SCC 103, (2004) 12 SCC 754   and   (2005)   3   SCC   422]   wherein, after   referring   to   the   decisions   of   the Privy   Council,   it   was   held   that   an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay  or  even though an appeal  lay,  an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in   an   appeal   from   a   final   decree   or order. It was further held that a special provision was made in Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as regards orders   of   remand   where   the   order   of remand   itself   was   made   appealable. Since   Section   105(2)  did   not   apply   to the   Privy   Council   and   can   have   no application to appeals to the Supreme Court,   the   Privy   Council   and   the Supreme Court could examine even the correctness   of   an   original   order   of remand   while   considering   the correctness   of   the   decree   passed subsequent to the order of remand. The same  principle   was  reiterated   in  Amar Chand Butail  v.  Union of India  [AIR 1964 SC   1658]   and   in   other   subsequent decisions. 14 14.  It   is   thus   clear   that   an   order notifying a vacancy which leads to the final   order   of   allotment   can   be challenged   in   a   proceeding   taken   to challenge  the final order,  as being an order which is a preliminary step in the process   of   decision­making   in   passing the   final   order.   Hence,   in   a   revision against   the   final   order   of   allotment which   is   provided   for   by   the   Act,   the order   notifying   the   vacancy   could   be challenged. The decision in  Ganpat Roy case [(1985)   2   SCC   307]   which   has disapproved   the   ratio   of   the   decision in  Tirlok   Singh   and   Co. [(1976)   3   SCC 726]   cannot   be   understood   as   laying down that the failure to challenge the order   notifying   the   vacancy   then   and there, would result in the loss of right to the aggrieved person of challenging the notifying of vacancy itself, in a revision against the final order of allotment. It has   only   clarified   that   even   the   order notifying   the   vacancy   could   be immediately   and   independently challenged. The High Court, in our view, has   misunderstood   the   effect   of   the decision   of   this   Court   in  Ganpat   Roy  [(1985)   2   SCC   307]   and   has   not case kept in mind the general principles of law   governing   such   a   question   as expounded by the Privy Council and by this Court. It is nobody's case that there is   anything   in   the   Act   corresponding either to Section 97 or to Section 105(2) of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908 precluding a challenge in respect of an order which ultimately leads to the final order. We overrule the view taken by the 15 Allahabad   High   Court   in   the   present case and in  Kunj Lata  v.  Xth ADJ  [(1991) 2 RCJ 658] that in a revision against the final order, the order notifying the vacancy   could   not   be   challenged   and that   the   failure   to   independently challenge   the   order   notifying   the vacancy   would   preclude   a   successful challenge to the allotment order itself. In   fact,   the   person   aggrieved   by   the order notifying the vacancy can be said to have two options available. Either to challenge   the   order   notifying   the vacancy then and there by way of a writ petition   or   to   make   the   statutory challenge after a final order of allotment has been made and if he is aggrieved even   thereafter,   to   approach   the   High Court.   It   would   really   be   a   case   of election of remedies.” 10. It could thus be seen, that considering the scheme of the Act; the principles as recognized by Section 105(1) and Order XLIII Rule 1­A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the various judgments of the Privy Council as well as this Court, it was held, that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or even though   an   appeal   lay,   an   appeal   was   not   taken,   can   be challenged in an appeal from a final decree or order.  It was therefore held, that an order, notifying a vacancy which leads 16 to   the   final   order   of   allotment   can   be   challenged   in   a proceeding taken out to challenge the final order, as being an order which is a preliminary step in the process of decision making in passing the final order.  The learned three Judges therefore held, that in a revision against the final order of allotment which is provided for by the Act, the order notifying the   vacancy   could   be   challenged.     It   was   held,   that   the decision in  Ganpat Roy   (supra), which disapproved the ratio in   (supra)   cannot   be   understood   as   laying Tirlok   Singh   down, that the failure to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there, would result in the loss of right to the   aggrieved   person   of   challenging   the   order   notifying vacancy   itself,   in   a   revision   against   the   final   order   of allotment.     It   was   held,       (supra)   had   only Ganpat   Roy clarified that even the order notifying the vacancy could be immediately and independently challenged.  It was therefore held, that the High Court had misunderstood the effect of the decision of this Court in      (supra) and had not Ganpat Roy kept in mind the general principles of law governing such a 17 question as expounded by the Privy Council and this Court. It was held, that there was nothing in the Act corresponding either to Section 97 or to Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 precluding a challenge in respect of an order which ultimately leads to the final order.  It was further held, that in fact, the person aggrieved by the order notifying the vacancy can be said to have two options available, either to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there by way of a writ petition or to make a statutory challenge after a final order of allotment has been made and if he is aggrieved even thereafter, to approach the High Court.   It was further observed,   that   it   would   really   be   a   case   of   election   of remedies.  11. In   the   present   case,   the   appellant   and   deceased Shabbir Ahmed, rightly, on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of     (supra), had filed a writ Achal Misra petition being Writ Petition No.7 (MS) of 2003, challenging the order of vacancy dated 4.6.2003. The learned single judge of the High Court vide order dated 23.8.2006 after specifically 18 observing and reproducing paragraph 14 of the judgment of this Court in the case of  Achal Misra  (supra) observed thus: “In view of the aforesaid, liberty is given to the petitioner to challenge the order th dated   4   June,   2003   after   the   final order is passed under Section 16 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.” 12. In the light of this, we fail to appreciate, as to how the learned judge of the High Court in the impugned order, could have made observations in paragraph 11 thereof.  The learned Judge goes to observe, that after dismissal of the writ petition there was no occasion for the said High Court to grant liberty to the respondents to avail remedy of revision challenging the order of vacancy dated 4.6.2003. It appears, that the learned judge has missed the last line in the order of the High Court dated 23.8.2006, which reads thus: “Subject   to   aforesaid,   writ   petition   is dismissed.” 13. The learned single Judge of the High Court has also failed   to   take   into   consideration   that   in   the   order   dated 23.8.2006   itself,   the   learned   judge   while   disposing   of   the earlier writ petition had referred to the law laid down by this 19 Court   in   the   case   of   Achal   Misra   (supra),   wherein   it   is specifically held, that even if a party does not challenge the vacancy order by way of writ petition, it is still open to it to challenge the same order along with the final order passed under Section 16 in the revision under Section 18.  However, the learned Judge, in the impugned judgment, has not even referred to the judgment of this Court in the case of   Achal  (supra), a relevant part of which has been reproduced Misra in the earlier order of the said High Court dated 23.8.2006.   14. In   the   present   case,   though   the   appellant   and deceased Shabbir Ahmed could have waited till passing of the final order under Section 16, they had in fact challenged the vacancy order before the High Court in a writ petition. The High Court had specifically granted them liberty to challenge the vacancy order along with the final order in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of   Achal Misra  (supra) vide order dated 23.8.2006.  The learned single judge of the High Court, in the impugned judgment, while holding that the revision is not tenable under Section 18 of the Act, places 20 reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of 4 Narayani Devi  vs.  Mahendra Kr. Tripathi and others .  It is   to   be   noticed,   that   the   judgment   on   which   reliance   is placed by the single judge of the High Court is an order of one paragraph rendered by two Judges of this Court.  The learned judge has failed in appreciating the law as laid down by this Court   in   Achal   Misra   (supra),   which   lays   down   ratio decidendi and is a binding precedent, which was very much available   on   the   record   and   a   part   of   which   had   been reproduced   in   the   order   dated   23.8.2006   in   the   earlier proceedings between the same parties.    15. By relying on an order of one paragraph passed by two learned Judges of this Court and ignoring to consider the legal position of law, which is ratio decidendi and a binding precedent as laid down by three learned Judges of this Court in  Achal Misra  (supra), we find, that the learned single judge of the High Court has committed a gross error.   16. We are, therefore, of the considered view, that the High Court has patently erred in holding, that the revision 4 (1999) 9 SCC 61 21 entertained by the District Judge against the vacancy order dated 4.6.2003 along with the final order of release dated 31.5.2007 was not tenable.   The learned judge has totally erred in observing, that the order of the High Court dated 23.8.2006 dismissing the writ petition had attained finality since it was not challenged before this Court.   The learned judge ought to have taken into consideration, that though the vacancy order was challenged in a writ petition, the High Court vide order dated 23.8.2006, while dismissing the writ petition had reserved the right of the petitioners (appellant and proforma respondent No.3 herein) before it to challenge the vacancy order along with the final order passed under Section 16.   The observation of the learned judge, that the High Court in its earlier order dated 23.8.2006, could not have granted liberty to challenge the vacancy order along with the final order is also contrary to the settled principles of judicial propriety.   17. That leaves us to the merits of the matter.  18. It will be relevant to refer to Section 18 of the U.P. Act, 1972. 22

23 Magistrate   shall,   on   an   application being made to him on that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded,   and   may   for   that   purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary”. 19. It could thus be seen, that the earlier right of an appeal   which   was   provided   under   Section   18   had   been substituted by a remedy of revision with the limited grounds of interference.   One of the grounds available is that, the District Magistrate had acted in exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.   20. This Court in the case of   vs.   Sarla Ahuja   United 5 India   Insurance   Company   Ltd.   had   an   occasion   to consider the scope of proviso to Section 25­B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.  This Court found, that though the word ‘revision’ was not employed in the said proviso, from the language used therein, the legislative intent was clear that the   power   conferred   was   revisional   power.     This   Court observed thus: 5 (1998) 8 SCC 119 24 “11.  Learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High Court in the present case has reassessed and   reappraised   the   evidence   afresh   to reach a different finding as though it was exercising   appellate   jurisdiction.   No doubt even while exercising revisional ju­ risdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the lim­ ited   purpose   to   ascertain   whether   the conclusion arrived at by the fact­finding court is wholly unreasonable…..” It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction,   however,   it   was   empowered   to   reappraise   the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact­finding court is wholly unreasonable.   21. Again in the case of   Ram Narain Arora   vs.   Asha 6 , this Court had an occasion to consider Rani and others the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent  Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus: “12.  It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25­B(8) 6 (1999) 1 SCC 141 25 proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examin­ ing the legality or propriety of the pro­ ceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts avail­ able in order to find out whether he had correctly   or   on   a   firm   legal   basis   ap­ proached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but ( sic  if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a   wrong   premise   of   law,   certainly   it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with such a matter…….” It  was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the High Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller,  the High Court could examine the facts available in order, to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case.  It has also been held, that pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but in a given case, if the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with the same. 26 22. In   the   case   of   Harshavardhan   Chokkani   vs. 7 ,   this   Court   had   an Bhupendra   N.   Patel   and   others occasion   to   consider   the   scope   of   revisional   power   under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.  This Court observed thus:  There can be no controversy about “7. the position that the power of the High Court   under   Section   22   of   the   Act   is wider than the power under Section 115 CPC.   Nonetheless,   the   High   Court   is exercising the revisional power which in its   very   nature   is   a   truncated   power. The width of the powers of the revisional court   cannot   be   equated   with   the powers   of   the   appellate   court.   In examining the legality and the propriety of   the   order   under   challenge,   what   is required to be seen by the High Court is whether   it   is   in   violation   of   any statutory   provision   or   a   binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the   evidence   or   omission   to   consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like. It is only in such situations that interference by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be   justified.   Mere   possibility   of   a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power. From the above discussion, it is clear that none of the aforementioned reasons exist in this 7 (2002) 3 SCC 626 27 case to justify interference by the High Court.” 23. This   Court   thus   held,   that   the   interference   in revisional powers would be permitted only if the High Court finds that the order impugned is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the   evidence   or   omission   to   consider   relevant   clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like. 24. Lastly, the Constitution Bench of this court in the case   of   Hindustan   Petroleum   Corporation   Limited   vs. 8   had an occasion to consider the scope of Dilbahar Singh revisional powers as contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The Court observed thus: “ 43.  We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of   fact   recorded   by   the   first   appellate court/first   appellate   authority   because on   reappreciation   of   the   evidence,   its view is different from the court/authority 8 (2014) 9 SCC 78 28 below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revi­ sional   jurisdiction   under   these   Acts   is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any   error   of   law.   A   finding   of   fact recorded   by   court/authority   below,   if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous   that,   if   allowed   to   stand,   it would result in gross miscarriage of jus­ tice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of   its   revisional   jurisdiction   under   the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is en­ titled to satisfy itself as to the correct­ ness or legality or propriety of any deci­ sion or order impugned before it as indi­ cated above. However, to satisfy itself to the   regularity,   correctness,   legality   or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reap­ preciate   or   reassess   the   evidence   for coming to a different finding on facts. Re­ visional   power   is   not   and   cannot   be equated with the power of reconsidera­ tion of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is re­ quired to be satisfied that the decision is according   to   law,   it   may   examine whether   the   order   impugned   before   it 29 suffers from procedural illegality or irreg­ ularity.” It can thus be seen, that the Constitution Bench has settled the position, that the revisional power does not entitle the   High   Court   to   interfere   with   the   finding   of   the   fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from   the   court/authority   below.   The   consideration   or examination   of   the   evidence   is   confined  to   find   out  as to whether the finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. It has been held, that a finding of fact recorded by court/authority   below,   if   perverse   or   has   been   arrived   at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, in such a case, it is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law.  30 25. No   doubt,   that   the   observations   in   the   aforesaid cases deal with the revisional powers to be exercised by the High   Court  under   the   special   statute.   This   Court   has observed, that in examining the legality and the propriety of the order under challenge in revision, what is required to be seen by the  High Court,  is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence  or where the  inference drawn  from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like.  It has been held, that if such a finding is allowed to stand , it would be gross miscarriage of justice and is open to   correction  because   it   is   not  to  be   treated   as   a  finding according to law.    26. The   revisional   powers   conferred   upon   the   District Judge under the U.P. Act, 1972 are almost analogous with the   revisional   powers   of   the   High   Court   that   have   been interpreted by this Court in the aforesaid judgments.     We find, that the said principles can be aptly made applicable to the revisional powers of the District Judge under the U.P. Act, 31 1972.   If the said principles are applied to the facts of the present case, it could be seen, that the learned District Judge was fully justified in interfering with the order passed by the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer.   27. It will be relevant to reproduce a part of the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge while allowing the revision filed by the present appellant and late Shabbir Ahmed.   “The   law   on   the   point   is   very   clear. Hon’ble Supreme Court in ARC 1995(1) 220   Harish   Tandon   Vs.   A.D.M. Allahabad   has   defined   the   scope   of Section 12(1)(b) – Deemed vacancy.  The Hon’ble Court  has held that the words “allowed” and “occupy” are significant. The extract of Head Note ‘D’ (para 18) of the   judgment   is   reproduced   below   for ready reference.  “Sub­Section   (1)(b)   of   Section   12   says that a landlord or tenant of a building shall   be   deemed   to   have   ceased   to occupy the building or a part thereof if he has allowed it to be occupied by any person   who   is   not   a   member   of   his family. The   words   ‘allowed’   and   ‘occupy’   are significant.  The landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building only if he has allowed it to be occupied by 32 any person who is not a member of his family.     The   words   “allowed   to   be occupied” indicate that the possession of   such   building   has   been   given   to   a person   who   is   not   a   member   of   the family.   It shall not be attracted when any person who is not a member of the family   resides   in   such   building   either along   with   landlord   or   the   original tenant.     If   the  landlord  or  the   tenant allows any person, who is not a member of the family within the meaning of the Act   to   occupy   the   premises,   with   the object   that   such   person   shall   occupy such premises in his own rights, in that event,   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of Section 12 shall be attracted? Averting   to   the   facts   and circumstances of the present case, the inspection note on the file is important. The R.C.I. made surprise inspection on 15­8­1999   and   found   Shabir   Ahmed, Smt. Shafikan, Naseema, Shabnam and Nasim present in the premises.   It was also told to him that Rashid Ahmed has gone to his village.   It is also noted in the   inspection   note   that   in   the   given premises, Sri Rashid himself, Sri Inam, s/o   Rashid   along   with   his   wife   and children, Sri Shabir Ahmed along with his   wife   Smt.   Shafikan,   daughter   and Sri   Ayub,   Naseema   and   Nasim   were residing in the property.  It is worthy to note that Sri Inam is the son of Rashid who   is   said   to   be   the   tenant   even according   to   landlord.       The   persons named   in   the   inspection   report   are either   the   family   members   of   tenant 33 Rashid   or   the   family   members   of   his brother Akbar.   Admittedly except the family member of Rashid or Akbar no other person was found residing in the property   in   question.     In   this perspective,   the   factum   of   deemed vacancy   is   to   be   seen.     The  Hon’ble Supreme Court  in so many words has held   that   the   words   “allowed   to   be occupied” indicate that the possession of   such   building   has   been   given   to   a person who is not a family member of the   tenant.   It   shall   not   be   attracted when any person who is not a member of family of the tenant reside in such building   either   along   with   landlord   or the original tenant meaning thereby if any   person   other   than   the   family member occupies such premises in his own right, in that event, clause (b) of sub­section   (1)  of   Section   12   shall   be attracted   and   not   otherwise.     Here   in the present case even according to spot inspection, the family member of Rashid who was the original tenant was found residing   therein.     The   other   members even if not their family members were found   residing   along   with   the   family members of the original tenant and not in their own exclusive right.  Therefore, the   vacancy   could   not   have   been declared in such eventuality.” 28. It could be seen, from the judgment and order of the District Judge, that the District Judge has considered the words “allowed to be occupied” in Section 12 of the U.P. Act, 34 1972   as   interpreted   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Harish vs.   Tandon   Addl.   District   Magistrate,   Allahabad,   U.P. 9 and others .    This Court in   Harish Tandon   (supra), while construing the words “allowed to be occupied” as appearing in Section 12 of the U.P. Act, 1972, had clearly held, that the said words would be attracted if the possession of such a building had been given to a person, who was not family member of the tenant i.e. if any person other than the family member was permitted to occupy such premises in his own right.     In   such   an   event,   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of Section 12, would be attracted.   This Court had further held, that clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 12 would not be attracted when any person, who is a member of the family resides in such building either along with the landlord or the original tenant.  29. A perusal of the inspection report clearly established, that the original tenant was residing in the tenanted premises along with his son, brother’s son and their families.  As such, the inspection report clearly established, that no person who 9 (1995) 1 SCC 537 35 was   not   a   member   of   the   tenant’s   family   was   allowed   to occupy the premises in his own right.  As such, the finding of the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer that the landlord had proved the case under clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 12 of the U.P. Act, 1972 was totally contrary to the law as interpreted   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Harish   Tandon (supra). Not only that, the finding as recorded by the said authority   was   totally   on   misreading   or   ignorance   of   the evidence on the record.  It could thus be seen, that the case would   squarely   fall   in   the   category   of   exercising   the jurisdiction  either illegally or with material irregularity.   In that view of the matter, the learned District Judge was wholly justified in interfering with the order impugned before him and reversing the same.        30. Though the District Judge as well as the High Court has also gone on the issue of Section 14, we do not propose to go into the said aspect of the matter, inasmuch as, we find, that   the   present   appeal   deserves   to   be   allowed   on   the aforesaid grounds.   36 31. We find, that the learned single judge of the High Court has also erred in interfering with the well­reasoned order passed by the learned District Judge while exercising the  jurisdiction  of the  High Court  under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.   32. It is a well settled principle of law, that in the guise of exercising  jurisdiction  under Article 227 of the  Constitution of India, the High Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal.   It   is   equally   well   settled,   that   the   supervisory jurisdiction  extends   to   keeping   the   subordinate   tribunals within the limits of their authority and seeing that they obey the law.   It has been held, that though the powers under Article 227 are wide, they must be exercised sparingly and only to keep  subordinate courts  and  Tribunals within the bounds  of   their  authority  and   not  to  correct  mere   errors. Reliance   in   this   respect   can   be   placed   on   a   catena   of judgments of this Court including the ones in  Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde & Ors.  vs.  Millikarjun Bhavanappa 10 vs.   Tirumale , Bathutmal Raichand Oswal   Laxmibai R. 10 (1960) 1 SCR 890 37 11 Tarta & Anr. ,  M/s India Pipe Fitting Co . vs.  Fakruddin 12  v.  M. A. Baker & Anr. , Ganpat Ladha Sashikant Vishnu 13 Shinde , Mrs. Labhkuwar Bhagwani Shaha & Ors.   vs. 14 Janardhan Mahadeo Kalan & Anr. , Chandavarkar Sita 15   vs.   Ratna Rao Ashalata S. Guram , Venkatlal G. Pittie 16 and   another   vs.   Bright   Bros   (Pvt.)   Ltd . ,   State   of 17  vs.  Maharashtra Milind & Ors. , State Through Special Cell, New Delhi  vs.  Navjot Sandhu Alias Afshan Guru and 18 19 ,     vs.   ,   others Ranjeet   Singh Ravi   Prakash Shamshad Ahmad & Ors.   vs.   Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) Through 20 ,  LRs. and others Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms.) and others 21 vs.  Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and others .   33. In the present case, we are of the considered view, that   the   approach   of   the   High   Court   in   exercising   the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was 11 (1975) 1 SCC 858 12 (1977) 4 SCC 587 13 (1978) 2 SCC 573 14 (1982) 3 SCC 514 15 (1986) 4 SCC 447 16 (1987) 3 SCC558 17 (2001) 1 SCC 4 18 (2003) 6 SCC 641 19 (2004) 3 SCC 682 20 (2008) 9 SCC 1 21 (2010) 1 SCC 217 38 totally erroneous.  The learned District Judge while exercising his power under Section 18 of the U.P. Act, 1972 and after finding   that   the   order   passed   by   the   Rent   Controller   and Eviction Officer was totally contrary to the law laid down by this   Court   in     (supra),   while   interpreting Harish   Tandon clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 12 of the U.P. Act, 1972 and also that the order passed was totally on a perverse reading of the evidence, had interfered with the said order and   reversed   the   same.     The   High   Court   totally misinterpreting the order passed by the earlier learned judge in Writ Petition No.7(MS) of 2003 dated 23.8.2006, on an erroneous premise, held that the vacancy order could not have been challenged along with the final order. The finding is totally contrary to the law laid down by the bench of three learned   judges   of   this   Court   in     (supra),   a Achal   Misra relevant part of which was reproduced by the High Court in its earlier order dated 23.8.2006.  The learned judge ignoring Achal Misra  (supra), which is a binding precedent, relies on an order of one paragraph of the two learned judges of this 39 Court while holding that the revision was not maintainable. We, therefore, are of the considered view, that the exercise of jurisdiction  by   the  High   Court  under   Article   227   in   the present case was patently unwarranted and unjustified.  34. In the result, the appeal is allowed.  The order of the High   Court   dated  26.10.2017  is   quashed   and   set   aside. There shall be no order as to costs.        ......................J.                                                        [NAVIN SINHA] ......................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; JUNE 26, 2020